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SUMMARY
George MacDonald is a nineteenth-century Scottish writer. Yasunari Kawabata is a 
twentieth-centuiy Japanese writer. This immediate disparity, coupled with their shared 
biological maleness, serves to make the authors’ writings potentially fruitful for the 
infemination reading. This strategy, the infemination reading, simply, considers a male 
writer’s negative constructions/conceptualisations of femininity.
In my introductory Tnformulations’ I define the infemination theorem, contextualising it as a 
derivative of the ‘French feminist drawing on deconstruction’ project. Here, I also outline 
my intention to consider the textual objects of analysis as autonomous, decontextualised 
entities.
Following this, focus shifts from the theoretical text of infemination to the fictional texts 
(especially Lilith and Phantastes) of MacDonald. His specific infeminatory 
‘(Di)Visions/Perversions of the feminine’ are bisected as ‘GynoScapes’ (Chapter One) and 
‘GynEscapes’ (Chapter Two). The former images a psychoanalytic penetration of ‘infant’ 
(infeminator) into the textual bodyscape of the ‘mother’. The latter signifies literally ‘an 
escape from the womb’, and here penetrative desire becomes penetrative anxiety so that the 
infeminator endeavours to evade (re)union with her body.
Kawabata’s particular ‘(Di)Visions/Revisions of the feminine’ are deemed ‘HIStory’ and 
‘HERstory’. These chapters share a concern with themes of language and silence. According 
to ‘HIStory’ (Chapter Three), man constructs woman in the silence-inducing language of 
patriarchy. According to ‘HERstory’ (Chapter Four), woman strives to reclaim self­
vocalisation. Infemination is explored through several of Kawabata’s texts, with a primaiy 
focus upon his Beauty and Sadness and ‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’.
My separate analyses of MacDonald and Kawabata conclude with an ‘atonement’, an ‘At- 
One-Ment’, where the authors are united and their texts demonstrated explicitly as sharing 
common infeminatory desires.
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INTRODUCTION: Informulations
1 Antitheses
George MacDonald (1824-1905) and Yasunari Kawabata1 (1899-1972) write a shared text. 
Although spatially, temporally, and linguistically separated, with paths never literally 
destined to cross, and connected seemingly only (biologically and literarily) through their 
male-sexed authorship, they might yet be considered connected due to a common process of 
infemination}  It is, indeed, their complete absence of consciousness regarding each other 
that serves to make their writings (the former’s Lilith and Phantastes; the latter’s Beauty and 
Sadness and ‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’)3 particularly useful for illuminating this mode 
of reading representations of gender. I aim to interrogate synchronically the textual systems 
of these distanced, differentiated and decontextualised writers in order to reveal their shared 
representational processes; to identify the possibility of a masculine unconscious that 
conceptualises the ‘feminine’ beyond the boundaries of history, culture, genre, and language 
systems. MacDonald and Kawabata, separated at least superficially (a nineteenth-century, 
English-language writer; a twentieth-centuiy, Japanese-language writer), shall be shown as 
participating in a common fantasy of femininity. Kawabata’s writings, although occupying a 
different cultural and linguistic system from MacDonald’s, shall be revealed as (apparently) 
‘belatedly MacDonaldian’; MacDonald’s writings, similarly, as (apparently) ‘prematurely 
Kawabatan’.4 Either way, their dissimilarities (spatial, temporal, linguistic separation) and 
similarities (shared representational tropes about the feminine) might be shown together to 
raise pertinent questions about the nature of masculine projection.
My commitment to undertake a gender study of MacDonald’s and Kawabata’s writings is 
informed by several (often interconnected; often apparently conflictual) critical traditions. I 
shall commence by delineating the criticisms which appeal to my conceptualisation of an 
infemination reading, and shall consider the conceivable merits and shortcomings specific 
models present for its definition. Following my exploration of a range of accounts of gender
and textual production, I shall adopt aspects of these models of authorship and representation 
for my ‘Infemination’ paradigm, which I explore as a new model of interpretation.
2 Engenderings
‘Feminism’, as a singular term suggesting a unified concept, is inaccurate. It should indeed 
be considered plural; as describing a multitude of idea-groupings (that are often 
contradictory) based around a common interest in sexual/gender inequality. Rosalind Delmar 
describes a “sclerosis of the [feminist] movement”, resulting from the multiplicity of 
feminisms, which means that factions “have become separated from and hardened against 
each other”, forming numerous groups “each...with its own carefully preserved sense of 
identity” and belief in its ‘rightness’ (Delmar, 1994: 6). Feminists are especially divided in 
terms of the equality-difference debate, some arguing that women should strive to attain 
‘sameness’ (equality) with men, and others claiming they should promote and valorise their 
differences from men (interpreting their exclusion from the patriarchal symbolic as a 
politicised resistance). Furthermore, poststructuralist feminists argue that the binary division 
between the poles of equality and difference should be deconstructed.5
In spite of their differing perspectives, however, feminisms might be demonstrated as 
having -  at least, to an extent -  shared origins. Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex 
(1949), a ‘cusp text’ positioned between the first and second ‘waves’ of feminism, might be 
understood as the common basis for later conflicting factions of feminism. In The Second 
Sex, de Beauvoir describes woman’s biological, social, psychological and 
historical/mythological subordination to man, which causes her to be socially resigned to a 
‘second position’, to the status of other. De Beauvoir argues that “[t]he terms masculine and 
feminine are used symmetrically only as a matter of form”6 (de Beauvoir, 1972: 15), 
continuing that “humanity is male and man defines woman not in herself but as relative to 
him; she is not regarded as an autonomous being.. .He is the Subject, he is the Absolute -  she 
is the Other” (16). De Beauvoir, in this way, makes the distinction between biological sex
3and social gender. In her famous dictum -  her notion of ‘becoming’ a woman -  she argues 
that women’s inferiority is created socially and not biologically; that, although birth grants 
femaleness (de Beauvoir does not deny the ‘reality’ of sexual difference), femininity is a 
socio-historical construct.
De Beauvoir’s notion that woman’s oppression lies in her being culturally constructed as a 
negative Other to a positive male norm provided a basis for much of the ‘second wave’ 
feminist writings of the 1970s. Whilst influencing Anglo-American feminists (Elaine 
Showalter, for example, shares de Beauvoir’s rejection of male-dominated theories such as 
Marxism and psychoanalysis), she also inspired their ‘French’ ‘opponents’.7 The writings of 
French feminists followed on from de Beauvoir’s description of woman as ‘man’s Other’ 
(“Like de Beauvoir, French feminists believe that feminine language is repressed -  is itself 
the ‘Other’ of social and cultural speech” [Humm, 1994: 94]). Helene Cixous has focused on 
the very nature of othering, inherent in (phallogocentric) binary opposition, whilst Luce 
Irigaray has sought to reconceptualise otherness as a potent and advantageous condition. As 
Rosemarie Tong puts it, “[t]he condition of otherness enables women to stand back and 
criticize the norms, values and practices that the dominant culture (patriarchy) seeks to 
impose on everyone, including those who live on its periphery -  in this case, women. Thus, 
otherness, for all of its associations with oppression and inferiority, is much more than an 
oppressed, inferior condition. It is also a way of being, thinking, and speaking allowing for 
openness, plurality, diversity, and difference” (Tong, 1998: 195).
Although derived from a common source -  the implications of which I shall return to -  
distinctions between Anglo-American and French feminist positions should be delineated. 
This division (a division that generates feminisms) is described in Toril Moi’s Sexual/Textual 
Politics (1985). Moi attacks Anglo-American feminist criticism on the basis of its 
empiricism. ‘Images of Women’ feminist literary criticism of the 1970s, which chastised 
nineteenth- and twentieth-centuiy authors of both sexes for portraying ‘unreal’ female 
characters (and especially women writers who ‘betray’ their own sex in such writings), is
4“essentially concerned with nurturing personal growth and raising the individual 
consciousness by linking literature to life, particularly to the lived experience of the reader” 
(Moi, 1985: 43). ‘Images Of Women* criticism makes the assumption “that art can and 
should reflect life accurately and inclusively in every detail” (Moi, 1985: 45), whilst 
“fail[ing] to consider the proposition that the real is not only something we construct, but a 
controversial construct at that” (Moi, 1985: 45). Likewise, Catherine Belsey attacks 
‘expressive realism* (the empiricist-idealist notion that art should be “mimetic and 
expressive” [Belsey, 1980: 9]) in Critical Practice. Belsey argues that
[t]he claim that a literaiy form reflects the world is simply tautological. If by ‘the 
world’ we understand the world we experience, the world differentiated by language, 
then the claim that realism reflects the world means that realism reflects the world 
constructed in language. This is a tautology. If discourses articulate concepts through 
a system of signs which signify by means of their relationship to each other rather 
than to entities in the world, and if literature is a signifying practice, all it can reflect 
is the order inscribed in particular discourse, not the nature of the world. (Belsey, 
1980: 46)
Moi also points out a tension between two competing and self-cancelling desires that 
haunts Anglo-American feminist literary criticism: “the demand for realism clashes with 
[a]... demand for the representation of female role models in literature” (Moi, 1985: 47). The 
portrayal of strong, free women might fulfil the latter criterion, however, the ‘authenticity’ of 
such a portrayal is questionable.
‘Images of Women’ criticism was succeeded in the late 1970s by an interest in exclusively 
female writers (supported by studies such as Elaine Showalter’s A Literature o f their Own, 
Ellen Moers’ Literary Women, and Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s Madwoman in the 
Attic). Showalter proposed a distinction between two forms of feminist criticism; between 
the notions of woman as reader (studying male writings) and woman as writer (studying 
female writings). Moi criticises Showalter’s biased (even anti-deconstructionist) treatment of 
these categories, claiming that her division is hierarchised: that the former category is eyed 
with “suspicio[n]” (Moi, 1985:75), whilst the latter encourages “sympathetic, identity- 
seeking” (Moi, 1985: 75) treatment. Male writings are treated with hostility; even critical
5theory, perceived as a male preserve (belonging to the perceived enemy, the “white fathers” 
[Showalter, cited in Moi, 1985: 205]) is rejected. Moi indicates Showalter’s perception of the 
(male) poststructuralist theorist as the enemy of feminism; the enemy from whom the 
feminist (presumed female) must escape in order to forge for herself a theory, a voice: A 
literature of her own. Finally, Moi accuses Showalter of replacing androcentrism with 
gynocentrism, arguing that ‘Gynocritics’ (the study of writings by women)8 encourages 
rather than challenges/subverts (patriarchal) humanist practices of reading.
In contrast with Anglo-American feminists, French feminists (a term which, for the 
purposes of my study shall largely refer to the writings of Helene Cixous, Julia Kristeva and 
Luce Irigaray) are influenced by Lacanian psychoanalysis and Derridean deconstruction, and 
the arguments of both Lacan and Derrida that language excludes the feminine from it. (For 
Lacan, briefly, females are unable to entirely resolve the Oedipal complex due to a 
‘deficiency’ in their anatomy, and they are thereby excluded from the symbolic order; for 
Derrida, the symbolic order is logocentric, phallocentric and dualised, privileging speech, the 
phallus, presence, the masculine). This immediately distinguishes them from Anglo- 
American feminists with their aversion to ‘male’ theory and their belief in the female 
theorist’s betrayal of the feminist cause.
Arleen Dallery contrasts the perspectives of Anglo-American feminists and French 
feminists on female sexuality, arguing that the former seek to locate “a real, reified female 
sexuality, whereas... [the latter] see sexual difference constituting itself discursively through 
inscribed meanings” (Dallery, 1994: 288). Whilst Anglo-American feminists stress “the 
empirical, the irreducible reality of woman’s experience”, French feminists focus on “the 
primacy of discourse... without which there is no experience” (Dalleiy, 1994: 288).
American feminism (or Women’s Studies) originated, as I have suggested, in order to 
confront a perceived androcentrism in the discourses of Western thought, holding that 
women’s experiences and voices were conspicuously absent (Dallery, 1994: 288-9). French 
feminism also is concerned with absence, but of the repressed/misrepresented feminine. 
French feminists have critiqued the hierarchies inherent (as Derrida indicates) in binary
oppositions, which provide a basis for the domination of the masculine concept over the 
feminine.
Cixous’ ecriture feminine and Irigaray’s parler-femme were suggested as forms of writing 
that could subvert these oppressive binarisms; as ways in which the repressed feminine could 
be excavated from its position of conceptual subordination. However, this has led to 
accusations of essentialism. Moi, for example, criticises Cixous for purporting “a vision of 
woman’s writing [a body-writing associated with white ink/breast milk] steeped in the very 
metaphysics of presence she claims she is out to unmask” (Moi, 1985: 110).9 Cixous’ 
essentialism, Moi argues, is evident in her distinguishing between the ‘masculine’ realm of 
the proper and the ‘feminine’ realm of the gift, which come to be further associated with 
male and female bodies.10 Likewise, Helene Wenzel argues that Cixous’ writing “perpetuates 
and recreates long-held stereotypes and myths about woman as natural, sexual, biological, 
and corporeal by celebrating essences” (Wenzel, 1981: 272). Similarly, Monique Wittig 
claims that ecriture feminine succumbs to “the myth of woman”; the myth that “woman is 
wonderful” (Wittig, 1984: 150). Moi asserts that Cixous’ conceptualisation of women as 
“mythological archetypes” (Moi, 1985: 123), and her desire to “appropriate imagination and 
the pleasure principle for women” constitute acts of patriarchal obedience: “[P]atriarchy, not 
feminism, insists on labelling women as emotional, intuitive and imaginative, whilst 
retaining rationality for men” (Moi, 1985: 123). Additionally, de Beauvoir rejected notions 
of ‘writing the body’ for its constituting a cultism of the material, seeking to evade the trap 
of essentialism/biological reductionism which she believed will inevitably follow the 
“construction of a counter-penis” (De Beauvoir in Simons and Benjamin, 1979: 342, 
emphasis in original).
Arleen Dallery defends ecriture feminine from such claims of essentialism, pointing out 
that, for example, de Beauvoir “neglects to note, along with other critics, that woman’s body 
is always mediated by language; the human body is a text, a sign, not just a piece of fleshy 
matter” (Dallery, 1994: 289).11 Dallery also suggests that de Beauvoir fails to acknowledge
the origins of ecriture feminine -  its being “a response to Lacanian psychoanalysis that 
claims sexual differences cannot be reduced to biology because woman’s body is constituted 
through phallic symbolization” (Dalleiy, 1994: 289-90). What French feminism does, 
Dallery argues, is “[deconstruct] the phallic organization of sexuality and its code, which 
positions woman’s sexuality and signified body as a mirror or complement to male sexual 
identity” (Dalleiy, 1994: 290).
I would argue that, although accused of essentialism, Cixous -  from whose writings I 
intend to borrow most -  remains ambivalent about connecting femininity with biological 
femaleness, and that her use of terms such as ‘man’ and ‘woman’ should perhaps be read not 
as assertions of biology but as concept-metaphors.12 Cixous is also anti-essentialist insofar as 
her writings are influenced by deconstruction. (Indeed, according to Maggie Humm, not only 
Cixous but Irigaray and Kristeva “are deconstructionists in the sens6 that they believe that 
systems of language are systems of power built on internal contradictions which can be 
sought out and deconstructed or taken apart. By focusing on the processes of language, 
particularly on the acquisition of language by the infant, French feminists aim to deconstruct 
patriarchal discourses” [Humm, 1994: 93-4]). Cixous’ effort to locate a positive 
representation offemininity in ecriture feminine evidences her anti-essentialist affinity with 
deconstruction, as it refers to the destabilising of hierarchised constructs.13 This might be 
distinguished from her additional desire (a desire which aligns her with feminism as a
political movement) to identify ecriture feminine with women’s writing: a writing to be
i
conducted by biological females in order to subvert ‘masculine’ symbolic language.14
The connection between deconstruction and feminism is perhaps most evident in the 
writings of Cixous. In ‘Sorties’, Cixous’ “whole theoretical project can in one sense be 
summed up as the effort to undo [the] logocentric ideology [of patriarchal binary thought]: 
to... hail the advent of a new, feminine language that ceaselessly subverts these patriarchal 
binary schemes where logocentrism colludes with phallocentrism in an effort to oppress and 
silence women” (Moi, 1985: 105). Cixous argues that “[t]hought has always worked through 
opposition” (Cixous, 1986: 63), qualifies such opposition as “hierarchical” (1986: 64), and
expresses the intention “to question [the] solidarity between logocentrism and 
phallocentrism” (1986: 65).15 Cixous’ concept of ecriture feminine postulates that feminine 
texts “struggle to undermine the dominant phallogocentric logic, split open the closure of the 
binary opposition and revel in the pleasures of open-ended textuality” (Moi, 1985: 108); 
such texts, which “work on the difference” (Cixous, 1977: 480), might be identified with 
Derrida’s notion of writing as differcmce}6 Cixous also expresses an affinity with 
deconstruction in the ‘The Laugh of the Medusa’, where she conceptualises an other 
bisexuality;17 a bisexuality which dissolves the binary opposition of male masculinity and 
female femininity -  not by demanding a neutralising fusion, but by permitting their co­
existence.18
Whilst Anglo-American feminists, then, are positivist (holding reality as fixed and capable 
of being directly observed), French feminists, with their focus on representations of gender 
rather than on gender itself, are constructivist (arguing that reality is constructed). French 
feminists believe that this creation/construction occurs through language; that “[l]anguage 
inevitably structures one’s own experience of reality as well as the experience of those to 
whom one communicates” (Hare-Mustin and Marecek, 1994: 51). Deconstruction like 
constructivism denies the notion of a single fixed reality, believing that texts have a 
plurisignificance that is not only evident in the present language but is to be located in what 
is unsaid.
In addition to French feminists, the gender theorist Judith Butler19 utilises a deconstructive 
approach in order to contest the binarisms implicated in gander. Again, like French 
feminists, Butler is influenced by de Beauvoir, who did “not assume that there is something 
like maleness or femaleness prior to the existence and relation of concrete men and women” 
(Colebrook, 2004: 4). Butler conceptualises the ‘becoming’, asserted in de Beauvoir’s 
dictum, as an ongoing process, rather than as a single and finite event. She claims that 
cultural norms, which define what it is to ‘be’ masculine or feminine, exert their influence 
over one’s ‘gender-becoming’. Gender, then, depends on one’s repeated performance of acts
in accordance with these laws: “If there is something right in Beauvoir’s claim that one is not 
bom, but rather becomes a woman, it follows that woman itself is a term in process, a 
becoming, a constructing that cannot rightfully be said to originate or to end. As an ongoing 
discursive practice, it is open to intervention and resignification...It is, for Beauvoir, never 
possible finally to become a woman, as if there was a telos that governs the process of 
acculturation and construction” (Butler, 1990: 33).
Butler’s affinity with French feminists is also evinced in the criticism levelled at both -  
Butler is critiqued for reducing feminism to a debate over gender representation, accused of 
diminishing gender into discourse.20 Where she parts company with French feminists, 
however, is on the matter of essentialism -  a common criticism of Cixous’, Irigaray’s and 
Kristeva’s writings. As Naomi Schor indicates, by way of outlining the history of 
essentialism in feminist studies, anti-essentialism was an issue in the conflict between 
Beauvoirian ‘equality feminists’ and the newer French ‘difference feminists’.21 Butler re-
conceptualises gender as a fluid variable, so that identity is not connected to an ‘essence’.
/
Butler disputes the account of gender as ‘natural’, arguing instead that it is cultural and 
constructed22 -  to the extent that it can be conceptualised as a “choice” (Butler, 1987: 128-9): 
“To choose a gender is to interpret received gender norms in a way that organizes them 
anew. Less a radical act of creation, gender is a tacit project to renew one’s cultural history 
in one’s own terms. This is not a prescriptive task we must endeavor to do, but one in which 
we have been endeavoring all along” (Butler, 1987: 131). Butler’s specific version of anti- 
essentialist gender theory postulates that all configurations of sex and gender are 
performances, a stance informed by Joan Riviere’s ‘Womanliness as Masquerade’ (1929).23 
This undermines the very notion of an essential masculine or feminine subject. Butler’s 
central contention in Gender Trouble is that “[gjender is the repeated stylisation of the body, 
a set of repeated acts within a rigid regulatory frame which congeal over time to produce the 
appearance of substance, of a ‘natural’ kind of being” (Butler, 1990: 33). Butler deconstructs 
the sex-gender binary, denying that there is. or can be a ‘natural body’ outside of social 
existence -  and it is on this point that she and essentialist feminists can be understood as
diverging.24
3 Positionings
For the purpose of situating ‘Infemination’ critically, I consider the legacy (and ongoing 
concerns), as outlined above, of feminist debate. I consider the Anglo-American feminist 
argument of the necessity of emphasising experience; their focusing on the social reality of 
male dominance, female oppression, as well as on the (arguably idealised) ‘positive 
experience’ of matrilinearity and sisterhood. These feminists, as I have suggested, have 
focused specifically on maleness and femaleness -  the men who write women; the women 
who write women in an effort to reclaim their supposedly male-denied voice. I also consider 
the opposing stance of French feminists and ‘queer theorists’, who, grounded in 
poststructuralist theory, have been concerned with representations of inequality. These 
believe that “femininity [i]s a theoretical area which represents all that is marginalized within 
the dominant patriarchal order, and is thus a term which describes a position which can be 
occupied by any peripheral subject, be they male or female” (Gamble, 2001:230).
Both feminisms, as I have delineated, have been subjected to criticism -  and often for the 
same reasons. Anglo-American feminists, for example, are taken to task about their 
occupation of the ‘wrong’ stance (evident in their pursuit of equality) in the equality- 
difference debate;25 French feminists, inversely, for their championing difference over 
equality. Both feminisms, additionally, are accused of essentialism, the assertion that gender 
is biologically determined, and of failing to distinguish between women as biological and 
social entities.26
In my conceptualisation of infemination I retain aspects of both perspectives, which is 
perhaps inevitable if it is to be understood that these positions are not as clearly polarised as 
they might initially appear. In my definition of the exogenous-androvocal author in Chapter 
Four, I dramatise the author’s becoming part of the ‘Scene of writing’, arguing here that the
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driving force behind representation is masculine projective fantasy (that is, a form of 
authorial ‘expression’).28 ‘HERstory’, its title being a common example of feminist folk- 
etymology, presents the notion of the female that lies beyond masculine representation; the 
female who will not and cannot be written by the infeminating male.29 This would suggest 
my affinity with essentialism -  which might be valorised, after Teresa de Lauretis (1989), 
Diana Fuss (1989) and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1987), as strategic and political. 
However, I also assert an anti-essentialist stance by arguing, for example, that infemination, 
although applied to the writings of MacDonald and Kawabata, is not necessarily applicable 
to all male writers. The assertion otherwise would, for one thing, be to commit the 
misandristic offence of conferring an individuality-suppressing, diversity-opposing ‘eternal 
sameness’ upon the male.30 Of course, I intend to compare MacDonald’s writings with 
Kawabata’s, highlighting their similar constructions of femininity. But it remains the 
(decontextualised) texts and not the males themselves who are central to my reading. This 
permits me to acknowledge the fact that the authors exist outside of the text as literal, ‘real’ 
biological human beings, and act presumably idiosyncratically and uniquely (in ways that 
might conflict with or confirm their infeminative textual representations) towards the 
feminine, whilst considering an additional reconceptualisation of them in relation to the text: 
as infemination authors. Infemination is not, therefore, claimed as locatable in/applicable to 
all male writing. Nevertheless, I would maintain that the broader category of gender will 
inform all that is written, all that can be written, and is evident even in what we fail/refuse to 
write. (This applies, of course, not only to male writers but also to female ones, who 
consciously and/or unconsciously dis/engage with gender).
Although demonstrating varying degrees of commitment to ‘both’ positions, therefore, I 
would locate my conceptualisation of infemination most firmly with French feminism. 
Affiliation should not, however, be confused with complete identification. My approach 
retains points of divergence from French feminist criticism in several areas. The writings of 
Kristeva might usefully be invoked in order to demonstrate this tension.
Kristeva, as I have described,31 “considers the avant-garde the revolutionaries of
representation” (Grosz, 1989: 59); as proponents of a movement that functions as “a catalyst 
of social upheavals through its capacity to induce crises of representation, expressing and
32liberating the otherwise unarticulated jouissance of the semiotic” (Grosz, 1989: 55).
Kristeva does not, however, “accord the feminine, or women, the subversive position of the 
avant-garde” (Grosz, 1989: 68),33 but associates it with male writers -  such as Artaud, 
Mallarme and Joyce.34 Thus, whilst the feminine semiotic challenges the symbolic, it does so 
most effectively in male writings.
Kristeva’s claim, then, is that feminine (that is, writing that might be identified with 
the maternal semiotic) male writing would be more politically potent than ‘feminine’ female 
writing. As Tong describes it, “[c]ulture is more upset when a man speaks like a woman than 
when a woman speaks like a man” (Tong, 1998: 205).35 In this way, Kristeva appears to 
privilege the male writing of femininity, undermining Cixous’ notion of ecriture feminine as 
a means by which females might write themselves deconstructively out of the hierarchic 
binarism that positions them as Other. Ecriture feminine comes to be conceptualised as an 
‘own goal’, providing merely more words for men -  metaphorically snatched, ironically, 
from the mouths of women. If the profit incurred by male writers of femininity exceeds that 
of female writers, what, then, remains for women to write? As Tong rightly asserts, men 
speaking like women is disruptive to patriarchal order, whilst women speaking like men 
presumably participate in nothing more than a fantasy of inclusion in the masculine 
symbolic. However, the notion of women speaking like men does not constitute feminine 
female Writing, as Tong suggests -  but indicates, rather, a performance of masculinity. 
Cixous would perhaps modify Tong’s statement to argue that culture, although perhaps 
largely unaffected by a woman speaking like a man, is affected by not only a man speaking 
like a woman but by a woman speaking (via ecriture feminine) like a woman.
In spite of such differences regarding the political potential of feminine writing, French 
feminists agree on its availability to both male and female writers. French feminism includes 
male-authored writing in the concept of ecriture feminine. My approach, however, excludes
all but male writers, suggesting -  to a degree -  my association with Kristeva, who also 
appears to express a desire for female exclusion from the scene of writing. Nevertheless, 
whilst Kristeva argues that males are, in a sense, better writers of femininity than are women, 
I take an opposing stance: critiquing the oppression of the feminine concept in the writings 
of MacDonald and Kawabata. (My ‘mourning’ of this loss of the feminine is evident where I 
resurrect the concept in my ‘HERstory’ chapter, demonstrating how the text rebels against its 
author; how the feminine is located, after all, in the male-authored text).
Infemination, as a novel theoretical paradigm, comes to be important to my critical 
analysis of the texts because of the insufficiency of existing models -  such as a French 
feminist reading which draws on deconstruction -  to address my specific textual and 
analytical concerns. French feminist criticism identifies the feminine in male and female 
texts. It often valorises male writings that, in Cixous’ words, are (femininely) “complex, 
mobile, open” (Cixous, 1986: 84). It often empowers female writings with the ability to 
conceptually overthrow (or at least challenge) oppressive binary oppositions. The 
infemination reading considers only male texts, identifying them with masculinity (as 
deconstruction defines it -  that is, as the ‘master’ concept, whose position is ascribed [by 
Western metaphysics] rather than achieved; inherited rather than merited). It concerns itself 
with texts that appear predominantly to support negative representations of femininity, whilst 
conceding that within the same texts femininity might be interpreted as becoming unbound. 
The infemination reading, likewise, is not a manifestation of ‘orthodox’ deconstruction (a 
contradiction in terms), as its sole concern is (representations of) gender. As with 
deconstructive analysis, my text is a reading of other texts. However, in my reading I do not 
strive to estrange myself from feminism -  as does Derrida, who protests that “deconstruction 
is certainly not feminist... (T|f there is one thing it must not come to, it’s feminism” (Derrida, 
1985a: 30, emphasis in original).36 Derrida “invokes woman and femininity as a metaphor 
for a more general and diffuse struggle against identity per se” (Grosz, 1989: 65), but does 
not accord this specific metaphor a privileged status in his quest to subvert binarism.
My desire to conduct a specific reading -  an infemination reading -  of gender
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representations in the texts of MacDonald and Kawabata prevents my entire and dogmatic 
submission to French feminist and deconstructionist theoretical approaches, which provide 
many -  but not all -  of the insights I need. Whilst plundering37 various aspects of existing 
theory debates, then, I conceptualise the infemination reading in order to meet requirements 
unfulfilled elsewhere.
Returning, however, to the shared concerns of my conceptualisation of infemination with 
existing models of interpretation -  which is, of course, my principal aim in ‘Positionings’ - 1 
shall indicate my intention to focus, via the infemination reading, upon (feminine) 
representations as opposed to (female) social reality.38 My infemination reading is an 
investigation of the function of tropes as a feature of textuality and not a projection of the 
author’s psyche. I conceptualise a rhetoric rather than an act of infemination, and read 
representation rather than experience.39 (Consequently, the titular notion of exemplarity is a 
statement of representation, suggesting not that the writings of MacDonald and Kawabata are 
privileged examples of infemination, but that they are merely examples of infemination).
My position on representation is informed by Loma Sage’s argument in her discussion of 
Susanne Kappeler’s The Pornography o f Representation. Kappeler considers the 
implications of representation, arguing that it is premised (pomographically) on “the 
systematic objectification of women in the interest of the exclusive subjectification of men” 
(Kappeler, 1986:103). Kappeler’s “version of women as blameless, as having no part in the 
construction of their world, and of themselves” (Sage, 2001: 230) is, according to Sage, 
challenged by Angela Carter’s reading of Sade. Admittedly, both Kappeler and Carter hold 
“that ‘representation’ in itself is powerfully impure and voyeuristic, and therefore cannot be 
safely distinguished from pornography” (Sage, 2001: 231, emphasis in original). However, 
whereas Kappeler “wants to do away with literariness, to destroy the images, and to have 
people speak for themselves without artifice in the name of truth..., Carter wants 
to...vindicate women’s creative role, past and present” (Sage, 2001: 231). Kappeler’s 
argument with Carter, then, is that she “was giving a formal, fictive and ‘untruthful’ answer
to a political question” (Sage, 2001: 231); that “Carter, the potential feminist critic, has 
withdrawn into the literary sanctuaiy, has become literary critic” (Kappeler, 1986: 134).40
Both Carter and Sade represent, according to Kappeler’s logic, the feminine from within 
masculinity, due to both their intentional pornography and the inevitability of representation- 
as-pomography. I also represent the feminine from within masculinity -  the feminine as 
represented by male writers. I do not leave the ‘morality’ of representation naively 
unchallenged -  and concede with Kappeler (and with Carter) that its structure (when defined 
as consisting of author-subject, spectator-subject and represented object) might be deemed 
pornographic. However, nor do I accept the inevitability of Kappeler’s “blameless” (Sage, 
2001: 230) -  thus powerless -  woman. I do not consider only the passive represented woman 
in my infemination reading, hence my concept of gynovocality; my notion of (paternal) 
authorial loss of control over the disseminating/infemiuating textual seed.41 Whilst Kappejer 
demands the end of representation in order for the salvation of the represented (that is, 
woman), I conceptualise with the infemination reading a potential space for the ‘both/and’. 
Representation is not posited as feminism’s enemy in the sense that I ally myself with air 
alternative definition of feminism -  a feminism that draws on deconstruction -  that is 
contrary to an expressivist, experiential version, as adopted by Kappeler. I focus on (what 
Kappeler would deem pornographic) representations of the feminine in male-authored texts, 
but also deny that (male) representations can only destroy their (feminine) object. Like 
Carter and deconstructive feminists, I consider the creative potential of femininity within the 
‘pornographic’ text; the suppressed concept, the gynovocality that are not sacrificed in 
representation.42
My focus on representation is, therefore, indebted to deconstruction, which itself (as I have 
stressed) informs French feminism. My interest in deconstructive reading arises from its 
affiliation with feminist and gender interpretive strategies; its shared concern of destabilising 
hierarchical oppositions (such as between male and female, masculinity and femininity -  and 
also, for the specific purposes of my study, between the West [MacDonald] and the East 
[Kawabata], between ‘low art’ [MacDonald’s fantasies] and ‘high art’ [the canonical, Nobel-
awarded Kawabata]). Infemination, as I conceptualise it, is an invocation -  to a certain extent 
-  of deconstruction43 in its retention of a phonetic echo of Derridean ‘dissemination’.44 
According to the ‘experience’ of deconstruction, my readings (the event is always plural) 
of/upon/within the fictions of MacDonald and Kawabata can be understood as performing a 
Derridean ‘tracing’ (the trace being an alternative term for deconstruction).45 That is, my 
‘deconstructive’ delineations operate to trace, thus double, the texts.46 This act of doubling is 
already suggested in my classification of each authorial section, where I define their specific 
variations on, or echoes of, the titular ‘(Di)Visioning’: MacDonald’s ‘Perversions’;
Kawabata’s ‘Revisions’.47 These repeated ‘(Di)Visions’ refer, simply, to femininity being 
‘seen’ twice. The feminine is multiple: spoken by MacDonald and Kawabata (themselves 
already pluralised, implicated in the triptych of author/narrator/character); spoken (via my 
interpretation) by me.
‘(Di)Visioning’ has, appropriately, dual resonance. It refers to the segregating influence of 
infeminative representation, whereby the female/feminine is seconded, othered, divided from 
a privileged male/masculine space.48 Furthermore, in the spirit of the ‘double’s’ significance 
in both infemination and deconstruction, it suggests two visions. Accordingly, I have 
selected for analysis the works of two authors, two examples of ‘already texts’: the linguistic 
re-writings (that is, translations) of Kawabata’s works; the mythological/historical re­
writings of MacDonald’s works.491 shall examine two ‘episodes’ of infeminative 
representation concerning each author, and outline my ‘findings’ in two chapters apiece.
This implication of the ‘two’ (with its relevance to both gender study and to deconstruction) 
serves to comment on the drama that informs the very nature of infeminative rhetoric, even 
before my readings commence. Although I endeavour to interrogate the works of MacDonald 
and Kawabata as largely distinct and separate entities, the fact that their texts can be read as 
infeminatory is suggestive o f‘doubling’ activity. (They ‘communicate’, despite the absence
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of cultural/temporal/personal interaction, via infemination).
Infeminative, like deconstructive, ‘(Di)Visioning’, then, always indicates traces of the
‘two’ -  the male (be he character or narrator - or, as I shall investigate in Chapter Four, 
indeed the author himself) and the feminine of his text. Deconstruction itself is already 
fundamentally concerned with suppression, omission, exclusion. It endeavours to 
free up the text buried beneath such fallacies, defending the notion that the privileged 
concept in the text possesses its own concealed, silenced opposite. What deconstruction 
strives to enable is the making visible of this suppressed partner concept. What infemination 
strives to enable is the making visible of the ‘feminine’.
Deconstruction, being intimately concerned with binary opposition (acknowledging both 
the privileged, immediately visible concept and its clandestine counterpart), provides, then, a 
natural point of reference for infemination. As in the case of the infeminator’s 
‘(Di)Visioning’, Derrida’s ‘tracings’ double vocality. For Derrida, deconstruction is about 
re-writing. Deconstruction is translation. “The question of deconstruction”, he asserts,
“is.. .through and through the question of translation” (Derrida, 1999: 282, emphasis in 
original).50 The primary texts of one of my selected infeminating authors, namely Kawabata, 
are what would conventionally be considered ‘translations’.51 The connection is significant. 
As Derrida’s understanding of language as already-doubled, of the word as innately 
multivocal, demonstrates, ‘translation’ is an inescapable condition. The universe is already a 
multiverse. ‘Translation’: the word itself, as Rey Chow indicates, is etymologically 
descended from antagonistic senses of tradition and betrayal/promiscuity/infidehty.52 
Translation is not only preservative (importing thoughts from an ‘original’) but creative 
(exporting and expressing its own dialogue). Chow explicates how translation 
“problematizes the ontological hierarchy of languages” (Chow, 1999: 503) so that one 
language is prioritised over another -  one retained as ‘original’, the other demoted to mere 
‘copy’, echo, derivative: ‘translation’. In my study of the (Kawabatan) already-translated- 
text I seek to overcome this issue of linguistic competition. My selection of an author in 
translation does not, however, serve to assert that translation should be privileged,53 in this 
case lauding the English over the Japanese text, the words of Seidensticker54 and Hibbett et
al over Kawabata, the writings of the ‘shadow-author’ over ‘author’. Rather, in my reading 
of translation I endeavour to promote only the validity of the ‘copy’ regarding the 
deconstructive (or infeminative) project. I approach each text as ‘English (language) 
literature’, validating translation after the model of Walter Benjamin who, according to 
Chow, considers “the act of translation [to be] less a confirmation of language’s ‘own’ 
impossibility than... a liberation, in a second language, of the ‘intention’ of standing-for- 
something-else that is already put together but imprisoned... in the original” (Chow, 1999: 
505, emphasis in original).55 My interest lies not in the success of a primary translation -  for 
example, Kawabata’s ‘translation’ of Japan (as socio-cultural and historical entity) into a 
linguistic copy (as Japanese words). Nor does it lie in grading the accomplishment of 
secondary translation -  Kawabata’s Japanese words rendered English words. Rather, I would 
endeavour to bypass these stages, so that my concerns would he with an acceptance of the 
English language translation as ‘original’, or ‘neo-original’, which I would then submit to a 
‘translation’ from a literary text into a critical one. My decision to focus upon Kawabata’s 
texts ‘in translation’ is related to my selection of authors from disparate time periods and of 
different nationalities. This deliberate decontextualisation is necessary in order to 
demonstrate a refusal to interpret texts as manifestations simply of the individual authors’ 
subjectivities.56
By privileging decontextualisation, I endeavour to confer upon the selected texts an 
element of autonomy of their own. This echoes the poststructuralist sentiment of textual 
isolation and autonomy, as professed by Barthes,57 and is a view supported and echoed by 
Derrida: “// n ’y  a pas de hors-texte”. There is nothing outside the text. There is no outside- 
text (Derrida, 1976: 158, emphasis in original).58 Translation, notably, signifies already the 
death of a single author, the translator becoming the second of an infinite number of authors: 
of innumerable recipients who re-write in the course of their readings.59
The infemination-reading shall not seek to uncover the factual origins of the text’s 
concerns (determined by authorial intentions), then, but shall principally focus upon fictional
genderings. (Thus, in my comparative study of MacDonald’s and Kawabata’s writings I shall 
consider only fictional connections between the texts; a fiction constructed by my 
infemination-reading). The infemination-reading is not principally about biography, histoiy, 
culture, society (although these voices and an infinite number of others might also inhabit 
and inform the text). Therefore, I have selected two male writers whose chances of actual 
‘intertextual’60 interaction are minimal61 My decontextualisation of MacDonald and 
Kawabata allows them -  or, rather, their texts -  a coetemalism, permitting them to be largely 
unfettered from certain segregating conditions. Culture and history come themselves to be 
understood as forms of fiction, narratives among potentially many others, competing for 
authoritative status, but refused automatic privilege.
To summarise, I incorporate elements of various debates into my conceptualisation of 
infemination, and the textual readings which follow.62 My choice of critical literature in 
support of my reading strategy is both motivated and unmotivated. The overlap between 
certain theoretical positions makes eclecticism, as I have demonstrated, inevitable. 
Feminisms, for example, can be understood as existing with gender theories along a 
continuum of attitudes towards sexuality and gender; Poststructuralism informs French 
feminist and queer theorist positions, as both draw on deconstructive practices to challenge 
‘either/or’ binarisms. My motivated choice involves my consideration of femininity from a 
French feminist perspective with a difference. This choice originates in an interest in 
deconstruction-derived notions of logocentrism, phallocentrism, phallogocentrism; in the 
hierarchic oppositioning of man/woman, masculinity/femininity, presence/absence.
I consider the French feminist notion of a feminine language and writing, whereby a 
relationship is posited between sexuality and textuality. I relate this to notions of feminine 
autonymy, self-naming, but believe that this could be taken in a broader, symbolic sense -  as 
expressing the possibility for the oppressed, marginalised, othered concept (as opposed to 
strictly the ‘biological female’) to speak for itself. ‘HERstory’ presents the notion of a 
possible feminine writing, but this might be interpreted as having less to do with biology and 
more with the symbolic retaliation of a suppressed ‘faction’.
My emphasis, like deconstructionists and French feminists, is on the texts as opposed to 
the authors, and upon textual representations of gender inequality. However, like Anglo- 
American feminists (and unlike feminist deconstructionists), I retain the importance of sex, 
in the sense that I propose a reading of specifically male-authored fiction. My aim in this is 
to negotiate between the two positions (which are not neatly polarised -  both French 
feminism and queer theory adopt deconstructive practices, and even the determined anti- 
essentialism of Butler is not matched by a clear-cut essentialism in Cixous or Mgaray). I take 
up the position of the in-between,63 in that I assert the centrality of gendered/sexed writing 
and the (anti-postmodernist) retention of the idea of the author, but then acknowledge how 
fluid gender categories can be. I argue, thus, for a playful logic of ‘in-betweenness’ that does 
not purport to resolve contradictions, but aims to negotiate within them. This eclectic 
position that negotiates difference produces a post-binary understanding of gender that links 
discourse to lived reality. This refusal to choose constitutes, therefore, a desire to bypass 
conventional binary divisions.
4 Namings
The rhetoric of infemination, as I define it, might be conceptualised as shaped by three 
intimately connected terms, which I name mortemalisation, teratologisation and 
dysgenication. I shall briefly outline these neologisms, whose creation is symbolic as much 
as ‘useful’. Their design serves to suggest a feminine inscription in a text (mine) that 
‘masculinely’ develops a hypothesis which it follows through to a logical and linear 
conclusion, as well as to indicate the relationship between the infemination theorem and 
other critical positions -  specifically French feminism and deconstruction -  which feature 
strategies of word-play. In spite of its subversive sub-textual aspirations, however, this 
terminology shall strive to ‘flesh out’ an otherwise abstract concept, facilitating the 
nayigation of the texts according to the logic of infemination.
The representation of degradations of the literal or symbolic mother is mortemalisation, a
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term which compounds ‘maternity’ with ‘mortality’, testifying to both motherhood and the 
death of/inherent in motherhood.64 Mortemalisation describes the infeminator’s textual 
aversion to mother figures. It is evident when he rejects female claims to creativity; when he 
undermines, destroys, denies or defames any aspect of the female’s experience of pregnancy, 
childbirth, childrearing, or of the mother persona herself.
Sharing certain fundamental concerns, as shall become apparent, with mortemalisation, but 
with an additional agenda of its own, is teratologisation. This occupies itself explicitly with 
monstrosity and, being a term I derive from the Greek teras (‘monster’), betrays its principal 
aim in its very name.65 The teratologised woman, simply, is the lesbian, the animal,66 the 
hysteric, the madwoman, the vampire; she is inhuman, scatological, sick, and persistently 
disruptive of the patriarchal order. The figure of the monstrous feminine,67 in all her 
incarnations, is employed in teratologisation to illustrate the feminine-induced breakdown of 
order into a ‘transgressive’ chaos.
As with teratologisation and mortemalisation, dysgenication is concerned with difference. 
(Or, more accurately in the case of dysgenication, with sameness). Dysgenication considers 
the gendered hierarchy that asserts an image of the impotent female versus (that is, 
subordinated to) the potent male. It is derived etymologically from the adjective dysgenic, 
connoting the attrition/erosion of (distinguishing/differentiating) characteristics .
Rendering it a noun, I employ it to intimate a deterioration or diminution of difference into a 
homogenous similitude. Dysgenication, operating to negate the potential of diversity-in­
fragmentation, describes the reification or hypostatisation of the individuality of the 
represented woman into sameness.
To summarise, the textual/critical tools of mortemalisation, teratologisation and 
dysgenication illustrate to various extents woman pomographised as object, as other, as 
substance receptive to male imprint, as commodity; woman degraded as bestial, tainted, 
monstrous; woman deprived of her maternal, generative capacity, rendered infertile, 
redundant and silent. Where fluids are feminised and necrotised in the texts of MacDonald
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and Kawabata, mortemalisation might be evinced. (Through an unremitting textual 
sanguinisation of her, the mother is consigned to a permanent state of celibacy and to an 
eternal infertility; to be conceptualised as “a fountain of life from which flows, every month, 
death itself, in a flood of debris, a wreckage which repeats itself continuously -  a tide of 
blood which gushes forth in memory of shame and cruelty” [Bois, cited in Dijkstra, 1986: 
366]). Where themes of paedophilia, necrophilia, sadomasochism and voyeurism surface 
(and in which configurations the feminine is subordinated), teratologisation might be 
identified. Where a project of etiolation is conducted against the bodies of the represented 
female characters, the infliction of a generic whiteness that renders them visually 
indistinctive and interchangeable, dysgenication is in operation.
My construction of this alternative language of infemination (alternative, that is, to existing 
terminology that inhabits French feminist and deconstmctionist discourses) constitutes a 
conscious inscription of origins and of movement away from origins. According to the third 
edition of Webster's Dictionary, a neologism is “a meaningless word coined by a psychotic” 
(cited in Rey, 1995: 63). Word-play, here, is associated with madness, which -  as my 
discussion of French feminism suggests -  might be conceptualised as a feminine subversion 
of phallogocentric doctrine. My word-play, likewise, is intended to grant a presence to the 
suppressed concept of femininity, a presence that ruptures the masculine economy of 
linearity and totality, a presence that reveals an intervention in language,68 and therefore 
illustrates the derivation of the infemination theorem from deconstructive feminist origins. 
Although pre-infemination terminology surfaces in my discussions (in order to facilitate my 
‘positioning’, my contextualisation of the reading strategy), I also write anew, separating 
from the past to suggest movement (away), progression, the ongoing nature of gender 
debate. Because the infemination reading is indebted to other discourses familiarity is 
permitted, but because it also differs from its sources (and, indeed, negotiates between 
sometimes opposing discourses) its rhetorical landscape is also specialised. My construction 
of an infemination language is, to summarise, an acknowledgement of sameness and 
difference, indicating the reading strategy’s relationship to other critical positions and
intimating that it has its own distinct agepda for the reading of representations of gender.
Now that I have defined ‘mortemalisation’, ‘teratologisation’ and ‘dysgenication’, the 
concepts shall be rendered comparatively invisible, to be retrieved explicitly in my 
concluding reflections. It is in these spaces of the introduction (‘Informulations’: an 
information/formulation amalgam) and conclusion (‘At-One-Ments’: combining semantic 
union with a visual tribute to retained autonomous identity)69 that the relationship between 
infemination and theory shall be explored. Conversely, both MacDonald’s and Kawabata’s 
respective ‘(Di)Visions’ shall focus upon representations of infemination. The theoretical 
language, then, shall be temporarily Suppressed and, in its place, the textual languages shall 
be considered.
5 Syntheses
The infeminator, in conclusion, is defined as such due simply to his negative construction 
of femininity. He only infeminates at the moment of his morternalistic, teratologistic and 
dysgenic representations, thus the texts remain open to innumerable alternative readings and 
reconstructions.70
Infemination is a system supported, in my current study, by texts of two principal authors. 
As I have repeatedly emphasised, these authors have created in this way in literal isolation 
from each other. Technically, both their lives occupied the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries (MacDonald’s spanning from 1824 to 1905 and Kawabata’s from 1899 to 1972), 
with MacDonald’s death being almost concurrent with Kawabata’s birth. Biographically, 
their lives also bear several similarities.71 Yet this connotation o f‘shared experience’, had no 
(known, probable, or even possible, in MacDonald’s case) impact on their subsequent 
writings’ demonstration of infeminatory correspondence.72 It is not the authors’ lives, then, 
which shall be considered as being pertinent to the infemitiation reader, but the texts 
themselves. These, the texts of MacDonald and Kawabata (as well as those works 
considered in secondary, supporting roles)73 ‘co-operate’ in their portrayal of males who are
concerned literally and/or metaphorically with the female body, and who confer upon this 
body claims of authority and desire.
The authors I interrogate are not alone in their writings -  but are accompanied by male and 
female textual creations. Whilst MacDonald’s texts are first-person narratives, featuring -  at 
the most -  an apparent duality of ‘author’ and ‘protagonist-narrator’, Kawabata’s are written 
in the third-person, so that ‘author’, ‘protagonist’ and ‘narrator’ might be differentiated.74 In 
Lilith, for example, both MacDonald and Vane are arguably implicated as participating in the 
textual constructions of femininity. The extent to which they are separable would appear 
dependent on whether autobiography is in operation. However, as my approach aims to 
decontextualise (that is, to minimise potentially contaminating distractions such as the extra- 
textual existence of the author from the text), MacDonald and Vane are primarily preserved 
as autonomous entities. Thus, in the case of Lilith and Phantastes the author’s reasons for 
infeminating shall be subordinated to those of the protagonist-narrator.
In ‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’, however, there is a third presence, with Kawabata and 
Eguchi being accompanied by a narrator. I endeavour to associate the narrator with the 
author only regarding sex, presuming his paternally-inherited maleness. In my readings of 
Kawabata’s texts, the author of course retains a greater presence than in my MacDonald 
readings -  due to my discussion of textual polyphony, the competing voices which (as in 
Bakhtin’s Problems o f Dostoevsksy’s Poetics -  and Kristeva’s appropriation of the 
Bakhtinian concept)75 include the author’s. Greater focus than granted the infeminating v' 
author shall, however, be directed towards his textual progenies. An extensive profile of the 
infeminator shall be constructed from an interrogation of the interaction at the level of the 
text between this male author’s male and female ‘offspring’. The perhaps ‘second 
generation’ infeminator, as shall become apparent, shall be the male protagonist (or 
character), whose actions within the text demonstrate the extent of his ‘contamination’ by 
male (paternal) authority.
I aim to investigate not only the male character’s infeminative activity but the complex
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motivations behind this response to the feminine. The mortemalising, teratologising 
and dysgenicating actions of, for example, Vane, a MacDonaldian protagonist, conducted 
against the various female characters he encounters, shall not be examined in isolation, as a 
detached, random (and ‘vain’) pursuit. Rather, his reasons (I shall argue that his is the quest 
of an orphan, both literally and spiritually, for a lost mother)76 shall be explored, via a 
consideration of the relationship between his present situation and his past experience, and 
between the unconscious and conscious components of his psyche. With Kawabata’s Eguchi, 
likewise, the ‘hows’ of infemination shall be explored, accompanied with potential ‘whys’.
In this case, the argument shall be that he mortemalises, teratologises and dysgenicates in his 
endeavour to locate in women in escape route from time (that is, death).77
Additionally to be considered are the ‘daughters’, the female offspring of the 
infeminating author. My study shall, for example, read the female characters who seemingly 
defy the infemination text by rebelliously rejecting an oppressed feminine speech. 
Kawabata’s proprietess (‘HSB’), the hostile ‘key-bearer’,78 a woman who seems impervious 
to what Eguchi perceives as the horror of death, might be interpreted as communicating with 
a subversive appropriated/impersonated ‘masculine’ voice. MacDonald’s titular heroine of 
Lilith too, before her transformation/emasculation into the submissive, silent female, asserts 
an initial dominant and aggressive ‘masculine’ presence. I shall also consider extensively the 
female characters who are denied speech. MacDonald’s Lona, for example, despite being 
perceived as an adult dwarf by Lilith, is infantilised by the infeminating Vane, who commits 
her to a perpetual childhood (with its implications of passivity and virginity). Lilith is herself 
only permitted salvation when she relinquishes her hold on masculinity and submits to the 
male injunction to sleep. Kawabata’s Otoko is written (literally and metaphorically) by the 
infeminator Oki, realised explicitly as an object of male construction and conceptualisation. 
Eguchi, another Kawabatan infeminator, communicates only with women denied 
consciousness.
My study, then, shall consider the un/involvement of all those associated with infemination 
(author, protagonist-narrator and infeminated female in first-person narratives; author-
narrator, protagonist and infeminated female in third-person narratives), endeavouring to 
delineate the ways in which each (to varying degrees) is implicated in its machinations. The 
categories shall not, however, be rigidly sustained in my reading/writing of MacDonaldian 
and Kawabatan infemination. Rather, I shall focus predominantly on the simplified 
groupings o f‘male character’ and ‘female character’.
MacDonald’s infeminations shall be interrogated first, his ‘(Di)Visions/Perversions of the 
Feminine’ bisected as ‘GynoScapes’ and ‘GynEscapes’, respectively. The former shall deal 
with a psychoanalytic penetration of ‘infant’ (infeminator) into the bodyscape of the 
‘mother’ (the female and/or feminine of the text). The latter chapter signifies literally ‘an 
escape from the womb’, where penetrative desire becomes penetrative anxiety: the sought 
mother becomes difficult to recognise, thus is established as a source of infantile fear, and 
the male protagonist endeavours to evade (re)union with (various manifestations of) her 
body. ‘GynEscapes’ shall reaffirm the textual presence of the gynoscape, yet shall illustrate 
the male’s aversion to the ‘home’ initially established as his necessary destiny in the 
preceding chapter.
Infemination shall be demonstrated as evident in MacDonald’s works of adult fantasy, 
Lilith and Phcmtastes, the former being his final prose work of fiction and the latter being his 
first. Both texts shall be employed in order to define the gynoscape. However, Lilith shall be 
investigated as the predominant infeminative source in the second chapter, with Phantasies 
considered in a supportive, collaborative role in terms of its infeminative design. The 
selection of two texts that occupy polarised regions of MacDonald’s writing experience is 
sigqificant because it validates my argument regarding decontextualisation: stressing the 
nature of writing as retrieval, and suggesting the impossibility of formulating ‘original’ and 
univocal scenes of desire.79
In an apparent contrast with MacDonald’s nineteenth-centwy Scottish infeminations, a 
consideration of Kawabata’s twentieth-century Japanese infeminations shall follow. Despite 
their prominent superficial differences, however, my analyses of these disparate works shall
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conclude with an affirmation of similarity, with an acknowledgement that the rhetorical 
devices of infeminative practice (mortemalisation, teratologisation and dysgenication) are 
common to both.
Kawabata’s ‘(Di)Visions/Revisions of the Feminine’ shall be deemed ‘HIStory’ and 
‘HERstory’. The former refers to masculine language, the latter feminine silence. According 
to ‘HIStory’, masculine language is characteristically solid and ordered; and is used to speak, 
write, define ‘woman’, but with the static perceptions of patriarchy. According to 
‘HERstory’, feminine silence can be mobile, creative; a language in its own right with which 
the suppressed faction (in this case, ‘woman’) can write herself, with the fluid perceptions of 
femininity.80
Infemination shall be explored through several of Kawabata’s texts, with a primary focus 
upon his Beauty and Sadness and ‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’. Of these texts, the 
former permits a co-occupation of the narrative (whereby male and female stories are 
recounted), and is defined as ‘HERstorical’. The latter, on the other hand, privileges male- 
only ‘telling’, thus confers a ‘Historical’ perspective.
My separate analyses of MacDonald and Kawabata shall be concluded, as I have earlier 
suggested, with an ‘Atonement’, an ‘At-One-Ment’,81 where the texts shall be brought 
together, united for a final explicit infeminative reading/rewriting.
GEORGE MACDONALD’S 
‘PERVERSIONS’ OF THE FEMININE
CHAPTER ONE: GynoScapes
1 IntroScapes
My gynoscopic reading, that is, one that images or identifies a womb metaphor in 
infeminative literature, conceptually links a textual landscape with a female and/or a 
feminine body. In terms of a female realisation, specific characters in MacDonald’s Lilith 
and Phantasies shall be examined in their various states of morselisation,1 fragmentation, 
even disintegration -  the Very landscape of their bodies (divided especially into hair, mouths, 
teeth, genitals) considered as indicative of the infeminator’s gynoscopic vision. In addition to 
this reading of the (biologically) female body-in-parts, a consideration of the literally- 
neutral, but literarily-gendered exterior world shall permit the conceptualisation of a 
feminine gynoscape.
Both Phantastesian and Lilithian ‘heroes’ shall, in this case, be understood as ‘penetrating’ 
the otherworld -  a feat described psychoanalytically as figuring an incestuous Oedipal entry 
into a lost maternal body. Both orphans enter the gynoscape (identifying potential mother- 
replacements in the forms of actual female characters along the way) in an endeavour to 
reclaim uterine security in a femininely-imaged heaven.2 The return to the matemalised body 
signifies for Lilith’s Vane and Phantastes’ Anodos the restoration of lost innocence, with 
childhood being posited by MacDonald as the supreme state of development into which the 
adult must endeavour to grow.3
Through an ideological feminine analysis, the gynoscape might be understood abstractly 
(and archetypally, with reference to Jungian psychology)4 as being the territory of a 
primordial Mother, whose body and will are aligned with the natural World. This shall 
demand a contemplation of the relationship between the literal literary terrain and a mythical 
Mother Earth figure. According to Pierre Grimal’s account of classical mythology, this 
‘female’ (or, rather, ‘feminine’) principle is Gaia, who is Earth perceived as a primordial 
cosmogonic element.5 This Mother Earth is believed to have procreated (without male
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intervention) to produce Uranus, or Father Heaven: a son who becomes incestuously 
involved with his mother so that other deities are created.6 This Great Mother figures in 
universal creation mythologies as the original maternal, the true ‘home* from which 
everything was emitted, and to which everything must return. Death, a literal disintegration 
which enforces a physical communion With the earth, permits this return.
The sense of duality, with respect to this symbolic universal Mother, is of particular 
relevance to the experiences of MacDonald’s male protagonists (in Lilith and Phantastes) in 
their gynoscape-traversals. The natural world is demonstrated in both texts as offering, by 
turn, comfort and threat. It is only, of course, when the spiritual journeys of Vane and 
Anodos end that4 She’ comes to be perceived as fixed in a position of omnibenevolence. 
First, however,4 She’ must be evinced in her oppressive diversity. This status is reinforced 
via the protagonists’ personal encounters of individual mother figures, who infiltrate their 
narratives as dualised aspects of the Great maternal. As this ambivalent maternal is an entity 
that must be encountered by both Vane and Anodos before they might locate completion and 
ultimate containment with(in) the (undifferentiated) Great Mother/Mother Earth, my analysis 
must begin with 4Her’. I shall briefly discuss the respective theories of Melanie Klein and 
Carl Gustav Jung with relation to the concept of the personal, as opposed to the universal, 
maternal. Following this, I shall, via a consideration of Erich Neumann’s Jungian analysis, 
conduct a final return to the Great Mother concept.
The notion of the dualised (or ambivalent) mother (as an infantile fantasy) is granted 
prominence in the theories of the post-Freudian Melanie Klein (the implications of which 
shall be introduced in this chapter and developed in the next). Klein focuses upon a pre- 
Oedipal period where the infant is unable to comprehend, thus tolerate, ambivalence. The 
child relates to part-objects, with a lack of awareness of a greater wholeness. His/her earliest 
needs are oral, but, coming to be denied by the founding object of gratification, the breast, 
the child is provoked to split objects into 4good’ and 4bad’, loved and hated, stable and 
unstable. In this, the paranoid-schizoid position ('paranoid’ because the child’s central
persecutory anxieties are external; ‘schizoid’ because the child’s central defence against 
persecution is to separate experience into good and bad), Klein asserts, the ego splits in order 
to project its death instinct onto the external object, the breast. The breast comes to be 
experienced as bad and threatening to the remaining ego. Co-existent, however, with this 
relationship with the ‘bad breast’ is one with an ideal breast. The projected libido constructs 
the ‘good breast’ as that which will endlessly satisfy the ego’s demand of preservation. For 
Klein, therefore, the central position in the child’s development is polarised.7
Similarly, Carl Gustav Jung’s distinction between a Good and Terrible mother focuses 
explicitly upon duality and ambivalence. Jung postulates the mother (in conjunction with the 
ctnima) as comprising the feminine archetype. According to Jung:
The mother is the first feminine being with whom the man-to-be 
comes in contact, and she cannot help playing, overtly or covertly, 
consciously or unconsciously, upon the son’s masculinity, just as 
the son in his turn grows increasingly aware of his mother’s 
femininity, or unconsciously responds to it by instinct. In the case 
of the son, therefore, the simple relationships of identity or of 
resistance and differentiation are continually cut across by erotic 
attraction or repulsion... (1959: 85-6)
Jung’s mother archetype might be considered as comprised of a combination of literal 
mothers, figurative mothers and feminine symbols. In thb first category he posits one’s 
matrilineage. Correspondingly, MacDonald’s Vane re-visits the gynoscape in an attempt to 
compensate for literal maternal loss, whilst Anodos is connected to Fairy Land through his 
matrilineal fairy blood. The second category features universal mothers such as the Great 
Goddess, Virgin Mary and Isis, as well as personal mother figures (that is, any actual women 
who have acted in a mother-like capacity towards the subject). Correspondingly, both Vane 
and Anodos encounter motherly female characters, such as the former’s Mara and Eve, and 
the latter’s nameless wise woman. These literal women and non-biological mothers (along 
with, of course, the feminine-imaged setting of the gynoscape) are also perceived as 
symbolising aspects of the Great Mother. The final category that comprises Jung’s mother
archetype consists explicitly of apparently non gender-specific symbols, which are to be 
feminised. These include the sea, the earth, the moon, and hollow objects.8 These symbols 
clearly correspond to many of the materials with which MacDonald’s gynoscape-universes 
are composed, relating to both the natural and artefactual characteristics of the Lilithian and 
Phantastesian landscapes.
Conflated, the three categories (literal mother, universal mother, symbol) betray a common 
characteristic of ambivalence. Jung asserts that the mother archetype is to be both positively 
and negatively identified:
The qualities associated with [the mother archetype] are maternal 
solicitude and sympathy; the magic authority of the female; the 
wisdom and spiritual exaltation that transcend reason; any helpful 
instinct or impulse; all that is benign, all that cherishes and sustains, 
that fosters growth and fertility[; t]he place of magic transformation 
and rebirth, together with the... underworld and its inhabitants.. .On 
the negative side the mother archetype may connote anything secret, 
hidden, dark; the abyss, the world of the dead, anything that devours, 
seduces, and poisons, that is terrifying and inescapable like fate.
(Jung, 1959: 82)
Accordingly (and as I have already indicated), Jung conceptually bisects this ambivalent 
figure into “the loving and the terrible mother”.9 (In order to permit a clear distinction 
between Jung’s and Klein’s polarised mothers, I shall term the former’s Good and Terrible, 
and the latter’s good/bad ‘breast mothers').
Erich Neumann, too, focuses (in his evaluation of the Jungian archetype) on the 
ambiguities of the maternal, suggesting a trisection of the concept. He images ‘her’ not only 
as Good mother (comprising positive elements), and Terrible mother (comprising negative 
elements), but as Great Mother (making possible the union of positive and negative 
elements).10 Neumann’s focus is predominantly on the latter, the Great Mother (from whom 
his study takes its title), who is defined as elementary; as immutable, as “the foundation of 
that conservative, stable, and unchanging part of the feminine which predominates in 
motherhood”.11 The other two (the Good and Terrible mothers) are defined as polarised 
facets or projections of this Great Mother.12 The Good mother, as Jung already suggests, is
associated with the ideal balance of containment and release that permits her offspring’s 
development. The Terrible mother fixates, ensnares, devours and dismembers her offspring. 
She promises only sickness, death and extinction, in contrast with the Good mother’s 
provision of birth, rebirth and immortality. Of the maternal dichotomy Neumann writes:
Just as the world, life, nature, and soul have been experienced as a 
generative and nourishing, protecting and warming Femininity, so 
their opposites are also perceived in the image of the Feminine; death 
and destruction, danger and distress, hunger and nakedness, appear as 
helplessness in the presence of the Dark and Terrible Mother. Thus the 
womb of the earth becomes the deadly devouring maw of the underworld, 
and beside the fecundated womb and the protecting cave of the earth and 
mountain gapes the abyss of hell, the dark hole of the depths, the devouring 
womb of the grave and of death. (1963: 149)
Accordingly, MacDonald’s Little Ones, for example, will be perceived by Vane as Good 
mothers to the babies they find in the forest, and nurture and protect. They extend this loving 
treatment to Vane, feeding and amusing him whilst he is imprisoned by the evil Giants. 
However, the Little Ones might also be interpreted as the Terrible mothers who consider 
their ‘offspring’ to be possessions, and who will not relinquish ownership even when 
necessary for the babies’ development. “One moonlit evening, as [the Little Ones] were 
going to gather their fruit, they came upon a woman... with a baby in her lap.. .They took her 
for a giantess that had stolen one of their babies, for they regarded all babies as their 
property” (Z: 167). The oppressive Terrible mothers respond with violence to this supposed 
theft: “Filled with anger they fell upon her multitudinously, beating her after a...sufficiently 
bewildering fashion” (Z: 167). The Little Ones take the baby, even though their initial 
justification for doing so (that is, their desired liberation of it from an apparent evil Giant) is 
rendered obsolete. The Little Ones recognise that the woman “hugged and kissed [the baby] 
just as they wanted to, and c[o]me to the conclusion that she must be a giantess of the same 
kind as the good giant [Vane]” (Z: 168). Nevertheless, they refuse to return their ‘prize’, 
instead endeavouring to pacify the mother by bringing her fruits to assuage her loss.
In Phantastes, also, a woman at first perceived as a Good mother proves herself to be
Terrible. Anodos locates (or so he believes) the “white lady” (P: 79) who had once deserted 
him. This time, however, she promises (at least, implicitly) to remain. “Why did you run 
away from me when you woke in the cave?” Anodos asks her. “Did I?” she responds, 
suggesting that she did not consciously abandon him. “That was very unkind of me; but I did 
not know better”, she finishes, expressing (presumably insincere) remorse, along with an 
immediate self-acquittal (P: 80). In order to reinforce her image of improved/repaired 
maternity (or, rather, her image, simply, of maternity, as she did not function as a mother 
figure on their very first encounter, but was, indeed, sired by a paternal Anodos), she invites 
her ‘infant’ into the womb. “Come to my grotto. There is light there” (P: 80). Not only 
explicitly offering Anodos passage into her womb-space, the white lady additionally 
promises the welcoming presence of light (the positive, masculinity-reinforcing substance), a 
“warm gloom” (P: 81, emphasis added), as opposed to a hostile darkness. The white lady is, 
in this instance, true to her word, leading Anodos into a cavern in which “glimmer[s] a pale 
rosy light” (P: 82). There, she permits him to rest, and relates to him a tale that convinces 
him of their (pre-Oedipal, primordial) (re)union. “I listened till she and I were blended with 
the tale; till she and I were the whole history” (P: 83). He sleeps, but, upon awakening, is 
confronted with her ‘transformation’. “The damsel had disappeared; but.. .at the mouth of the 
cave, stood a strange horrible object. It looked like an open coffin set up on one end” (P: 84). 
The womb becomes explicit tomb, and the white lady is revealed as the evil “Maid of the 
Alder” (P: 85), the Terrible mother who is intent on “giving [Anodos]...into the hands of 
[his] awful foe” (P: 85), the Ash.13 Unsatisfied with ‘merely’ ensuring the death of his 
masculinity, she also targets his subjectivity, endeavouring to capture and contain him in her 
deathly maternal embrace. “The [coffin-like] thing turned round -  it had for a face and front 
those of my enchantress... [but] with dead lustreless eyes” (P: 84), Anodos reveals, making a 
direct connection between the two [Good and Terrible] mbthers, thus proving them to be 
facets of one being.
Both a positive and a negative maternal are to be experienced within Anodos’ and Vane’s 
journeys through the otherworld, with seemingly bifurcated paths actually leading to the
same place: to the sought maternal womb of the Great Mother. Anodos and Vane are both 
impelled to die during the course of their respective narratives, a traumatic, destabilising 
experience that is, paradoxically, survived. Having been guided by some maternal figures 
and hounded by others, and even subjected to antonymically hostile and receptive treatment 
from individual ‘mothers’, their conclusions are univocal. This multiplicity o f‘women’ (a 
category which here includes female characters and the feminine landscape) are encountered 
-  together, they constitute the gynoscape -  and are variously projected as elementarily 
positive or negative, or transformatively both, by MacDonald’s male ‘orphans’. But this 
phase of a pejoratively infantile (or childish) not-knbwing is eventually to be passed, to be 
usurped by the esteemed innocence of childlikeness. Anodos and Vane shall shed their 
physically-developed but spiritually-stunted selves via a traversal of the gynoscape, to 
mature into children. From a position of initial pre-Oedipal materiality, they progress into a 
spiritual union with a re-experienced ‘mother’. ‘She’, the Jungian Great Mother (as 
Neumann defines her, in his study of her psychological and cultural-historical significance), 
now conceptually stabilised by her ‘offspring’, returns.
Extricating the concepts of Good, Terrible and Great mothers from psychoanalytic theoiy,
1 shall employ them in order to assist my gynoscopic readings, particularly of MacDonald’s 
Lilith and Phantastes. I also intend to consider them in relation to a variety of ancillary texts 
which uphold similar thematic and theoretical concerns. This chapter shall be structured 
accordingly (but not rigidly, with close interaction permitted between pseudo-sections), so 
that the respective gynoscapes of first Lilith, then Phantastes, and finally a selection of 
MacDonald’s shorter fairytales shall be interrogated.
2 GynoScaping Lilith
By way of an introduction to my commentary specifically on Lilith, I shall commence with 
an examination of certain aspects of the mythological biography on which MacDonald’s
titular character is based. Raphael Patai culturally and historically locates the origins of the 
mythical Lilith in Sumeria, in the third millennium BC. The earliest reference to her, he 
identifies, is in the Sumerian King List (circa 2400 BC), where a Lillu-demon, belonging to 
the vampire class, is mentioned.14 According to Sumerian legend, Patai relates, Lilith was 
incapable of maternity, possessing an unproductive womb and breasts. She was portrayed in 
the art of the period as a beautiful but bestial goddess who ruled by night.15
The ‘biography’16 of this Lilith was expanded in the Talmudic period (between the second 
and fifth centuries AD), coming to be fully recognised as an explicit she-demon.17 The Lilith 
described by the Talmud, in perhaps her most (in)famous incarnation, is Adam’s first wife, a 
woman who refused to lie beneath him during coition. Adam, according to this account -  as 
Patai delineates -  attempts to force her into submission. But, by uttering the magical name of 
God, Lilith flees to the Red Sea. Although the Bible (from which Lilith was expurgated) 
states that Adam had been responsible for naming the beasts -  “whatsoever Adam called 
every living creature, that was the name thereof’ (Genesis 2:19) -  and that it was his 
language that constituted the contraction of the Word into words, of infinite spirit into finite 
nature, it is Lilith who possesses the language out of which the Divine Name is constructed. 
Lilith, uttering this Ineffable Name, is able to escape, and, although Adam appeals to the 
Creator for her enforced return, his wife is sufficiently empowered to decline. Her chosen 
residence, the story continues, is a place of evil, inhabited by lascivious and promiscuous 
demons, and here Lilith gives birth to her own demonic brood. God then sends angels in 
pursuit of his lost female, but she refuses to return. Only when they threaten to drown her 
does she compromise, consenting to the sacrifice of her own children in her place. She 
returns to Adam who, in the meantime, has received a replacement wife (Eve). Along with 
this new wife, Adam has been expelled from Paradise, and the couple have voluntarily 
separated. Lilith, intent on self-authoring an independent maternity, gathers Adam’s 
nocturnal emissions and conceives by them.18
MacDonald’s Lilith shares aspects of this history, being a woman whose “first thought was
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power” (Z: 147, emphasis in original), and “count[ing] it slavery to be one with [Adam], arid 
bear children for Him [God] who gave her being” (Z: 147). Adam identifies that Lilith’s 
dominant flaw is her pride in her maternity. “One child, indeed, she bore; then, puffed with 
the fancy that she had created her, would have me fall down and worship her!” (Z: 147) As 
Adam, perhaps motivated by envy at her female creative potential,19 refuses to be 
subordinated to her, she takes revenge (Z: 48). Adam does not, however, withhold her 
possible redemption, although her position as wife has been usurped. If she repents, she will 
be permitted to ‘sleep’ in (Mother) “Earth’s bountiful bosom” (Z: 230).
Adam (in the form of the Sexton Mr Raven) brings people ‘home’ to Mother, to “[his] 
wife’s house” (Z: 27, emphasis added) of sleep. The Raven speaks of this ‘home’ as a 
euphemistic womb-space: as “the only place where you can go out and into” (Z: 15). This 
space is uncanny, a word Vane himself uses (Z: 16) to describe his (once familiar) 
surroundings. “[T]he house had grown strange to me”, he remarks, as it devolves into a 
“dreadful place” in which he “was nowhere safe” (Z: 16): “[H]ow could I any longer call that 
house home, where every door, every window opened into -  Out' (Z: 21, emphases in 
original). Although the unheimlich, according to Freud’s ‘The Uncanny’, refers specifically 
to what “is not known and familiar” (Freud, 1919: 76, emphasis in original), it proves itself 
to be a mere “sub-species of heimlich” (78), with the latter term indicating two conflicting 
and self-cancelling ideas: both “that which is familiar and congenial” (77) and “that which is 
concealed and kept but of sight” (77). What ‘belongs to the house’ is, thus, both ‘homely’ 
and withdrawn from the eyes of others; made secret, private, esoteric. Freud explicitly 
relates this dichotomy to the female genitals, which he describes as an “unheimlich place 
[which].. .is the entrance to the former heim of all human beings, to the place where 
everyone dwelt once upon a time and in the beginning” (86). In Lilith, the Raven (or Sexton, 
or Adam) is responsible for delivering Vane to the ‘mother’ he has lost or has been lost by 
(and, equally, must prevent Vane from uniting with the Terrible mother by exposing her 
castrating and suffocating desires). “This is the couch that has been waiting for you” (Z: 35), 
the Raven states. “Do not be a coward, Mr Vane.. .Give yourself up to the night, and you
will rest indeed” (L: 36). Vane must confront the uncanny, the feared return of the repressed. 
Horror provokes his response: “Would they have me make of a charnel-house my bed­
chamber?...! will not[!]” (L: 36). Vane’s hosts are transformed before his eyes from 
embodiments of “[l]ife itself, life eternal, immortal” (Z: 32) into “two...spectres that waited 
on the dead” (Z: 36). This confrontation with that which he has consigned to the 
unconscious, out of sight, (but not so) out of mind, provokes in Vane the desperate impulse 
to “escape” (Z: 37): “I ran, I fled wildly, and bursting out, flung-to the door behind me” (Z: 
37). However, the outside is also the inside: “Had I come to myself out of a vision? -  or lost 
myself by going back to one?” (Z: 37) he wonders, sensing that his fearful experience of the 
new is a simultaneous return. Vane asserts a chaotic self-will in refusing the Raven’s 
instructions to lie down and sleep, unable, at this point, to comprehend how death could ever 
be a prelude to action. But the rules are different in this otherworld from the logic that 
governs the ‘waking’ sphere. ‘Reality’ soon proves itself to be the wilderness (where history 
repeats itself, where doors show and conceal themselves, where mothers leave children 
forever), whilst the ‘other’ world appears more subject to determinism: an ordered spiritual 
realm in which good and evil, although in continual warfare, are bound by fixed laws.
To perhaps be imaged as a symbol of this oppressively ambiguous climate is MacDonald’s 
prime negative embodiment of femininity: his titular Lilith. She is conceived as an elemental 
and libidinal being, associated with the materiality that opposes spiritual freedom. She is an 
incarnation of the fall-from-language made flesh, an absence that self-propagates to produce 
perpetual nothingness. Lilith is the embodied darkness that the male hero must conquer, in 
order that the “resurrection-morning” (Z: 245)20 sunlight be permitted expression.21 
Accordingly, her orifices must be sealed, her boundaries made inviolate,22 ensuring that the 
masculine ‘self might retain a safe division from the feared space of die feminine ‘other’.
Vane’s first conquest of femininity in the otherworld is over this, the literal body of Lilith. 
He discovers her lifeless, wasted corpse and claims it as his “treasure” (Z: 104), the Eve to 
his Adam (Z: 102). And to this, his fetish-object, he is compelled to restore life, imaging her
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an “angel-visage with lustrous eyes” (Z: 102) when, in reahty, she is “drawn and hollow5’ (Z: 
98), “emaciated” (Z: 96), “worn” (Z: 96), a “wasted shred of womanhood” (Z: 102), her eyes 
“awful chink[s] out of which nothingness had peered” (104). When she is finally revived 
is a cold, cruel, hostile ‘landscape’, yet Vane still has a desire to look at her, mesmerised by 
her medusa-gaze.23 “I cowered before the blaze of her eyes”, he confesses, “but could not 
avert my own” (Z: 110). He pleads to be allowed to be her slave, genuflecting at her 
corporeal altar even though it is contrary to his (masculine) reason: “Did I love her? I knew 
she was not good! Did I hate her? I could not leave her! I kpelt beside her” (Z: 110). She 
flees, he follows, she bites him and only then he desists. He remains, however, under her 
spell -  he obeys, for example, a later request to climb a tree that he knows will be a ‘grave’ 
mistake. This senseless climb delivers him into the “stormy water” of the Terrible mother’s 
amniotic fluid, in which he (the infant-again Vane) is “flung about wildly, and [feels 
him] self sinking” (Z: 139). “Gasping and gurgling and choking, I fell at last upon a solid 
bottom” (Z: 139), he relates, signifying both his unwitting return to a helpless, infantile state, 
and his unwilling expulsion into a hostile world. Vane then finds himself transported to the 
plane of his original, everyday existence, a world in which (as an orphan) the mother -  the 
very object of his quest -  does not exist.
The Lilith body regards Vane with hostility as a reaction perhaps against his idealisation of 
her as a somnambulant, supine female (which implies an association with the Victorian 
“[cjult of [ijnvalidism” [Dijkstra, 1986: 25]). Whilst, in life, Lilith’s animal energy makes 
her a threatening, active force, in death she is sustained in the silent realm of the passive 
erotic. Vane further (although perhaps unintentionally) degrades her body, in the course of 
his traversing the gynoscape, by imaging it as being comprised of a disjunction of parts. 
Operating as a feminine projection, her hair, for example, suggests her status as a (Victorian) 
madwoman or whore (when unleashed, functioning as a symbol of insanity or sensuality).24 
Lilith has “hair [which] was longer than itself’ (Z: 96); hair which Vane refuses to allow to 
become unruly, uncontrolled, a shattered surface (a symbol of madness). “How is it my hair
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is not tangled?” Lilith asks when she regains (or, rather, reveals her) consciousness. Vane 
tells her that he has bathed her in the river and that her hair has “drifted in the current” (Z: 
108). Although she admits that he has “compelled [her] to live” (L: 108), she believes that he 
has killed her hair: “My poor hair!... it will be more than a three-months’ care to bring you to 
life again” (Z: 107, emphasis in original). Her hair, Lilith seems to claim, is (or would be) 
vital, potent (which is perhaps what motivates Vane to civilise it when the opportunity 
arises). Lilith perhaps locates her devastating powers in her hair, operating as a feminised, 
demonised Samson. MacDonald propagates the notion of Lilithian trichological danger when 
he explicitly identifies “the horror in her hair” (L : 203). Conceptualised thus, Lilith’s hair 
connotes the woman’s affiliation with the medusa of classical mythology: “Her hair hung 
and dripped; then it stood out from her head and emitted sparks” (Z: 201). Although, in this 
configuration, she should not be looked upon -  her naked body threatening to turn the seer 
into stone -  Vane is a voyeur. The Freudian medusa (which metaphorically figures the 
female genitals) arouses sexual desires in ‘her’ male observer, causing the ossification of 
erection. However, it concurrently terrifies, causing the paralysis that is impotence.25 Vane is 
not panoptical,26 rather his vision is perpetually frustrated as Lilith wears many masks, 
sometimes appearing as a corpse, sometimes as a leech or cat, sometimes as a beautiful 
princess.27 “We must be on our guard”, warns Adam, “or she will again outwit us. She would 
befool the very elect!” (Z: 150) Vane must commit himself, therefore, to a continuous 
process of unveiling; of stripping away at the incongruous, of excoriating the artificial. 
Lilith’s hair, which “streamed in a cataract, black as...marble” (Z: 127), is one such veil.
The act of veiling is a duplicitous operation, which transforms the organic and natural 
(the hair) into an artefact (the veil). The nature of the material of the veil is irrelevant as the 
act of veiling confers artificiality upon it. Veiling is also deceptive because of its combined 
makeup of suggestion and actuality. When veiled (and therefore concealed from the 
masculine gaze), the female’s body retains its autonomy. It remains an unknown entity, 
available only via the flawed, unstable analytic devices of supposition, implication and
assumption. It cannot be classified, categorised, or territorialised with masculine tools of 
rationality and certainty. On the other hand, this veiling permits the concept of the 
morselised ‘body in pieces’ to be reinforced, with the male gaze encouraged to visually 
traverse the female corporeal terrain, and to isolate dilatory fetishistic moments along the 
way. (Veiling can be understood as inviting the denigration of this body, as the focused-upon 
hidden surfaces are imaged, in this way, as erotic stimuli, as pudenda, wherever they might 
be located).
That veiling is ambiguous is a notion upheld by Terry Castle’s The Female Thermometer, 
which posits a connection between the theme of the masquerade ball in eighteenth-century 
realist literature and the uncanny in fantastic fiction.28 The masquerade comes to function as 
an uncanny space that Castle describes as a “dream-like zone where identities become fluid 
and cherished distinctions -  between self and other, subject and object, real and unreal -  
temporarily blurred” (Castle, 1995: 17). The masked body is the veiled body, its intention 
being to sustain uncertainty of identity.29
The ambiguous nature of veiling determines that it be an activity, in Lilith, undertaken by 
disparate female characters. Therefore, along with the evil and hair-cloaked Lilith, the 
virtuous Mara is portrayed as veiled, her face bandaged with “a long white cloth” (Z: 77). 
When Vane first encounters this putative “Cat-woman” (Z: 73) he fears some 
“[ejxtraordinary ugliness” or “inconceivable monstrosity” (Z: 73) to be her secret. She is 
only exposed to him when he steals a glance on leaving her cottage. Mara is then unveiled, 
de-mummified, demystified: which comprises a symbolic conquest -  against her will. “I had 
scarce crossed the threshold when I turned again”, Vane relates. “She stood in the middle of 
the room; her white garments lay like foamy waves at her feet, and among them the 
swathings of her face: it was lovely as a night of stars” (Z: 80).30 Vane is punished for his 
transgressive seeing,31 as was the Biblical wife of Lot, with whom Mara herself is often 
(mistakenly) compared (Z:77). Lot’s wife, desiring to see truth unveiled, looks over her 
shoulder at the falling city and becomes a pillar of salt. Likewise, Vane comes to be banished 
for looking, suddenly locating himself “outside a doorless house” for which he “could find
no entrance” (Z: 80).32
Mara’s veil, a garment of mourning testifying to her role as “Mother of Sorrow” (Z: 201),33 
might also be connected to her status as the Biblical Mary Magdalene (Z: 240).34 Once a 
harlot, then personally saved by Christ, Mara/Mary now wears a white veil as a physical sign 
of her purity: a ‘virgin’s veil’, a symbol of the hymen returned to its original state of 
wholeness. As Mary Magdalene, Mara is “revirginised by [her] penance” (Newman, 1995: 
177), cleansed of her former life, and rendered akin to the supposed apotheosis of femininity, 
the Virgin Mary. In the Gnostic Gospel of Philip, Mary Magdalene is revealed as being the 
disciple whom Jesus “used to kiss often on her mouth” (cited in Newman, 1995: 177). When 
asked why she was favoured, Jesus explained that she could see the light of truth, whilst the 
other (male) disciples resided in darkness (Newman, 1995: 178). The Jesus-kiss served to 
silence Mary’s dissemination of this knowledge, and now Mara, with the physical absence of 
Christ, must use cloth to keep her mouth “muffled” (Z: 79) and her secrets safe. The mouth, 
also, as displaced symbol of feminine sexuality, operates as a sign of difference (opposed to 
the Biblical egalitarian ideal whereby “all are one in Christ Jesus” [Galatians 3:28]) which 
Jesus’ kiss/ Mara’s veil must conceal (and seal).
Mara’s veiling is also allegorical. The Little Ones fear the unseen, the unknown:
“There she is -  in the door waiting for us!” cried one [of the children], 
and put his hands over his eyes.
“How ugly she is!” cried another, and did the same.
“You do not see her,” [Vane] said; “her face is covered!”
“She has no face!” they answered.
“She has a very beautiful face. I saw it once...” I added with a sigh.
“Then what makes her hide it?” (Z: 195)
Vane responds with a lesson in Christian faith. “You cannot like, and you ought not to 
dislike what you have never seen” (Z: 195). He speaks from experience, having himself once 
expressed an inability to believe, which has resulted in his loss of both name and the ‘vanity’ 
and egocentrism implicated by it (Z: 74). Faith (symbolised by the unseen, unknown, veiled 
Mara) facilitates, Vane comes to understand, the eventual translation of “dim memories” into
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“broad daylight” (Z: 252).35
Mara’s veil, as I have suggested, serves to evoke an image of the cut-up female body, 
seen only in pieces through the fetishisation of various aspects of it. This theme is developed 
in Lilith, with reference also made to the titular female’s mouth. Throughout the text, the 
female body-in-parts continues to be expressed via this image, with a particular focus upon 
the lips (which, as well as symbolising the genital labia, function as an expression of orality, 
of maternal sustenance). When Vane first encounters Lilith he notes her “beautiful yet 
terrible teeth, unseemly disclosed by the retracted lips” (Z; 96). Lilith, who “lives by the 
blood and lives and souls of men” (L: 148), becomes the white leech, sustained by a 
vampiric feeding upon Vane36 (an image also invoked in Stoker’s Dracula, with the Count 
being described as “gorged with blood; he lay like a filthy leech, exhausted with his 
repletion” [Z>: 60]).37 The act is always sexual -  in both Dracula and Lilith. “[H]er mouth 
wore a look of satisfied passion; she wiped from it a streak of red” (Z: 133), Vane observes 
of Lilith, in the latter text, after one such feed. This process is reciprocated, ft/rectional, as he 
further confesses to experiencing a post-coital feeling: “Gradually the pain ceased. A 
slumberous weariness, a dreamy pleasure stole over me” (Z: 110). He too, it seems, is 
vampiric, having been sustained, for a time, by his visual feeding off the unresponsive 
sepulchre of flesh; the ivory tower of Lilith-as-corpse. As with the three female vampires of 
Dracula, who inspire an alarming ambivalence of feeling in their (male) prey (“a deliberate 
voluptuousness which was both thrilling and repulsive” [D: 47], “a wicked, burning desire” 
[Z>: 47], an “intolerable, tingling sweetness” [Z>: 47]), Lilith encourages Vane’s participation 
in her monstrous scheme. Like Harker, Vane is compelled to desire penetration, albeit an 
unnatural piercing from a female who, as Christopher Craft (writing on Dracula) suggests, 
has usurped the masculine prerogative to a dominant, aggressive appetite, manifested in her 
bisexed mouth.38 Craft describes that, “[w]ith its soft flesh barred by hard bone, its red 
crossed by white, [the vampire’s] mouth compels opposites and contrasts [femininity and 
masculinity] into a frightening unity” (Craft, 1999: 96). Accordingly, Stoker describes the
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female vampires’ phallic “white teeth” encased in vaginal “ruby.. .lips” (D: 46). As Harker 
“close[s] [his] eyes in a languorous ecstasy and wait[s] -  wait[s] with [a] beating heart” (D: 
47) of anticipation, so too Vane awaits Lilith’s animation. He suspects that he might already 
be the object of her penetrative and emasculating gaze -  “Then I bethought me that her eyes 
had been a little open.. .it might be she was awake and holding them close!” (Z: 104) -  and 
derives pleasure from the thought, desiring to implement a relationship with her wherein he 
is the “child whose mother pretends to abandon him” (Z: 110), wherein he might undertake 
the role of a feminine passivity to masochistically become her “slave” (Z: 110).39
Lilith, sustained by blood, becomes the pre-Oedipal mother who returns eternally 
replenished, eternally youthful and beautiful to fulfil with her son their mutual incestuous 
desires. As the infant feeds from the maternal breast, so too the Terrible mother turns upon 
the ‘parasite’ for sustenance. Significantly, even though both Lilith and Vane want to feed, 
both expressing a cannibalistic instinct, such desire in the female is considered transgressive: 
she is rendered a nymphomaniac, her atavistic hunger posing a threat as it targets the vital 
fluid of man’s seminal energies. She becomes a menace to both narrative and social order 
and must necessarily be eliminated by the hero.
The act of feeding is, furthermore, transmissive if Lilith’s black-spotted hand is to be 
considered an unholy stigmata -  as a wound she re-creates upon Vane as she bites into his 
cheek. Her hungry mouth images the vagina dentata, the toothed, female genitals which 
symbolise the all-devouring (the penis-devouring) woman.40 This is the mouth of two 
potentially deadly mothers, expressing both the cannibalistic, oral-sadistic mother (who 
threatens to devour her young) and the pre-Oedipal mother (who threatens to [symbolically] 
engulf her young). Lilith epitomises the former. “I will not repent”, she says, “I will drink 
the blood of thy child” (Z: 149). She is a literal mother herself: of angelic (Lona, whom she 
murders) and demonic offspring. The latter, when she has been imprisoned by Vane, come in 
search of her: “Monsters uprose on all sides... every beak and claw out-stretched, every 
mouth agape. Long-billed heads, horribly jawed faces, knotty tentacles innumerable” (Z: 
211). These creatures bear a maternal resemblance as physical medusas -  one has a “dreadful
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head with fleshy tubes for hair, and...a, great oval mouth” (Z: 211-2), another a “long neck, 
on the top of which, like the blossom of some Stygian lily, sat what seemed the head of a 
corpse, its mouth half open, and full of canine teeth” (Z: 212). Like their mother (of whose 
dangerous power they are a literal projection), they threaten castration, they threaten to 
undermine the integrity of the (masculine) body, their hair phallically empowered, their 
mouths baring hungry teeth. Lilith must herself be dismembered, sealed and decapitated, her 
mouth infibulated, her head (one sight of which turned Vane momentarily to stone) removed. 
(Whilst she retains wholeness, Vane’s own bodily/psychical integrity is at her mercy). Her 
offending hand, which corttains the stolen waters of life, must be literally cut off. (While she 
retains wholeness, a death-sentence is imposed upon the land). The severance of this hand 
(or appropriated phallus) signifies the necessary extraction of the castration-threatening teeth 
of the vagina dentata\ the deformation of her sexualisation cast out of sight, out of language: 
a violation disguised as curative. Lilith, the threatening ‘phallic mother’, the fantasised 
omnipotent maternal, must be castrated, to permit the restoration of order. According to 
Freudian psychoanalysis, the child, unaware of anatomical difference, initially believes both 
males and females to have penises. Visual evidence undermines this theory (proving that 
girls do not), and the boy concludes that a mutilation has occurred. In order to explain his 
‘presence’ and her ‘lack’, the boy conceptualises ‘castration’, thus affirming his (narcissistic) 
phallic mastery or universality.41 Vane/Adam/God must operate on that which challenges 
this theory, literally cutting away that which has resisted being cut.
Prior to the reality of her castration, Lilith attempts to sustain her empowering masculinity 
through a reparation of her broken body into impenetrable solidarity. She employs a mirror 
as a potentially unifying device, as it is in the mirror -  as Lacanian psychoanalysis suggests -  
that identities are made or broken, depending on one’s experiences of mis/recognition.
Lacan, briefly, in explaining the socialisation of the subject, describes the necessary 
migration from the realm of the ‘imaginary’ (where the infant inhabits a symbiotic state, pre- 
differentiation) to the realm of the ‘symbolic’ (the locus of language and representation), via
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the ‘mirror stage*. During the ‘mirror stage* (which is instigated by the intervention of the 
Name-of-the-Father,42 which asserts an already patriarchally-determined societal destiny), 
the infant comes to identify the Other in the mirror as being both oneself and not-oneself, 
and attains subjectivity.43 Lilith narcissistically affirms her own beauty in this mirror, which 
permits her an idealised, as opposed to realistic, reflection.44 “[WJhat she called thinking 
required a clear consciousness of herself, not as she was, but as she chose to believe herself; 
and to aid her in the realisation of this consciousness, she had suspended.. .a mirror to 
receive the full sunlight reflected from her person” (Z: 182-3, emphasis in original). Lilith, 
following the Lacanian model, is condemned to self-wwrecognition.
Lilith’s relationship with her mirror serves, in a sense, to undermine her status as 
monstrous feminine: as the vampire, according to a superstition plundered, for example by 
Adelbert von Chamisso (1781-1838) and E.T.A. Hoffmann (1776-1822)45 casts no shadow. 
(In Dracula, likewise, Harker discovers this fact when the Count fails to appear in his 
“shaving-glass” [D: 35]: “[T]here was no reflection of him in the mirror! The whole room 
behind me Was displayed; but there was no sign of a man in it, except myself’ [D: 35]). 
However, Lilith’s mirror also asserts her monstrosity as, through aligning her with the sun 
rather than with the moon, she is (chaotically) masculinised.
Lilith fails in her attempted self-reunification. Her mirror betrays her (according to an 
infeminative perspective). Vane indirectly maligns her as the nothingness/absence of her 
female sex, when he metaphorically traverses her hostile body in his necessary passage via 
darkness and into the light of eternal life. She comes to be imaged as the “Bad Burrow” (Z: 
47), which is a “den of monsters” (Z: 209), or as the ‘monstrous feminine’.46 In the Bad 
Burrow, Vane encounters “an animal like a tiger.. .showing his white teeth in a soundless 
snarl” (Z: 48), a “large serpent.. .covered from head to distant tail with feathers of glorious 
hues” (Z: 49), and a “worm... [like] a polar bear.. .with a white mane to its red neck” (Z: 49). 
These constitute three images of the threatening (Lilithian) mother: biting, phallic, 
enormous. The fourth and final apparition, however, appears explicitly (and positively,
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according to Vane’s perspective) feminine: “the form of a woman” cloaked in a “white mist” 
(L: 50). The beauty of this woman’s face seemingly assuages for Vane the fact that her eyes 
are dead47 (and consequently shall always refuse to reflect his completed image back to him), 
yet he is inexplicably drawn towards her. Vane perhaps identifies her (falsely) as being that 
which he seeks: the ghost of the lost mother. He runs towards her, but stops, as this cruel 
parody of the maternal body suddenly and violently fragments: “A moment more and her 
legs, hurrying from her body, sped away serpents. From her shoulders fled her arms as in 
terror, serpents also. Then something flew up from her like a bat, and when I looked again, 
she was gone” (L: 50). Not a symbol of primordial wholeness, but evincing a (teratologised, 
monstrosised) body in disintegration, this fourth image, who “leav[es]” him in hostile 
“shadow” (L: 50), confirms for Vane that he is indeed “abandoned in a strange world” (.L:
45), an orphan in both realms of his experience. Vane later describes the Bad Burrow as a 
“fearful hollow”, the womb wherein “once had wallowed the monsters of the earth” (L: 244). 
He identifies these creatures as “abortions”, as a “horrid brood” (L: 244), as children rejected 
by the Terrible mother who themselves can but become monstrous -  as the child “leam[s] 
from the mother what it is to be [in/]human” (David Holbrook, 1991: 28).
The abyss is penetrated by Vane and he finally emerges unscathed, his masculinity intact. 
Following his temporary engulfment, he is permitted to return to his desired ‘home’. 
MacDonald conceptualises places of ‘home’ and ‘not home’, of ‘worlds’ and ‘otherworlds’ 
in both Lilith and Phantastes** Vane comes to recognise the presence of co-existent worlds, 
under, behind, beyond; worlds accessible through various portals, through orificial entrances 
and exits. The transition between ‘heres’ and ‘theres’ is made by Vane through books in 
libraries and mirrors in attics. The threshold divides to sustain order, preventing the ‘other 
side’ from infecting the space of the measured and known self. The threshold, as David 
Holbrook asserts, is the doorway into the ‘paradise lost’ of the maternal body.49 Across the 
threshold, the orphan can seek and find that which he has prematurely (for it is always a 
premature happening) lost.
The orphan (Vane) enters the otherworld to locate and restore the dead to life -  a
dangerous enterprise as it is “the mother who [already] rejected the child by dying” 
(Holbrook, 1991:27), and who, revived, might live to reject him still. Vane encounters 
various manifestations of the maternal: the destructive mother who is averse to creation; the 
castrating mother, her capacity for medusan petrifaction enabling her to rule a Bulikan 
empire of stone; the nurturing, wisdom-imparting, life-initiating mother; the sexually 
desirable (but sexually unattainable) mother. The Kleinian ‘good breast’ (the pure “delicious 
little fruits’* [Z: 59] from the hands of the Little Ones) and the ‘bad’ (the heady, stupor- 
inducing wine given to him by Lilith [Z: 132]) are both offered within MacDonald’s 
gynoscape (a ‘landscape’ encompassing the menacing, predatory female body and the 
enticing sanctuary of the female body). Vane must take his chances with each. The space of 
death must be penetrated, the lost mother relocated, even if she might offer him the poisoned 
milk of the ‘bad breast’ which will threaten his being; even if she might manifest to him the 
deficiency, the ‘lack’ of the maternal body that threatens the totality of his (the child’s) own. 
Doubts are over-shadowed by needs; by the orphan’s primal, oral needs (which evoke an 
image of vampiric [but reciprocated] transmission, a system of mother-child mutual 
parasitism). The orphan is compelled to find his way ‘home’ to once-known intra-uterine 
existence. His selfhood might be challenged -  the mother reminds him that he was once a 
part of another self, a part of her body ^  however, the threat of death is the last seduction, 
feared as the abyss, the hole, the nothingness of the female genitalia, but desired because it 
enables the incomplete man to return to a state of union. It is the inability to die, the inability 
to return to an antenatal slumber which Vane must overcome in order to be ‘spiritualised’. 
Only when he is ready to submit to death will he be returned ‘home’: to the “ever so far 
away in the palm of [his] hand” (Z: 45).50
In conclusion, the bodily ‘landscape’ explored and experienced by MacDonald’s male 
narrator-protagonist Vane is, by turns, classifiable as sexuality, as fertility, as decay. In 
Lilith, the gynoscape is dis/embodied by several principal female characters: by the idealised 
sexless but productive virgin figure, the threateningly aggressive sexual figure, the female
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bodiless, the female all-body. There are instances of defiant sexuality (Lilith’s initial 
position), of sexuality repented and absolved (Eve and Mara, the purified and mariologised 
women), of sexuality unknown (the eternal child Lona). There are tropes of male-authored 
sexualisation (Lilith’s fetishised, lifeless corpse; the child Lona’s ‘grooming’ for wife-status; 
the exposure of the naked body of Mara). Equally, male operations of de-sexualisation are 
implemented when ‘necessary’ (Lona’s being sustained as a child to facilitate her 
idealisation as pure; Eve’s being imaged maternally, as opposed to being carnally defined; 
Lilith’s final male-induced sleep; Mara’s physicality being classified only by her milk and 
tears).
The feminine gynoscape supports a dialectic of life and death: the nurturing mothers Eve 
and Mara, and the devouring mother Lilith; the fecund forest home of the silvanian Little 
Ones and the dead city Bulika; and, most significantly, Vane’s eventual rebirth and the death 
that permits this.
3 GynoScaping Phantastes
Likewise, in Phcmtastes, female characters constitute MacDonald’s gynoscape, variously 
classified as fertility and sterility, as life and death. Although I shall wish to identify these 
operations in the course of my investigation, my analysis of the Phantastesian gynoscape 
shall begin with chronological intentions. I shall chart (approximately after the 
Bildtmgsroman mode)51 the various movements of Anodos’ journey into personal discovery, 
into spiritual maturity, to which he has recourse to return to the symbolic maternal body. 
Necessary deviations from this structure shall be made, nevertheless, along the way, where 
theoretical or intertextual references are of pertinence. Again, where episodes are of greater 
significance to my later concern of ‘GynEscapes’, their analysis shall be suspended.
To begin at the beginning, however, Anodos is initiated into gynoscopic exploration on the 
day of his official ascension to adulthood: his twenty-first birthday. His paternal inheritance 
is symbolically connoted by his receipt of phallic “keys” (P: 13), which shall unlock the
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secrets of a “long-hidden world” (P: 15), and command him to conduct an act of penetration. 
Anodos must enter -  enabled by the power-bestowing, authority/authenticity-providing 
phallic keys -  a “chamber” (P: 13), investing it with “the first lights that had been there for 
many a year” (P: 13-14).52 This chamber signifies perhaps the mother’s genitals which, 
“since [his] father’s death.. .had been left undisturbed” (P: 14) -  both by coitus (the vagina) 
and by pregnancy (the womb). The metaphor enacts a repressive function, occulting that 
which should remain out of sight, so that the vagina (and the womb beyond it) becomes an 
explicit cavernous room. Anodos does not consciously acknowledge the maternal presence 
implicitly suggested by this space. His conscious motivation is indeed paternally-inspired, so 
that the secrets he identifies are his fathers’: the stoiy he seeks being one of his patrilineagp. 
Nevertheless, he enters “with a strange mingling of reverence and curiosity” (P: 14); 
“Perhaps, like a geologist” (P: 14), perhaps like a gynaecologist. He desires to know, to 
penetrate that which “lay shrouded in a mystery” (P: 14), to pass through the “deepest folds” 
(P: 14), which sustain an almost unnatural darkness, a darkness which only blackens further 
when he attempts illumination. Crossing the vaginal threshold, Anodos becomes enveloped 
by an oppressive and uncompromising womb. Despite his best efforts to bring strong, 
conquering, masculine light to the scene, he must admit to the inferiority of his (mere) 
“tapers” which “seemed to throw yet darker shadows into the hollows” (P: 14). His 
movements towards satiation are thwarted, his endeavour “to learn how [his] father, whose 
personal history was unknown to [him], had woven his web of stoiy” (P: 14) temporarily 
denied. All that might be concluded at this stage, and ascertained as unquestionable fact, is 
that this “story” can only be retrieved via the mother and her metaphoric body. The paternal 
story, with which Anodos intends to furnish his own, is to be located within this, the 
maternal bodyscape. The father’s story is, in part at least, his story -  the story of the father’s 
fathering Anodos. In this sense, the story of Anodos itself dwells in the maternal space. He is 
compelled to probe deeper, to uncover “the secret of this long-hidden world” (P: 15), in spite 
of (and because of) an impending sensation “gathering around [him] as if the dead were
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drawing near” (P: 14). He recognises the necessity of an act of aggression (imaging an 
uninvited defloration, or repeating the violent parental coition, as perceived by the infant, 
which reveals castration), targeting the supposed locus of the chamber’s mystery: “One of 
the rusty hinges cracked and broke as I opened the door” (P: 15). The literal cabinet 
containing his father’s papers and the metaphoric vagina resist his actions, until he locates a 
suitably brutal and phallic tool, “discover[ing] at last a scarcely projecting point of steel on 
one side” (P: 15): “I pressed this repeatedly and hard with the point of an old tool that was 
lying near, till at length it yielded inwards; and the little slide, flying up suddenly, disclosed a 
chamber” (P: 15). Inside he encounters “a little heap of withered rose-leaves, whose long- 
lived scent had long since departed” (P: 15), in addition to the sought papers.53 The 
colourless papers are themselves compared with the dead roses, and neither is touched by a 
“fear[ful]” (P: 16) Anodos, who connects both with “oblivion” (P: 16). Both (potential) 
maternal vagina and paternal penis are symbolically revealed as inert -  the roses and papers 
considered lifeless, and not to be animated or vitiated by Anodos’ (living) touch. Anodos 
physically recoils -  “I leaned back in my chair” (P: 16) -  withdrawing his initially bold, 
curiosity-driven penetration. If the paternal penis has met with devastating devivifying 
conclusions, his (as direct heir) might be at risk of a similar fate. Whilst unquestionably 
identifiable as his father’s papers (this womb-chamber is patriarchal property), thus 
reasonably associated with the phallus, the rose-leaves are a less solidly certifiable symbol. 
Although the rose itself operates as an effective vaginal emblem, what Anodos finds are 
mere leaves -  memories of unity, or derivatives, ancillary to the holistic vaginal 
representation. The rose is fragmented. The vagina is fragmented. Petals, thorns, leaves. Lips 
and teeth. The leaves might be impotent, bloodless lips, drained of signs of life, of scent and 
colour. They might be mythical teeth, separated from a mobilising mouth, unable to sustain 
the vaginal threats of vampirism and castration. In any case, the detachment of these leaves 
from their originary consolidation has the fatal outcome of decay -  a disintegration perhaps 
enforced by parental coition. The paternal papers (post-coitally “small” \P: 15] and 
“colourfless]” [P: 16], with phallic blood-flow having long ceased) have survived intact. The
maternal rose, however, is dust. Vaginas, when they are associated with sexuality/carnality 
or expulsion (as opposed to the passage into maternal uterine security) are expendable. The 
orphan desires to retreat not into this hostile (because ambiguous) space but (in a reversal of 
the birth process; in a second-chance gestation) into the privileged non-erotic maternal 
womb. The dangers implicated in the vagina become apparent for Anodos, following the 
logic that it poses a (castrative) threat to wholeness (thus demanding the paternal 
intervention that would authorise its own destruction).
After his initial exploration of his inherited space, his father’s chamber, Anodos retreats to 
a space of which he is already master: his bedroom. “[I] went to my own room”, he admits, 
“and to bed” (P: 19, emphasis added). Now, rather than actively pursuing his sought 
otherworld (in this case, Faiiy Land), he awakens to find that it has found him. This space 
encroaches upon his own, making him its passive (feminised) recipient:
[A] stream of clear water was running over the carpet, all the length 
of the room, finding its Outlet I knew not where. And, stranger still, 
where this carpet, which I had myself designed to imitate a field of 
grass and daisies, bordered the course of the little stream, the 
grass-blades and daisies seemed to wave in a tiny breeze that followed 
the water’s flow. (P: 20)
The effect is uncanny: the space approximately follows pre-existing definitions (real daisies 
sprouting from fabric ones, according to a plan imagined and controlled by Anodos), yet also 
adhering to its own design. The space both resembles Anodos’ room and also violates its 
order, to operate in excess of its original state. It is the same room, a known room, yet 
somehow different, chaotic, unknown. Anodos’ immediate recognition of change is 
associated, significantly, with water (this episode follows his vision of a maternal sea in the 
eyes of a fairy? who promises his subsequent entry to Fairy Land). “While these strange 
events were passing through my mind, I suddenly, as one awakes to the consciousness that 
the sea has been moaning by him for hours.. .became aware of the sound of running water 
near me” (P: 20). His language comes to be infused with fluidity: “overflowing like a 
spring” (P: 20); “the water’s flow” (P: 20); “rivulet” (P: 20); “motion of the changeful
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current” (P: 20-1); “dissolve” (P: 21); “fluent as the waters” (P: 21); “sinking sea-wave” (P: 
22). The maternal, amniotic waters extend to Anodos, who has now reached the age of 
maturity, and is embarking on adulthood. These waters, to which he refers, are initiatory, 
instigating his journey into the gynoscape, the traversal of which shall permit his ascension 
into adult being. Water has numerous significances, as Mircea Eliade describes, in defining 
its role in religious symbolism:
In water everything is ‘dissolved’, every ‘form’ is broken up, 
everything that has happened ceases to exist; nothing that was 
before remains after immersion in water, not an outline, not a 
‘sign’, not an event. Immersion is the equivalent, at the human 
level, of death at the cosmic level, of the cataclysm (the Flood) 
which periodically dissolves the world into the primeval ocean.
Breaking up all forms, doing away with the past, water possesses 
this power of purifying, of regenerating, of giving new birth...
(cited in Douglas, 1966: 162)
Water performs, therefore, a spiritual function in the economy of initiation, constituting a 
baptism, which cleanses but also signifies a death: of former states, selves, beings. It might 
be conceptualised as the deluge, which Jung suggests as an image of the unconscious, 
bursting through into consciousness54 -  as traumatic but necessary for individuation. It might 
be imaged as that which permits new beginnings, and as signifying a return: to origins, to 
original beginnings, to the amniosis of the womb. Jung reinforces this proposal that water 
might be subjected to multiple interpretations. “Psychologically.. .water means spirit that has 
become unconscious” (Jung 1959: 18-19), he asserts. Alternatively, “water is earthy and 
tangible, it is also the fluid of the instinct-driven body, blood and the flowing of blood, the 
odour of the beast, carnality heavy with passion” (Jung 1959: 19). Both Phantastes and 
Lilith permit the co-existence of a spiritual and corporeal analysis of water. Fluidity is 
granted a literal happening (the waters, for example, which consume Anodos’ bedroom, or 
the constant lachrymation of Mara), but, in reference to the abstract feminine 
conceptualisation of the gynoscape, it is also to be considered symbolically.
Lilith's Vane, like Anodos, commences his journey into the (otherworldly) gynoscape from
an ambiguous uterine space, “the main garret.. .whose gloom was thinned by a few lurking 
cob-webbed windows and small dusky skylights” (X: 10). This space is uncanny, being both 
“unexplored” (X: 10) and “[his] own” (X: 10), both unknown and known.55 His initial portal 
is fluid, a mirror which “reflected neither the chamber nor [his] own person” (X: 11), but 
which created an impression of “the wall melt[ing] away” (X: 11). However, it leads Vane 
not into a watery, maternal embrace but directly onto “a wild country, broken and heathy” 
(X: 11), a hostile “tract of moorland, flat and melancholy” (X: 11). Vane is confronted, upon 
entering this region, with a desolate and arid landscape. This parched terrain, he later 
discovers, has been deliberately and dramatically deprived of water. “Except the hot stream, 
two draughts in the cottage of the veiled woman, and the pools in the track of the wounded 
leopardess, I had not seen water since leaving home” (X: 128), he notes. Lilith has enforced 
drought upon the land, gathering all waters into the palm of her deformed hand.56 She 
monopolises fluidity, which extends to include her relationship with maternal milk and 
vampiric blood, deigning that there be “water in [her] palace, and not a drop in the city” (X: 
128). Her paedophagia (that is, the motivation behind her child-eating enterprise) 
implements a necessary cessation of maternal lactation (milk-production is impotent without 
babies to feed). Equally, her vampirism determines that blood is transfused rather than is 
permitted autonomous flow. She feeds upon Vane, as I have indicated, in the form of a white 
leech when he perceives her to be most inert (believing her a corpse). Later, “ [s]he seemed 
quite dead” (X: 192) and “[h]er hands were...“bound” (X: 192), yet she endeavours to 
continue her vampiric feast, again upon Vane. “Lilith was upon me... [W]ith her teeth she 
pulled from my shoulder the cloak Lona made for me, and fixed them in my flesh. I lay as 
one paralysed. Already the very life seemedflowing from me into her” (X: 192, emphasis 
added). Blood is not so much shed, then, as seamlessly transmitted, denying spillage and 
boundary-transgression.57 Fluid does not seem, in Lilith, to flow freely. Water is 
consequently a substance to be sought; to be fought for. Prior to its restoration and 
reinstatement as ‘divine fluid’ (“[w]ater came from heaven” [X: 129]), its appearance in the
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text is often mistrusted, due to its ambiguous status. It is variously perceived as deceptive 
(Lilith’s bath, which Vane suspects is “medicated” and “enchanted” [Z: 128]); as saviour and 
nourisher of evil (the stream which, although unsuitable for the sustenance of good, being an 
impossible drink for Vane due to its “strange metallic taste” [Z: 99], vitalises Lilith’s 
apparently lifeless body); as indicative of sorrow (Mara’s face, muffled to conceal her 
lachrymation, is suspected monstrous [Z: 73]); as associate of death (the bifurcated “dead 
river” [Z: 192], near which Lilith endeavours to again feed upon Vane). ‘Good’ water, in 
Lilith, is omnipresent (Vane hears its existence under the ground), but dormant, anticipated, 
concealed.
For Anodos, however, water exerts an immediate and self-evident presence. Fluidity, in 
Phantasiess is primarily associated with functional maternity, although the water metaphor is 
also proven to have duplicitous implications. Night, for example, is derogatorily described in 
the language of flux and motion. Anodos considers the night to consist of “hours that flow 
noiselessly over the moveless death-like forms of men and women and children” (P: 26, 
emphasis added), imaging “mortals” (P: 26) -  and, by implication, himself -  as passive and 
static; as acted upon by the irrevocable operations of time. Anodos indicates the oppressive 
nature of this type of fluidity, describing the inert sleeping bodies as “lying strewn and 
parted beneath the weight of the heavy waves of night, which flow on and beat them down, 
and hold them drowned and senseless, until the ebb-tide comes, and the waves sink away, 
back into the ocean of the dark” (P: 26-7). The night flows with an errant and chaotic 
rhythm, battering the senseless, supine body, until the (masculine) light reasserts a 
revitalising presence, re-establishing boundaries and restoring order. Anocjos shall, 
significantly, come to learn of his own ‘belonging’ to the night -  the fairies’ day -  due to his 
fairy blood.
Whether granted positive or negative association, however, the presence of water is 
affirmed through repeated reference. Anodos follows the course of his bedroom-stream, 
which guides him further into the gynoscape. His entry into a new woodland terrain (which
marks, simultaneously, his exit from the amniotic fluid) acquaints him with the potential 
hostility of the landscape: “The trees, which were far apart where I entered, giving free 
passage to the level rays of the sun, closed rapidly as I advanced” (P: 24). This forest 
symbolically attests (in its imaging of pubic hair) to the vaginal portal, a seemingly hostile 
space, which must be crossed to permit eventual womb (re-)entry. At first, Anodos is not 
daunted by penetrating this passage -  the trees are fragmented by sunlight, a masculine force 
of whiteness, lightness, goodness, rationality, clarity. However, upon entry, the trees 
conspire to form “a thick grating” (P: 24), “barr[ing] the sunlight out” (P: 24), illustrating a 
feminine victory over the light. This serves to divide Anodos from his masculinity. Already 
he is deactivated. “I seemed to be advancing”, he says, “towards a second midnight” (P: 24). 
He is advancing (that is, making forward steps), but is concurrently retreating -  his is a 
motion of degradation, diminution, a falling into the abyss. Any life contained within this 
domain is apparently dormant: “Everything sleeps and dreams now” (P: 26).
Anodos escapes, however, to encounter a mother figure who is willing to feed him. Her 
cottage is a forest within a forest, being “built of the stems of small trees set closely together, 
and.. .furnished with rough chairs and tables, from which even the bark had not been 
removed” (P: 28). (This recalls the earlier scene of the obstructive wooded mesh that 
imposed darkness upon Anodos. Such repetition serves to reinforce the conception of the 
gynoscape as a cyclical entity, which is an aspect of its femininity, commemorating female 
circularity, the rhythm o f ‘her’ menstruation, the uroboric configuration o f‘her’ genitals). Its 
occupant permits the hungry ‘child’ to partake of her food (the Good mother, of course, 
presents rather than withholds her potent and replete breast), alerting him, even, to “the 
homeliness of the fare” (P: 29, emphasis added). She further reinforces her matrilineal 
relationship to him by asserting their racial (blood) bond -  informing him of their common 
fairy origins (P: 28). Again, when Anodos expresses the “rash” (P: 31) decision to leave her, 
and to independently continue his journey, she permits the realisation of this need, allowing 
the (healthy) separation in spite of her maternal instinct to protect him from a potentially
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hostile exterior world.
Apart-mg and departing, Anodos enters a forest, which proves equally maternally 
accommodating, being illuminated by the “unusually bright, and sight-giving” (P: 48) moon. 
This moon “send[s] a great many of her rays” (P: 48, emphasis added) in ordef to facilitate 
his passage. However, the forest also illustrates the dual potential of Mother Nature58 as the 
moon becomes obscured by the “filmy vapour” (P: 50) of clouds. Anodos, consequently, is 
subjected to the will of the Terrible maternal, who embodies the hostile darkness (concealing 
his would-be annihilator, the shadowy Ash).59
The duplicitous, ambivalent mother is also evident in the character of the marble lady, 
whom Anodos encounters after escaping the forest darkness. Anodos enters an apparently 
positive womb-space, “a rocky cell, all the angles rounded away with rich moss” (P: 65): a 
Good maternal environment, which provides liim with a water source that he interprets as the 
“elixir of life” (P: 65). In this cavern he discovers the partially concealed form of a marble 
lady, which he -  in an explicitly “Pygmalion” (P: 65) enterprise,60 recalling Vane’s 
‘restoration’ of corpse-Lilith -  (re)animates. This episode I shall examine in depth in the 
following ‘GynEscapes’ chapter, nevertheless, I shall indicate now the bearing that this 
marble lady shall have upon Anodos’ gynoscape-quest. She is of particular significance for 
two main reasons. First, this is because she is transformative, inhabiting, or seeming to 
inhabit, the various forms of other female characters, allowing her repeated identification 
with the maternal. Second, when she flees from him, the focus of Anodos’ quest shifts: to be 
principally motivated by the desire for her recovery. The marble lady, in this way, becomes 
the mother he explicitly seeks; a mother he can best identify as his own psychic projection, 
as she is literally created by him. With reference to her transformations, briefly, she is 
granted both positive and negative associations. She visually images the “tiny woman-form, 
as perfect in shape as if she had been a small Greek statuette roused to life and motion” (JP:
16) of Anodos’ fairy grandmother. (This woman had appeared to him on the morning of his 
birthday to instruct him that the lost maternal was to be located in Fairy Land). Her form is
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also adopted by the treacherous “Maiden of the Alder-tree” (P: 76), “befool[ing]” (P: 86) 
Anodos into believing that he is in the company of his would-be lover, the white lady. Being, 
furthermore, a woman who “will smother” men “with her web of hair” (P: 25), she might be 
considered an inversion of the Beech-maiden, who wraps Anodos with a protective tress.61 
Through the combination of her medusan hair, her pallor and, indeed, her very powers of 
transformation, the marble lady (when negatively perceived) might also be compared with 
Lilith.
Anodos’ compulsion to follow the woman temporarily prevents his progression, as it 
causes him to re-tread ground. His story not only repeats that of, for example, the 
(meta)fictional and intratextual Percival (the Arthurian knight who is similarly seduced 
through her adoption of the white lady guise), but also that of the fictional and intertextual 
Vane. Anodos surrenders the Good maternal environs of the fluid-containing cavern in order 
to pursue an illusion, quitting, like Vane, the spiritual sleep of immortality he had begun to 
enjoy within the ‘womb’ for a material and mortal pursuit. He does momentarily return to 
the positive embrace of the Great Mother, but is urged on by a desire for physical union. 
“Earth drew me towards her bosom; I felt as if I could fall down and kiss her. I forgot I was 
in Fairy Land, and seemed to be walking in a perfect night of our own old nursing earth” (P: 
77). The intangibility of this ‘mother’ proves all too apparent, and Anodos, even “in the 
midst of this ecstasy.. .remember[s] that... [somewhere] sat the lady of the marble.. .waiting 
(might it not be?) to meet [him]” (P: 78).
Rejecting this embrace proves catastrophic, as Anodos, led away from it by the white lady 
he perceives to be his beloved, is “nearly slain” (P: 86) by the Ash. Immediately following 
this, the landscape becomes alien and indifferent to him. “The birds were singing; but not for 
me. All the creatures spoke a language of their own, with which I had nothing to do” (P: 87); 
“there was no well to cool my face” (P: 87); “the daylight was hateful to me” (P: 87).
This situation is partially overcome when Anodos locates a farm, a hermaphroditic symbol, 
feminine in its productivity, its fecundity, its creative and nutritive capacity, but masculine in
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its civilisation of the natural world. “The sun was high... shining over a wide, undulating, 
cultivated country...Everything was radiant with clear sunlight” (P: 97), Anodos observes. 
The farm functions (albeit transiently) as a welcome antidote to the hostile, dark, uncivilised, 
chaotic femininity he had earlier encountered. It affirms his (masculine) rationality, so that 
he is able to announce: “I did not believe in Fairy Land” (P: 97). This perspective is rapidly 
reversed as he experiences a nostalgic yearning (nostalgia, connoting a longing for home);62 
as a femininely fluid “tide” or “gush of wonderment and longing” (P: 99) anoints him, 
recalling his literal lost mother, with whom he associates water. Earlier, whilst gazing into 
the eyes of his faiiy grandmother, he had “remembered somehow that [his] mother died 
when [he] was a baby” (P: 19). “I looked deeper and deeper [into the fairy’s eyes], till they 
spread around me like seas, and I sank in their waters... ‘Surely there is such a sea 
somewhere!’ said I to myself. A low sweet voice beside me replied -  ‘In Fairy Land, 
Anodos’ ” (P: 19). Fairy Land now reasserts its hold over him, “[drawing him] towards it 
with an irresistible attraction” (P: 99).
Anodos leaves the farm cottage, intent on re-penetrating the forest, his “spirits” (along with 
the phallus of his restored masculinity) “[rising]” (P: 101) in the process. Rather than 
continuing to cower in the safety of the sun-infused environment provided by the farm, 
Anodos confronts directly his anxieties regarding femininity. He submerges himself in the 
blackness.
The binary opposition of light and dark is -  as I havfe already indicated -  hierarchically 
dualised in MacDonald’s writings, so that the latter is postulated as inferior; so that darkness 
can be only light*s other, denied existence in its own right. Whilst light is admitted operation 
as a symbol of masculine transcendence, darkness, on the other hand, is feminine, the 
irrational and chaotic counter to masculine reason and order.63 This serves to uphold the 
Manichean principles of the Judeo-Christian tradition: the dichotomy of good versus evil, 
whereby light, God, the masculine, the soul are posited in opposition with darkness, Satan, 
the feminine, the body.64 (Likewise, in Stoker’s Dracula the vampire is defined by Van
Helsing as “a blot on the face of God’s sunshine” [D: 242]).65
Examples of black/white polarisation, of course, abound in both Lilith and Phantastes. In 
the former, MacDonald defames Lilith’s felinity (connecting her with the ravenous and 
merciless black-spotted leopardess), whilst portraying Mara (who is identified as a cat- 
woman) as an embodiment of goodness. Mara is associated with a white leopardess, whose 
fighting of the (black) other, in order to spare the Bulikan infants from Lilith’s hunger, 
constitutes an affirmation of life. Mara’s white leopardess, furthermore, conducts an act of 
reverse-vampirism, nourishing the very sources that the Lilithian black-spotted equivalent 
would deplete. “I was wakened by something leaping upon me, and licking my face with the 
rough tongue of a feline animal”, Vane relates. “ ‘It is the white leopardess! ’ I thought. ‘She 
is come to suck my blood!... ’ But.. .a pleasant warmth instead began to diffuse itself through 
me” (L: 124).
Lilith, nevertheless, is ambiguous in her appearance, fluctuating in description between 
black and white association (with black and with fair hair, with spotted and with spotless 
skin). Before she is ‘redeemed’, she is evil, thus is an agent of blackness66 (a spiritual 
condition that manifests itself as a tainted body). She is also associated with the satanic Great 
Shadow,67 a figure who prowls the streets of Bulika, and silently monitors the Lilithian 
spotted leopardess’ infanticides. Although MacDonald defines her as having originally 
escaped from Adam, in order to unfetter herself from a position of abject passivity to a male 
‘owner’, Lilith’s relationship with her consort, the Shadow, is another (albfeit black) prison. 
The resultant submission occurs in spite of the fact that she initiated the affiliation, having 
“so ensnared the heart of the great Shadow, that he became her slave, wrought her will, and 
made her queen of Hell” (L: 148). “I will do as my Self pleases -  as my Self desires” (Z:
199), she later asserts. “You will do as the Shadow, overshadowing your Self inclines you?” 
(Z: 199), taunts Adam, in response. The Shadow’s identification, ironically, as another man, 
undermines her claim to autonomous being.
It is only after her ‘redemption’ that Lilith can shed this Shadow, this blackness, and be
truly associated with a positive whiteness68 (a spiritual whiteness, as opposed to the death- 
pallor of her material state); a ‘redemption’ via castration, at the hands of Vane/Adam/God. 
The result of this operation this masculine trinity deem ‘whiteness’, thus conflating gendered 
and racial hierarchies. Lilith’s body, although previously linked with the spotted leopardess, 
is now ‘cleansed’, draped in a “white creature” (L: 220), “Mara’s leopardess” (L: 220).
“[W]e laid the beauty [Mara’s white leopardess] across the feet of the princess, her fore- 
paws outstretched and her head couching between them” (L: 220). Whilst the spotted 
leopardess was symbolically indicative of moral corruption (a literal testament to blackness 
encroaching on whiteness),69 the white operates as a figure for salvation. (Lilith is ‘saved’ 
even though she is literally cloaked in ‘base’ bestiality. The employment of an [otherwise 
perhaps degrading] animal image in conjunction with redemption is validated when an 
association is made with the Biblical conceptualisation of Jesus as a sacrificial [white] 
lamb).
In Phantasies, also, the shadow is associated with a feminine evil. Anodos describes the 
(thereby feminised) male Ash-shadow’s appearance in bestial language, “the 
fingers.. .[being] like the claws of a wild animal, as if in uncontrollable longing for some 
anticipated prey” (P: 51), “[t]he hand [being] uplifted in the attitude of a paw” (P: 51). Such 
descriptions of the Ash-beast recall those of the Lilith-beast (in her leopardess capacity -  in 
which guise she was also illustrated as colluding with a shadow). Anodos, furthermore, 
comes to associate the Ash-shadow with vampires -  he was earlier warned of its “greed[y]” 
(P: 33) nature -  which again suggests similarities with the bloodthirsty Lilith. “It reminded 
me of what I had heard of vampires; for the face resembled that of a corpse more than 
anything else I can think of’ (P: 52). Like those of the beautiful corpse Lilith, “[t]he features 
were rather handsome” (P: 52), however, the male- sexed shadow’s feminine characteristics 
particularly contribute to its corrupted and distorted effect. Anodos focuses on the shadow’s 
lascivious and vampiric mouth, which suggests -  as I indicated earlier, with reference to 
Craft’s study of Stoker’s vampire -  a visual bisexuality. This conflation of the male and
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female constitutes a transgression of the ‘either/or’ (patriarchally-perceived) fundamental 
law of gender, making it monstrous and chaotic according to Anodos’ perception. The male- 
with-vagina (as attested to by the mouth) is comparable with the "phallic female’. This 
vagina (being vampiric) does not testify to the inert ‘absence’ which would suggest a 
deactivation of the male’s potency. Rather, it is an active and aggressive eater, visually 
accompanied by (penis-imaging) fingers. “Especially I remarked, even in the midst of my 
fear, the bulbous points of the fingers” (P: 50), notes Anodos. The fingers comprise the large 
hand, in which form the shadow attacks (the mouth, however, is part of an inner figure, 
visible “in the central parts” [P: 51]). This would suggest an external and dominant male 
sexing, which contains a hidden (vaginal, thus invisible, abyssal) feminine aspect: posing a 
secondary threat to Anodos’ integrity. Whilst the masculine hand (with five penises unlike 
Anodos’ singular member) threatens to crush, to discipline, to chastise, the female vagina 
threatens to engulf and devour. And, together, the fingers provide the mouth with the 
necessary teeth image, which would enable both the de-vitalisation (and emasculation) 
permitted by (bi-gendered) vampiric feeding, and the castration at the mercy of the toothed- 
vagina. “The lips were of equal thickness... [and] they looked slightly swollen. They seemed 
fixedly open, but were not wide apart” (P: 52). Anodos’ description of the shadow’s mouth, 
which he identifies as a particular site of horror, is, then, clearly vulval. Engorged with 
blood, its lips establish a metonymic link with the vampire, which is itself (or herself) 
defined predominantly by its “haemosexual” (Frayling, 1991:388) activity. The lips are 
permanently parted, as the immortal vampire requires blood-sustenance (and speech) for 
eternity. They are not, howeVer, opened to the extent that would suggest separation, division 
-  the mouth retains its integrity, refusing to confer an image of negation, which would 
otherwise perhaps constitute an acknowledgement of its supposed origin as male-inflicted 
wound. Despite the lips’ visible plurality, their duality, in their retained proximity they 
prevent a disruptive (and silencing -  with vocality being dependent upon not only their 
opening but the inteijection of this with moments of closure) divisibility.
In addition to this monstrously feminised Ash-hand, Anodos is subsequently confronted
with another shadow, even more destructive to the integrity of his identity than the first. This 
shadow literally bifurcates him into black and white. This shadow is his own.70 Disobeying a 
feminised Bluebeard, who forbids his passage into a particular room of her cottage, Anodos 
is seized upon by his own shadow. This shadow proves dominant, manipulating his actions 
and distorting his motivations. However, it is eventually cast off as inferior, as second, as 
feminine, when Anodos, like Lilith, comes to be ‘redeemed’.
With regard to darkness (and marking a return to chronological analysis), Anodos’ 
decision to leave the masculine light of the farm, and to confront shadows, is motivated by a 
penetrative desire. This penetration of blackness, he hopes, shall enable him to reclaim the 
masculinity undermined by the Terrible mother, the Alder-maiden. Her utilisation of the Ash 
in her attack upon Anodos was as a phallus. Her possession of this symbolic appendage 
(which does not belong to her, but is appropriated from the male body of the Ash) serves as a 
visual threat of her castrative powers. Anodos consents, nevertheless, to sacrifice his 
physical body to the devouring feminine, to the darkness. This decision, however, causes 
him to be deposited into “a great hole in the earth” (P: 208), an “abyss” (P: 209) which 
images a threatening vagina with no “perceiv[able]...bottom” (P: 209), and which 
commands a “tortuous descent” (P: 209). This “infernal hole” (P: 216) is granted a direct 
birth/death association, visualised as both a “[birth] passage” (P: 220) and as a “tomb” (P: 
221), which Anodos describes as “recaU[ing]terrible dreams of childhood” (JP: 220).
Anodos is eventually delivered, albeit through tbe traumatic experience of a deathlike 
birth, into the care of Phantasies' most significant Good mother figure. At first identifying 
his surroundings (after expulsion from the ambiguous “hole”) with desolation, as “bare, and 
waste, and gray” (P: 220), as another “heaving abyss” (P: 222), Anodos comes to recognise 
the positive maternity of his new-found landscape. Initially attempting a suicidal surrender to 
the personified hostile mother of the sea, he receives a sudden intimation of the presence of 
the Good aspect of the Great Mother: “A blessing, like the kiss of a mother, seemed to alight 
on my soul; a calm, deeper than that which accompanies a hope deferred, bathed my spirit”
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(P: 222). This (grand)mother, as personified Nature,71 prevents Andodos from an 
annihilating engulfment. The “[amniotic] waters of themselves lifted me, as with loving 
arms, to the surface” (.P: 223), he notes. In these arms, Anodos sleeps, accompanied by 
“dreams of unspeakable joy” (P: 224); dreams which promise his salvation, telling “of 
restored friendships; of revived embraces; of love which said it had never died; of faces that
i
had vanished long ago, yet said with smiling lips that they knew nothing of the grave; of 
pardons implored, and granted” (P: 224-5). Anodos is anointed by these visions, these 
femininely fluid “bursting floods of love” (P: 225). He awakens in the physical arms of the 
wise old woman, who continues the redemptive (maternal) work of the dreams, taking his 
“head on her bosom” (P: 229), and permitting him to weep “happy tears” (P: 229); “feeding 
[him] like a baby5’ (P: 229); and singing him to sleep. This woman is paradigmatic of the 
benevolent mother, with whom union would mean the positive fulfilment of the gynoscape- 
ideal. “I was in Elysium”, Anodos describes, “with the sense of a rich soul upholding, 
embracing, and overhanging mine, full of all plenty and bounty. I felt as if she could give me 
everything I wanted; as if I should never wish to leave her, but would be content to be sung 
to and fed by her, day after day, as years rolled by” (P: 234-5). Being a Good mother, 
however, she is willing to release her child. Anodos feels “as if [he] were leaving [his literal] 
mother for the first time” (P: 250), and “weep[s] bitterly” (P: 250). The wise old woman 
invokes this response because, as the benevolent and universal Great Mother, she does not 
act as a substitute or surrogate for the literal mother: she is her.
Anodos leaves because he has earned his death, and now is his time. This death, like that 
experienced by Vane, is, paradoxically, life-affirming (or, rather, eternal-life affirming). “I 
breathed the clear mountain-air of the land of Death. I had never dreamed of such 
blessedness. It was not that I had in any way ceased to be what I had been... [I transcended] 
the old form!” (P: 310) This death is experienced as a return to Mother Earth, who welcomes 
and nurtures the prodigal son. “Now that I lay in her bosom, the whole earth, and each of her 
many births, was as a body to me.. .1 seemed to feel the great heart of the mother beating into
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mine, and feeding me with her own life, her own essential being and nature” (P: 312). 
Revelling in his liberation, Anodos is, however, torn from this maternal embrace -  his story, 
like Vane’s, shall have no ending within the confines of this narrative.72 Rather than an 
experience of his true death, this ‘return’ is merely instructive, advising Anodos on how 
to most profitably (in a spiritual sense) live, and providing him with a cleansed vision with 
which to perceive life. Following this tutelage, Anodos is sent away from Fairy Land, 
traumatically expelled from the womb, and delivered to the world of “common life” (P:
317). “[A] writhing as of death convulsed me; and I became once again conscious of a more 
limited, even a bodily and earthly life” (P: 314), he intimates of the trauma of birth. Anodos 
is transported from the uterine “state of ideal bliss” (P: 315) into life, its fetters of 
materiality, carnality and sexuality rendering it perhaps “the [feminine] world of shadows” 
(P: 315). Having been enlightened during his traversal of die gynoscape, these shadows are 
unable to consume, possess, or infect him with their (hostile feminine) blackness. 
Nevertheless, his “anxiet[ies]” (P: 318) are not entirely assuaged, nor does his new-found 
knowledge entirely obliterate his ignorance. He is suspended in a position of not-(yet)- 
knowing, which the text refuses to alleviate. Anodos’ “questions.. .cannot [be] answer[ed] 
yet” (P: 318) with univocality, thus multivocality (a matter I shall now address, in relation to 
potential MacDonaldian intertexts) remains the necessary mode of expression.
4 GyroScopics
MacDonald is himself keen to promote a multivocal approach to literature, making this fact 
explicit in his 1893 essay, ‘The Fantastic Imagination’. “Everyone...who feels the story, will 
read its meaning after his own nature and development: one man will read one meaning in it, 
another will read another”. Following this, MacDonald asks rhetorically, “how am I to assure 
myself that I am not reading my own meaning into it, but yours out of it?” He answers, 
“[w]hy should you be so assured? It may be better that you should read your meaning into 
it... [YJour meaning may be superior to mine” (MacDonald, 1999: 7). MacDonald refuses to
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assert fixed, self-privileging, author-as-gqd definitions. Indeed, he suggests that the recipient 
should take an active (perhaps Barthesian)73 role: that s/he should introduce his/her own 
readings to the text; that s/he should confer his/her own conditions and interpretations upon 
it; that s/he should be writer as well as reader.
This position of legitimised plurality permits, of course, the validity of infemination- 
reading/writing. It also permits, however, the bringing to the reading of the text readings of 
other texts, in an activity of intertextual interpretation (which shall now become my focus). It 
validates an endless influx that sustains the open-endedness of interpretation. This open- 
endedness visualises circularity over finity: the gyroscope (a feminine image whose 
implication in the masculine infeminative text reinforces my assertion that infemination need 
not be its only possible reading).74 As my concerns are not primarily with ‘solid’ ties 
between texts, with the concrete, external facts and data which consciously and rationally 
shape them (which strictly intertextual interpretation demands), my analyses of a selection of 
MacDonaldian ancillaries shall centre upon their textual (as opposed to historical or 
biographical) relevance to gynoscopic and/6r other gender concerns expressed in Lilith and 
Phantastes.
Commencing with an indication of thematic repetitions located in the core MacDonald 
texts, I shall progress via a consideration of several of his short fairytales, namely, ‘The Grey 
Wolf, ‘The Light Princess’, and ‘The History of Photogen and Nycteris’.75
4:i Primary GyroScopics
The gynoscape’s repetitive and recollective activity, its operation of doubling, comments 
on the very nature of Anodos’ quest, it being for a story already told. (“He has begun a story 
without a beginning, and it will never have an end” [P: 45], assert the fairy folk, indicating 
the inevitability of his outcome). Anodos longs for Faiiy Land without real hope of its 
existence, Until the ancestral fahy messenger reveals this place to be his pre-destined 
destination.
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Vane, too, is implicated in processes of repetition, of doubling. Foundational to his 
character, he admits, are “inherited...tendencies]” (Z: 5), which cause him to seek 
“analogies” (Z: 5) everywhere -  in both his dreams and waking life. Vane immediately (that 
is, before he even encounters a separate, second world) acknowledges the fact that duality 
informs his experience. He indicates, for example, the indisputable actuality of his literal 
inheritance (a “house” [Z: 5], an “ancient property” [Z: 6], a solid material gain), yet 
professes a belief in “the transitory nature of possession” (Z: 6, emphasis added). What 
appears real, static, immobile might yet be fluid, vital, mutable; what appears definite, 
factual, indisputable might yet suggest otherworldliness, unreality, fiction.
Vane (like Anodos) begins in a landscape of confrontation, alone (being orphaned, and 
temporally distanced from his ancestors), yet forced to accommodate (despite his singularity) 
duality. Lilith itself might be perceived as being fundamentally informed by the rhythms of 
repetition, duality, duplicity. The story of Lilith has, of course, Biblical and mythical origins: 
a story, insofar as its basic premise and characterisation, that is already told. In MacDonald’s 
Lilith, the major players from many of these earlier accounts are present: Adam, Eve, God 
(who exerts an implicit, invisible presence) and Lilith. Mortemalisation, also, is a repeated 
concern (with Lilith’s infamous infanticide being retained from tradition). Her assertion of 
independence from patriarchal authority is, again, evident (her claim to self-creation and 
desertion of her husband). Like her mythological predecessor, she lives, also, in seclusion, 
isolated in a hostile region, over which she reigns.
MacDonald manipulates this ‘original’ to produce an extended ‘copy’, a ‘second’ which 
echoes yet advances the stoiy. He contributes additional characters and issues previously 
unexplored in traditional, mythical reports, centring the narrative around his Mr Vane, 
composing a first-person account, thus reclaiming focus for the masculine subject and 
authority for his (infeminative) voice.
MacDonald’s Phantasies, although in a manner less direct and self-evident, might be 
understood as sharing Lilith's tendency to double. Firstly, its gynoscape is revealed as
68
inherently duplicitous -  a fact later communicated explicitly to Anodos by a knight:
“Somehow or other,” said he, “notwithstanding the beauty of this 
country of Faerie, in which we are, there is much that is wrong in it.
If there are great splendours, there are corresponding horrors; heights 
and depths; beautiful women and awful fiends; noble men and weaklings.”
(P: 295)
The Phantastesian gynoscape demonstrates the dual function of the ‘two’ : being an 
aggressive, chaotic and oppressive environment and providing the hero with the 
receptivity of an eventual maternal ‘home5. Tradition aligns the ‘two5 with femininity, 
evident not only in (feminist) notions of second-sexing and othering, but also asserted by the 
Pythagorean bisection of the universe. Pythagoras declared that odd numbers belong to the 
right side: associated with the limited, the fixed, the masculine, the straight, the light, the 
good; with the power of organic unity and mutual attraction. Even numbers, however, he 
relegated to the left side: the sphere of the infinite, the unlimited, the manifold, the mobile, 
the feminine, the crooked, darkness, evil; with the power of disparity and random disruption 
(Schimmel, 1993: 13).76 Whilst ‘one5, then, is an odd number (and masculine), ‘two5 is even 
(and feminine). If the ‘two5 is to be considered femininely gendered, it follows that anything 
that is doubled might be associated with the feminine.
In this way, the dualities which repeatedly inform MacDonaId5s textual terrains are 
indicative of femininity: transforming the neutral ‘landscape5 into the gendered ‘gynoscape5. 
Characterised as a feminine, labyrinthine, organic ‘absence5, not only destined to be actively 
traversed/penetrated by a masculine, linear, univocal ‘presence5 but also threatening to 
absorb and contain this subject, the gynoscape is a textual universe which embodies chaos. 
This disorder, however, also permits a liberating polyphony,77 which asserts the impossibility 
of a story-telling which connotes an enforcement, an assertion and a foregone conclusion, in 
favour of plurality. Stories are not told, finished, spent, but continue to reveal themselves in 
new and endless configurations -  both in themselves and in their (intertextual) lives within 
other fictions.
Phantastes, with its titular assertion of being ‘A Faerie Romance’, would immediately 
suggest such a concern with multivocality, with the duality of the ‘two’. This text might be 
understood as constituting a repetition or recapitulation of existent fabular constructions, 
and as extracting universal truths from a giveii repository. The fairy tale (with which 
Phantastes appears to claim generic affinity) demonstrates a dependency upon a finite and 
pre-determined number of forms. Whilst details may differ between individual tales, the 
fixity of the universal story structure arguably never falters. The faiiy tale plot, simply, 
begins with a misdeed or a lack, and ends with a happy recovery, repair or satiation. The 
protagonist must progress from the initial position of lack (from muteness, from self­
incompletion, from not-knowing), until ‘presence’ (the once [upon a time] seemingly 
inaccessible ‘treasure’) is found.78
\
Anodos’ quest is “to find [his] Ideal” (P: 318), his ‘shadowless’ (spiritual) self, but the 
space of Fairy Land must be suitably experienced before he can hope to locate this elusive 
‘treasure’. Anodos’, in this sense, is a story already told, a fact he seems to acknowledge 
when he describes the “unfinished story [which] urged [him] on” (P: 60). His story, at this 
moment, has not reached its conclusion, just as the generic story, the fairy story, is yet to 
end. Anodos makes overt references, even, to the stories which have gone before, which 
have already been told, which have transpired yet are permanently available for future 
salvaging and recovery:
Numberless histories passed through my mind of change of 
substance from enchantment and other causes, and Pf 
imprisonments such as this before me. I thought of the Prince 
of the Enchanted City, half marble and half a living man; of Ariel; 
of Niobe; of the Sleeping Beauty in the Wood; of the bleeding trees; 
and many other histories. (P: 68)
Anodos’ literal experience of reading, furthermore, suggest that, actually, only re-writings 
are permitted in the Phantastesian world. His books occupy a dual reality, existing in their 
own right as apparently autonomous and isolated stories, but also coming to encroach upon 
his life. The manuscripts he locates in the fairy-palace library impose their individual
realities upon him. “[I]f the book was one of travels, I found myself the traveller”, he 
explicates. “New lands, fresh experiences, novel customs, rose around me. I walked, I 
discovered, I fought, I suffered, I rejoiced in my success” (P: 140). Anodos comes to live, for 
a time, vicariously through the books. “Was it a history? I was the chief actor therein... With 
a fiction it was the same. Mine was the whole story. For I took the place of the character who 
was most like myself, and his story was mine” (P: 140-1). (His assertions -  “Mine was the 
whole story”; “his story [HIStory] was mine” -  intimate, incidentally, a masculine 
domination of language, of telling, of speech). Anodos finds that although the books are 
doubled (recounting tales of anonymous people, whilst synchronously shaping his own tale), 
his life, via this replication, is diminished (“years condensed in an hour” (P: 141]). He must, 
therefore, reinstate a process of incremental repetition, a duplication that will prevent his 
reduction into nullity, into a (textually-induced) premature “arriv[al] at [his] deathbed” (P: 
141). He does this by writing, or, rather, re-writing: a process he refers to as 
“reconstruction]” (P: 153) or “reproduction]” (P: 153). Anodos endeavours to relate the 
tales he has experienced/read, not as a word-for-word replication, but as “a translation from a 
rich and powerful language, capable of embodying the thoughts of a splendidly developed 
people, into the meagre and half-articulate speech of a savage tribe” (P: 153). Although his 
versions of the stories might be inferior literary creations, they are, indeed, creations. It is 
their very difference, polarised dramatically in Anodos* self-deprecating description, which 
renders them profitable re-workings. The books invest in him the ability to double. “I could 
tell many a tale out of them” (P: 187), he asserts. This gift permits immortality, enabling 
Anodos to be continually “buried and risen again” (P: 187); implicating him in a 
harmonious (and feminine) cycle.
4:ii Secondary GyroScopics
Like both Anodos and Vane, the male protagonist in MacDonald’s short story The Grey 
Wolf* is affected by duality. He begins from a hostile space -  an Englishman, a foreigner, a
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stranger in Scotland;79 a nameless man, defined by his outsider status, in terms of not only 
nationality but profession (a student, whose ‘cultivated’ mind contrasts sharply with his 
‘wild’ surroundings); a man whose (emphasised) youth or ‘between childhood and 
adulthood’ status renders him perhaps deserving of the ‘Anodos’ monicker -  which is the 
Greek for ‘pathless’, or ‘aimless’.80
This man - 1 shall refer to him as ‘man’ as an indication of maleness not maturity -  who 
already commences from a position of uncertainty, is additionally burdened by die weather, 
being “caught in a storm of wind and hair (‘GW’: 132), which “entirely obscure[s] the 
landscape” (‘GW’: 132). In desperate search of shelter as the weather deteriorates, he takes a 
path ironically blemished with relics of death (strewn with “the bones of many small 
animals” [‘GW’: 132]), which leads to a “little cave in [a] rock” (‘GW’: 132). This cave, as 
an obvious womb-symbol, promises to provide him with his desired “refuge” (‘GW’: 132). 
However, he is reluctant to enter into its abyssal embrace, hearing from its entrance “a 
footfall, stealthy and light as that of a wild beast” (‘GW’: 133). He is reassured when his 
masculine sense of vision is restored, released from its initial oppression at the mercy of an 
oppressive (feminine) darkness. The wild, raptorial footsteps are proven (it would seem) to 
belong not to visually repellent “dangerous animals” (‘GW’: 133) but to a young woman.
The man is reassured, greeting her (semi) presence (“He could not see her well, because she 
was turned towards the darkness of the cave” [‘GW’: 133]) with an “[e]agerly” (‘GW’: 133) 
emitted response. His request for directions, for a map to navigate the hostile gynoscape, is 
temporarily denied. However, in spite of the young woman’s reluctance to guide him to the 
labyrinth’s exit, the man is (temporarily) comforted by her presence. Now, her initial 
animalistic aural emissions (the bestial-sounding footsteps) are replaced, according to the 
man’s (albeit limited) perception, by a “sweet tone[d]” (‘GW’: 133) voice. Her bared teeth 
appear “bewitching” (‘GW’: 133), rather than as carnivorous; as “smil[ing]” (‘GW: 133), 
rather than as anticipating mastication.
The young woman, although refusing to free him entirely from the hostile feminine space,
72
offers the man an apparent (Good maternal) haven, a “shelter” (‘GW’: 134) from the 
oppressive elements. During their journey to this supposed sanctuary, he notes her 
appearance:
She was harefooted, and her pretty brown feet went catlike over the 
sharp stones, as she led the way down a rocky path to the shore. Her 
garments were scanty and tom, and her hair blew tangled in the wind.
She seemed about five and twenty, lithe and small. Her long fingers 
kept clutching and pulling nervously at her skirts as she went. Her face 
was grey in complexion, and very worn, but delicately formed, and 
smooth-skinned. Her thin nostrils were tremulous as eyelids, and her lips, 
whose curves were faultless, had no colour to give sign of indwelling 
blood. (‘GW’: 134)
As yet, however, the man does not consider the ramifications of her physicality, although his 
description indicates her bestial nature. She is barely clothed yet is not oppressed by the 
elements, instead comfortably and agilely confronts both the gales and the jagged pathway. 
Her affinity with the natural world might suggest her ethereality, but this is refuted by the 
fact of her burnished skin. Rather than being preserved in an exalted whiteness, her skin is 
brown, tarnished by the sun, which can only operate thus upon a strictly physical body. Her 
form is not idealised, like those of Lilith's female characters (to a state of unreal whiteness 
as permitted the acorporeal Lona, Mara, Eve). Rather, it is tangible, mortal, and therefore 
corruptible by natural forces. Her unruly mesh of hair (along with her state of undress) 
images her as a lascivious (sexual and bestial) madwoman.81 Her twitching nose (privileged 
over her shielded eyes) indicates her highly evolved olfactory capacity, a sense developed in 
predatory animals in order to locate their prey. Her grey face, as shall becortie apparent, is 
indicative of the colour of her true lupine countenance -  she is, of course, the titular grey 
wolf (a reversal of Little Red Riding Hood, as the, albeit reluctant, hunter, rather than the 
hunted). However, at this moment, her complexion seems to correlate with the description of 
her similarly bloodless lips. Her greyness operates as an image of her ebbing vitality, as 
blood can only be restored to her via the satisfaction of her carnal desires. Redness will 
return to her mouth when she feasts upon it -  her lips must be painted (artificially granted
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‘life’) in the blood of another, and vitality will be both physically and cosmetically 
reclaimed. This act is one not of mere feeding, of Darwinian survival,82 but of vampirism. 
She will feed with a purpose other than personal physical sustenance. Her hunger is of a 
more complex nature than that of a basic, functional necessity. But, rather than a portrait of a 
Lilithian vampire (who operates in this capacity as woman, as leech, as leopardess), this 
young woman, as shall become apparent, feeds in the specific form of a wolf, rendering her, 
more strictly, a werewolf.
The relation of lycanthropy to blood is made apparent when the former is considered a 
metaphor for menstruation (although the phenomenon itself is not always gender specific). 
Whilst masculine blood might be conceptualised as vital, courageous, positive, feminine 
blood (especially when seeming to replace the nutritive, Good maternal fluid of milk) 
signifies the violence of carnality. Whilst milk flows freely from the Christ-nurturing breasts 
of the traditionally-conceptualised Madonna, blood is to be associated with the brutality of 
the Crucifixion, a concession to corporality made by Christ to enable a subsequent 
disembodiment. Bloodshed is punitive: connoting sacrifice and slaughter. It is permitted 
visible expression when the solidarity of the (would-be inviolate) body is penetrated, 
whether by literal or symbolic weapon (whether knife-stab or deflowering phallic-stab). The 
blood lost during menstruation testifies to a mysterious wounding (‘wounding’, itself, being 
an act of violence), without an evident, visible cause. The fact that this blood’s origin is 
endogenous but becomes tangible without external intervention, and, furthermore, that its 
spillage can be regularly sustained by the female body without causing fatality, grants it a 
seemingly magical potency. This creates a basis for its association with myth -  with 
vampirism and lycanthropy alike.
Menstruation, vampirism and lycanthropy are incomprehensible to the rational (masculine) 
mind, and are sustained as feminine ‘illnesses’. Menstruation (the onset of which permits 
future parturition, whilst a present happening temporarily, but routinely, prevents 
conception) conducts a direct breach of (patriarchally-determined) social and natural orders. 
Already, the blood expelled in it constitutes an aberrant effusion in its disavowal of
74
boundaries. And, more significantly, this disruptive menstrual excess, indicative of female 
sexual maturity, is paradoxically disruptive of woman’s reproductive capabilities, so that the 
woman who bleeds rather than conceives is guilty of failing to fulfil her biological (and 
social) destiny of maternity. Lycanthropy, or werewolfism, is connected to menstruation via 
their shared identification with the moon.83 As the lunar cycle determines the menstrual, so 
too is it mythically purported to effect the changes of female into wolf. The first act of 
menstruation, a monumental ‘change’ from sexual immaturity to adult fertility, also suggests 
the lupine transformation, and the recurrent bleeding periods thereafter re-live this original 
‘change’.
At this point in MacDonald’s narrative, however, the male protagonist is unaware of the 
young wolf-woman’s condition -  of her connections to either animal, moon or blood. He is 
unaware that her greyness images her lupine fhr; that her colourlessness shall demand a 
blood-sacrifice for the enabling of its restoration. He senses her bestiality, noting, for 
example, how her demeanour is “catlike” (‘GW’: 134), but clearly is yet to comprehend the 
actual nature of the beast. His suspicions of her are confirmed by her eyes, which she at first 
endeavours to conceal from him. “What her eyes were like he could not see, for she had 
never lifted the delicate films of her eyelids” (‘GW’: 134). Upon reaching her mother’s 
cottage she unwittingly and fleetingly reveals them:
A moment after [their arrival] the youth caiight the first glimpse of her 
blue eyes. They wer$ fixed upon him with a strange look of greed, 
amounting to craving, but as if aware that they belied or betrayed her, 
she dropped them instantly. The moment she veiled them, her face, 
notwithstanding its colourless complexion, was almost beautiful.
(‘GW’: 134-5)
The young woman has the aggressive (masculine) gaze of the hunter, a perversion of her 
femininity which causes, according to the man’s perspective, her ‘ugliness’. Only when she 
submits to his gaze (by lowering her own) can any semblance of beauty be restored. (Her 
eyes must be “[re-]veiled” because their revelation confirms, in a reversal of Mara’s
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unveilipg, her bestiality).
The man sits down to eat, but the young woman, perhaps disgusted at the 
(meticulously described [‘GW’: 135]) civilisation of their meal, flees. She soon 
returns, preceded, the man intimates, by a “sound like the pattering of a dog’s feet”
(‘GW’: 135). The man now substitutes a canine interpretation of the woman for his earlier 
feline assumption, and later reinforces this by imaging her as a “four-footed creature as tall 
as a large dog” (‘GW’: 137).
When the cat/dog woman does finally enter the cottage, he concedes that “[s]he 
looked better, perhaps from having just washed her face” (‘GW’: 135). This cleansing 
permits her skin to now be perceived as “white” (‘GW’: 135), but it is perhaps only thus in 
contrast with the “single drop of blood” (‘GW’: 135) that now appears “within her tom 
dress” (‘GW’: 135). The encroachment of a tainting redness upon a seemingly almost- 
redeemed white ground would perhaps suggest that she has been out to feed. But rather than 
solely indicating this venture to satisfy a primitive carnality, the blood-spot also suggests the 
onset of her menstruation. The man, directly after recording his “bewilderment” and “horror” 
(‘GW’: 135), reveals his captivation by the young woman, a reaction which would appear to 
infer the operation of lunar influences (with the moon, as I have described, being intimately 
connected with menstruation). “[T]he youth could not take his eyes off the young woman, so 
that at length he found himself fascinated, or rather bewitched. She kept her eyes for the 
most part veiled with the loveliest eyelids fringed with darkest lashes, and he gazed 
entranced’ (‘GW’: 135-6, emphases added). When the young woman again reveals her non­
shrouded eyes, “his soul shuddered within him” (‘GW’: 136), yet this is insufficient to break 
her spell. As with Lilith’s physical appearance for Vane -  and the three female vampires for 
Stoker’s Harker -  this young woman’s “[l]ovely face and craving eyes altemate[s] 
fascination and repulsion” (‘GW’: 136) for the man. Even when her face seems to transform 
hideously before him (to “[reveal]”, most significantly, “her [vaginti dewtafa-imaging] 
dazzling teeth in strange prominence” [‘GW’: 136]), he is compelled to remain in her 
presence. He chooses to believe in bewitchment, although giving its form a rational, tangible,
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physical explanation, concluding that his senses have been intoxicated not by magical 
powers on her part, but by a drink given to him by her mother, which “must have been 
drugged and have affected his brain” (‘GW’: 136). The man is roused from his unnatural 
sleep with the reality of physical discomfort. “In the middle of the night he felt a pain in his 
shoulder, came broad awake, and saw the gleaming eyes and grinning teeth of some animal 
close to his face. Its claws ware in his shoulder, and its mouth in the act of seeking his 
throat” (‘GW’: 137). The beast endeavours to “[fix] its fangs” (‘GW’: 137), preparing itself 
for a vampiric feed, but the man struggles. He wields his knife, the symbol of phallic mastery 
(and a masculine arbiter of order, being the tool which had been responsible for sanitising 
the otherwise chaotically formless food into neat portions), and the creature withdraws.
The male-borne knife recalls Adam’s sword, which administers (a castrative) punishment 
to Lilith (Z: 218). It also images the stake, the traditional device employed for the (gender) 
neutralising of vampires. In ‘The Grey Wolf the knife-wielding man suddenly detects a 
sound that is both human and bestial, a “sound as of mingled weeping and howling” (‘GW’: 
137), coming from outside the hut. Eventually, the girl returns -  in human form, her eyes 
now purged of their “fierceness” (‘GW’: 138), which is replaced by “sadness” (‘GW’: 138). 
She is finally explicitly identified as the beast, as “a huge grey wolf’ (‘GW’: 139), her throat 
bearing the bruises which testify to the struggle of the previous night. (A sexual struggle 
wherein the male endeavoured to brutally enforce the subjugation of the would-be masculine 
female). Unlike Lilith's Vane, however, the man refuses to finally destroy the woman, even 
if she is a monster: “There was no weapon at hand; and if there had been, his inborn chivalry 
would never have allowed him to harm a woman even under the guise of a wolf’ (‘GW’:
139). The wolf-woman leaps at his throat, but “just as he expected to feel her fangs, he found 
a woman weeping on his bosom, with her arms around his neck” (‘GW’: 139). Unlike Lilith, 
this woman is illustrated as struggling against (rather than as embracing) her monstrosity, as 
“wringing her hands” (‘GW’: 139) in despair of her condition, as battling against her 
negative, instinctual “grdwling” (‘GW’: 139) with a positive, penitent “moaning” (‘GW’:
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139). She is permitted, albeit in a state of constant persecution, to live.
In contradistinction to this grey wolf-woman, who fights her bestiality (yearning perhaps 
for the civilisation and order of masculine being), one might consider another of 
MacDonald’s animal-associated women, Makemnoit, of his short story ‘The Light Princess’. 
Makemnoit is the witch/fairy who, in MacDonald’s parody of the ‘Sleeping Beauty’, confers 
an evil gift upon the (titular) newborn princess, depriving her of physical and moral gravity. 
Not only is the princess condemned to float, but, to the frustration of her parents, is destined 
to be unable “to see the serious side of anything” (‘LP’: 23), finding amusement even (and 
especially) in others’ anticipated pain (‘LP’: 23). Her parents are perhaps particularly 
troubled because of the impact this ‘gift’ has upon her femininity: its depriving her of the 
(supposed) feminine virtues of tenderness, compassion and chastity. In the first instance, she 
refuses to continue in the tradition of the passive, supine heroine, like the ‘Sleeping Beauty’ 
to whom MacDonald initially alludes. Rather, her curse makes her particularly active, so that 
she would “bound” (‘LP’: 24) and “run” (‘LP’: 24) in the air, “rolling about...in an ecstasy 
of enjoyment” (‘LP’: 25). Whilst her mother, a ‘real woman’, sheds feminine tears (imaging 
the pure and feminine mourners, the Virgin Mary and Lilith’s Mara), she can only mock: 
“What queer faces mamma makes! And she squeezes water out of her cheeks! Funny 
mamma!” (‘LP’: 23). Her femininity is further undermined by her lack of modesty, 
demonstrated when she accidentally flies into an embrace with a page yet “did not mind it 
much” (‘LP’: 24). The fact that “she ha[s] no shyness in her composition” causes the king’s 
“dignity” to be “greatly hurt” (‘LP’: 24). Her demeanour might be perceived as inappropriate 
on the basis of both class and gender, offending her father not only because of the social 
implications of a princess kissing a servant, but because a female who actively instigates 
sexual relations is (according to the patriarchal definition) not feminine. In spite of her 
apparent failed femininity, however, the princess does learn of her natural affinity with 
(feminine) fluidity.
Water, when she immerses herself in it, restores her physical gravity. The princess bathes
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in a lake, where she is joined by a prince, whose perception of her assists a (pegative) 
restoration of her femininity. Perceiving her as a white beauty, he confers upon her the 
passivity (of objectification) she lacks. When imaged as a corpse (as “Radiant whiteness”; as 
“Swan-white” [‘LP’: 37, emphases in original]), she is deprived of the ability to undertake 
the errant activity which tainted her femininity. Now, her actions must be reactions; 
responses to his imperatives. “Lift thine eyes”, he orders, “[b]anish night/By the might/Of 
thine eyes” (‘LP’: 37, emphases in original). The prince finds that his ‘treatment’ of the 
princess is, to a great extent, curative, permitting him to love her. (To have loved her prior j  
masculinised state would perhaps have suggested a patriarchy-defying homosexual desire):
The prince soon found out that while in the water the princess was 
very like other people. And besides this, she was not so forward in her 
questions or pert in her replies pt sea as on shore. Neither did she laugh 
so much; and when she did laugh, it was more gently. She seemed 
altogether more modest and maidenly in the water than out of it. (‘LP’: 38)
The princess’ new-found femininity becomes, however, the target of the evil Makemnoit, 
who drains the gravity-restoring lake. Makemnoit, like Lilith, plots to steal the waters, and to 
replace them with “mud.. .full of lovely creatures dying, and ugly creatures coming to life” 
(‘LP’: 39). Makemnoit plots “the unmaking of a world” (‘LP’: 39), as Lilith transforms 
Bulika from a fertile “Land of Waters” (Z: 75, emphasis in original) into a desert. Makemnoit 
shares also with Lilith a bestial association, being accompanied by a “black cat” (‘LP’: 40), 
and employing an equivalent of the Lilithian white leech in her plans. Makemnoit prepares a 
magic potion, out of which emerges “a huge gray snake” (‘LP’: 40):
It grew out of the tub, waving itself backwards and forwards with a 
slow horizontal motion, till it reached the princess, when it laid its 
head upon her shoulder, and gave a low hiss in her ear. She started -  but 
with joy; and seeing the head resting on her shoulder, drew it towards 
her and kissed it. Then she drew it all out of the tub, and wound it round 
her body. It was one of those dreadful creatures which few have ever 
beheld -  the White Snakes of Darkness. (‘LP’: 40)
The pallor of the serpent reinforces the instability I have already indicated with regard to the
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moral natures of darkness and light. This snake, like Lilith’s white leech, has a somatic 
whiteness, but is spiritually black. Its whiteness perhaps suggests its masculine gender, 
which correlates with its phallic form. This ‘male’, nevertheless, is clearly subordinated to 
the female witch, as not only is she his creator (and he the mere object of her creation), but 
he is described in terms of (a feminising) horizontality. If the snake had emerged from the 
potion vertical (that is, erect) the power balance between them might have been altered. As it 
is, he sways horizontally (imaging the supine  ^the passive, the feminine), and is forced to 
encircle her body (imaging the ‘round’ of the female genitals).
Makemnoit takes her creation to a cavern below the lake. “She then untwine[s] the snake 
from her body, and h[olds] it by the tail high above her.. .till at last the snake ma[kes] a 
sudden dart, and clfings] to the roof with its mouth. ‘That’s right, my beauty!’ crie[s] the 
[evil] princess; ‘drain it dry.’ ” (‘LP’: 41). The snake obeys, “sucking at the stone” (‘LP’: 41) 
like Lilith’s entomological incarnation drains Vane, and now coming to be explicitly 
described as “a huge leech” (‘LP’: 41). When it is satiated, and the lake/Good maternal 
(“mother Earth” [‘LP’: 42]) receives an enforced aridity, the creature “shrivelfs] up” (‘LP’: 
41), and the underground cavern receives its waters. The Tight princess’ begins to “wast[e] 
away with her lake, sinking as it sank, withering as it dried” (‘LP’: 42), “fe[eling] as if [it] 
were her soul, diying up within her, first to mud, then to madness and death” (‘LP’: 43). The 
degradation of the water from purity to a corrupt and soiled status is perceived by the 
princess as paralleling her own situation. This sense of co-defilement suggests a possible 
psychosexual anxiety, whereby the princess transfers her sexual inhibitions, using the 
distancing device of metaphor, onto the experience of the water. Like the water, which 
begins from physical cleanliness, the virgin is (metaphorically and idealistically) untainted. 
Then, as the water is muddied, the deflowered woman comes to be imaged as marked with 
the corporeal ‘stains’ of sexuality. Finally, according to the princess, this sex -  perhaps 
secretly and guiltily enjoyed -  leads to madness, and madness leads to (social) death.
Makemnoit stipulates a condition for the water’s return: “The body of a living man could
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alone stanch the flow. The man must give himself of his own will; and the lake must take his 
life as it filled” (‘LP’: 43-4). The prince (again in a reversal of fairytale paradigms) must 
sacrifice himself for the sake of the princess.84 “She will die if I don’t do it, and life would be 
nothing to me without her; so I shall lose nothing by doing it” (‘LP’: 44). His motivation is 
not the desire for them to be together (as a mundane, physical, human couple), but an 
idolatrous wish for her to be immortalised as a supreme object. “How lovely the lake will 
be... with that glorious creature sporting in it like a wild goddess” (‘LP’: 44, emphasis 
added). In this way, her virginity shall be eternally preserved: she shall never be soiled by 
the inevitable sexual union involved in human relationship.
The prince demands that, if he is to perform this sacrificial act, the princess must 
accompany him. “[She must] go with me, feed me with her own hands, and look at me now 
and then to comfort me” (‘LP’: 46). His body is forced into a hole in the lake-bed, where it 
must continue to be wedged until the waters return and he is drowned. The princess, her 
gravity again absent, feels nothing for the man: “The hole wanted stopping; and if only a 
man would do, why, take one” (‘LP’: 47). She addresses him “coolly” (‘LP’: 48), with 
indifference and “condescension” (‘LP’: 49). Only when he is engulfed and “past breathing” 
(‘LP’: 50) is she moved by his sacrifice, and dives into the water to save him. He is revived 
by a combination of the princess’ love-driven efforts and the (male-empowering) sunlight.
At the sight of his recovery the princess finds that she has developed her own source of 
fluidity, far superior to the waters of the lake. “The princess burst[s] into a passion of 
tears, and [falls] on the floor” (‘LP’: 51, emphasis in original), her gravity coming to be fully 
restored. Makemnoit is punished as the waters of the land destroy her home, “burying her in 
its ruins; whence no one ever venture[s] to dig up her body” (‘LP’: 53).85 Unlike Lilith, who 
is eventually ‘saved’, Makemnoit is denied redemption. Rather, “ [t]here she lies to this day” 
(‘LP’: 53). Unhappily ever after.86
Sharing thematic similarities with this faiiy tale (as well as with the other MacDonaldian 
works) is another of MacDonald’s short stories, ‘The History of Photogen and Nycteris: A
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Day and Night Mahrchen’.87 This commences with the introduction of an evil female 
character, a witch named Watho: a ‘woman’ whose bestiality renders her particularly 
comparable with Lilith, and with the wolf-woman of ‘The Grey Wolf. Like the latter, the 
nature of her condition is lupine: “she had a wolf in her mind.. .the wolf had made her cruel” 
(‘HPN’: 304). Watho is compelled to commit acts of evil (“She was not naturally cruel” 
[‘HPN’: 304]) in order to “soothe her wolf-pain” (‘HPN’: 332), like the young woman who 
is forced to carry out necessarily brutal and predatory activities when she becomes a 
werewolf. Watho invites to her castle two women, who physically image the polarities of 
darkness and light. Lady Aurora (named after the Roman goddess of dawn) has “hair of the 
yellow gold” and “fair” skin (‘HPN’: 305). She is given an apartment with “airy spaces” and 
“plentiful sunlight” (‘HPN’: 305). Vesper, however, (her name meaning ‘evening’) is a blind 
widow with skin like “darkened silver” and “black and fine and straight-flowing” hair 
(‘HPN’: 305). Watho lodges Vesper in windowless rooms, like a “sarcophagus” (‘HPN’: 
305), encouraging in her “an atmosphere of sweet sorrow” (‘HPN’: 306).
Both Vesper and Aurora become pregnant, conceiving seemingly ‘immaculately’, without 
human male intervention. (The ‘father’ of their babies, one might infer, is neither divine nor 
male, but the masculinised Watho, who is patemalised [and mortemalised] by 
magic). Aurora gives birth to a boy “[j]ust as the sun rose” (‘HPN’: 306), who is named 
Photogen. Watho, determined to claim ownership of the child, informs the mother that he is 
still-born. Watho proposes to prevent Photogen from ever experiencing darkness, permitting 
him to live only (as his name suggests) in the light. A little later, Vesper delivers a girl in the 
darkness of “the windowless tomb of a blind mother” (‘HPN’: 307). The child is named 
Nycteris, and Watho intends to force her to live (as her name suggests) solely in the dark. 
Whilst Photogen’s body grows to become “strong and elastic and swiftly responsive” 
(‘HPN’: 306), Nycteris remains “a sadly dainty little creature” (‘HPN’: 307). Whilst 
Photogen is granted every privilege, being encouraged to “[bask] in the foil splendour of the 
sun” (‘HPN’: 306), which enables him to become “the merriest of creatures, always 
laughing, always loving” (‘HPN’: 306), Nycteris is deprived of almost all human interaction,
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and is bestialised into a “little bat” (‘HPN’: 307).
Nycteris, via reading, gains a vicarious (and distorted) awareness of the presence of 
another world, exterior to the oppressive Terrible mother’s womb (of Watho) in which she is 
held captive. She finds, and clandestinely utilises, a secret entrance to this otherworld, this 
symbol of surrogate benevolent maternity. Entering it, she experiences a “resurrection” 
(‘HPN’: 313) or “a birth itself’ (‘HPN’: 313) -  a deliverance from the womb-tomb into life. 
Outside, Nycteris encounters the light of the moon, which she understands as “the mother of 
all the lamps” (‘HPN’: 313). She anthropomorphises the moon into “a live thing” (‘HPN’: 
316), matemalising ‘her’ into a Good mother figure who embraces her “with such loving 
kisses, and such liquid strokings of her cheeks and forehead” (‘HPN’: 315); who “holds [her] 
to its bosom and loves [her]” (‘HPN’: 335). The moon comes to be associated with 
femininity -  a correlation asserted throughout MacDonald’s writings. (The feminisation of 
the, moon -  versus the masculinisation of the ‘superior’ light-source, the sun -  is a common 
feature of male-authored Victorian literature in general,88 with Stoker, for example, 
describing an anthropomorphised and feminised “Moon herself... [which] stood before me in 
all her size and splendour” [D: 284]). The current MacDonaldian moon, then, “lift[s] herself 
above the horizon” (‘HPN’: 317, emphasis added), and is additionally conceptualised as a 
mother, who rises in order “to see what her children [the wind, trees, clouds and river] were 
about” (‘HPN’: 317). Nycteris is unaware, however, that this ‘mother’ is the moon, believing 
her instead to be the sun (with the understanding that the artificial light of her dimly 
illuminated room is lunar). She only learns otherwise when she encounters Photogen, who
f
had himself conspired to experience darkness.
Photogen is ordinarily courageous, but finds himself fearful (or emasculated) at the 
extinction of light. Outside, at night, he sees Nycteris’ personified moon, which he perceives 
as “a fresh terror...so ghostly! so ghastly! so gruesome!” (‘HPN’: 320). He interprets her as 
“the darkness alive -  and after him! the horror of horrors coming down the sky to curdle his 
blood, and turn his brain to a cinder!” (‘HPN’: 320) He aligns the moon with a
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conceptualisation of the Terrible mother, his description recalling that which his hunting 
instructor Fargu had previously conferred upon Watho: “When she [Watho] looked at him 
[Fargu] in a certain way, he felt, he said, as if his heart turned to ashes in his breast, and what 
ran in his veins was no longer blood...” (‘HPN’: 308) For Photogen, the “great lamp [is] 
dreadful.. .looking like a witch, walking in the sleep of death” (‘HPN’: 324). She appears to 
have the power to castrate him, being an ally of the “horrible darkness that creeps into [him], 
goes all through [him], into the very marrow of [his] bones [which].. .makes [him] behave 
like a girl” (‘HPN’: 325). The setting of the sun serves to extinguish his own “fire” (‘HPN’: 
322), and his despair at this emasculation is emphasised with his desperate plea for the 
returned erection: “If only the sun would rise!” (‘HPN’: 325)
Nycteris, though ordinarily a fragile girl, is strengthened by the night, and endeavours to 
comfort the boy, who cowers from what he understands to be an embodiment of death: the 
moon as “the ghost of a dead sun” (‘HPN’: 325), as “the shadow of the world” (‘HPN’: 319). 
However, the darkness is not destined to last. The moon, her light seemingly drained from 
her, dies, and is replaced (according to Nycteris’ perception) by the “terrific sharpness” 
(‘HPN’: 332) of a “terrible light” (‘HPN’: 338); by the “flaming furnace” (‘HPN’: 328) that 
is the sun. Although Nycteris had protected Photogen during the night, permitting him to 
sleep in her lap, the rising of the sun causes her to be abandoned. Nycteris is forced to shade 
herself by employing her hair as a “veil” (‘HPN’: 333), to create an artificial, but effective, 
“twilight of...blackness” (‘HPN’: 333), thus learning perhaps that she (as a woman) is a 
natural source of darkness.
In spite of Photogen’s desertion of Nycteris on this occasion, the two decide to unite in 
order to flee their captor. Nycteris warns Photogen that he must learn to accept the night 
along with the day, “else [he] will always be only half brave” (‘HPN’: 336). Without an 
acceptance of femininity, he will also be (according to a Jungian perception) half a man. 
Nycteris claims to have commenced her own consolidation of day and night: “I have begun 
already -  not to fight your sun, but to try to get at peace with him, and understand what he 
really is, and what he means with me -  whether to hurt me or to make the best of me”
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(‘HPN’: 336). She comprehends the necessity of a dual-gendered psyche, which permits the 
desired outcome of Jungian individuation. Even though she suggests, at this point, that sun 
and moon, masculinity and femininity, are equal forces, she does later compromise this 
position. Nycteris appears to finally acknowledge the sun’s (masculine) superiority, 
“com[ing] to love the day best, because it was the clothing and crown of Photogen, and she 
saw that the day was greater than the night’ (‘HPN’: 340-1, emphasis added).
The prominence of the theme of ‘darkness versus light’ in ‘The History of Photogen and 
Nycteris’ permits a connection between this tale and Lilith, which is further reinforced when 
the Lilithesque Watho reappears to pursue her escapees. As Lilith’s hair is black (in order 
that she might be dramatically contrasted with the blonde -  and spiritually white -  Eve), 
Watho’s hair is red, allowing her differentiation from Nycteris and Photogen; from polarised 
night and day. The redness of Watho’s hair suggests bloodshed, brutality, carnality -  she not 
only encourages Photogen to “spen[d] his days in hunting”.(‘HPN’: 318), but is herself 
predatory when she occupies the form of a (red) wolf. The redness of her hair might also 
symbolise a permanent menstrual sanguinisation, so that she (in ‘refusing’ to procreate) is 
mortemalised. She profits, after all, from a surrogate maternity, causing by magic, one might 
infer, pregnancies in Aurora and Vesper, whilst sustaining her own flow of blood.
Watho takes the form of “a wild beast” (‘HPN’: 339) when she pursues Photogen and 
Nycteris, appearing to them as “a great red wolf’ (‘HPN’: 339), and is duly slain by 
Photogen’s (phallic) arrow. Photogen approaches the dead form of this apparent “monster” 
(‘HPN’: 339) in order to retrieve his arrow, and finds that “[t]here lay -  no wolf, but Watho, 
with her hair tied round her waist” (‘HPN’: 339). ‘Watho as wolf was perhaps a masculine 
construction, all along -  a female rendered monstrous due to her phallic dominance which 
oppressed and undermined the development of Photogen’s masculinity. Freed from this 
retentive Terrible mother, Photogen becomes able to move, at last, into an adult heterosexual 
relationship with another woman (that is, Nycteris).
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Vane, likewise, must shed the oppressive Lilithian mother, although is denied (courtesy of 
the stubbornly inconclusive ending) the consummation of his union with Lona, which would 
finalise his reintegration into the symbolic womb of the Great Mother. Anodos, also, must 
triumph over the hostile maternal body in order to fulfil his destiny, however, like Vane, is 
denied final satiation. This is the point on which the principal MacDonald texts diverge from 
the shorter (finite) tales.
The purpose, with relation to the gynoscape theorem, served by ‘The Grey WolF, ‘The 
Light Princess’, and ‘The History of Photogen and Nycteris’ is to illustrate the quest-in- 
completion, the ‘oppressive mother lost’ and/or the ‘benevolent mother found’. Dramatising 
thematic rhythms apparent in Lilith and Phantastes, but in miniature, these fairy tales portray 
not only useful capsule-gynoscapes, but also operate as guides on how to effectively 
navigate (and overcome) them.
5 EndScapes
My analyses of Lilith, of Phantastes, and of the additional short texts, which conclude 
with an affirmation of (predominant) similarity, serve to illustrate the nature of 
MacDonald’s writing as re-visitation, as revision. Thematic repetitions, intertextual 
connections and intratextual co-operations bind these works, whilst the principal texts Lilith 
and Phantastes also communicate explicit structural collaboration. Both Lilith and 
Phantastes centre on notions of return: to mothers, restored, re-membered. And in their 
structural lives they image a common shape: the shape of the gynoscape. They are cyclical 
narratives, in which Vane and Anodos begin and end at the same place, in uncertainty, with 
neither story being permitted true closure. Mothers are found, lost again, and replaced. 
Mothers are transiently experienced then forbidden. Then promised. Vane and Anodos are 
suspended in a state of perpetual frustration, and unfailing anticipation.
The ‘persistent’ narrative, the narrative that just will not end, visualises the uroboros, the 
serpent which devours its own tail and gives birth to itself: the symbol of eternity. The snake
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is a symbol identifiable with the phallus. The snake, periodically shedding and re-growing its 
skin, mimics also the rhythm of menstruation , a symbol of rejuvenation and transformation. 
The snake is masculine and feminine, embodying in its uroboric configuration “the ‘Great 
Round’, in which positive and negative, male and female, elements of consciousness, 
elements hostile to consciousness, and unconscious elements are intermingled” (Neumann, 
1963: 18). Likewise, ‘GynoScapes’ is a bi-gendered (if hierarchic) fiction, representing 
masculine presence (the penetrating orphans, the infeminators) and feminine absence (the
penetrated maternal body, the infeminated). The fact that GynoScopic stories are GyroScopic
\
stories permits polyphony, the communication of alternative voices. A counter­
representation in the rhetoric of negation perhaps ‘writes back’, opposing the solely 
infeminative fabrication of the feminine, in the structure: in the circle that is spatially 
infinite, the (w)hole composed of an endless line, with no part that could be determined as 
beginning or end, yet with beginning and end at every point. The feminised circle demands 
permanent return, suggesting an unwavering need in the orphans for the maternal. 
Nevertheless, the shape of the gynoscape narrative also reinforces the infeminative word: 
return means an endless traversal of female bodyscapes (.Lilith) and feminised landscapes 
(Phantastes)?9 with its implications of morselisation, fragmentation, dissection, suppression, 
sanitisation, territofialisation. Mothers will always be sought, and punishments will always 
accompany the seeking.
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CHAPTER TWO: GyneScapes
1 DefinEscape
The gynoscape, as I have conceptualised it, is a feminised terrain, a female body-in-parts, a 
womb-territory both hostile and enveloping, both creative and malignant. In the previous 
chapter I discussed the potency and concurrent impotency of this ambiguous body -  strong 
as it creates itself, forges its own image (asserting the chthonic primahty and wholeness of 
the Great Mother/Mother Nature), but diminished when figured as an androscopic construct 
(the inert, passive principle of the fetishised female corpse). In this chapter I charted the 
movement of MacDonald’s male protagonists across the female bodyscape (Lilith) and the 
feminised landscape {Phantastes), their encounters with both Jungian and Kleinian dualised 
maternity, and their final almost-reunions with the desired lost mother (who, in MacDonald’s 
Christian and Lilithian vocabulary, might be implicitly termed ‘Father’).
The male and masculine penetration of the gynoscape might lead its subject to the 
conclusion of gynescape, which signifies literally an ‘escape from the womb’. This (current) 
chapter, although necessarily dealing with feminised, bodily landscapes, shall be concerned 
specifically with the male subject’s ‘maternal misrecognitions’ with regard to female 
characters. With a central textual focus, now, upon Lilith (womb-escape being a concern 
most evident in Vane’s experience), I shall investigate MacDonald’s protagonist’s search for 
the elusive bountifiil breast and fecund womb. The woman who possesses these shall be 
considered, after the Jungian maternal dichotomy, a Good mother, whilst the woman who 
does not shall be rendered Terrible.
The venture to locate the positive breast and womb, it shall become apparent, inspires 
numerous fluctuations in and re-directions of desire1 for Vane, with regard to specifically 
two ‘objects’: Lilith and Lona. Briefly, Vane gravitates towards the sexual woman Lilith, but 
this leads him into the barren desertland of the monstrous feminine -  the body which denies 
its reproductive function, resisting procreation and opposing life. Relinquishing this futile
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endeavour, Vane targets Lona, the pre-sexual woman, the eternal child. However, despite her 
Good mother qualities (albeit in surrogacy), her status as a child renders her effectively 
wombless. Whilst Lilith is fertile, but refuses to either bear or nurture* Lona is an eager 
mother, prevented (due to her suspension in sexual immaturity) from ascending to the role. 
Whilst Lilith chooses a metaphoric self-mastectomisation (withholding the desired breast), 
Lona would feed, but with the empty (thus, futile) breast.
Demonstrative, then, of Vane’s impulse ‘to gynescape’ are his encounters with these two 
figures: Lona (matriarch of the Little Ones, product of the barren Lilith-womb, and chosen as 
Vane’s -  sexualised, yet non-sexual -  bride); and Lilith (the filicidal child-killer and 
dangerous mother compulsively pursued by Vane). I shall commence my investigation with 
a consideration of the gynescape-contributions of each (Lilith and Lona), through which 
respective relations to specific ‘perversions of the feminine’ might be mediated. These often 
intimately related concepts (to include necrophilia, paedophilia, idolatry, sado-masochism, 
bestiality/zoophilia and scopophilia) might be understood as associates of the more 
general terminology of infeminative practice: from mortemalisation, teratologisation, 
dysgenication.
This project might envisage them variously as active proponents, or as passive recipients, 
of such ‘treatments’: as advocates of perverting femininity, or as embodiments of the 
‘feminine perverted’. Following this, I shall briefly implicate two potential thematic 
intertexts with Lilith, namely, MacDonald’s Phantastes and Sacher-Masoch’s Venus in Furs, 
before concluding with a gynescopic overview.
2 LilithScape
Vane’s quest to locate and reinstate the absent mother necessitates his encounter, as I have 
suggested, with gynoscapes, with a geographical maternity that fluctuates between Lilith- 
badness and Lona-goodness. I shall commence my investigation of the activity of Vane’s
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gynescape by briefly defining the contrasting landscapes associated with both potential 
‘mothers’, and by considering his manoeuvring through and manipulation of (and by) the 
dualised terrain.
The locale inhabited by Lona and the Little Ones is described in positive maternal terms, as 
a “hollow” (L: 56) populated by “fruit-bearing” trees (56), a fertile landscape out of which 
babies appear to grow. Lona explains to Vane that babies “don’t come to the wood” (61), but 
that they appear in response to the Little Ones’ desire (“we go to the wood and find them” 
[61]). But where do they come from? “From the wood -  always” (61); they are the product 
of a procreative bodyseape. Furthermore, the Little Ones retreat into “nests” (85), the womb­
like cradle that serves as “God’s bird-nursery” (85), to inhabit the vital architecture of nature 
(as opposed to the city of Bulika which consists of “nests of stone” (178). This is an act 
which compounds their infancy, as they claim to have “c[o]me from the wood. Some think 
we dropped out of the trees” (62), so that a return to tree-dwelling signifies )a literal return to 
origins. Although lacking water (the Little Ones live in a “valley” [75] that was once 
“overflowing with live torrents” [75]), this terrain remains a fecund womb, where life is 
grown out of love. Nevertheless, without water the children have nothing “to cry with”
(141), so are denied the necessary outpouring that will make them (spiritually) grow. The 
Raven instructs Vane that the Little Ones must be allowed to grow and implies his suspicion 
that Vane has deliberately prevented such maturity: “You might have removed some of the 
hindrances to their growing!” (141); “You confess you thought it might be water they 
wanted: why did you not dig them a well or two?” (141) Vane himself admits: “I fear what 
you say is true, Mr Raven! But indeed I was afraid that more knowledge might prove an 
injury to them -  render them less innocent, less lovely” (142).
Lilith, on the other hand, rules Bulika, a country which was once inhabited by “simple 
folk” (75), by an innocent childlike people to whom she introduces a corrupting greed 
(instructing them to abandon their former nature-respecting ways of “tilling the ground and 
pasturing sheep” [75], and to instead “dig for” dead spoils, for “diamonds and opals and sell 
them to strangers” [75]; and to “build a city” [75] where once the landscape was naturally
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determined). As a punishment for killing a “huge snake” (75), the Biblical Satan-in- 
serpentine-form, Lilith apparently “gathered up in her lap what she could of the water over 
the whole country, closed it in an egg, and carried it away...leaving the country as dry and 
dusty as her own heart” (75). Her sterile ovum becomes, ironically, the receptacle of the life- 
giving waters, her ‘ovulation’ conducting a cruel and perverse mockery of reproduction. 
Bulika, in its Lilithian-authorised artificiality, becomes the antithesis of the pure, natural 
state of childlikeness, and its inhabitants are condemned to the forms of physical giants, 
whilst remaining spiritually stunted -  as “[t]o grow, they must have water” (76): one is not 
bom a ‘child’, one becomes it.
Lilith strives to uphold the Bulikan emptiness by “doing what she can to keep [the 
Bulikans] from multiplying” (75); by sustaining a condition of childlessness, a resistant, 
empty uterus, in an attempt “to put an end to the race” (115). The bite of her infanticiding 
leopardess-projection operates as an effective mortemalising device, with the consequence of 
there being “hot many mothers in Bulika” (120). Lilith, somewhat of a feminine counterpart 
to the Biblical Herod, strives to keep the landscape fruitless in response to “an old prophecy 
that a child [Lona] will be the death of her” (115). She “live[s] in terror of the birth of an 
infant destined to be her destruction” (168); an infant who threatens to exceed her in youth 
and beauty, and perhaps to usurp her status as prime object of masculine desire. As 
exemplary, as I have suggested, of the Victorian vampire, then, she refuses to feed her 
babies, choosing instead to parasitically and monstrously feed upon them.
Lilith, in refusing to mother might be construed not only as a woman who draws blood 
from external sources, but as a woman who herself bleeds; as a woman who lacks the 
parturition that would interrupt the menstrual flow. It is this incessant bleeding, this 
persistent loss, which might be understood as enforcing her necessary condition as a 
vampire. Lilith, in this sense, loses blood (vaginally), which must be replaced (orally). She is 
intent on harnessing the (feminine) power of fluidity, whether it be a matter of shedding the 
blood of her rivals, or of stemming the Bulikan waters. She strives to regulate and dominate
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emissions and out-pourings, perhaps in the light of her inability to control the inevitable 
“open channel” (that is, Lona) “through which her immortality... is flowing fast away” (150).
The hostile landscape in Lilith, then, is the titular female’s bodyscape -  the terrible burrow 
and wood; the rocky, water-starved terrain; the non-productive city of Bulika. These “silent 
and empty” (83) wastelands are dead (51), as is the Lilith-body in its inability to create. 
Lilith’s perverse opposition to life subjects her to a naturally accelerated process of decay, 
whilst her daughter is granted an eternal inability to age. Her people are condemned to an 
eventual extinction, whereas Lona’s (the Little Ones; the children of nature) prosper in their 
living city. The children, however, are unable to grow until Lilith and her waterless (thus 
infertile) lands are redeemed. The Sodomic Bulika must be destroyed by the (patriarchal) 
hand of God, cleansed in a neo-diluvian enterprise of renewal and reparation.
Vane recognises the necessity of water restoration to the development of the Little Ones.
He endeavours (unwisely) to enforce this recovery through war, leading an army of these 
naturally peace-loving children against Lilith. The consequence of Vane’s instruction is 
death: the death of Lona at the hand of her malignant mother. Indeed, all the children (who 
are enticed into war by the promise of a reunion with their lost mothers) are subjected to a 
repeat rejection, as the women of Bulika know only a commitment to the self.
Vane’s constant desire for possession, for mastery, evidences what might be interpreted as 
an anal-sadistic impulse, with such fantasies being derived from the anal erotogenic zone.
The child, dominated by the anal-sadistic libido-position is impelled, according to Kleinian 
psychoanalysis, to wish to appropriate the contents of the (‘bad’) mother’s body. As Klein 
expounds in her 1928 paper, ‘Early Stages of the Oedipus Conflict’, the mother has already 
frustrated his oral desires (in weaning) and now appears to target his/her anal wishes. Klein 
indicated how the child, feeling deprived by his mother of milk and faeces, desires revenge -  
wanting to bite, deface, devour and rob her. This leads to a dread of being similarly mutilated 
by her; of being attacked orally and anally. The boy, motivated by penetrative impulses, 
however, is caused to genitally desire the otherwise hated mother, but fear of the father as
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castrator renders him reluctant to compete with him for her. Such Oedipal and genital rivalry 
can be avoided by his regression into pre-genital impulses: of robbing and destroying the 
faeces, babies and paternal penis, which are imagined by the child as being incorporated 
within the mother in sex. With relation to the child’s experience of maternally-induced anal 
deprivations, then, Klein asserts that sadistic tendencies will arise. The child desires to obtain 
possession of the mother’s faeces by penetrating her body (by sending into Lilith the burning 
[and raping] worm that “pierc[es] through.. .her secret chamber” [Z: 201]); by cutting it to 
pieces (by slicing off Lilith’s offending hand); by devouring it (by demanding that Lilith, 
even as a corpse, should “nourish his life” [Z: 102]).2
The anal-sadistic desires communicated by Vane’s constant possession-attempts (exercised 
over the maternal body) serve to testify to his child-within-the adult; to his (persistent) 
infantile tendencies. In spite of his striving to assert himself as the adult in relation to the 
Little Ones (that is, his commitment to guarding, defending and protecting them in the role 
of ‘saviour’ Good Giant), his own infantile inclinations continue to surface, to return. This is 
evident in his persistent egoism, which motivates, for example, his aspiration to replace the 
current Bulikan monarch (Lilith) with Lona: he envisages his own installation as the new 
queen’s consort. (His ill-advised unification attempt, of course, leads only to a separation, as 
Lona is killed by her mother’s hand).
Infantilisation is, however, also reinforced, with Vane’s final ‘reward’ being the promise 
of reunion with the positive gynoscape: the promise of being promoted into an eternal 
childlike status. (The differentiation must be made, however, between childlike and childish 
being. Whilst the former is beneficial, the latter impedes spiritual self-realisation).3
Lilith, like Vane, must mature into innocence. Her defeat comes not by the might of 
Vane’s child-army but in the moment of self-recognition. Lilith learns to see her (true) self. 
Then she wills a change. She agrees to a sleep: to be re-integrated into the body of the 
Mother. Agreeing to sleep, Lilith is, according to the infeminator, agreeing to live (albeit in a 
permanent passive, pliable, silent, ‘feminine’ state). Her city, its waters restored, is also 
permitted life. Likewise, when the sleepers awaken (‘sleepers’ being all those who have
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willingly embraced their ‘deaths’), a similarly fertile landscape awaits, constructed of “living 
stones” (L : 250, emphasis added). Lilith the Terrible mother’s Bulikan tomb is finally 
usurped by the vital gynoscape of the Great Mother’s (a feminised Christian God’s) womb.
Having thus summarised the basic gynoscopic configurations of the text, I shall proceed to 
consider its major (maternal) players in some detail. The perfected, bodiless Lona, as I have 
suggested, is textually polarised with the tainted, corporeal Lilith. The living body, Vane (as 
infeminator) comes to understand, exists as a counter to the ideal of spirituality. The soul, 
according to this definition, cannot be perfected whilst it remains ensconced in a ‘base’ 
bodily receptacle. Whilst humans continue to cling to their corporeal packaging, they remain 
anchored to the finite; they cannot rise as God-images, but crawl with beasts. “Every one, as 
you ought to know, has a beast-self -  and a bird-self, and a stupid fish-self, ay, and a 
creeping serpent-self too -  which it takes a deal of crushing to kill!” instructs the Raven.
“You can tell what sort a [hujmari is by his [or her] creature that comes oftenest to the front” 
(L: 30). The Raven directs Vane to an acknowledgement of the (variously expressed and 
repressed) animal(s) within. According to Lilith, humanity might be construed as ‘beastlike’ 
in two opposing senses: the human is a natural, inevitable animal in comparison with the 
Divine, but can also be a deliberate animal, in choosing to associate with the “[v]ilest of 
God’s creatures” (148). Humans are beasts because they are products of nature, of natural 
drives and impulses. However, they can also be degraded to ‘beastlikeness’ in their 
compulsion to sin.4 The Raven advises Vane to harmonise die many animal Selves that 
constitute him (to embrace the positive aspects, and to dis-integrate the negative, the evil 
snakeisms that must be “crush[ed]”).5
Lilith, however, is personified evil because she visually sustains her negative bestial 
selves. She is an unnatural woman, constructed of malignant parts: the sexualised 
incarnations of a raptorial cat-body, a parasitic leech-body, a petrifying snake-body. She 
might endeavour to appropriate a superficial whiteness (to perhaps physically emulate her 
usurper, Eve), but (initially) fails in this because of her refusal to be spiritually cleansed. In
94
her first textual appearance, therefore, she quickly disintegrates before Vane’s eyes -  
fragmenting into her disharmonious many-selves, her negative beastlikeness “unmask[ed]” 
(143).
Whilst animals, the Raven explains, are born out of the earth (“when the earth gives a 
heave, and out comes a beast” [19]), men and women are granted superior (divine) origins.6 
Humanity is created “not out of Nothing, as say the unwise, but out of [God’s] own endless 
glory” (147). Lilith, however, refuses to acknowledge this, instead expressing a belief in self- 
creation -  which is communicated in the poem the Raven recites to Vane. This relates that 
Lilith was originally an immaterial, discamate being, who took physical substance 
(embodiment) from a man (Adam), “cloth[ingf> herself “in the likeness true/ O f that idea 
where his soul did cleave” (144, all poetic emphases in original). When ‘bodied’, Lilith not 
only considers herself to be superior to all other women (“All women, I, the woman, still 
outran,/ Outsoared, outsank, outreigned’ [144]), but exploits her “power/ Over the soul of 
every living man” (144). As a “bodiless thing1’ (144), she had represented a male’s unreal, 
erotic ideal, being derived explicitly from Adam’s own longing (“wrought/By him out o f 
himself ’ [145]). However, such male creation, whereby Lilith is constructed as an Adamic 
fantasy, rebounds on its unwitting proponent: Lilith refuses Adam his request for directional 
companionship, instead “[giving him nothing where he gave his whole/Being1’ (145). 
Nevertheless, she eventually comes to be “held” (145), imprisoned, trapped within a 
body -  a body that she initially enjoys as a source of sensual pleasure, but which rapidly 
proves to entail undesirable conditions of ageing, decaying and death. Lilith observes her 
corporeal decline from “ivory tone” (146) to “dark all within” (146); from the sexually 
intoxicating force that “made \Adam\ love [her] -  with a hungering/ After he knew not what’ 
(145) to a sexually repellent mass, characterised by “pulpy skin” and “slimy horrors” (147).
Lilith vows to exploit the creative potential (of maternity) inherent in her condition of 
materiality, to impel Adam to “obey and worship her” (148). Her husband, however, declines 
obeisance, and she responds, as I have earlier indicated, with bad maternity.
“[S]he poured out her blood to escape me” (148), relates Adam, indicating that she perhaps
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menstruates as an outward sign of her rejected maternity. Lilith refuses to fulfil God’s 
(patriarchal) imperative to populate the earth, instead “consum[ing] and slay[ing]” (148) the 
children who bear God’s image; “liv[ing] by the blood” (148), rather than nourishing by it.
It becomes Vane’s duty to succeed with Lilith where Adam had initially failed: to sanitise 
and silence the bestialised and mortemalised female; the female who is denigrated (by the 
infeminator) for being both a ‘natural’ woman (femininity being equated with the 
realm of the material) and an ‘Unnatural’ woman (as expressing an aversion to the corporeal 
conditions of her sex that are sanctioned by patriarchy). Lilith, in short, is both too much of a 
woman (whilst she fails to transcend her material condition) and not woman enough (whilst 
she is reluctant -  in her refusal to mother -  to fulfil patriarchally-approved bodily ‘duties’). 
The infeminator, in this way, paradoxically opposes both nature (the wild feminine 
counter to masculine civilisation and order; the bodily sphere, which is positioned as 
hierarchically inferior to the spiritual) and the ‘unnatural’ (the female who is not feminine).
Vane, at first, attempts to fashion Lilith into the image of a Good mother, but is lured into 
her Terrible body: into the black, ellipsoidal room (which the text explicitly identifies as 
being a projection of her brain). Within the black marble palace, Lilith allows Vane to bathe 
in an amniotic fluid which “seemed to invite [him] to its embrace” (128). She continues her 
maternal role-play by offering him her (apparently) nurturing lactation, a literal “bowlful of 
milk” (129), followed by an intoxicating wine from “two silver goblets of grotesquely 
graceful workmanship” (129), which figure her (artificial) breasts. Vane describes the 
sensation imparted on him by Lilith’s wine/milk: “A delicious languor infolded me. I seemed 
floating, far from land, upon the bosom of a twilight sea. Existence was in itself pleasure. I 
had no pain” (132). This is immediately followed by a sudden “shoot of mortal pain” (133), 
which violently interrupts his paradisal suspension (and which suggests the equation of Lilith 
with the ambiguous Kleinian mother, whose breasts are ‘good’ and ‘bad’). The pain 
instigated by Vane’s ingestion testifies to his coming-into-being. It is the pain of expulsion, 
of division and separation. The experience, although identified by Vane as an apparent death,
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might be more accurately associated with the gynoscopic feelings of gestation and birth.
Vane comes to recognise his imprisonment within, first, the mother’s body (wherein his 
“whole body seemed paralysed” [133]; wherein his “will agonised, but in vain, to assert 
itself’ [133]; wherein he had to “lay passive” [133]; wherein his identity as an individual, as 
a separate being in his own right was yet to be established). Vane recognises, second, that his 
imprisonment is, in fact, within the Terrible mother’s body (“Some evil thing was upon 
me!” he cries. “[Something hateful!” [133]), realising that Lilith is in the process of feeding 
upon him (“she wiped from [her mouth] a streak of red” [133]). Lilith welcomes the orphan 
Vane into her body with the intention of utilising him as a “tame animal for her to feed upon; 
a human fountain for a thirst demoniac” (133). Vane, in complying (at least, temporarily) 
with her design, is emasculated -  engulfed by her dominant body to become himself 
material, sexual, bestial, mortal.
To be defined as foody’ cannot, according to Lilith's (patriarchal) Christian persuasion, be 
indefinitely conddned. Vane retains a body until he learns the lesson of humility and 
accomplishes the abandonment of his arrogant and egocentric claim to free-will. Prior to this, 
however, his being ‘bodied’ has potentially devastating consequences for his masculinity (in 
addition to those imposed by the temptations proffered by Lilith). Vane is regrettably 
compelled to employ his body as a vessel of desire, loving transgressively, with the outcome 
of death (although not necessarily his own).
Vane expresses, for example, a bestial (or feminine) desire for horses (155),7 a passion that 
he claims to have expressed at the cost of human relationship: “Hitherto I had loved my Arab 
mare...more, I fear, than live man or woman” (55). As Lilith has rejected her maternal 
function, so too Vane rejects, in this way, his paternal role (although, for the woman such 
renunciation is termed ‘monstrous’, whilst the man’s resistance might yet be defined as 
being as an expression of spiritual-above-corporeal devotion).
When presented with the Sexton’s horse, Vane asserts a passion similar to that which he 
directs towards the dangerously bestial Lilith:8 “The sight of this mighty one, terrible to look
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at, woke in me longing to possess him” (155). The horse, with its “eyes of the dead” (156), 
its body “a block of marble” (156), “smooth and thin, and shiny as satin” (156), operates as a 
Lilithesque “temptation” (156). (The former is never more desired than when it exposes 
“protuberant bones” [156], and the latter also attains greatest sexual value when it is a 
wasted corpse). Both beast and woman-beast represent the Shadow, the darkness of adult 
carnality, as opposed to the light of the child’s body-not-yet-known. Vane is offered the 
choice of darkness or light but selects, at this stage, the bestial option, revealing that he 
“forgot the children, infatuate [sic] with the horse” (157). He rides the beloved steed against 
the Sexton’s advice, and the horse is necessarily diminished from an unfaltering “tornado” 
(158), embodying the brute force of nature, to a “helpless bulk” (159), a passive mass; to a 
“horse no more” (159). His Tover’ resists his untimely advances, frigidly refusing to be 
‘ridden’ (“the body froze under me” [159]), and delivers him instead to a position of sexual 
subordination.9 Vane is forced to become the (non-consenting) object of a lupine lust, 
signified by the wolves’ (into whose midst he is inserted) “quick panting” (159); to be 
enclosed in the wolves’ vagina-like “half-circle [which] contracted around [him]” (159).
“My time was come!” Vane fears, spying the (repression-indicative) castrating teeth of the 
lupine vagina dentata, “[a]las, I had not even a stick!” (159). His wolf-lovers approach him, 
“their eyes flashing with fury of greed, their black throats agape to devour [him]” (159), and 
Vane can do nothing but passively and “hopelessly [await]” (159) their simultaneous 
penetration and engulfment. He is not consumed by them, however, as he is ‘purchased’ by 
an equally ravenous (and penetrative) horde of cats: “In a moment the sharpest of sharp teeth 
were in my legs...biting wherever they could bite, furiously scratching me anywhere and 
everywhere” (160).
This episode of feline “persecution]” (161) might also be understood as illustrating Vane’s 
receipt of a corporal punishment from a disciplinarian (but not necessarily sadistic) mother. 
Mara is identified with cats (imaged by the Little Ones as the feral “Cat-woman [who] is 
awfully ugly -  and scratches” [71, emphasis in original], and perceived by Vane through
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similar child-eyes when he describes the cat collective she leads [and is part of] as a “hateful 
swarm” [160]). The cats/Mara/Mother, then, torment Vane throughout the “miserable night” 
(160), their chastisement of him eventually coming to be apparent as an act of ‘love’; an act 
which serves to direct him (both physically and spiritually) along a “comparatively smooth 
path” (160). The irifantile Vane initially resisted punishment (“Madly I fell on [them], every 
finger instinct with destruction” [160]); he then recognised that recalcitrance is futile (“[I] 
could not rid myself of one” [160]); and now, finally, he learns a lesson of motherly love at 
the extremity (“Whep at length the morning appeared, I was beyond the channels...In my joy 
I would have made friends with my persecutors” [160-1]). At the close of his ordeal, Vane 
expresses a profound sehse of not only relief but pleasure. This fact is communicated by his 
submergence into “moss” (161), a natural velvet which re-conflgures the erotic animal fur, 
and by his falling into a deep (perhaps post-coital, sexually-sated) sleep.
Vane, in this incident, might also be understood as a self-styled, active victim; as the 
masoChist who controls his punishment, who employs the sadist in a “contractual power 
arrangement” (Kincaid, 1992: 262), who requires the sadist on a definitional basis. In this 
way, he teratologises the mother so that she is the beast, she is the monster that he is not. 
Nevertheless, the sadism/masochism, active/passive, subject/object dynamic is also easily 
(and readily) reversed, as expressed by Vane’s aggressive desire for the text’s literal 
children. (“They [the Little Ones] were so charming, so full of winsome ways, that I  must see 
more o f them... ‘T omorrow, ’ I said to myself with delight [and determination], ‘ I  shall see 
them againV ” [L: 60, emphases added]).
Vane’s transgressive equine love (my initial example of emasculating, bestial desire) 
occurs, of course, even before he encounters the Little Ones (who similarly become ‘bestial’ 
objects of his desire, in that they are defined as belonging to a different, perhaps less evolved 
species [Little Ones or Lovers, as opposed to Giants] from him). The horse, his commanded 
lover, dies in his premature conjugation with it, exposing him to the further emasculating 
episodes in the Evil Wood. The death of the horse results in Vane’s subjugation to a 
humiliating sexual sterility. He is, to summarise, submerged in a hostile-womb darkness
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without even a substitute phallus (the absent “stick” [159]) to assert his masculinity; he is 
then delivered into the jaws of the simultaneously sexual (“now rubbing...up against me” 
[160]) and devouring she-cats. Whilst the living horse had enabled Vane to vault the “evil 
hollow” (158), the dead horse serves to submerge him in the dangerous, femininely- 
sexualised landscape: to be “caught in the net of the darkness” (159).
Despite Vane’s apparent attraction to the bestial, a tension might be demonstrated as 
persisting between his attitudes towards (for example) the masculine, adult, sexualised horse 
and the feminine, non-sexual child Lona. Vane’s interest in the latter illustrates his desire for 
the clean, undefiled child of idealisation (as opposed to the ‘dirtiness’ of sensual reality).
Purity, in Lilith, is defined as a state before the (pubertal) “coarse[ning]” (146, emphasis in 
original) of the body. Purity characterises even Lilith’s original condition, prior to her 
spiritual descent into ‘evil’ where even her physical self becomes degraded: “rott[en\” (146, 
emphasis in original); liquidised into a formless “mash” (147, emphasis in original); emitting 
blood (in menstruation) and the vaginal secretions that signify sexual desire. Purity, in short, 
is associated with childhood.10
Vane comes to seek maternal restoration in the figure of the child (Lona), renouncing his 
original quest to locate ‘home’ within the gynoscape of the (physically and spiritually 
corrupted) adult female (Lilith). This is perhaps due, in part, to the fact that the figure of the 
child has an unambiguous and permanent body. The paedophilically desirable child is the 
“inert child, the child of stasis, uncontaminated by the threat of change, growth, 
independence” (Kincaid, 1992: 93). The Little Ones, as eternal children, are “empty” (L: 68), 
and are available to be ‘filled’ by the maternal-womb-seeking adult Vane. He resists his 
initial inclination “to teach them many things” (68), “[t]o enlarge their minds [if not their 
bodies] after the notions of [his] world” (71), perhaps desiring unconsciously to sustain his 
own infantile position. “[T]hey had in no way become dependent on me”, he insists, “they 
were still my protectors, I was not theirs” (68). This assertion testifies to his attempted 
rejection of the adult world, a world he has escaped upon entering the gynoscape. Such a
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rejection is suggestive of the paedophile’s11 pathological withdrawal from the perceived 
oppressive world of adult responsibility. Re-fashioning himself as a (permanent) child, the 
orphan need not become the ‘man of the house’, to fill the blank created by parental death. If 
his status as a child is sustained, so too is his need of the gynoscape. (The activity of 
gynescaping demands the annihilation of some mothers -  ‘bad’ mothers; Lilithesque mothers 
-  but not necessarily of all. Certain gynoscapes must continue to be upheld if the orphan is to 
retain his position as child).
In summary, Vane desires Lona because, as an eternal child, she will never degrade into 
‘dirty’ adult female sexuality. He asserts for himself, on the one hand, the dominant position 
in their relationship, based on his (persisting) adult (as well as male) status. However, he 
remains unable to completely reconcile his dualised convictions regarding the adult, the 
bestial, the in/human (bestiality, in Lilith, connoting both the ‘inhuman animal’ and the 
‘Divine-opposed human’), the material, the bodily, the blemished, and the child, the 
in/human {child, in Lilith, connoting both the ‘transcendent-because-idealised-inhuman’ and 
the ‘beast-opposed human), the spiritual, the ‘clean’. Consequently, he simultaneously 
conceptualises Lona as a ‘pure’ mother, and posits himself as her (redeemed) child.
3 LonaScape
Vane’s evasion of adult-being culminates, as I have indicated, in his attempted acquisition 
of a child-mate. In order to contextualise Lona, an evaluation of her of igins (as initially 
established in the text) is necessitated. Briefly, Lona is a ‘Little One’. The Little Ones do not 
grow up. They might physically grow, but this is demonstrated as signifying a spiritual 
deformity or degradation. Within the arid bodyscape of the ruling Princess Lilith’s realm, 
they can only be children. The biggest of the Little Ones become either mothers or giants. 
Lona, the biggest girl (“the tallest and gravest of the community” [Z: 61]) becomes a mother, 
even though she acknowledges a fear about her size, expressing doubt at her qualifications
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for being her people’s matriarch, the “heart and head and sheltering wings” (150) of the
children: “I am the biggest”, she tells Vane. “It frightens me sometimes” (63). Bigness 
necessitates an expulsion from one’s home, both literally and metaphorically. Little Ones 
who grow can become a new species and must leave the forest. Likewise, the infant, having 
grown too much for its original resting place, must eventually experience the trauma of birth. 
Bigness, for the Little Ones, can, therefore, have fatal consequences: the Little Ones who 
grow can cease to be, dying out of the old and entering an undesirable and irreconcilable new 
state. This newness is deemed a punishment, a response to sin, a response to their 
transgression of the laws of eternal innocence. Lona explains: “If a Little One doesn’t bare, 
he grows greedy, and then lazy, and then big, and then stupid, and then bad” (64). The child- 
sinners become Giants, or “Bags” (159), a term which, in Scots dialect, can connote 
gluttony, meaning ‘to cram the stomach’.12 The Little Ones who commit this ‘deadly sin’ 
are, significantly, described as feasting upon (perhaps Edenic, Fall-inducing) apples: “Look 
at little Blunty: he is eating one of their [the Giants’]apples! He will be the next...he will 
soon be big and bad and ugly, and not know it!” (64). An alternative meaning of bags (again, 
according to the Scots) is ‘to swell or bulge’.13 Lilith’s Bags, therefore, are children whom 
sin has swollen into giants,14 (“That is what comes of Little Ones that won’t be little!” [67, 
emphasis in original]).
‘Growth’, for the Little Ones, might be conceptualised as a gendered process. If female 
children were to become big they would become mothers (their bigness signifying 
metaphoric wombs). It is these, the “bigger girls...[who have] the smaller [children], and the 
smaller the still less, to tend and play with” (61). If males (like Blunty) grow big, however, it 
is interpreted as a sign of developmental dysfunction: they might only become giants (and 
never ‘big’ with pregnancy). They are transferred between two non-desirable (emasculating) 
poles -  from a state of infantilisation whilst little, to a state of greediness, laziness, stupidity, 
badness and childlessness when big. Males, , with their potentially inherent inferiority, are 
subordinated within this (matriarchal) community until Vane, proponent of a ‘superior’ 
masculinity, intervenes, to become ‘all the man they need’. (Vane challenges their belief-
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system: he is big, but good; big, but not a Bag; big, but [potentially] fertile).
Whilst the Little Ones’ community operates as a matriarchy (with Lona at its head), the 
Giants reify a male of their kind, “the biggest and fattest of them -  so proud that nobody can 
see him; and the giants go to his house at certain times, and call out to him, and tell him how 
fat he is, and beg him to make them strong to eat more and grow fat like him” (66). Whilst 
Lona is admired for a selfless maternity (although a surrogacy -  not giving birth, but indeed 
giving life, through nurture), the biggest Giant attains his social standing through a non- 
creative, non-productive, non-yielding consumption -  taking where the (Good) mother only 
gives. With regard to gender, again, the female’s position is one of a positive instability, a 
flexibility, so that even though possession of a womb might enforce a passage into hysteria 
([Victorian] woman enwombed ‘grows’ mad),15 it can also be obviously productive, 
containing the capacity for creation. The male, on the other hand, is granted a negative 
stability, a (patriarchal) rigidity which declares that, once reached, his condition of bigness 
is unchangeable. He will have no recollection of a past (“He will wake one morning and find 
himself a giant...He will think he has been a giant always, and will not know...any of us” 
[66]). He will have no capacity for the comprehension of an ‘other’ (“He will be like the rest; 
he will not remember us -  most likely will not believe there are Little Ones” [65]).
Lona, as a female, will never be degraded into such the same (paradoxically) stultifying 
growth as befalls the males of her community. She is the child figured as a “free woman” (Z: 
179); as freed from the imperative of her sex (that is, her function to reproduce). She is the 
Little Ones’ appropriated ‘mother’, who is, ironically, denied a procreative capacity of her 
own; a womb-disabled ‘woman’ who is consequently unable to ‘deliver’ her people from 
Lilith. Instead, it becomes (the Good Giant) Vane’s responsibility to implement the 
expulsion of the Little Ones from Lilith’s oppressive womb-cage.
Lona is (infeminatively) sustained, as I have asserted, in the purity and sexlessness of 
childhood, her body prevented from becoming an instrument of ‘expulsion’ (with its
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negative connotations of faecal emission, the defecation of an inseparable life-death dyadic). 
Her name, itself expressive of the lone that, in Scots dialect, denotes a fecund space,16 might 
be imaged as a (gynoscopic) receptacle, the originary pre-fissured uterus. In an extension of 
this, Lona’s body comes to signify for her people the Kleinian ‘good breast’, as she nurtures 
the babies she finds.
This breast, which figures throughout Klein’s writings, exists in infantile fantasy (as I have 
already indicated) in a relationship of antagonism with the opposing ‘bad breast’. Klein’s 
1945 paper, ‘The Oedipus Complex in the Light of Early Anxieties’, for example, describes 
the child’s relationship with part objects, primarily the mother’s breast, split (to begin with) 
into a good and loved one, and a bad and hated one -  a relationship which eventually extends 
to the mother’s whole body. Dividing the mother figure into a good and a bad ‘breast 
mother’ is the child’s way of interpreting ambivalence. It is the child’s way of bisecting and 
confronting the world. The idealised good ‘breast mother’ is a bountiful source, never 
frustrating desire, never ceasing to give. The bad ‘breast mother’, however, comes to 
epitomise all that persecutes, threatens and frightens.17 Experienced first as a body-in-parts, a 
reintegration eventually occurs, so that the maternal fragments come finally to be understood 
as a whole -  so that the bad figure and the good figure come to be understood as one and the 
same: mother. When this is finally achieved, when love and hate are reconciled, the infant 
knows wholeness.
Lilith describes an episode o f‘maternal’ breast-feeding which is suggestive of the 
conflicting perception an ‘infant’ might direct to a single source. In this incident Lona 
demonstrates how she, the assumed mother, feeds her ‘finds’. She exhibits this to a self- 
infantilised Vane in response to his need. (It is, after all, he who specifically requests to 
witness the experience: “But how do you feed him?” Vane asks. “I will show you”, Lona 
responds [62]). Vane’s desire, here, is for a vicarious, externalised and voyeuristic 
experience; for the opportunity to witness Lona’s maternity without being personally 
implicated. (He perhaps requires a ‘demonstration’ of her mothering before he can decide
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whether she is a Kleinian good or bad ‘breast mother’):
She put [a plum] to the baby’s lips...Without waking he began at once 
to suck it, and she went on slowly squeezing until nothing but skin and 
stone were left... ‘But what if you let the stone into the baby’s mouth when 
you were feeding him?’ [Vane] said. ‘No mother would do that,’ she replied.
‘I shouldn’t be fit to have a baby!’ (62)
Lona feeds her babies on the displaced breast of the fruit. They passively suck, but she, the 
aggressor, pulping ‘her’ flesh, might be interpreted as transforming the ‘innocent’ act to one 
of eroticisation. Prolonging the feed (“slowly squeezing”), she perhaps expresses, albeit 
unconsciously, a masochistic (and auto-erotic) fascination with the potential destruction of 
the maternal breast. Vane appears to sense a Kleinian ‘bad’ maternity at work, and ventures 
to suggest that she might indeed be offering a ‘bad’ breast -  not only a source that becomes 
depleted (so that only “skin and stone” remain) but a murdering milk: the stone would choke. 
She assuages his fears, however, her innocence operating as guarantor for her sincerity. She 
innocently denies that a mother should harm her child -  without knowledge, at this point, of 
her own maternal origins. Her own mother (Lilith), after all, would certainly offer the stone 
concealed within the plum to her suckling child. (Lilith does as much to Vane, persuading 
him to drink her wine which renders him helpless, and then proceeding to drink his paralysed 
body’s blood). Lona redeems herself with her innocence: she becomes the bountiful Good 
(and ‘good breast’) mother once more.
As Lona nourishes from a displaced breast, she is herself a displaced mother. The eternal 
child is not physically capable of child-bearing, but is sustained in a permanent position of 
neophytic in-betweennesS. “I thought what a lovely woman she would grow. But what 
became of them when they grew up? Where did they go?” (62) ponders Vane. “That brought 
me again to the question -  where did they come from first?” (62) Lona’s provides a single 
answer: “Here” (62). She is destined to both begin and end (according to the infeminator) 
with childhood, her physical maturity and physical (biological) maternity to be forever made 
“unknown to herself’ (151).
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Lona’s indefinitely prolonged child status is perhaps established and enforced, as I have 
earlier indicated, in response to Vane’s desire. The Little Ones are perceived by Lilith as a 
“savage dwarf-people” (130), and the children themselves reveal that, according to the 
perceptions of the Giants, they do not exist as children but as “moles and squirrels” (69). 
Vane, however, subjectively identifies them as “lovely little goblins” (57). His interpretation 
might be related to the very nature of his quest: he is seeking the Good mother who offers 
uterine safety; this woman might not exist in reality; he must, consequently, select an object 
on which to project idealisation; the children, being “innocents” (179), have the necessary 
malleability to permit this transformation (unlike the sexually mature and manipulation- 
resistant Lilith). The idealised mother-lover must contain discordant qualities of chastity and 
fertility, and these are the very (unrealistic) characteristics that Vane imposes upon Lona.
He deliberately keeps the truth of her origins a secret from her (“I never told her anything 
about her mother” [174]), even though he plans for her to assume the very role her mother 
occupies (“Lona should take her seat on the throne that had been her mother’s” [172]). 
Although Vane insists that Lona should appropriate her mother’s status, he opposes her 
identification with Lilith, insisting, rather, that she become the untainted, pure, Virgin 
Mother.18 Lona must not, he determines, learn her maternity from a corrupt source (to 
become the ‘copy’ of a blemished, imperfect ‘original’). Vane’s position in this succession 
shall not, he reveals, be one of equality, but shall require his “spend[ing] [his] life in her 
service” (172). He offers himself here neither as father nor as husband but as a (self- 
subordinated) son: as the object of his ‘mother’s’ omnipotent creation. Vane relinquishes 
conquest-desires, resisting the imperialistic, phallic impulse to explore and to master, instead 
seemingly affording Lona the reverence of a mother goddess: as, whilst he must traverse the 
gynoscape, the geography of maternity, to locate ‘home’, the female Lona is already ‘home’ 
-  she is the gynoscape. He can, however, honour her without a threat to his masculinity, as 
this gynoscape is the female-body-without-threat. It does not forsake boundaries with the 
fluid outpourings that operate as a defiance of patriarchal order (Lona, as a child, is in a state 
preceding pubertal menstruation). It does not debase itself in (a bestial) copulation which not
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only defiles the female’s purity but also threatens to engulf, devour and castrate the male 
(Lona, as a child, is sexually immature). Furthefmore, Lona’s inability to literally procreate 
(Lona, as a child, cannot physically conceive) is rendered insignificant as, in Vane, she 
already has ‘offspring’.
Vane’s withholding of the truth from Lona serves not only to spare her from learning the 
fact of her evil origins (with the implication that she might be in possession of an inherited 
‘bad blood’) but also operates to conceal from her that she actually has parents. This allows 
for the dissemination of the myth that Lona is no product of ‘human’ (tainted, corporeal, 
mortal) coition. Apparently lacking in parents, she can be fantasised (by Vane) as having 
been created only in God’s divine (immortal, inhuman) image: as a direct projection 
emanating from a spiritual male.
Vane’s project o f‘dehumanising’ Lona might be conceptualised as an expression of his 
necrophilic desire.19 Whilst Lilith functions as woman-as-death, her daughter Lona is 
woman-as-dead. Lona is transported to heaven before she can be (sexually) defiled by life. 
Death is her defloration, death acquires her virginity.20 This act is instigated by her mother: 
Lilith (Vane’s rejected and usurped love-object) kills her daughter. And although Lilith kills, 
it is Vane who is granted ownership of the body.
Vane’s fantasy about preserving Lona’s corpse expresses his anxiety regarding her 
physical dissolution. Equally, it intimates his reluctance to permit her autonomy (and 
autonymy):21 it is an expression of his mastery. In death she can, of course, be possessed in 
his prolonged viewing of her: to become the permanent object of his fetishistic desires. 
Additionally, the fetishisation of her corpse represents for Vane a triumph over death. As 
Bronfen indicates, the male, in fetishising death, preserves “his narcissistic sense of self’, to 
become “immortal” (Bronfen, 1992: 97).
Lona, as the eternal virgin, is freed from material time and bodily declivity, and is 
sustained thus by Vane’s objectification of her: “I fell a wondering where Lona was gone, 
and dropping on the grass, took the dead thing in my lap, and whispered in its ear, ‘Where
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are you, Lona? I love you!’ But its lips gave no answer” (Z: 188, emphasis added). Lilith 
was also (initially) loved in her status as silent memorial, as ideal feminine, as immobile 
and inert. However, Vane learns that her death is not the (passive, supine, exquisite) feminine 
version that can be loved by the male subject. Her death is self-asserted, actively adopted as 
a mask that veils her true vampiric state of animation. She informs Vane that he does not 
make her live or die, but that she controls both spheres of non/being (a claim which extends 
even to his body, as she kills the parasitic leech, deciding the precise proximity of his body 
to death). Lilith asks him, “[h]ad you failed to rouse me, what would you have done?” (107) 
Vane answers, “[h]ad I seen the smallest sign of decay, I would at once have buried you” 
(107), endeavouring to (re-)assert his mastery over her mortality. He resorts to explicit 
objectification in order to affirm his position as subject. “I would have buried it” (107), he 
declares. “ ‘It! What? -  You would have buried thisT [Lilith] exclaimed, flashing round 
upon [him] in a white fury” (107, emphasis in original). She contests both her imposed 
object and death statuses. “I was but in a trance!” (107) Furthermore, Lilith accuses Vane of 
“pretend[ing] [she has] lain unconscious” (107). Her ‘death’, she asserts, is of his 
manufacturing, an infeminative fantasy, a fabulation based on necrophilic desire.
Vane might attempt to sequester Lona from Lilith through his fantasy of her occupation of 
an uncontaminated and untouchable space, however, they are not to be so simply divided. 
Lona was born, and is the product of Lilith’s parturition -  albeit an ‘ungrown’ progeny. Her 
mother is described as grown: as a “giant-girl...queen” (70) and an “awful bad-giant witch” 
(70). She “certainly...is not a girl”, the text instructs emphatically, “[s]he is older than this 
world” (75). Lilith is, in a certain sense, an expanded Lona, a Lona bloated with her own 
sexual maturity, with her own potential to give (and take, if it is to be understood that a 
delivery into being is a necessary delivery into death) life. Vane notes, “I had been struck, 
the moment I saw [Lona] again, with her resemblance to the princess [Lilith]” (164).
However, he perceives that the mother’s “dazzling beauty...was softened by childlikeness” 
(165) in the daughter -  a beauty less dangerous, less savage, less ‘hard’ (that is, masculine);
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a beauty that can be regimented, civilised, even unsexed into a safe (childlike) androgyny.22 
Vane learns to reject the “dazzling beauty” (165), the beauty that literally dazzles, charms, 
blinds.23 He must favour Lona’s “beauty...deepened by the sense of motherhood” (165), the 
beauty of the pure, non-sexual mother, the beauty of the nurturer whose genitals are yet to be 
defined (6r defiled) by the vocabulary of adult sexuality. Lona’s beautiful motherhood 
consists not even in immaculate conception, a parturition that can be absolved. Rather, she 
loves like a mother whilst loving as a child. Vane falls in love with Lona: “I loved her as one 
who, grow to what perfection she might, could only become the more a child” (165). He 
loves her because she makes of him a child also; “She drew my heart by what in me was 
likest herself...Every word she spoke seemed to go straight to my heart, and, like the truth 
itself, make it purer.” (165). Lona becomes a cleansing device for Vane, a means by which 
he can remove the ‘stains’ which tarnish his (human, adult) soul, and which prevent him 
from entering the paradisal New Jerusalem. This ‘entering’ constitutes the ultimate 
penetration he desires, the heavenly city imaged Biblically as feminine, as “a bride adorned 
for her husband” (Revelation 21:2).
Vane’s initial “heart’s desire” (L: 104) is, of course, the sexually mature Lilith. He 
re-vivifies her, asserting his own (feminine-appropriated) creative potential: “As a father his 
motherless child, I had bofrie and tended her” (109). He speaks of her in procreative terms -  
as well as having “borne” her (carrying her in his borrowed womb), he refers to the intense 
“labour” (109) he has endured in her creation, and names her “a sleeping child” (99). He 
gives her a life that she (whose ultimate ‘crime’ is her commitment to free-will over 
humility/subordination to paternal law) cannot accept; an unnatural life (he subjects her to a 
period of gestation within a “cave” [100] he makes his own) that she duly rejects, asserting a 
right to self-creation (and even making of him the “\c\hild of folly” [136, emphasis added]). 
Such resistance to masculine creativity had been responsible even (according to the 
Raven/Adam’s account) for her original exile from Paradise.
Vane’s turning to Mother Earth might be understood as an attempt to reverse his own birth:
to be male-authored and self-authored, as opposed to being the passive product of female 
(and ‘other’) productivity. This creation shall, in theory, be superior to that of his first birth, 
the creation performed by his mother, because his own (self-)reanimated corpse will deny 
the death that her creating demands. Vane’s entry into the gynoscape illustrates a desire to 
harness the mother’s creative power of birth and its necessary accompaniment, death. But, in 
his attempt to claim creative autocracy, Vane also finds himself preserving the dead mother 
when he extends his new powers to reanimate the body of Lilith. This ‘creation’ (a Terrible 
mother, who was always resistant herself to reproduce) re-lives only to propagate death. 
Forced to live, she is forced to fulfil her bad-maternal destiny, to ‘produce’ (through a brutal 
infanticide) the feminine corpse of Vane’s beloved Lona.
Nevertheless, Vane is (for a time, at least) seduced by her ‘monstrosity’: “My frame 
quivered with conflicting consciousnesses, to analyse which I had no power”, he describes, 
in an erotically-charged affirmation of carnal desire. “I was simultaneously attracted and 
repelled” (127). She is the “wounded angel” (102) of his dreams, with the “innocent smile of 
a girl -  and in face, figure, and motion seem[ing] but now to have stepped over the threshold 
of womanhood” (127), whilst sustaining a predatoiy cruelty, a “danger” (127) that 
accompanies sexual maturity. Vane, although “tempted to love a lie” (131), learns that he 
cannot make of her the child that gynescaping desires demand. She will not follow him but 
asserts a dominant sexuality, a Sacher-Masochian sexuality (like Severin, Vane must regret 
his insistence on being made his furred Venus’ “slave” [L: 110], her marble, controlled, 
sculpted-by-his-own-hand body encased in feline -  leopardess -  savagery). “To satisfy the 
hunger of my love, you must follow me looking for nothing, not gratitude, not even pity in 
return! -  follow and find me, and be content with merest presence, with scantest 
forbearance!” (130). This is Lilith’s imperative. Her daughter makes no such demands. She 
shares with Lilith a potential fetish-object status, yet is desirable in other ways (being 
“[always] almost a woman” [173], “divinely fostered” [150], raised by “angels” [150], and 
bom with a dormant “mother-heart” [150] that was to be awakened on finding “a baby in the
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wood” [150]). In Lona, Vane finds (or projects) the face of his lost mother. “I hardly 
remembered my mother”, he states, “but in*my mind’s eye she now looked like Lona” (173). 
However, he also degrades (or mortemalises) the mother in his (teratologising) visualisation 
of her as a “devot[ed]... divine animaF (174, emphasis added). It is, nevertheless, her 
“humility” (175), her concession to being “most at home by [his] side” (174), that causes her 
to be privileged by Vane over the transgressive Lilith.
Vane focuses upon preservation, fearing the loss of not only ‘his’ Lona but of ‘his’ Little 
Ones in general. He harbours an inner desire to prevent their reunion with their absent 
mothers (a reunion which has troubled connotations for the orphan, who is defined thus 
because of his originally being abandoned by a ‘faithless’ -  dying -  parent). “Perhaps you 
will be hurt!” (177) warns Vane, in an endeavour to dissuade them from undertaking this 
return. “We don’t mind that!” they reply. “Some of you may possibly be killed!” Their 
response is the same. “I would give my life”, says Lona, “to have my mother! She might kill 
me if she liked! I should just kiss her and die!” (177) Lona’s life is, of all the Little Ones’, 
the most valued by Vane, and the most endangered (because her mother is Lilith). Lona is, 
however, destined to become the lost child. At the hand of Lilith she is condemned to a 
separating sleep, a sleep that Vane cannot share, the death that must be entered alone. 
“[B]etween me and my Lona”, he comes to lament, “lay an abyss impassable!...Space and 
Time and Mode of Being, as with walls of adamant unscalable, impenetrable, shut me in 
from that gulf!” (236). Her sex (the abyss, the gulf) now sexualised, now “ripe” (238) -  as 
she “fell asleep a girl... [and] awoke a woman” (238) -  becomes hostile; a “desolate” (237) 
landscape, a “pale, starry night betwixt [Vane] and the sun” (236). Although momentarily 
likened, pre-sleep, to her evil birth-mother’s appearance, upon Lona’s awakening Vane 
states that “she was not dark!” (238, emphasis in original). Rather, she emerges “white as 
snow and glistering” (238), her eyes assuming “the radiance of the [Great] Mother’s” (238). 
Lona’s transformative sleep implements a tripartite transition: from the ‘clean’, innocent, 
unblemished, sexless child-body, to the tainted blackness (whereby it is identified with its
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maternal source, Lilith) of (pubertal) sexualisation, and resulting in the cleansed, ‘saved’, 
spiritualised adult-body. Lona becomes a woman, but in the image of the Virgin Mary, the 
redeemed Mara (Magdalene), the redeemed Eve.24 She is not a Terrible mother (like Lilith), 
a mother whose unwilling maternity causes her to be conceptualised as monstrous. She is not 
a ‘human’ mother (like the Bulikan women: “[A]t sight of... [them] what a dismay clouded 
the face of Lona! Hardly one of them was even pleasant to look upon!” [180]), a mother 
whose visual, tangible imperfection signifies her ‘inevitable’ degradation (with maternity 
being considered as the privileging of the material, the sexual over [sexless] spirituality). She 
resembles, rather, the Good aspect of the Great Mother -  her overwhelming goodness and 
spirituality perhaps enabling her to subvert the mortemalist project (although affirming 
dysgenication as she becomes another typological Maiy).25
Vane seeks union, as I have repeatedly asserted, with the maternal body (to affirm the 
“mother and son” relationship in which “no farewell is possible” [239]). However, this 
mother is not to be located in Lona, and the two finally separate again, never to be reunited 
(in the course of the text, at least, which claims for itself an “[e]ndless [e]nding” [250]). This 
final separation occurs as Vane and Lona re-enter the (Great) Mother’s body; as they “[pass] 
through the fringe, and [enter] the deep folds” (250) of her uncanny sex. This final separation 
is itself a death, functioning to “[remove] all complexity, purifjy], [put] what we love at such 
a distance that it becomes sadly pleasurable and irresistibly erotic” (Kincaid, 1992: 234). 
Lona must be lost so that she is free to be shaped by Vane’s (selective) memory forever.
4 TranScapes
Vane’s project of inducing and/or sustaining feminine death in order to facilitate 
manipulation (an activity he conducts upon both potential ‘mothers’, Lilith and Lona) is 
echoed in the intertextual repetitions of Phantasies, in the intmtextual repetitions of the 
stories within the Phantastesian stoiy, and in the ‘involuntary’ repetitions of (the otherwise 
unconnected, due to the decontextualising approach of the infemination reading) Sacher-
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Masoch’s Venus in Furs. A brief (trans-textual) consideration of these additional texts shall, 
combined, provide cross-referential support regarding infeminative activity for many of the 
thematic concerns of Lilith?6
Both protagonists of MacDonald’s adult fantasies (that is, Lilith and Phantastes) sculpt 
women out of a (pure) inanimate source, then flesh out this shared erotic dream. In 
Phantastes, Anodos, another orphan, is led to his Fairy Land by a mother (a maternal faiiy 
grandmother), where he discovers/creates a white marble lady. He is compelled to awaken 
her from her "death of dreams” (P: 70). Animated, however, she flees her ‘creator’, and 
Anodos must embark on a quest of pursuit. Anodos comes to be involved with this ‘woman’ 
upon locating a stone that he envisages as having the potential to become an ideal female 
companion -  when ‘she’ is appropriately and sufficiently doctored by his own hand. He 
discovers a ‘‘rock [which] is marble, white enough and delicate enough for any statue, even if 
destined to become an ideal woman in the arms of the sculptor” (P: 66). First, he must purify 
his find by “removing the moss from the surface of the stone” (P: 66), the ‘moss’ which 
connotes the pubic hair that sustains the woman as earthly, body-bound, naked, as opposed 
to (the artificial and ideal) nude. The surfaces must be “polished”, “smooth[edj” (P: 66), the 
“crust” (P: 67) that corrupts the surface of natural woman removed. When freed from such 
material fetters Anodos’ ‘find’ reveals itself to be “a block of pure alabaster enclosing the 
form, apparently in marble, of a reposing woman” (P: 67). This woman, her body an 
“alabaster tomb” (P: 68), a “marble prison” (P: 79), a “pearly shroud” (P: 78), becomes as 
much a fetish object for Anodos as Lilith’s emaciated and lifeless corpse becomes for Vane. 
Like Vane, Anodos feels obliged to restore her to life: “the longing had grown into a 
passionate need of seeing her alive” (P: 71). His own life comes to depend upon her response 
to his desire: “Cold lady of the lovely stone! Awake! Or I shall perish here” (P: 71). Both 
women are successfully revived, and both flee, leaving their creators unsatiated. As Lilith 
reveals herself to be the child-devouring ruler of the dead city Bulika, the marble woman is 
exposed (albeit inaccurately) as the “walking Death” (P: 86) that (literally) shadows Anodos.
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Both Anodos and Vane locate in their respective endeavours of creation the Terrible mother. 
As Lilith is the source (as I have already suggested in the preceding chapter) of a poisonous 
lactation, offering a seductive but fatal ‘bad breast’ to the orphaned ‘home’-seeking 
protagonist, likewise the marble woman lures her unwitting prey (himself an orphan also) 
into the “sepulchral cave” (P: 87) of a hostile, engulfing womb.
The contrast between the material and the spiritual, between the defiled, bestial, haiiy 
adult-body and the pure, unblemished, smooth child-body, is similarly suggested by Sacher- 
Masoch’s image of the ‘Venus in furs’ (in his text of the same name). Sacher-Masoch, 
although not strictly focusing upon a MacDonaldian woman-body/girl-body dichotomy, 
describes nonetheless a “marble” female body furred “like a chilly cat” (VF: 21). ‘Venus’ is 
cat and marble, animal and mineral, woman and child, human (material, palpable, sexual) 
and divine (spiritual, intangible, untouchable).
Sacher-Masoch’s ‘Venus’ originates as a literal artefact, a “statue...in stone” (VF: 32), a 
“beautiful woman of sculpture” (VF: 36). This woman should be constant, unchanging -  her 
marble body never to desert him as material flesh would -  as maternal flesh would (VF:
145), Severin comes, however, to conflate this static, unobtrusive, univocal image with that 
of a real woman. Pursuing this feminine unreality, he is suddenly confronted with female 
reality (VF: 36): Wanda von Dunajew, a woman he endeavours to poeticise, idealise, 
‘venusise’. Wanda, unlike her compliant counterpart, introduces the notion of feminine 
duality -  presenting Severin with an image of a combined life (“coloured” cheeks) and death 
(“stone[-like]” coiffure” [VF: 36]). Such cosmetic ambivalence is desirable (as appearance 
can be controlled -  the body can be fetishistically attired according to the specifications of 
Severin’s fantasy). Even a dualised character is permissible (when it is strictly controlled 
within the confines of role-play). However, Wanda later reveals that, additionally, women 
are informed by a natural duality:
INJever be sure of the woman you love, for the nature of woman 
hides more than you think.. .No woman is either so good or so bad 
as to be incapable any moment of thoughts, sentiments or actions the
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most devilish or the most divine, the most degraded or the most 
elevated... [W]oman.. .according to the impulse of the moment, is 
faithful or treacherous, generous or cruel. {VF: 75, emphasis in original)
Severin is himself a man governed by dualised thinking, believing that a man “must choose 
to be the tyrant or the slave [of a woman]” {VF: 29). Unable himself to be a master (being a 
self-confessed “dilettante” [VF: 31]), Severin vows to accept a position of slavery. Severin 
desires to become the “absolute property” {VF: 107) of Wanda, (errantly) investing faith in a 
supposed feminine malleability (which would permit him to shape her into his ideal master). 
Wanda (‘virtuously’) reveals herself to be a natural masochist:27 “I could quite well dream of 
belonging to a man for life, but he would have to be a complete man, a man who could 
impose himself on me, who could subjugate me by the force of his character” {VF: 49). 
However, ‘playing Venus’ awakens in her genuine sadistic impulses, so that boundaries 
between life and art, between true being and performance are no longer discernible.28
Wanda refuses to authentically reproduce the Severin-authored fiction, but transgresses his 
idiosyncratic boundaries (even renaming him Gregor).29 Failing to accurately “realise [his] 
dream” {VF: 63), but operating in excess of it {VF: 62), Wanda frustrates Severin’s desire. 
Nevertheless, he continues his pursuit of her until she commits her superlative unscripted act 
of cruelty against him. This final and ‘curative’ degradation involves his being ‘sold’ to a 
male rival, who has earned (the essentially masochistic) Wanda’s respect through his 
assertion of a masculinely “master[ful]” {VF: 147) stance.30 Alexis Papadopolis is described 
by Wanda as “every inch a man” {VF: 136), the very antithesis of the impoverished 
masculinity represented by the farcically abject Severin. Alexis, nevertheless, physically 
resembles a woman {VF: 138): as a paradoxical male furred ‘Venus’. He operates perhaps as 
‘Wanda exposed’ -  a version of the Wanda, that is, who was fabricated by Severin. This 
Wanda was masculinised, her omnipresent whip a phallus grafted onto her (feminine, 
passive, masochistic) body in response to Severin’s desire. Alexis reveals the truth of her 
identity. Resembling her in appearance and in action, he substitutes Wanda’s performance, 
explicitly operating out of a motivation of cruelty, not love. Only when his oppressor is
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known to be biologically male can Severin perceive his treatment to be a rape. “My blood 
was spurting under the whip” (VF: 158), he acknowledges of the brutalisation, the non­
consented sex-act; “he went on striking without mercy” (VF: 158). Similar exertions at the 
hands of Wanda had always augmented his passion. However, Alexis-as-Wanda31 alerts 
Severin brutally of his emasculated status (his phallic “worm... being crushed” [VF: 158]), 
instilling in him the necessary “shame” (VF: 158) that impels him to return “to the paternal 
hearth” (VF: 159). With his father’s guidance, the doubly-emasculated Severin (first, by his 
own doing, by his assertion of masochistic desire; second, due to his rape by Alexis-as- 
Wanda) “leam[s]...fo work andfulfil [his] duties” (VF: 159, emphasis in original). No 
longer does he court castration, the desire to succumb to the respective female-administered 
fates of (beheaded) Holofemes and (blinded) Samson (VF: 34).
Now, Severin recognises the futility of his search for the lost mother in the marble woman. 
This was the initial path he pursued with devastating consequences: due to his confusion of 
reality and art, and his attempts to conflate these incompatible entities into an impossible 
union. There are no mothers for Severin. Only fathers. Learning this, he is freed from 
bondage to his ‘Venus’ and to all women.32
Having thus described the chronological activity of Sacher-Masoch’s Venus in Furs, I shall 
proceed to integrate the text with aspects of MacDonald’s Lilith and Phantastes.
The idealised forms of statues and women are desirable when they are successfully 
segregated from the corrupting potentiality of the real. They must concede to the limitations 
of their frames. The ‘women’ of Severin’s, of Vane’s, and of Anodos’ respective 
experiences, however, transgress, violating the phallic-voiced regulations which would 
sustain them as ‘art’ in distinction to ‘life’. Severin sets the rules (for an ordered 
masochism), but Wanda breaks them. He sculpts an ideal woman (marble-bodied and 
cloaked in furs) from his desire. He fashions her meticulously to satisfy his scopophilic 
impulse, taking for inspiration the blue-print of art (VF: 33, 37, 60-1). Also inspiring his 
action is history, both world and personal (that is, stories already told and comfortingly 
distanced from his present reality). History comprises, for Severin, not only historical figures
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(“all the depraved women...lovely and despotic, such as Libussa, Lucrezia Borgia, Agnes 
of Hungary, Queen Margot, Isabeau, the Sultana Roxelana, the Russian czarinas of the last 
century” [VF: 61-2]) but his childhood experiences of women (such as the pleasurable 
tortures he suffers at the hands of the fur-cloaked Countess Sobol [VF: 56]). Finally, he is 
inspired by mythology (again safely removed from both time and reality), the “world of 
antiquity” {VF: 55) (from which the original goddess Venus is, of course, derived).
In short, Severin’s ‘Venus’ must fulfil certain specified criteria as defined by her 
(dysgenicating) creator. Instead, of course, she threatens to turn the image against him, to 
assert her own autonomy, to act according to her own script. Worse still, she threatens self­
degradation, which entirely undermines his demand for a clearly defined sado-masochistic 
relationship -  in which she is woman, he is beast (VF: 87). Wanda authorises her own 
bestiality when she confers animation upon the fur (in an errant act of self-definition). The 
fur, although self-designed as passive object of Severin’s gaze, threatens to interfere with 
life; to turn upon its creator, the artist responsible for its being, and devour him. (The child of 
psychoanalysis desires, on the one hand, to delegate responsibility to the mother, yet on the 
other, fears that such a renunciation of autonomy will make him the prey of her sadistic 
operations). Severin expresses a fear of feminine engulfment, deriving from a general 
“aversion” (VF: 54) to women that originated in his childhood. He recounts his various 
endeavours to evade (or ‘gynescape’) his potential oppressor: evident in his rejection of 
breast-milk (VF: 54); his “flight” (VF: 55) from a “ravishing” and “amorous” chambermaid 
(VF: 55); his being drawn to unreal feminine images -  “a cast of Venus” (VF: 55, emphasis 
added).
The threat of engulfment is similarly expressed and/or enacted by both Anodos’ marble 
lady and Vane’s Lilith. In the cases of these ‘women’, it is their hair which transgresses, 
which threatens the unbroken symmetry of the ordered (and dysgenicated) white body. It 
obscures the face of the former from sight: “her hair had fallen partly over her face, so that I 
could not see the expression of the whole” (P: 67). Fpr the latter, it is a violent “cataract”
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against the passive, gentle ‘‘soft whitefness]*’ (Z: 127) of her body. As metonymically 
exemplified by her hair, the female sex, in Lilith, Phantastes and Venus in Furs, is connected 
with the elemental, with nature, with the alien, the hostile and incalculable, and repeatedly 
imaged as contrary to male culture, reason and civilisation. The female sex, being 
conceptualised in this way, must be tamed into artifice; with woman safely rendered a work 
of art, cosmetic, masked, concealed. Both Anodos and Vane are seeking ways ‘home’ to the 
Mother and, as she is presumed inconstant (having abandoned her son, in the first instance, 
in the waking world), they look in the most dangerous places. When the willing and 
responsive Anodos is engulfed by the maternal “waters” (P: 19) of his fairy grandmother’s 
“eyes” (P: 19), he believes himself to have located the Great Mother. However, he soon 
finds himself unwittingly plunged into the amniotic waters of a hostile mother, a resistant 
mother; a mother who seems, significantly, to physically resemble the dangerous desire- 
object Lilith, a “tall, gracious lady, with pale face and.. .dark hair [which] flowed behind” (P: 
17-18). “Foolish boy”, she chides, in a Lilithian fashion, “if you could touch me, I should 
hurt you” (P: 19). Her “sea” is described as “still as death”, and reveals itself to be no true 
sea after all, “but a low bog burnished by the moon” (P: 19).
The mothers first selected by the respective male protagonists are dangerously sexual. 
Anodos strains to see his marble lady’s countenance in the dark, “looking for the beauty of 
her face” (P: 80) which, he discovers to his discomfort, “I found too plenteously” (P: 80, 
emphasis added). She epitomises excess, a woman of “intense loveliness” (P: 83, emphasis 
added), “extreme beauty” (P: 83, emphasis added), constituting a sensual overload, an 
intoxication for her creator.
Lilith, too, threatens to “kill [Vane] with her beauty” (Z: 110) -  an intention he 
acknowledges. However, being “dazed” (Z: 108) by her, “haunted” (Z: 108) by her, even 
“enfeebled” (Z: 108) by her, he is unable to avert his gaze. Such obeisance to her deified 
“Greek goddess” (Z: 109) body means that he, the masculine principle (on the side of 
rationality, civilisation and order), is defiled into (a transgressive) bestiality. “ ‘Down!’ she
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cried imperiously, as to a rebellious dog. ‘Follow me a step if you dare!’ ‘I will!’ I 
murmured, with an agonised effort” (L: 111, emphasis added).
Sacher-Masoch’s Severin, too, having offered himself as Wanda’s slave, is (teratologically, 
femininely) degraded into an animal. “Just waif’, warns his cruel mistress, “and you will 
whimper like a dog under the whip” (VF: 110). She explains that, as her slave, “[his] love 
has no more value for [her] than the attachment of a dog which one can always kick and 
drive away” (VF: 124). He is “not a man” but is of a “canine nature, which fawns when 
trampled on, the more so, when it is ill-treated” (VF: 86).
Neither Severin nor Vane can renounce totally their masculine claims to mastery, with both 
eventually withdrawing their initial commitments to female servitude. The smooth body of 
the statue must necessarily be re-configured as bestial in order for this break to be made; for 
the roles to be reversed. Severin, then, learns only to “hate and despise” Wanda when she 
“become[s] vulgar” (VF: 144), visualised as “a huge bear” (VF: 100), an image devoid of the 
seductive bestial sexuality that a feline or serpentine conceptualisation might allow. Severin 
is able to derive erotic pleasure from his imaging her furred body as a cat’s, and also 
expresses sexual arousal -  his being “all on fire” (VF: 118) -  when she “kiss[es] [him] like a 
serpent with her tongue” (VF: 118-9, emphasis added). However, as a bear, Wanda appears 
only predatory -  without sexuality. This absenced sexuality is, nevertheless, re-instated when 
Severin describes her vampiric hungering for his “warm blood” (VF: 100).
Severin’s beast/vampire nightmare strikes an obvious parallel with Vane’s experiences in 
Lilith. When Vane finally understands himself to be no more than anticipated prey for Lilith, 
he projects savagery and monstrosity upon her (L: 133). This demonstrates an endeavour to 
avoid accepting responsibility for the degradation of his masculinity into the emasculated 
status of the ‘weak eaten’. He focuses upon Lilith’s conceptualisation as the ‘unnatural 
woman’, rather than on his own position as the ‘unnatural man’, reluctant to acknowledge 
his role in the construction of his failed/failing masculinity.
Of course, once defined, the bestial female can be conquered; the leopardess put “in a cage,
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her mouth muzzled, and her [clawed] feet in gloves of crocodile leather. Chained...”
(X: 120); the devourer castrated, ensuring that the “Princess will not bite now” (X: 209). The 
broken beast (becoming the slave) can be shaped into a valid femininity, a fertile maternity, 
so that Lilith, when conquered, releases the waters (“her tears...flowing as she slept” [X: 
208]) which allow Bulika to be recovered. “The white juice is running out of the princess!” 
observes a Little One (X: 208), connoting the shedding of milk in place of blood -  the milk 
which means motherhood, the success of conception, as opposed to the menstrual flux that 
testifies to an unfertilised womb.
Neither of MacDonald’s women, the marble lady nor Lilith, can be adequate mothers for 
the respective orphans who seek a productive, self-fulfilling reunion, because both embody 
the cruel and perpetual frustration of desire -  manifesting the sacred (white, pure, innocent, 
childlike) body alongside the antagonistic profane (sullied, sexual, bestial) body. Vane is 
troubled by this dichotomy: “Could such beauty as I saw, and such wickedness as I 
suspected, exist in the same person? If they could, how was it possible?” (X: 128, emphasis 
in original). (Sacher-Masoch’s Severin expresses a similar perspective on woman, conferring 
his own inability to reconcile his divided loyalties to fear and to desire. “[W]omen”, he 
describes, “inspired me with a singular aversion, naturally coupled with the fact that they 
interested me so much” [VF: 54]).33 Lilith physically embodies the conflict (of a juxtaposed, 
coterminous ugliness and beauty), with her one “hand shut hard” (X: 131) and covered in 
(animalistic) “hair and claws” (X: 131), and her other “lovely as hand could be” (X: 131); 
with her one hand that recalls the Kleinian good ‘breast mother’ and the fecund and heimlich 
womb, and the other which symbolises the alternative bad, the empty, nourishment-refusing 
maternal body.
Anodos is also troubled by his chosen mother’s feminine duplicity: “What distressed me 
most...was the perplexing question, How can beauty and ugliness dwell so near?” (P: 87) 
Even though she is proven “faithless, deluding, traitorous” (P: 87), he continues to confess 
an inexplicable attraction to her. Eventually, however, she must be cast off, her barren,
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expulsive womb exposed as a “hollow deformity” (P: 86), her mock-hymen “mask of 
nothing” (P: 90) dashed “to pieces” (P: 90), so that her seductive but fatal beauty is evinced 
in an episode of naked clarity. The woman must be stripped (a second excoriation, following 
that involved in Anodos’ Pygmalion activity).34 Guise and artifice -  bodily accoutrements -  
must be exposed as deceit.
The subject of clothing is also pertinent to Lilith. Vane first sculpts the Lilith-body to his 
own specifications, so that she is transformed from the “skin and bone” (L: 107) he first 
encounters, to the “plumper” and “fairer” (Z: 105) form he desires. Then, however, he 
fashions for her a garment to conceal her nakedness -  a nakedness imposed by presumed 
“savages” (Z: 96): “I must not, could not let her lie exposed and forsaken! Natural reverence 
forbade it. Even the garment of a woman claims respect; her body it were impossible to leave 
uncovered! Irreverent eyes might look on it!” (Z: 96) Although endeavouring, at this point, 
to make a mother out of her, he does not consider his own eyes “irreverent”. Rather, he 
sustains her as the object of his gaze (as it is the gaze which shapes the object, making it pure 
or defiled at will) for three months. This constitutes the son’s daring to look upon the naked 
maternal body; the son’s sharing (a premature) intimacy with a mother’s body which is 
(apparently) the ‘home’ he seeks. In the poem related by the Raven/Adam, the narrator 
(Lilith) describes Vane’s endeavour ‘Vo clothe [her] human” (Z: 145, all poetic emphases in 
original). His attempts are in vain because she is, although not to be equated with life-giving, 
the determined creator of herself. In this poem Lilith recounts her self-motivated change, 
whereby she “\f\ouled [her] fair hands” (Z: 146), and, although admitting that “[her] past 
entire [she] knew, but not [her] now” (Z: 145), she was indeed the instigator of her ‘fall’ 
(having actively “given [her] opals for a smock” [Z: 146]). When he discovers Lilith to be 
the Terrible mother, Vane makes instead her daughter (Lona, the ‘good breast’, the nurturer 
of the Little Ones, the anti-Lilith) his lost ‘mother’. Already observing her maternal capacity, 
he makes for her a garment to cover her ‘shame’; to veil the sexualised, immodest, post-fall 
body; to shroud, Mara-like, the (maternally) torn hymen, restoring her to a status of pre­
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sexuality. In clothing Lona he invests her body with erotic significance, rendering her the 
tainted mother, in contrast with himself, the (pure) child. Vane describes her vestment: “I 
rose and put it on her. She rose, took it off, and laid it at my feet - 1 imagine from a sense o f 
propriety” (L: 174, emphasis added). In this account he acknowledges his possible ‘staining’ 
of her natural, unmarked body; his clothing of her in an unwarranted sin. Lona’s disrobing 
operates, in this way, as a visual renouncement of sin.
Similarly, Mara conducts a sanctified revelation of her nakedness, disrobing as an 
expression of her sorrow, as a symbol of an inner destitution. Mara’s shedding of artifice 
constitutes an abandonment of materiality, and a complete surrender to God (a return to the 
pre-fall state of an ignorant purity).
Lilith’s relationship with clothing is another matter entirely. When she first appears, she 
struggles to swathe herself in mist: “Up and down she walked, vainly endeavouring to lay 
hold of the mist and wrap it around her” (L: 50). This mask of purity, this “white mist...now 
assuming, now losing to reassume the shape of a garment’ (L: 50, emphasis added) is, 
however, impossible to maintain. When she does disrobe it is preparatory to a transformation 
into an embodiment of feminine evil: she strips to become serpentine (“a long-bodied thing, 
rushing in great, low-curved bounds over the grass” \L: 111]), or feline (the “spotted 
leopardess” [L: 136]).
Lona, however, is willing to wear the death-shroud (the eternal link between sexuality and 
death to be sustained; a link forged when the Biblical Adam and Eve, immediately after their 
transgression, discover their nakedness and clothe themselves) as soon as she has made for 
Vane a “garment which she had fashioned similarly [to her own]” (L: 174). Clothed thus 
they would appear partners, equals, sculptors each of the other’s body. However, whilst 
Vane constructed Lona’s from shed feathers, from death, she forges his from “the dried 
leaves of a tough evergreen” (L: 174, emphasis added), a testament to eternal life. Whilst 
Lona’s has a singularly decorative function, an aesthetic value alone (with Vane enthusing 
about the “splendour of [the] plumage”, the “glorious feathers” [L: 174]), the garment she
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has made for Vane operates effectively as “scale-armour” (L: 174), an exo-skeletal 
protection required by the warrior who anticipates entry into battle.
This, incidentally, serves as a reversal of an earlier scene enacted between Vane and Lilith. 
The preceding episode describes Vane’s activities within Lilith’s palace, including his 
acceptance of her invitation to bathe; to be temporarily submerged in the “great white bath” 
(L: 128) of her soured mother’s milk; to be lured briefly into the suffocating “embrace” (L: 
128) of her false love. Following Vane’s bath, he is offered (by Lilith) a white gown to 
shield his nakedness, which he duly puts on. In complying, he is ‘made’, constructed in 
white (marble?) artificiality by a feminised Pygmalion. This white robe might, of course, be 
associated with the feminine, a garment of material (as opposed to spiritual) virginal purity.
I have explicated how ‘blackness’ is often associated in MacDonald with femininity, whilst 
‘whiteness’ seems perceived as masculine, as pertaining to the spiritual, the transcendent. 
However, it should be remembered that ‘whiteness’ is also a condition often imposed upon 
the feminine by, for example, the dysgenicating infeminator, who conceptualises women as 
‘all all-white’. The connection, here, of the gown with the ‘white feminine’ serves to suggest 
a relationship between femininity and materiality. Lilith confronts the femininely-clad Vane 
in a garment that is immediately (by Vane) masculinised; imaged as battle-dress, as “a silver 
mail” (L: 129). Lilith refuses to be his shadow, the blackness to his white. Rather, she 
reverses all infeminatively-determined requisites o f‘good’ femininity -  even though this 
renders her ‘chaos’; the monstrous feminine.
Whilst Lilith emasculates Vane through clothing, Lona facilitates the reclamation of his 
manhood. Not only providing him with a (Lilithesque) garment, Lona’s pliability and 
passivity ensures that she will readily receive his (masculinity-affirming) domination.35 
Lona, as a child, is imaged as a vacancy, an emptiness to be filled by the adult’s 
eroticisation, thus is available to be transformed into his idealised image of the lost ‘mother’.
Like Vane, Anodos (and also Severin) is concerned with manipulation. Anodos’ true desire 
is to locate a motherhood such as that which Vane finds (or creates) in the Little Ones. He
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reads of it in a book in which “the words disappeared” (P: 141), so that only a mystical 
impression of its contents is imparted to him. What he describes, therefore, is bom out of his 
own longing. “Now the children, there.. .arrive no one knows how. A maiden, walking alone, 
hears a cry.. .and searching about, she findeth.. .a little child. This she taketh tenderly, and 
beareth home with joy” (P: 143-4), he reads. There are only mothers, never fathers, and 
whilst “[t]he men alone have arms; the women have only wings” (P: 146); wings “of 
glistering glory” (P: 146). These mothers are exalted because they are chaste. They are never 
tainted by fornication: “When a youth and a maiden look too deep into each other’s eyes, this 
longing seizes and possesses them; but instead of drawing nearer to each other, they wander 
away, each alone, into solitary places, and die of their desire” (P: 149-150). They retain the 
purity of children, never attaining mature sexuality -  their wings being described by Anodos 
as “but undeveloped arms” (P: 150), suggestive of a physical arrested development.
In this (metafictional) world Anodos encounters the mother he is chasing, the mother who 
appeared to him as white marble, the mother whom he is responsible for shaping, for 
sculpting, for constructing. This mother must relinquish control to the infant, who potentially 
possesses the power to manipulate her into the desired (‘good’) form. Anodos focuses upon 
one specific woman in the book, who is described as finding peace only when she surrenders 
to death. Embracing inevitable death, she locates a solitary snowdrop, lies down beside it and 
dies, but is reborn as a “child, pale and peaceful as a snowdrop” (P: 152).
Women, for Anodos as well as for Vane, are seemingly perfected when infantilised. 
Furthermore, death operates as a means by which the mother is preserved forever. The 
marble lady frustrates Anodos’ desires when she becomes mobile, when she runs away from 
him. Whilst a statue, she could be fixed in his gaze; in a condition of permanence (as 
manifested also in Vane’s desire for the non-changing infant, immobilised in eternal purity). 
Whereas living necessitates change (and for the worst, with children maturing through 
puberty into adulthood and moving away from their original sin-free status), death creates 
stasis.
Anodos continues his pursuit of the errant mother, seeking her (vicariously) in other books.
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He relates, and re-lives, the story of Cosmo, a student with an interest in the occult, who 
purchases an old mirror in which he comes to see a woman dressed in white. This woman, 
who appears to be “suffering” (P: 170), becomes Cosmo’s “new-found shrine” (P: 166) as he 
is compelled to watch her, even (or especially) in the passivity of her sleep. Cosmo controls 
her world, filling his room (and consequently its reflection) with objects to please her; 
continuing to voyeuristically admire her whilst remaining himself unseen. He believes he 
loves her, yet desires to control her destiny by magic: “[I]f a spell can force her presence in 
that glass (and she came unwillingly at first), may not a stronger spell...compel her living 
form to come to me here?” (P: 174-5). The enchanted lady appears to him and implores that 
he destroy her prison, and, after hesitating (“To break the mirror would be to destroy his very 
life” [P: 179]), he agrees. Cosmo fails in the task, both lady and mirror disappear, and he 
falls into a fever. Later, however, he learns that his lady is a princess who lives in the city; a 
princess cursed to live in a trance; a princess “more like marble than a living woman” (P: 
185). Cosmo eventually frees her, but at the cost of losing her. (This, of course, emphasises 
her position as another incarnation of the Terrible mother, like Anodos’ marble lady, like 
Severin’s or Pygmalion’s ‘Venus’, like Vane’s Lilith). Sustained in her deathlike stasis, she 
can be perfectly preserved. Interference, however, with this patriarchally-authored condition 
has devastating (loss-inducing) consequences.
The forsaken Anodos forsakes the books he finds in the Fairy palace and resumes an active 
search for the resistant mother. He enters a hall containing “an innumerable assembly of 
white marble statues, of every form, and in multitudinous posture” (P: 192). This discovery, 
he claims, “absorbed [his] delighted gaze” (P: 192) (that is, satisfied his scopophilic urge. 
Anodos is a voyeur who loves through his eyes). However, he also suspects that these statues 
cunningly frustrate his gaze:
[E]ach stood perfectly still upon its black pedestal: but there was about 
every one a certain air, not of motion, but as if it had just ceased from 
movement...I had the suspicion that they had anticipated my appearance, 
and had sprung, each, from the living joy of the dance, to the death-silence 
and blackness of its isolated pedestal, just before I entered. (P: 193)
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His desired statue is the most recalcitrant. He senses her presence on her pedestal, but she is 
invisible to the eye. Anodos is determined to excoriate the invisible layers which conceal her 
from view; “to unveil [his] Isis” (P: 199, emphasis added). This woman must be exposed, her 
body made available for manipulation by his gaze. Divesting her operates as a figurative 
clitoridectomy (the ‘hood’ which hides is removed in this “unveil[ing]”). Her hostile body 
(the vaginal ‘absence’ or invisibility) is made, at last, tangible, palpable -  controllable. 
Anodos assumes a creative power, giving the marble lady not just visibility, presence, but 
life (“ever as I sang, the signs of life grew” [P: 205]). Once the woman is unveiled he 
ventures to touch her (recollecting the earlier episode wherein he endeavours to embrace his 
fairy guide/grandmother). However, she flees, refusing to relinquish her body to his eager 
sculptor’s hands. The marble lady reveals to him, nevertheless, a pathway into the 
gynoscape, as she descends into a seemingly impenetrable chasm (which “[Anodos] could 
find no way of entering” [P: 208]). Anodos learns to penetrate the space, conceding as he 
does to “[descend] spirally into its abyss” (P: 209), into the nothingness, into the infinite 
womb spiral. Within the uterine cavity he is confronted with monsters: malicious and 
grotesque “goblin creature[s]” (P: 211), who are the children that function as sibling rivals 
for maternal affection. “You shan’t have her; you shan’t have her” (P: 213), they chide, 
promising him an eternal condition of loss. “She’s for a better man” (P: 21^), they taunt, 
placing the validity of his masculinity into question. The mother, they insist, is not meant for 
the child but for the father.
In the Oedipus Complex, of course, the boy feels in competition with the father for the love 
of the mother. This rivalry and desire is necessarily consigned to the unconscious because of 
the conscious ego’s recognition of the societal incest taboo. The boy fears that his father 
shall punish his sexual desire with castration, understanding the female lack of penis to be 
the effect of this devastating procedure. The boy fears for his masculine identity 
(experiencing his ‘castration complex’) and overcomes this through superego identification 
with the father.36 Following this model, Anodos surrenders in the name of patriarchal
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authority: “Well, if he is a better man, let him have her” (P: 213). He is not convinced, 
however, that there is a better man -  he has taken the place of the father, inheriting the 
paternal right, the (phallic) key to the door of the (maternal) otherworld.
Nevertheless, ‘his’ lady’s (‘bad’ maternal) rejection galvanises him to continue his 
journey, until he finally encounters the wise old woman who nourishes him freely with the 
desired ‘good breast’s’ milk (P: 229). He is content to dwell with her in “refuge and repose” 
(P: 228), envisaging a union with her that resembles Vane’s intentions for Lona. (Although, 
unlike Lona, this woman is not a child, she is non-sexual in the sense that she is post-sexual, 
aged perhaps into a second infantile status). The woman, however, comes to recall Anodos’ 
marble lady -  an image he now associates with death (“stand[ing] still as a statue;.. .her 
face.. .white as death” \P: 236]). The memory of her revived, Anodos is compelled (perhaps 
by a Freudian death drive)37 to resume the quest, only to locate his desire-object (the white, 
marble woman) in the arms of another. Granting that this ‘other’ (namely, Percival the 
knight) is indeed a “better man”, Anodos surrenders his life -  finally coming to realise that 
this ensures a direct route to the ‘mother’ (as Great Mother/Mother Earth) who was always 
already there. He sleeps the (Lilithian) ‘sleep of death’, that promises new (spiritually 
cleansed)38 being. The wise old woman, although (falsely) interpreted by Anodos as the 
(Lilithian/Venusian) white lady, is the Phantastesian Good and Great Mother. She is God the 
Mother (figured as Father in Lilith), the ‘home’ to which the (would-be) gynescaping male 
returns.
Anodos, like Vane, achieves a gynescape from the physical: from the oppressive, hostile, 
sexual, corporeal wombs of the marble lady and of Lilith, respectively. Neither protagonist, 
however, desires to evade spiritual union with (a feminised, matemalised) God. This 
becomes their shared final goal -  briefly permitted realisation through their respective 
attainments o f ‘sleep’.
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5 FinalScape
At the heart of gynoscopic literature, in conclusion, is death. The desired outcome of 
‘gynescaping’ is, therefore, perhaps always death. In the case of Lilith, which has been 
central to my ‘GynEscape’ analysis, there are two deaths, gendered deaths. Vane enters the 
otherworld in order to locate death. His exploration and experiencing of the feminised, 
matemalised landscape is enabled under the initial guidance of the Raven (who operates in 
response to his desire for a ‘home’). He penetrates the bodyscape and is confronted 
immediately with the Raven-articulated imperative: DIE. At this precise moment he is 
unaware that death presents choices. He is afraid. He refuses and flees. Vane believes that he 
is running away from death. He is running to it.
Vane’s travels through die gynoscape allow him to encounter his literal dead parents. 
These are the parents whose deaths have made him an orphan in the ‘real’ world. He finds 
them twice in the novel -  the first time, however, he fails to recognise them. He is taken 
‘home’ without even knowing it. In this first encounter, they are cadavers, to be located in 
the Sexton’s cemetery. Whilst his father has the appearance of “a king who had died fighting 
for the truth” (L: 34), his mother is tainted with the same black sin-spot that is later shown to 
be a characteristic of Lilith. Although, in one sense, she is suggested to be a Christian 
martyr, and her blemish to be a stigmatic wound (“the nail found in her nothing to hurt” [L: 
34]), the comparison made between her hand and the hand of Vane’s father appears to stress 
its being an affliction. Whilst her hand has “in its centre a dark spot” (Z: 34), the father’s is 
described as seeming “clenched on the grip of a sword” (L: 34) -  a sword with which he has 
fought nobly (phallically, masculinely) for the truth.
Vane, much earlier, mentions briefly the death of his parents: “My father died...my mother 
followed him” (L: 5). In contrast with the stasis and certainty of the paternal condition (his 
father dies, ceases, ends with a sense of abruptness and finality) his mother only ‘follows’. 
His mother does not die, she merely moves. His mother’s position is one of instability -  and, 
at this stage she is feared as an ambiguous mother. When Vane initially enters the attic (the
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starting-point for penetration into the gynoscape), this feminine womb-space symbol 
communicates the dangers of the Terrible mother, “threatening to crush [him]” (L: 16), and 
causing him to decry the “horror of the empty garret spaces” (L : 17). Then, upon leaving the 
‘real’ world for the otherworld, he is subjected to a terrain that is “vague and uncertain, as 
when one cannot distinguish between fog and field, between cloud and mountain-side” (L: 
11).
This fluctuation between the solid and the insubstantial connotes, again, the instability of 
the female body. Not only does this body oscillate from an anticipation of bleeding to an 
actual bleeding (the menstrual cycle), and traverse three stages of infertility (pre-pubertal, 
pre-menstrual), fertility (pubertal, menstrual) and infertility (post-menstrual, menopausal), 
but, in maternity, it disrupts this pattern further. Whilst the pre-menstrual female body can be 
interpreted as androgynous, the menstrual body as feminine and the menopausal body, in its 
ageing femininity, as androgynous again, maternity silences this outward sign of fertility 
(interrupting the feminine blood-flow and inducing, for a time, a vision, a semblance -  
though not an actuality -  of premature unsexing). The mother’s body, then, the gynoscape, 
can be perceived as the ultimate disruption to (patriarchal) order, refusing to respect 
boundaries. Her body expands with a ‘bigness’ that is always ambivalent in the text; and 
stages of pre-femininity, femininity and post-femininity are obscured from sight.
Consequently, when Vane is offered an early and easy reunification with the mother he is 
reluctant to renounce his name (which connotes both conceit and futility) and ‘sleep the 
sleep’. The mother (he does not even recognise her as such, only describing her as a 
“beautiful woman, a little past the prime of life” [L: 34]) is unknown territory. This initial 
reluctance, however, causes him to be propelled into the veiy body of the Terrible mother. 
Indeed, he literally penetrates this ‘dangerous’ sphere when, as I have earlier asserted, he 
unwittingly enters Lilith’s brain. The images he witnesses within are those he has 
experienced before (the skeletal dancers, the fight in the Evil Wood, the physical 
disintegration of Lilith), which serves to emphasise the uncanny quality of the
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(un)familiar maternal:
Some of the actions going on when thus illuminated, were not 
unknown to me; I had been in them, or had looked on them, and so 
had the princess: present with every one of them I now saw her...I 
knew that in the black ellipsoid [hall in Lilith’s palace] I had been in 
the brain of the princess! (Z: 137)
In endeavouring to outrun death, he outruns life. He delays union with the desired lost 
mother, the Good mother incarnation of the Great Mother, to be temporarily contained 
within the hostile, death-inducing witch-mother’s body.
Lilith’s death dichotomy I term atropic and thanatic. What they mean for the individual 
equates approximately to Jung’s Good/Terrible maternal duality. Atropic death is a term I 
derive from the name of Atropos, the Fate who cuts the thread of life. This death is 
classically personified as female, a death imaged as Petrarch’s “donna involta in veste 
negra”: a woman wrapped in black garments (cited in Guthke, 1999: 82). Furthermore, she is 
a violent and devastating death, the “daughter of Night”, according to George Richardson’s 
Iconology (1779), “ravenous, treacherous and furious...roving about open-mouthed, and 
ready to swallow up all that comes in her way” (cited in Guthke, 84).
Her counter is Thanatic death, derived from the Classical figure Thanatos, the male death 
personification (which also, incidentally, inspired Freud’s “instinct o f death... which works 
in silence” [Freud, 1925: 36]). Thanatos is the brother of sleep, representing “a beautiful and 
gentle death...death reconciled with life as life takes its leave” (Guthke, 80), as opposed to 
the aggressive, active, warlike death Atropos delivers.
Atropos is a cruel mother, severing the umbilical cords which bind her children to her, 
violently breaking (in an equally castrating cut for the male ‘infant’, such as the 
MacDonaldian infeminator) the bonds of maternity. Of MacDonald’s anti-heroines Lilith 
best exemplifies Atropic death, as Schiller’s “insatiable glutton everywhere in Nature” (cited 
in Guthke, 128), her appetite for feeding (a vampirism I have detailed at length) impossible 
to satisfy.
130
When Vane is instructed to die, it is with the language of sleep: a gentle non-invasive 
persuasion to surrender being. The bed is cold so Vane flees. He cannot distinguish between 
a positive, life-affirming death and a negative death-as-etemal-stasis, a death as ‘the end’.39 
He runs into the arms of Lilith. She is, at first, a corpse. He wills her to life. He invites death 
into his ‘home’. Vane revives death, nourishing her (unwittingly) with his blood and 
(deliberately) with his desires. The gynoscape turns black.
Unlike Atropos, Thanatos is conjoined with the image of Jesus, the deliverer (an 
appropriated feminine, procreative image) of souls, so that “both Christ and Death [are] 
fused into an unorthodox union [which] lead[s] us from this world to eternity” (Guthke, 171, 
emphasis in original). Thanatic death (the Christian delivery into Paradise through a ‘sleep’) 
is demonstrated as triumphing over Atropic death, with Lilith’s ‘sword-which-separates’ 
being acquired by Adam so that he might cut off her offending right hand -  an episode which 
echoes the sword-bearing (male) angels sent to destroy Sodom (to conquer the primordial 
feminine landscape).
Even though it is to the Christian ‘Father’ that Vane is delivered, his experience is that of 
being returned to a loving mother: a Great Mother. ‘She’ finally receives Vane back into her 
body, a birth process of absorption rather than of expulsion, so that he does not burst from 
the womb in an act of reverse-penetration but is engulfed by an active maternal vagina. Vane 
does not open the door, rather, “[t]he door opened; the hand let mine go, and pushed [or 
should it be pulled?] me gently through” (Z: 250). Vane’s re-entry of the womb also marks 
the establishment of his narrative’s endless ending, as a period of gestation must be endured: 
“All the days of my appointed time will I wait till my change come” (L: 251); “I wait; asleep 
or awake, I waif’ (Z: 252).
It might be concluded, however, that the writer who polarises metaphorically a Thanatic 
(masculine, ‘good’) death with an Atropic (feminine, ‘bad’) death -  evident where Vane, 
Anodos or MacDonald represent their (infeminative) fantasies of feminine evil -  gynescapes.
YASUNARI KAWABATA’S 
‘REVISIONS’ OF THE FEMININE
CHAPTER THREE: HIStory
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1 IStory
The titular heroine of J.R. Salamanca’s Lilith1 “constructs] an entire universe for herself, 
with its own history, its own cosmology, its own laws and art, even its own language” (Li: 
138). She “invent[s] a language of her own... which she speaks and writes in most of the 
time”; She “compose[s] a literature in it for her private world -  two or three novels, poems, 
stories, and a whole tradition of folk music, which she plays on her flute.. .the strangest 
music... ever heard”; She “[makes] up a tonal system of her own, with quarter notes, 
something like the Oriental scale”; “She makes her own clothes...[and] the cloth for some of 
them”; She “paints remarkable pictures with vegetable colors”; She “practices a kind of 
private religion-magic” (Li: 138). But Lilith Arthur is punished for her “tremendous creative 
achievement” (Li: 138), which is rendered a mere “delusional system” (Li: 138). She is 
consigned to an asylum, where she eventually goes “all to pieces” (Li: 367).
Gilbert and Gubar assert that the Lilith myth “represents the price women have been told 
they must pay for attempting to define themselves” (Gilbert and Gubar, 1979: 35), and view 
Lilith herself as a metaphor for “the problems of female authorship and female authority” 
(Gilbert and Gubar, 1979: 36). Both Salamanca’s and MacDonald’s Liliths share the fate of 
their mythological ‘ancestress’. The latter’s Lilith (along with her trans-textual associates) is, 
as I have illustrated in the two preceding chapters, (infeminatively) punished for her attempts 
at self-creation. This punishment continues now, evident in the selected texts of Kawabata, 
which ‘revise’ (hence the ‘Revisions’ status of his ‘[Di] Visions’), repeat, re-configure much 
of the MacDonaldian infeminative activity previously denoted as ‘Perversions’.
‘HIStory’, as I define it, is about masculine self-nomination. The male protagonists of 
Kawabata’s ‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’, Snow Country, The Sound of the Mountain 
and The Lake endeavour to establish their own ‘speech’ via constructions and 
conceptualisations of the feminine. Eguchi, Shimamura, Shingo and Gimpei are men with
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tenuous holds on their respective masculinities and subjectivities, and seek (re)affirmation in 
and through the bodies of women. Female characters are, therefore, mediated; forbidden 
direct expression; communicated as objects of the male speaking subjects’ desires.
‘HIStory’ shall catalogue the negative representations of the feminine through an intimate 
engagement with the male protagonists’ (masculine) speech about (feminine) silence.
The privileged text for interpretation shall, in this chapter, be the novella ‘House of the 
Sleeping Beauties’, which serves to define the ‘Historical’ principles that communicate the
concept of ‘woman’ as being a product of male language. The additional texts (namely,
*
Snow Country, The Sound of the Mountain and The Lake) shall be posited as a ‘support 
cast’, operating to assert a repetition that provides both the mpvement of transition and the 
stasis of unification.
2 ‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’
Eguchi, a man approaching his life’s metaphoric winter, visits a discreet brothel, 
accompanied by the literal “sound[s] of approaching winter” (‘HSB’: 16). He is received by 
a woman he assumes to be the proprietess, a threatening, masculinised mother figure who is 
in possession of “the key” (15) he requires in order to reach ‘her’ girls. This (nameless and 
only vaguely, uncertainly professionally defined) woman articulates also a masculine (and 
emasculating)3 language; a rhetoric of power and domination. Although she is the apparent 
owner of the collective female sexes of the girls, and asserts immediate orificial mastery 
(seeming “no doubt used to looking through doorways” [14]), she refuses to allow herself to 
be (femininely) sexualised. Rather, she permits Eguchi a vision only of het cold frigidity 
(“[her] thin lips scarcely parted as she spoke” [13]). She is a “woman” (40) in comparison 
with the girls, a subject among objects.
The proprietess permits Eguchi to enter a room in which a naked girl is displayed, 
synthetically sedated; a room in which private transaction (for solitary satisfaction rather
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than mutual sexual pleasure) will occur. Clients at the titular ‘house’ are always and only old 
men, impotent men, no-longer-men (20) who are themselves emasculated into almost- 
women (their experiences therein serving to reinforce the sense of a vagina-like “opening left 
by a sudden emptiness in [their] heart[s]” [21]). Clients are enveloped in a wombscape, 
within “four walls, so covered with velvet that there might have been no exit. The crimson 
velvet... [which] shut[s] in a girl who had been put to sleep, and an old man” (21). This 
space, this “secret room of velvet” (58) recalls the “secret place” (30) of the female genitals 
-  an image destined to dominate Eguchi’s fantasies and memories.
Eguchi’s visit to the house arouses in him the compulsion to seek a vampiric feast. He 
encounters in himself the parasitic need for a female sacrifice, coming to acknowledge that 
“only when he was beside a girl who had been put to sleep could he himself feel alive” (22). 
His feeding stops short of true physical and emotional contact, so that “[n]ot the smallest part 
of his existence reached her” (22). “The naked girl would know nothing, would not open her 
eyes, if one of the old men were to hold her tight in his arms, shed cold tears, even sob and 
wail” (67). The naked girl is necessarily ‘dead’ to him; the teratologised (animal) female 
whose ‘transubstantiation’ into exposed and available meat requires no active input from the 
(would-be, should-be) ‘predator’. Even though confronted with an unconscious, inanimate 
body, Eguchi is, nevertheless, granted “a gentle affirmation” (89) by sleeping at the 
beautiful, unresponsive woman’s side; comforted by his “rejection by the sleeping girl” (89).
Instead of satiating a physical thirst, his ‘sleeping beauty’ functions as the mediatrix of past 
memory, returning to him and restoring in him (however fleetingly) his already-lived life.4 
She operates as a temporaiy conduit between his old age5 and his youth, between his 
‘present’ and his ‘absent’. And, although convinced that he shall visit the ‘house’ only once, 
he is compelled to return -  to feed (albeit passively) off her suspended being, her momentary 
non-being in which he vicariously locates life. Eguchi finds that he must re-attend, and 
repeatedly pursues the always-already-there (generic) naked girl/foetus in the womb for the 
transient periods of gestation that operate as a re-generation for his aged flesh. He must re-
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encounter the safe and silent de-animated feminine in order to re-live; to revive past 
experiences, lived lives, spent emotions.
Time, in ‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’, becomes a place where past and future meet in 
a static place, symbolised by the ‘sleeping room’ -  beyond which Eguchi ceases to exist. His 
departure from the house is presented as co-existent with his return. He therefore never 
leaves but is in constant re-arrival. What remains in the wake of this temporal disruption is 
an eternal stagnancy comprised of isolated autonomous moments; temporality is abolished to 
attain an omnitemporality, a sempiternal stasis. Moments become autonomous, invulnerable. 
There is neither a ‘then’ nor a ‘now’. Time, in this way, must always signify reduction.
Time is to be degraded in Eguchi’s experience; simplified into an equation of 
economic exchange. He uses the unresponsive bodies of the ‘sleeping beauties’ to buy back 
life, paying “to drink in the youth of girls put to sleep, to enjoy girls who would not awaken” 
(59). His compulsion is slavery, and he, oppressed by the neediness (the dependency, the 
addiction, the hunger) of old age, is the embodiment of this slave. (This, again, reinforces his 
sense of emasculation, with ‘mastery/masculinity’ being polarised hierarchically with 
‘ slavery/femininity ’).
Endeavouring, however, to combat his self-destructive sensibility (and to claim occupation 
of his ‘rightful’ master position), Eguchi recognises the necessity of creation, in which are 
implicated what I define as voyeuristic, omnivoyeuristic and vehtriloquistic desires. Eguchi’s 
voyeurism, simply, enforces silence upon the girls, whilst his ventriloquism confers upon 
them a silent ‘speech’. My notion of omnivoyeurism proposes, additionally, a multi-sensory 
aspect of subject-object positioning (elaborating on the previous concepts’ respective visual 
and vocal concerns).
I shall define, first, Eguchi’s voyeurism, followed by his ventriloquism; and conclude with 
a broader omnivoyeuristic reading (which shall also chronologically delineate the ‘action’ of 
the text, via a consideration of both Eguchi’s semi-conscious ‘waking’ and unconscious 
‘sleep’ dreams).
2:i Voyeuristics
The love of looking, scopophilia, is derived from the infantile experience wherein a lack of 
power and mobility are overcome by the assertion of a controlling gaze. Once having exerted 
a supposed power over the primary female object, the mother, the adult domes to repeat this 
fantasy, projecting his gaze onto other women. In the act of voyeurism, the gaze is a medium 
through which the male watcher not only establishes the feminine body as object, but asserts 
absolute power over this object.6
Eguchi watches the ‘sleeping beauties’ (whose passive, unseeing, supine state has occurred 
at his command). What he sees is inanimate flesh. His patronage of the house sustains the 
funding of the manufacturing, the /wamifacturing of living women; the masking of their 
reality as “living doll[s]” (20), so that actuality is replaced by artificiality, the ‘natural’ 
female replaced by the ‘cultural’ feminine.
Kenneth Clark, in a discussion of Western art, distinguishes between states of ‘nudity’ and 
‘nakedness’ (between ‘cultural’ and ‘natural’ femininity), which otherwise might be 
considered as interchangeable terms for ‘being unclothed’. (I have already indicated that 
these might be differentiated in my MacDonald chapters, but shall elaborate here on the 
implications of such categorisation). Clark suggests that “the nude” is exemplary “of the 
transmutation of matter into form” (Clark, 1957: 23), so that, whilst nakedness is a 
deprivation, involving discomfort, defencelessness and shame, ‘nudity’ connotes “a 
balanced, prosperous and confident body: the body re-formed” (Clark, 1957: 1). According 
to Clark, “[t]he body is not one of those subjects which can be made into art by direct 
transcription” (Clark, 1957:3). The body (in its ‘naked’, natural state) must be modified, 
moulded, manipulated into art. ‘Nudity’ is cosmetic. It is the artifice of a regimented 
economy, as opposed to the honesty of the ‘naked’; it elucidates the ideal, as opposed to the 
actuality of the ‘naked’; it is the consequence of a shift from the corporeal to the spiritual, 
from the literal to the figurative. ‘Nakedness’, on the other hand, lacks. It is the reality of the
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body, the body without frames, without fmitude, without disguise. It is the (pre-gaze/gaze 
subverting) body which shuns regulation, instead threatening to contaminate, to interfere 
with the smooth machinations of order.
If the girls of "House of the Sleeping Beauties’ are ‘naked’ (vulnerable, exposed, seen 
without seeing, incapable of affectation), Eguchi’s looking is automatically rendered an act 
of scopophilia, an act of voyeurism, an act of perversion.7 Looking, according to Freud, 
becomes a perversion when, “instead of being preparatory to the normal sexual aim [of 
genital copulation], it supplants it” (Freud, 1905: 251, emphasis in original). Freud asserts, 
furthermore, that, “[tjhe force which opposes scopophilia...is shame” (Freud, 1905: 251, 
emphasis in original). Sartre also makes an explicit connection between sight and shame: 
“Pure shame is not a feeling of being this or that guilty object but in general of being an 
object; that is, of recognising myself in this degraded, fixed, and dependent being which I am 
for the Other” (Sartre, 1992: 384, emphases in original). Eguchi experiences shame when he 
empathises with the girls’ objectification. Upon realising, on the first night, that “[o]nly his 
own clothes” (‘HSB’: 20) were in the room, and that the girl might even have entered naked, 
he “cover[s]” (21) up her body and “close[s] his eyes” (21). He is conscious of shame, aware 
that his voyeurism is “ugliness” (43). He requires reassurance, asking the proprietess if the 
girls “ever ask what sort of old man was with them” (72). She guarantees him that he will not 
be seen. However, he continues to castigate himself for his “blasphemy” (94).
In order to assuage Eguchi’s guilt, ‘nakedness’ must be transformed into ‘nudity’. The girls 
are at first exposed (drugged and stripped), their artifice apparently shed. However, they are 
then watched by a man, who himself (unable to surrender to otherness) remains unseen. 
Eguchi removes his clothing whilst they are already immersed in the “deepest sleep” (18), 
becoming the voyeur whose (unidirectional) gaze galvanises their ‘naked’ bodies into ‘nude’ 
artefacts.
This ‘doll-making’ is a derogatory enterprise because of both its genericising and 
objectifying implications. First, the girls are dysgenicated; reduced to an eternal similitude;
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reduced to meat, with the solitary function of being “new flesh, young flesh, beautiful flesh” 
(39) for the old men to (scopophilically) consume.8 Their sameness is enhanced visually with 
their being pallorised (for the most part) to a generic anatomical whiteness. Significantly, the 
single girl who defies this diversity-opposing model, asserting a (racial) difference, an errant 
otherness, dies. She is the girl with a “dark, naked body” (98, emphasis added). Eguchi 
suspects that she already knows (the ultimate otherness) death: “The thought flashed through 
his mind that old Fukura’s partner when he had his last seizure had been this dark-skinned 
girl” (91).
Second, their objectification is a degradation, an act of humiliation which always demands 
a loss. The girls are vulnerable objects that are exposed to an invulnerable masculine gaze; to 
a gaze which defines the ‘naked* body as degraded in itself. Significantly, Eguchi does 
express an initial desire (and a desire that re-surfaces in accordance with his guilt) for self­
exposure. “Wake up. Wake up” (21), he demands, despite understanding that “[s]he was to 
be looked aP (20, emphasis added); that she was meant for one-way observation and 
certainly not for interaction. Preceding his second visit, he silences his desire to request 
meeting the girl “before she went to sleep” (35), as he understands non-communication 
(though an “ugly restriction”, a “sad restriction” [17]) to be the most important rule of the 
house. When the barriers of male invulnerability/concealment and female 
vulnerability/exposure are broken, the client risks his own diminution into object, slave, 
victim, animal, feminine. The girls’ sustained sleep means that Eguchi can touch without the 
threat of being touched; that “[h]e [the generic voyeur] can know the body of a woman, and 
yet encounter a knowledge which will not change him” (Griffin, 1981: 34).
Eguchi’s confirmed objectification of the feniale body involves his exposure of ‘it’ through 
a processual revelation of synechdocal detail. Divided into (fetishised)9 parts (the “blood that 
grew richer toward the tips of the fingers”; the “flush of the earlobes”; the “sheen of the hair” 
[‘HSB’: 20]), the generic female is denied coherence, integrity, wholeness. In this way,
Eguchi renounces panopticism,10 suspending the narrative in a position of frustration and
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sustaining the female body in a condition of inconsolable fragmentation.11 Eguchi decides 
not only what to reveal but when, at any time refusing to engage with die body further, “to 
touch the sleeping girl, to look at her naked” (31). Through closing his eyes, he silences the 
erotically invested gaze through which the girls (and the story) are mediated.
Eguchi might be imaged as would-be ‘author’, whose fantasy is to write a ‘text’ of the 
generic female body. This is suggestive of Roland Barthes’ model of ‘classic’ or 
‘readable/readerly’ (lisible)12 narrative as striptease. The lisible text, he indicates, in 
Mythologies, is revealed piecemeal, with the ‘gaze’ of representation focusing upon isolated 
moments of arrestment/transfixation, until the final resolution of total exposure. Eventually 
the artificial, the superfluous, the redundant is shed in favour of ‘naked’ truth.13
Progression towards this goal is frustrated, however, with Eguchi’s repeated invocation of 
this singular scene of desire: The first girl is revealed as a series of parts; Eguchi perhaps 
identifies this physical fragmentation with his own (Lacanian)14 psychical body-in-pieces, as 
her breasts, her scent, her mouth, her hair activate for him a  regeneration of his past, and 
permit also the surfacing of current anxieties; Eguchi, reluctant to further confront his own 
broken self, takes the sleeping medicine provided by the house; Eguchi “sink[s] into the 
depths of sleep” (‘HSB’: 33), freeing himself from the consciousness that threatens the self s 
ontological security with images of dissolution; Eguchi leaves the house, but continues to re­
visit, re-enacting the entire sequence.
If Eguchi is the ‘author’, then his constant repetition of the scene allows him the potential 
for constant reproduction. Eguchi replicates (appropriating the maternal function of 
gestating, labouring and delivering the text), as if a constant reaffirmation of life will drive 
away death. His movement undertakes a circular trajectory,15 against the grain of 
comprehensible linear time (Which requires concrete beginnings and endings), which 
necessitates the re-treading of painful as well as pleasurable ground. This, however, is a 
necessary sacrifice if time and death are to be cheated.
Before this cycle is finally broken (by a girl’s death), Eguchi is, to conclude, suspended in
a state of pre-occupation with the body, and with methods of reading (and of avoiding 
reading) the body.
2: ii Ventriloquistics
‘Reading’ the body necessitates, for Eguchi, concerns with language (with soma and sema 
being destined to collide). His objectification activity has, therefore, not merely visual but 
also vocal implications. The girls’ bodies, banned from (self-)creation and innovation, are 
instead rendered abdicated receptacles, to be ventriloquised by men who themselves are 
losing life and validity. “Asleep and unspeaking, [the girls] spoke as the old men wished” 
(39), with one voice, the same voice: a mute voice.
Nevertheless, the girls, in their terminal unresponsiveness, might be perceived as 
frustrating masculine desire. Under Eguchi’s gaze (and at his command) they do not awaken, 
although his absence permits their return to consciousness, so that he does, to an extent, 
sustain control {actively determining, conversely, sleep, with his presence). This is, however, 
insufficient. The girls, creations bora of his own desires, must be recipients of a (generic) 
voice of his own author(is)ing.
Susan Griffin indicates that “[pjomography expresses an almost morbid fear of female 
speech” (Griffin, 1981: 89). Eguchi, however, is troubled by the female speech-that-is- 
silence; by his comprehension of ‘her’ (the generic female’s) total disregard of his being. 
“Eguchi was not yet used to keeping company with a girl who said nothing, a girl who did 
not open her eyes, who gave him no recognition. Empty longing had not left him” (‘HSB’: 
44). He writes alternative scripts for the girls, evoking a “picture of [them] in the daytime” 
(74); mobilising “well-shaped [but immobile] legs” into an “awkward gait” (74). He desires 
to hear their voices, but recognises that his ventriloquism of them might actually be 
ineffective, as “[a] voice was different when it came from a sleeping person” (87).
Eguchi attempts to construct for the girls other selves, in an effort to satisfy his (still)
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creative potential -  writing them “[impossible” mother (21), “baby” (21), “sacrifice” (74), 
“slave” (42), “virgin” (77), “prostitute” (43), “phantom” (19), “toy” (74). Thus, one girl is 
‘made* to communicate “words of love with her toes” (47), her inanimate form 
“overflow[ing] with a sensuousness that made it possible for her body to converse in silence” 
(47). Another, he renders “untutored and without affectation” (87). Other selves are unseen, 
removed from the ‘house’: the girls’ clothing and all cultural markers of identity are shed 
before presentation to the clients. Consciousness is never allowed for both ‘partners’ 
concurrently (the old men are only permitted entry when the girls are asleep), as the intrusion 
of other selves would only destroy the safe illusion the manufactured selves provide.
Eguchi nevertheless comes to realise the potential negative aspects inherent in the process 
of manufacture. Put to sleep to spare his shame, ‘she’ only confirms it. Unable to 
reach ‘her’, his visits are certified an “ugly senile dalliance” (35). If ‘she’ was to awaken, he 
considers, “the place [would] bec[o]me no more than an ordinary bawdy house” (35). There, 
in the conventional brothel, the man is the master to whose desires the woman must respond. 
Even if he enacts a masochistic fantasy, the woman occupies the position of sadist only 
insofar as he permits. Control is never relinquished.
Eguchi considers punishing the hostile (generic) female body (whose unresponsiveness 
authors his “shame”) by ‘animating  ^ ‘her’ with acts of violence; by fantasising that a girl, 
“[gjiving everything over to him, aware of nothing, in a sleep as of suspended animation”
(23) is “a breakable object” (23, emphasis added). The girls’ untiring submission night after 
night enables dysgenication, allowing him to, “if he wished, think that all women’s bodies 
were alike” (92); to image them as corpses who, even after he departs, become only “open- 
eyed corpse[s]” (92). But whilst ‘she’ resists acknowledgement of his existence (the girls 
know nothing of any of their clients so that the men themselves are genericised, 
standardised, rendered ‘man’, one man, ‘he’), Eguchi cannot reassert the masculine 
imperative of mastery. His impulse, as male subject, is necessarily to conquer. Such an 
achievement would mean the negation of fear and insecurity; the establishment of order over 
(and out of) disorder. Yet this desire is frustrated. Eguchi’s hunger increases for a response,
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and “[i]t seemed to him that to force himself upon the girl[s] would be the tonic to bring 
stirrings of youth” (89). However, he realises that even rape is disempowered as a method of 
inflicting autocratic rule within the house, as “[t]here would be no resistance from the body 
of the girl[s] put to sleep” (89-90).
Eguchi, out of desperation, considers murder: the notion of strangulation as a means of 
self-reassertion. But this too must be rejected for being an emasculating act -  “no trouble at 
all even for an old man” (91); a cowardly act akin to “wrenching the arm of a baby” (73). 
Even death, it seems, operates on the sleeping girls’ side, conspiring to keep their secrets, 
their silence that ensures that they need not ‘speak’ man. Their death is a life, into which 
Eguchi concedes a desire to be initiated. He requests the medication granted the girls (“I 
wanted the medicine you gave her. I wanted to sleep like her” [70]), but (on the grounds of 
his age) is refused. (The proprietess, in denying Eguchi the medication, articulates a refusal 
to mother. Indeed, her denial is an expression of ‘bad’ mothering as, like the Kleinian bad 
‘breast mother’, she withdraws the sustenance her ‘dependent’ desires).
2:iii Omnivoyeuristics
The ‘body’ as desire-object signifies a return to an infantile pre-symbolic state, and must 
be interpreted via non-linguistic, instinctual means. Eguchi confers an almost medical 
anatomisation of the female body, describing it not only in visual and aural but in olfactory, 
gustatory and tactile -  or omnivoyeicristic -  terms.
One specific girl’s body, for example, is (fetishistically) divided into “a dark glow” and “a 
purplish cast” (86); a “wild, sharp scent” (92) and “a faint odor at the armpits” (86); “oily 
skin... [which] was cold and slippery” (96); and only one voice, despite the fact that “[m]ost 
women have several” (87). Two areas of significance are immediately discernible in 
Eguchi’s conceptualisation of the female body in this way. First, his ‘reading’ determines 
that ‘it’ should occupy an objectified status of dismemberment. (This, of course, recalls 
my discussion of MacDonald’s representations of fragmented females, in Chapter One).
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Second, Eguchi’s organisation is of interest in its implication of most facets of sensory 
perception. It is this latter concern which is central to omnivoyeuristic analysis.
In particular, the waking dreams experienced by Eguchi at the ‘house’ appeal repeatedly to 
each of his senses. Eguchi’s first sensation retrieved in this way is olfactory: the “milky 
scent of a nursing baby” (21), a “womanish scent” (21), the “smell of young warmth” (21). 
This smell evokes memories of his (now-grown) “nursing babes” (24), a (fluid) recollection 
which leads Eguchi into contemplating an (even earlier) experience of blood: “Eguchi had 
had a lover before he was married.. .Once when he withdrew his face he saw that her breast 
was lightly stained with blood, tie was startled, but, as if nothing had happened, he brought 
his face back and gently licked it away” (24-5). This memory is revealed to be one of a 
(gustatory) vampiric feeding. The conditions are similar to those at the ‘house’, as the girl 
was described as being “in a trance” and “did not know what had happened” (25). Eguchi 
identifies this parasitic (and willingly yielded, graciously submitted) sustenance as a “gift 
from a woman bringing strength to a man’s whole life” (25).
He himself is a more reluctant food-source. He reveals that, in his youth, he met an older 
woman who claimed that kissing young men in her imagination could restore youth. “She 
was free to draw in her mind as she wished the figure of Eguchi among the men she would 
not mind being kissed by...and he could neither resist nor complain” (26). Initially repulsed 
at the “sullying.. .fact that without his knowing it he was being enjoyed in the mind of a 
middle-aged woman” (26), he now recognises his own repetition of her actions.
As well as exploring this first (milk/blood-suggestive) girl olfactorily, Eguchi identifies 
that he “seemed to feel music in [her] body” (21). This sensation is communicated to him 
instinctively (thus extra-sensorily), yet nevertheless inspires an aural reception. He identifies 
noises outside the house with the girl’s body, and augments this witji a physical (tactile) 
exploration of her palpable form:
[Eguchi] took her wrist and brought it to his side. He felt her pulse, 
holding the wrist between his index and middle fingers...From time
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to time the wind passed over the house... [and] [t]he roar of the waves 
against the cliff softened while rising. Its echo seemed to come up from 
the ocean as music sounding in the girl's body, the beating in her breast, 
and the pulse at her wrist added to it. (28, emphases added)
The music of this girl’s body modifies (“softened” [28]) the noise of the impending and 
encroaching death Eguchi has already couched in (reality-evading) poetic language (terming 
it, as I have already indicated, “approaching winter” [28]).
A visual perception is provoked by this aural and tactile experience, in spite of the fact that 
his physical eyes are literally unseeing, so that “[i]n time with the music, a pure white 
butterfly danced past his closed eyelids” (28). This vision leads him on to another. In his 
youth he had eloped with a young girl. The sky had been filled with rainbows, which the girl 
interpreted as a parental panopticon16 (their gaze monitoring her flight). The girl, initially 
deriving pleasure from an assumed status of subjectivity, is reinstated into her original 
object-position. She suspects having become the permanently viewed object of a parental 
gaze, not realising that she travels in the physical presence of a literal voyeur, a man who 
enjoys her semi-conscious naked body. Furthermore, as she visualises her parents visualising 
her, this man visualises her (currently concealed) genitals: “[F]rom the small rainbows, the 
cleanness of the girl’s secret parts came before him” (29). Eguchi identifies his first, 
encounter of the genitals as an experience of purity and cleanliness; as occurring “on a night 
of snow flurries” (29), an image of whiteness perhaps recollected via the butterfly image. 
(Conventionally, the butterfly literarily symbolises the soul. However, due to the 
infeminator’s equation of masculinity with the spiritual and femininity with the body, the 
butterfly image, when employed as a description of the female, must be ‘materialised’).17
The immaculate, untainted condition of the (albeit corporeal) genitals stimulates a fluid 
and (soul) cleansing reaction in Eguchi: “So struck had he been by the cleanness that he had 
held his breath and felt tears welling up” (29). He also describes their spending time together 
at “a blue stream, where a waterfall roared down... [wherein] the girl stood naked” (31). 
Water, in this instance, washes away the blood of sexuality, establishing a purificatory 
whiteness over a contaminated (and contaminating) redness. However, in terms of colour
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symbolism, white also comes to signify death in contradistinction with the red of life.18 Of 
course, in my analysis of MacDonaldian infeminative activity, I explored the polarisation of 
a negative (feminine) blackness and a positive (masculine) whiteness; and also considered 
various configurations of feminine whiteness (the generic "body’ of Lona/Mara/Eve, the 
dead-white body of Lilith). My current Kawabatan (‘Historical’) consideration shall explore 
the additional dichotomy of redness and whiteness, and the various connotations of each.
Eguchi describes how he and the girl part, only to meet up years later when she is 
accompanied by a baby in “a white wool cap” (30). The memory, he concludes, is 
diminished “to three details, the baby’s white cap and the cleanness of the secret place and 
the blood on the breast” (30). The whiteness of death achieves mastery over the redness of 
life (a process which shall later be illustrated as reversed in Snow Country, so that red fire 
finally subsumes white snow) as all three of these visions come to be defiled. The white cap 
(an image Eguchi directly connects to that of the butterfly) signifies death, as it renders the 
infant faceless (operating to obliterate identity, and causing a death of the self): “Is it a boy 
or a girl?” Eguchi asks the mother. “ ‘It’s a girl. Really! Can’t you tell by looking at 
it’.. .Eguchi made no special attempt to look at the baby’s face” (30). The supposed 
cleanness of the genitals is, of course, ‘soiled’ by the very fact of the girl’s maternity.
Simply, she has given birth, thus sustains no hold on virginity. Finally, the (“wet” [25]) 
blood Eguchi finds on her breast is conquered, the fluidity sanitised and regulated. Eguchi 
re-establishes order as he cleanses the afflicted area with his tongue (employing a permitted, 
restorative wetness that enables a diluvian ablution). Redness succumbs to white. In further 
affirmation of the victory of death over life, the girl herself is described as having died 
“[m]ore than ten years ago” (30). The middle-aged woman, too, is “long dead” (26).
The theme of death similarly surfaces in Eguchi’s recollections of his deceased mother, 
triggered again by his experience of the first sleeping girl. Touching her breast, he detects a 
sense that he is holding that “of [his] own mother before she had him inside her” (36). This 
memory reinstates his mother into a position of virginity, of chaste whiteness, of sexual
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deathliness. He makes of her a ‘sleeping beauty’, an inert body, an object to be manipulated 
under the male’s hand and eye. Furthermore, to image a condition prior to his life is also to 
contemplate his non-existence, his non-being: another death of sorts.
The perception of colour is, of course, a visual phenomenon, and it is through watching 
(that is, committing a visual act) the first girl’s body that Eguchi recalls his original learning 
of the place’s existence:
When Kiga had visited Eguchi, he looked out into the garden.
Something red lay on the brown autumn moss. ‘What can it be?4 
He had gone down to ldok. The dots were red aoki berries. Numbers 
of them lay on the ground. Kiga picked one up. Toying with it, he told 
Eguchi of the secret house. He went to the house, he said, when the 
despair of old age was too much for him. (22)
Old men live the brown autumn moss, sustained in a perpetual state of morbidity, inhabiting 
a season of eternal death. When they have become ‘no-longer-men’ it seems they can 
become no more. Progression and even movement become impossible tasks. They are 
condemned to a static, bloodless life. The red berries, however, give hope. Penetrating the 
uniform decay, they symbolise the life-blood’s assertion of an unexpected presence, and 
delay the inevitable arrival of whiteness. Kiga informs Eguchi: “It seems like a very long 
time since I lost hope in every last woman” (22). There are some women who might be able 
to vivify the dead (by providing dying men with a source of life; with blood that, sustained 
within the female, might be interpreted as ‘bad’, but transfused into the male ‘becomes’ 
redeemed). They are sleeping women.
Eguchi delays the employment of his senses on his second arrival at the house: “He lay 
with his eyes closed, as if to savor the pleasure that was to come later” (40); “He lay 
wrapped in [her] perfume, thinking her too good to touch” (40). He is content with olfactory 
satisfaction (“There could be no greater happiness than thus drifting off into a sweet sleep.
He wanted to do just that” [40]), until she reaches out to him: “[S]he turned gently toward 
him, her arms extended under the blanket as if to embrace him” (40). He is invited to engage 
his other senses, responding (tactilely) by “shaking her jaw” (40). However, “[t]he urge was
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not so strong to explore the sleeping girl with his hands” (45). Rather, “[h]e wanted to hear 
her voice, to talk to her” (44-5). She does begin to speak to him, but “in a voice that was not 
a voice” (45), and in a voice not of receptivity but of resistance: “Don’t, don’t.. What do you 
think you’re doing?... Stop it” (45). Because of this, Eguchi names her as “unmistakably a 
witch” (46). She is excess.19 “Her nails were pink. Her lipstick was a deep red” (39), in 
contrast with the “maidenly” (19) appearance of the first girl, “untouched by cosmetics”
(19). (She is perhaps a visual Lilith, whose bodily redness indicates a vampiric blood-thirst. 
The comparatively ‘clean’ girl, on the other hand, recalls a visual Lona, with her appearance 
of a sustained childlike purity). The witch-girPs “scent was rich... [and] [t]he room was filled 
with it” (39) -  a smell Eguchi describes as a “too-strong odor” (45). She possesses “too-thick 
eyebrows” (43), “long fingernails [which] cut” (48) Eguchi’s flesh, and her face “was too 
near, a blurry [or ‘tainted’] white to his old eyes” (43). Her body, appearing to reinforce the 
proprietess’ claim that she is “experienced” (37), is, nevertheless, revealed to be a virgin’s20 
(Eguchi examines her [tactilely] for physical evidence of this status). Its scent recalls white 
flowers, particularly “[w]hite camellias” (48) which, in turn, “brought memories of his three 
married daughters” (48).
Eguchi describes a famous “petal-dropping” (49) flower he had visited with his youngest 
daughter (“to revive her spirits” after losing her virginity [49]): a red and white camellia, 
combining (visual) life and death on a single tree. This memory (of white flowers and red 
flowers, of virginal and non-virginal vaginas, respectively) operates as an intercessor 
between the present body of the sleeping witchlike girl and the past memory of his youngest 
and favourite daughter. Eguchi regrets the loss of his daughter’s virginity,21 incestuously 
perceiving her genitals to be his own possession (“it was as though the jewel in his hand had 
been scarred” [51]). He desires to restore to her what she has lost, a second gift, but she is 
disinterested, content to remain in the world of sexuality. Eguchi visualises “her 
unsightliness22 in the act” (52), compelled to “reflect upon how his daughter’s body was 
made” (52). He contemplates her being raped (“A man could force himself upon her” [52]),
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needing reassurance that her concession to coitus was an inevitable repercussion of “an 
explosion of loye on the part of the [male] youth” (52), made possible due to her physical 
“inability to turn the act away” (52). The truth of the matter, however, was that she had 
“gone meekly home with him” (50), the man responsible for her ‘defloration’ (to be 
otherwise imaged as her ‘petal-dropping’), and has no intention of crediting Eguchi’s 
restoration offer. She is only absolved in the paternal eyes when she becomes a wife and 
mother: “After she had her baby her skin was clearer, as though she had been washed to the 
depths” (53). Maternity allows her to be re-defined in domestic as opposed to sexual terms. 
As a mother (of a son) she fulfils her (patriarchally-prescribedy function of reproduction, 
with sex becoming a solely procreative act. Her father acknowledges her transition in 
(literally) floral language: “she had come into bloom” (53) and was in possession of a 
“flower-like brightness” (53). She becomes, according to his perception, the camellia which 
has shed its (corruptive) red petals.
Eguchi’s third visit is met by a novice ‘sleeping beauty’, a girl “still in training” (57), who 
is described by the proprietess as “new, and small” (57), and whom Eguchi (visually) 
perceives as “[cjhildlike” (58). This girl is devoid of artificial cosmetic garniture, instead 
presenting him with a bare, unmediated body, a body without barriers. He is immediately 
(tactilely) “enveloped” in a “warmth” which originates in the (olfactory) “smell of her hair 
and skin” (58). Eguchi contemplates her “sleep like death” (59), which activates “a memory 
of a woman” (59) he knew sexually, three years ago. This woman, like the sleeping girl of 
his present experience, was “quiet and docile” (60), thus it comes as a surprise to learn that 
she is a mother (“It seemed strange that she, the first slender and firm-fleshed woman he had 
embraced in a long while, should have two children. Hers had not been that sort of a body. 
Nor had it seemed likely that those breasts had nursed a child” [60]). The memory of a 
deathlike sleep is connected to the woman’s assertion of having “slept as if [she] were dead” 
(61). Eguchi had noticed her eyes: “They were misty, washed clean” (61). She had 
undergone the purification of a sleeping-death, a ritual cleansing that is invoked repeatedly
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in Eguchi’s un/consciousness. They do not meet again, and Eguchi believes this to be 
“because she was pregnant” (62), a condition he also perceives as ablutory (as when his 
youngest daughter is ‘sanitised’ through parturition): “He felt calm and reposed, as if 
her.. .getting pregnant had washed away the impropriety [of the extra-marital affair]” (62-3). 
Recollecting the body of his lover three years later, Eguchi’s memories are characterised 
with “fond[ness]” as opposed to “lust” (63). He perceives her as pure and iconic, “a symbol 
of young womanhood” (63), imaging a pre-sexual (Lona-esque) body (“There had been 
nothing in her of the whore or the profligate”, yet she had yielded herself to him “without 
resistance and without restraint” [64]).
His mind returns to the ‘sleeping beauty’ of his present, who recalls for him the body of a 
young prostitute. Her own “childlike tongue” (65) suggests a past image of the “long, 
thin.. .watery” (65) tongue of a fourteen year old prostitute who was “not in the least afraid 
of men” (65). This girl of the past, he recollects, felt neither “shame” nor “fear” (65), unlike 
the sleeping girl who “was frightened” (57) at the prospect of being with an old man. She is 
lured from him with the sound of festival drums, whilst the current girl would be deaf to the 
world, and immobilised by her status of insentience.
Eguchi contemplates the tongue of this sleeping girl, the appearance of which he perceives 
as an invitation to violate her body (invoking an “impulse toward a misdeed more exciting 
than putting his finger to her tongue” [<>6]), or even to kill her (“He was tempted. He peered 
into the open mouth. If he were to throttle her, would there be spasms along the small 
tongue?” [65]). This girl comes to signify evil. She reminds old men of their lifelong 
“wrongdoing[s]” (67), provoking “fear of approaching death and regret for their lost youth” 
(67), and instilling in them reluctant “remorse” (67). Eguchi eventually concedes, however, 
that she perhaps represents “a Buddha of sorts”, her body permitting their “regrets 
and... sadness... [to] flow quite freely”, and providing, with her “young skin and scent” a 
“forgiveness for the sad old men” (67). Eguchi decides to hold her in his arms, whereas he 
had initially “avoided touching her” (68). He then endeavours to explore her gustatorily as 
well as tactilely, “touch[ing] his lips gently to her closed lips” (69). He finds, however, that
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“[t]here was no taste. They were dry”, as opposed to being “damp with the taste of sex” (69). 
The lips’ dessicated texture might serve to connote death, the dead body through which 
blood-fluid no longer flows. Again, the dry texture (being opposed to ‘wet’ sexuality) 
permits Eguchi a taste of virginity, a taste of the girl’s purity and whiteness.
Eguchi concludes his contemplation of the girl with a metaphor of a desired male maternity 
(which might also be interpreted as an image of ingestion: “It would have been good to take 
the small girl inside him” [70]). This night, he feels “none of the gloom and the loneliness of 
old age” (69), asserting himself instead as eater, as active and authoritative. Eguchi, the 
brown autumn moss, recognises his own potential for (rai-blooded) creation, acknowledging 
that, if he can learn to produce the vital redness of life, he can cheat the brown decay of 
death.
The fourth visit, however, returns Eguchi to the midst of an engulfing presence. “The one 
tonight is very warm” (73), the proprietess warns, and, upon entering the bedroom, Eguchi is 
met with a “sweet smell of woman... [that is] stronger than usual” (74). She is a larger, 
heavier-breathing girl, whose “rich hair” seems to have “a reddish cast” (74). This 
exacerbates the sense of suffocation caused by the decor of the crimson room, and posits her 
as a symbolic ‘womb within a womb’. Eguchi describes “[h]er skin [which] was so smooth 
that it seemed to cling to him” (74), and her physical warmth that “less sank into him than 
enveloped him” (74). The girl commands an enervating authority over Eguchi, the impotent 
male who had previously attempted to assert phallic mastery over the scene. Her “scent was 
unusually strong”, “too thick and sweet a smell” (76) to conjure up memories, the memories 
which permit his escape, his transcendence of the real scene. Eguchi must convert this 
perception of a hostile, cloying, intoxicating scent to the disarmed, ‘inno(s)cent’ “milky 
smell of a baby” (76). This leads him to the idea of impregnating the girl, an act which 
would thus allow him to reclaim his lost masculinity: an act of (re)masculation:
She seemed like a girl who could easily be made pregnant. Although
she had been put to sleep, her physiological processes had not stopped,
151
and she would awaken in the course of the next day. If she were to become 
pregnant, it would be quite without her knowledge. Suppose Eguchi, now 
sixty-seven, were to leave such a child behind. (76)
Eguchi has no means of detecting whether life might ever triumph over death; whether a 
baby could ever be permitted existence. Each of his visits has presented him with a new girl, 
thus he cannot even know whether life is restored to the bodies of the sleeping girls, or 
whether they are expendable, used-once-and-destroyed. His suspicions lean towards an 
affirmation of death. Endeavouring to bring life into the place, he must direct violence 
toward himself, <'iforc\ing\ upon himself a picture of the girl in the daytime” (74, emphasis 
added).
Eguchi realises that his subject-position (as aggressor, as rapist) is tenuous, his authority 
usurped even by a lifeless girl. His own ‘"self-interrogation” (78), for example, is perceived 
as emitting from her body. “[H]e seemed to hear a derisive voice” (77), which warns him of 
the dangerous potential of his becoming the object of her gaze (“If by a chance in a million, 
a chance in a million, a girl were to open her eyes -  aren’t you underestimating the shame?”
[78]). He considers conducting an act of violence upon her (“to cut her arm almost off or 
stab her in the chest or abdomen” [78]), but this directs him only to a contemplation of his 
own suicide (78). However, cowardice, an inescapable attraction to “a timid ending” (78), 
prevents his (masculinity-reasserting) activity. Eguchi acknowledges the fact that he does 
“not have the courage of his youngest daughter” (78), who dramatically enforces a change 
from self-whiteness into redness, from sexual death (the passive inertia of virginity) to 
sexual actualisation (a life force that inspires creation, that permits her to literally generate a 
new life). His inability to act (to destroy either the female body or his own) suspends him, 
purgatorily, at the mercy of his senses.
Whiteness encroaches even now, impressing upon his unseeing (“closed” [78]) eyes:
Two butterflies were sporting in low shrubbery along the 
stepping-stones of a garden... [More] appeared one after another from 
the shrubbery, and the garden was a dancing swarm of white butterflies, 
close to the ground.. .The swarm of butterflies had so grown that it was 
like a field of white flowers. (78-9)
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The butterflies form a carpet of snow (it was sleeting on Eguchi’s actual arrival at the house). 
They are evoked by the expanse of “ample white bosom of the girl, spread out here beside 
him” (79). They recall the “white butterfly [which danced] behind his closed eyelids” (30) of 
an earlier visit. But now they are multiple, their impact greater, transforming an entire 
landscape into a terrain of death. The effect is one of a chaotic excess. Eguchi locates a point 
of safety within the transitory in-between. This is where red and white collide to give, in 
the language of colour, an intermediary pink. “He opened his eyes. He gazed at the 
small pink nipples. They were like a symbol of good” (79). They give him the courage to act. 
He inflicts upon the white, immutable, obdurate “breasts several marks the color of blood”
(79). The result seems negligible. However, it is sufficient to temporarily re-dress the 
balance between life and death. Like the intrusion of the red aoki berries upon the carpet of 
brown moss, the scant stains have the potential to destroy oppressive, monolithic authority. 
The following morning, Eguchi learns that the “sleet” (79), which began as one butterfly, as 
“a scattering” of “white dots” (71), “has stopped” (79). He lives.
His final visit is, however, met with death. It is “dead winter’1’ (81), and Eguchi is 
‘welcomed’ by the proprietess’ (visual) “white” (81) and “ashen” (82) face and (aural) “cold 
voice” (82). They discuss the death of an old man at the house, a company director and 
friend of Eguchi’s. In Fukura’s case, death was made a “secret” (84). His body was carried 
away during the night in order to preserve his “good name” (82). The “girl, put to sleep [who 
had] lain warming the corpse” (83), awoke the following day with “a scratch from her neck 
over her breast.. .a welt with blood oozing out in places” (84). This, Eguchi perceives, is 
evident of Fukura’s “last struggles” (84), a pathetic attempt in the throes of death to summon 
the life-blood that will prohibit the mastery of morbidity. Fukura fails. The girl’s body 
remained unresponsive, blemished only with a scratch that is “nothing you could call a 
wound, really” (84). Her uniform whiteness was barely marred in his final desperate 
moments.
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Eguchi is to spend this final night with two girls, one “wild and rough” (86) and “darkly 
glowing” (90), the other “shorter” (90), “gentler” (91) and “fair” (92). The dark girl’s feral 
exterior seems to conceal even greater chaos, suggested by, for example, her fingernails with 
the “color of blood.. .vivid beneath them” (87). It is apparent to Eguchi that she has 
attempted to modify and mask her embodied chaos (unconvincingly) with trappings of order, 
exemplified by her deceptive mouth, both painted and seeming to bear a memory of 
disfigurement (“an operation for a harelip” [87]).
Eguchi contemplates kissing her (“The guests here were of course free to kiss. Kissing was 
not among the forbidden acts” [88]), yet stops when he realises that hers are not the “dead 
lips” (88) that “give the greater thrill of emotion” (88). Seeking sexual fulfilment in death 
constitutes, of course, the expression of a necrophilic impulse, such as that communicated by 
the male protagonists of both MacDonald’s and Sacher-Masoch’s texts. In Eguchi’s case, 
however, the ‘dead’ desire-object is dark-skinned, unlike Vane’s, Anodos’ and Severin’s 
various white, ‘marble’ females. It is the present girl’s darkness that illustrates her aversion 
to dysgenicating infeminative attempts to construct a uniform inert, ‘dead’, white femininity. 
(Indeed, darkness, as I earlier suggested in my discussion of black/white, 
materiality/spirituality, evil/good polarisations, can already be construed as a defiant 
counter-representation of the feminine).
Rather than affirming death, then, Eguchi’s prodding at the girl’s mouth galvanises her to 
moisten it (89), thus restoring the ‘wetness’ of vitality (and, potentially, of an active 
femininity). Eguchi recoils at her errant activity: “Does she kiss even when she’s asleep?” 
(89) Even without consciousness she rebukes his advances, “push[ing] [him] cleanly away”
(89); clearly vocalising a refusal to accept a status of inert objectivity. With this girl, Eguchi 
is forced most poignantly to confront the fact that he has “left before him not a great deal of 
life as a man” (89). Despite this resignation, however, he does experience “a sudden urging 
of the blood” (89), a momentary inspiration to “break the rule of the house” (89) and break 
the body (and spell) of the girls. This “impulse” (90) is, nevertheless, rapidly replaced by 
“emptiness” (90) -  he can turn away from this particular girl, but only to be brought face to
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face with another. He perhaps cannot escape the house until the whiteness of death entirely 
absorbs the defiant redness of life.
Eguchi considers the form of the other, the fair girl: a more feasible potential conquest. She 
has a body he wants to consume (“He wanted to take [her fingers] in his mouth” [90]). He 
wants to contain her completely, to hold her breasts which “fitted into the palm of his hand”
(90). He encircles her “soft, docile, fragrant” (94) neck, brings her head toward him and 
inhales hersweet [non-oppressive] scent” (91).
When “he embrace[s] the hollow at [her] hips” (94), Eguchi is caused to consider that she, 
in this metonymic emptiness, might be the “last woman in [his] life” (94). This thought 
instigates another question: “[W]ho had been the first woman in [his] life?” (94).23 He takes 
a breast of each of the sleeping girls in his hands: the smooth, non-threatening breast of the 
fair girl, whose “soft skin clung to Eguchi” (92) without the menace of absorption, and the 
oily breast of the dark wild girl, with her chaotic, irregular, alien (“Eguchi had doubts as td 
whether the girl was Japanese” [87]) body.24
With a hand upon each, Eguchi remembers his mother. She had died in the winter, her 
body ravaged to “skin and bones” (95) by tuberculosis (visually recalling the Lilith corpse). 
On her deathbed, his mother had held him with a cold grip. He had stroked “her withered 
breasts” (96) and, simultaneously, “she vomited a large quantity of blood” (95). Eguchi is 
unable to conceptualise his mother in isolation from her death. Visualising her final 
moments, he is traumatically ‘delivered’ back into the womb/tomb/room of the house, 
“walled... [in] the color of blood” (95), the (masculine) colour of life, which (with reference 
to birth) also (femininely) signifies inevitable death. He is returned to infancy, a memory 
crystallising in his mind of “groping for” (96) the once-fecund maternal breasts which permit 
him to sleep in comfort. The soporific medication begins, at this moment, to take over his 
consciousness. He enters sleep as an infant, granted new life, cleansed, yet the play of his 
unconscious interferes with the dreams that follow, imposing death upon his washed slate of 
consciousness.
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This is not, however, Eguchi’s first sleep-dream (triggered by the medication, as opposed 
to a stream-of-consciousness memorial perception provoked by the girls). His first, which 
occurs on his original visit, drives him into “the embrace of a woman... [with] four legs” 
(32). Also equipped with two arms, this woman is a swarm of limbs, corporeally partitioned, 
denied bodily totality, according to his perception. Eguchi finds himself “entwined” (32) in 
her excess, and, significantly, thinks “the four legs odd, but not repulsive” (32). They operate 
perhaps as a configuration of the Freudian ‘uncanny’: implementing a sense of unfamiliarity 
(as with the sight of the female genitals to the infant male), but self-assuaging the horror by 
conferring a reassuring indication of original ‘homeness’. Thus, the monstrous multi-limbed 
female is viewed with curiosity rather than fear. The legs enfold him, a loving mother 
cradling her infant. Yet, they also oppress him, binding his body to hers, luring him 
physically into the (life and) death locus of the maternal vagina. The woman’s excessive 
limbs might equally be imaged phallically, so that her female depletion is satiated, indeed 
over-satiated, with excess. In place of absence she now has too much presence, more 
presence, a greater endowment than any man. She has two legs, two penises. The former 
truss Eguchi to her, fixing his position in the desired space. The latter, the phallic-signifying 
addendum, represent her potency (rendering her the woman who is no longer the mere bearer 
but now the creator of meaning). Her second penis perhaps also configures that which she, as 
castrative mother, has extracted from him. She is, therefore, the loving, protective, 
enveloping (Jungian) Good mother and the restrictive, stifling, oppressive (Jungian) Terrible 
mother.
Eguchi’s second dream is about dysfunctional birth: “One of his daughters had borne a 
deformed child in a hospital.. .It was hideous... [and] the baby was immediately taken from 
the mother” (32). The mother, deprived of effective parturition, reasserts order by “hacking 
[the baby] to pieces” (32), with the intention of “throwing] [‘it’] away” (32). Eguchi is 
perhaps the baby’s father, and its deformation a statement of his (incestuous) guilt. The 
mother reclaims mastery over her transgressed body by destroying their creation -  an act
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which excludes the father, denying him not only creative success, but destructive input also. 
This re-positions him, as he is by the sleeping girls, as a sterile (childless and powerless) 
‘man’. Alternatively, the baby is Eguchi, his mother (described, in terms of monstrosity, as 
the dehumanised woman who cannot tolerate disorder in the body of her children) merely 
retaliating (via an act of castration) for the dismemberment he confers (within the ‘house’) 
upon the feminine body.
On his second visit to the house, Eguchi does not dream, but is delivered (by his 
medication) into “a warm sleep” (54). He must endure an exclusion from dream, positioned 
as an outsider and unable to penetrate the experience of his sleeping companion:
The voice of the girl sobbing awakened him. Then what sounded like 
sobs changed to laughter.. .He put his arm over her breasts and shook her.
‘You’re dreaming, you’re dreaming. What are you dreaming of?’ There 
was something ominous in the silence that followed the laughter. (54)
Eguchi feels unease at this disorder; at the fact that this static body actively emits. The girl’s 
outpourings are chaotically fluid, consisting of a cacophony of tears and laughter,25 silences, 
and even disconnected sentences. The latter reveal that she is in unconscious conversation 
with her mother: “ ‘Mother.’ It was like a low groan. ‘Wait, wait. Do you have to go? I’m 
sorry, I’m sorry’ ” (46). The girl appears to be experiencing another maternal rejection 
(perhaps in echo of the fact that Eguchi’s own mother ‘deserted’ him into death when he was 
a young man).
Dysfunctional mothers, according to Eguchi, give birth to dysfunctional babies: this girl is 
an apparent witch; the infant of his previous dream was deformed; his first medication- 
invoked dream configured a hostile mother whose son was perhaps castrated. Eguchi’s 
repeated conceptualisation of dysfunctional maternity communicates his own anxieties about 
ageing, that is, of being converted to a ‘dysfunctional baby’ (with the condition of ageing 
being suggestive of a completion of a cycle, a return to an infancy). This ‘infancy’ is 
perverted in the sense that it compounds new life with decrepitude, vitality with senility. 
Eguchi, as a dysfunctional baby, will have weakness (dependency, need of nurture) without
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strength (potential for development, growth). He will undergo no further living transition. 
Only death shall be imminent. “A thought came to him: the aged have death, and the young 
have love, and death comes once, and love comes over and over again” (76).
Eguchi does not take his sleeping pills on his third visit, and, even though he concedes to 
do so on his fourth, does not dream. (“Dreams? None at all. I just slept” [80]). On his final 
visit, he identifies that an old man who “regret[s] the hours lost in sleep” (93), that is, who 
refuses the sedative, serves only to confirm his ugly aged desperation. Although recognising 
the ingestion as an act of submissiveness, of infantile obedience (“For the first time it 
occurred to him to wonder whether all the old men who came to the house obediently took 
the medicine” [93]), Eguchi consumes the soporific. This time, not only the drug but the girls 
are demonstrated as having a direct impact on the quality of his sleep:
He turned toward the dark girl, because hers was the strong scent. Her 
rough breath hit his face.. .The strong scent interfered with his sleep, and 
he turned away. Even then her breath hit the nape of his neck.. .It may have 
been because he had difficulty sleeping between the two girls that Eguchi had a 
succession of nightmares. (96)
He describes his final dream as “disturbingly erotic” (96):
[H]e came home from his honeymoon to find flowers like red dahlias 
blooming and waving in such profusion that they almost buried the 
house.. .It was his dead mother who greeted them... ‘Aren’t [the flowers] 
beautiful’, [his bride] said. ‘Yes’. Not wishing to frighten her, he did not add 
that they had not been there before. He gazed at a particularly large one among 
them. A red drop oozed from one of the petals. (97)
The blanket of red flowers usurp that of his earlier vision of whiteness (of white 
camellias/butterflies/snow). They are suffocatingly sexual, vulvic images, which threaten to 
consume the house, engulf Eguchi (who endeavours to retain neutrality, occupying a liminal 
position between life and death), and assert a climate of chaotic excess. Although Eguchi 
feared the earlier uniform whiteness of death (whilst, admittedly, being in some ways drawn 
to white death: desiring perhaps its extinguishing or sanitisation of the ‘errant’ feminine 
redness), he has no desire for the balance to be re-dressed with such disequilibrium; with
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such excess.
Each flower might be read as a ‘sleeping beauty’, who, although appearing to his 
conscious mind as safely static, disarmed, white, in his unconscious reassert their (red) 
vitality. Watching the sleeping bodies would cause Eguchi to contemplate whiteness; now, 
watched by them, deprived of control, he is overwhelmed by their strident redness, their 
irrepressible sexuality.
Eguchi does not wish to enter the ‘uncanny’ house (“[w)ondering whether it was the right 
house, he hesitated to go inside” [96]). His mother insists, aligning herself with the red 
flowers: “Why are you standing there?... Is your wife afraid of ms?” (96, emphasis added). 
The home, in this sense, is the maternal vagina, possibly to be aligned with the largest and 
most potent dahlia. The mother introduces herself as one of Eguchi’s women, one of the 
floral vaginas, and the most significant. He has himself already made this connection 
between her and the ‘sleeping beauties’, with her image being continuously invoked by his 
contemplation of the girls’ dormant bodies. In this dream, dead memory is revived. His dead 
mother is brought back to life. The ‘sleeping beauties’ (and even Eguchi’s recollections of 
other women whose bodies he has enjoyed) signified by the flowers are awakened. The 
whiteness becomes red, vibrant, vital.
The dahlia singled out for scrutiny is, however, not necessarily maternal (it is perhaps most 
likely the house itself which represents the maternal womb-space, a nucleus and focal point, 
with memories of lesser women merely assembled around it, forming a uniform and generic 
floral display). Rather, it might represent die ‘sleeping beauty’ who is about to die, the girl 
from whom blood is about to be metaphorically shed. The other flowers, though intoxicating 
in their redness, demonstrate some semblance of restraint and containment. Their boundaries 
are not transgressed by the secretion of the vital fluid. The final flower, however, bleeds;. It 
becomes a pollutant, that warns of death rather than life, so that, accordingly, Eguchi 
awakens from the dream into a confrontation with actual fatality (97).
Fluid, for Eguchi, is a threatening substance, thus he strives to stem and control it via his
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transmogrification of the female body (operational in the gaze) into ‘nudity’.
In her elucidation of the male artist’s creation of the female ‘nude’, Lynda Nead states that 
he works “to seal orifices and to prevent marginal matter from transgressing the boundary 
dividing the inside of the body and the outside, the self from the space of the other” (Nead, 
1992: 6). Eguchi’s gaze automatically operates to conduct artistic interference, transforming 
(or ‘healing’) the wounded ‘naked’ body into the solid ‘nude’; bestowing upon ‘her’ (what 
Nead terms) “erectile definition” (Nead, 1992: 18). In this assertion of “erectile definition”, 
Eguchi might reassure himself of his continued masculinity in the face of his impotence- 
inducing ageing.
However, the presence of fluid (of ‘paint’) must remain known to him; must remain visible 
as a sign of the girls’ created/painted status. The sleeping girls do not respond to pain with 
fluidity (lachrymation), nor to sex with fluidity (vaginal lubrication), nor to conversation 
with fluidity (language), but present, instead, a hostile aridity. Eguchi recognises that if he 
requires fluidity he must enforce it. He marks, therefore, a girl’s breast with lipstick to 
suggest blood (‘HSB’: 77); he prods at another’s “dry” (88) lips until she automatically 
moistens them; and another, overheated by his “[device] for the aged” (86), his electric 
blanket, perspires, to secrete an oiliness (91). This latter girl melts like a painting, thus 
confirming her status as a conquered, female ‘nude’.
Another reason for Eguchi’s necessary location of fluidity is related to the concept of 
interconvertibility. Eguchi connects blood-images to those of milk (juxtaposing the puerperal 
metaphor of the lactating breast with the aggressive vision of a bloody, bitten one [26]), 
illustrating a mobility that permits a transgendering of fluidity. If blood can be milk (and 
vice versa), he might conclude that either can perhaps be semen. As Eguchi is in pursuit of 
his fleeing masculinity, all fluidity which comprises his reminiscences, fantasies and dreams 
might be interpreted as an expression of the endocrinal essence. (Transubstantiated) semen 
is, therefore, vampirically sourced from the female bodies, which are themselves perceived 
as abundant stores of fluidity.
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The configuration of ‘woman’ perhaps most profitable for this project is the ‘mother’, who 
already speaks multiple fluids -  both blood and milk (nurturing her infant internally with the 
former, externally with the latter). Eguchi is taught to feed by appropriated mothers, one of 
whom offers him a perverse, bleeding breast for sustenance. (“[T]he girl whose breast had 
been wet with blood had taught him that a man’s lips could draw blood from almost any part 
of a woman’s body” [25]).
Despite her potential positive (fluid-supplying) function, the ‘mother’ might also be 
understood as a danger, in the fact that in her domination of the sphere of reproduction she 
provides a fundamental model for (a death-indicative) repetition. The male who denies the 
mother might be perceived, as I have suggested, as asserting his right to self-creation, in a 
quest for immortality. Eguchi denies (though obliquely, as he has not stipulated the request) 
motherhood in the girls, through sleeping only with virgins. And, although he does not 
subject each to a manual examination, he assumes their childless status. In order that he 
might master the maternal body and usurp the mother’s creative function -  an alternative 
plan to enable the reclamation of his virility -  he infantilises the girls.
He describes the first as “asleep with her mouth open, showing her childlike tongue. It was 
a tongue that seemed likely to curl around his finger, were he to touch it, like that of a babe 
at its mother’s breast” (66-7). Eguchi must image the girls as impossible mothers (21). He 
denies one maternity by forbidding her ascension to (fertile) maturity, but is forced to finally 
concede that hers is “a smell.. .to make him feel woman in the girl” (23). Eguchi must, 
therefore, locate other ways of destroying her. He images her not only as vulnerable infant 
but as aged, as perhaps older and closer to death than himself:
He had not heard how the girl had been put to sleep. She would in any 
case be in an unnatural stupor, not conscious of events around her, and 
so she might have the muddy, leaden skin of one racked by drugs. There 
might be dark circles under her eyes, her ribs might show through a dry, 
shriveled skin. Or she might be cold, bloated, puffy. She might be snoring 
lightly, her lips parted to show purplish gums. (16-17)
He visualises the destruction of her body due to his horror at recognising the destruction of
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his own. The girl, once mortemalised through infantilisation, is now removed from a 
position of potential maternal potency and productivity, described by Eguchi, rather, in terms 
of corporeal dissolution (the ashen, puckered skin and protruding bones). Hers is a 
dysfunctional ‘pregnancy’ (the bloated puffiness which suggests non-life -  “a corpse from a 
drowning” [16] -  as opposed to life) and an impotent and non-threatening sexuality (the 
vaginal lips which reveal an absence of teeth, instead only gums).
Eguchi’s fixation upon the mother figure (including incestuous desires for his own) 
suggests his inability to destroy his past phases, his former selves, and live in autonomy from 
her. His compulsion to frequently re-visit the ‘house’ elucidates his slavery. This repetition is 
death, not only for himself (in his inability to produce alternative scenes of desire) but, of 
course, for the girls, who must ‘die’ nightly.
The suspension of the girls in this symbolic cycle of death becomes impossible only when 
actual death occurs, when reality intrudes upon art. True mortality permits the materiality of 
the female body to become most evident. The girls’ bodies had, prior to this event, been 
safely conceptualised as ‘unreal’ (due to their inanimacy). Eguchi had, in the past, 
experienced conscious prostitutes, but with limited satisfaction (sending them away from 
him “without regrets” [66]). In the ‘house’, he had been able to replace conscious women 
with female corpses (that is, with bodies aesthetically modelled as dead so that his only 
experience of them is in a state of unconscious, unresponsive, inhuman objectivity). The 
staged ‘death’ of the girls had articulated for Eguchi a beauty in stillness, wholeness and 
perfection, as the act of dying (the transition from animacy to inanimacy) was never 
witnessed, only the harmonious finished product, the silent state post mortem. It was 
perceived as a beautiful death, a sublime virgin sacrifice that permits an old man to live (in a 
position of safe spectatorship, of survival).
However, this was an imperfect scheme. Eguchi was allowed to have sexual knowledge of 
the generic girl’s body because ‘she’ was ‘dead’, but ‘her’ very status of lifelessness would 
mean that this form of sexual knowledge is undermined -  or, as Elisabeth Bronfen writes of 
the necrophilic male’s, “impotent” (Bronfen, 1992: 10). As Bronfen asserts, knowledge of
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this type will only be “scripture rather than progeny, will be a celibate, self-produced and 
self-referring form of reproduction” (Bronfen, 1992: 10). Nevertheless, ‘death’ is sustained 
until death intrudes. When this finally happens, Eguchi is enabled to fully comprehend the 
true dehumanising nature of the ‘house’ (and of his own activities therein). The dead girl’s 
body is expropriated: simply to be replaced by another. She is denied the experience of a 
personal death, a death which would carry individual, subjective meaning, removed, instead, 
to the “dubious inn” (‘HSB’: 99) which serves as the secret and silent repository for all 
errant bodies.
Eguchi had attended the ‘house’ seeking an uncontaminated space, a freedom-granting 
refuge of purity from the realities of his ageing and decaying flesh and his diminishing 
masculinity. With his own materiality invisible to the sleeping girls, Eguchi had desired to 
read the ‘unreal’ (or immaterial, thus immortal) bodies of silent women (women, whose 
“bod[ies].. .converse[d] in silence” [47]). But the girl’s intrusive (and enlightening) death 
refuses to gratify this desire.
This final scene (the action of which I shall briefly delineate) evinces the deterioration of 
Eguchi’s subjectivity. He is accompanied by two girls, one of whom dies. Alarmed,
Eguchi alerts the proprietess. “Go on back to sleep”, she advises, “\t]here is the other 
girV (98, emphasis added). He is horrified at her response -  “no remark had ever struck 
him more sharply” (98) -  and rightly so, as it implicates his own position of replaceability. 
“He heard an automobile pulling away, probably with the dark girl’s body. Was she being 
taken to the dubious inn to which old Fukura had been taken?” (99) Fukura, the former client 
who had died at the ‘house’, was also replaced -  by other old men. His space was simply and 
discreetly replaced by a series of equally indistinctive others. The replaceable subject can 
only become an object. The male voyeur (Eguchi, Fukura, Kiga) who institutionalises 
‘looking’ (attending an organised establishment, a brothel) is self-objectified, even as he 
converts the female into an object that is pliable and controllable by his gaze.
Both the ‘maleness’ and ‘femaleness’, the ‘subject’ and ‘object’, implicated in the act of
(omni)voyeurism are defined as destructive categorisations. Voyeuristic, ventriloquistic and 
omnivoyeuristic activity can only determine, for both parties, it seems, the loss of the self, 
regardless of whether one gazes or is gazed upon. There is only one speech: the silent 
vocalisation of death.
3 Snow Country
As with Eguchi, protagonist of ‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’, sensory perception 
serves to bind Shimamura (albeit tenuously) to reality, enabling him to comprehend and 
experience external phenomena as aesthetic (as opposed to functional, practical) events. 
Shimamura co-exists with himself, simultaneously occupying two worlds: the material (his 
experience of a real ‘snow country’) and the spiritual (his experience of an unreal, idealised 
‘snow country’). This division, of course, recalls MacDonald’s dualising of Vane’s and 
Anodos’ respective worlds.
The opening sentence of Snow Country might be interpreted as expressing (symbolically) 
the dualised spheres of the literal/actual and the illusory: “The train came out of the long 
tunnel into the snow country” (SC: 3). Shimamura is on board a train which spans two 
‘worlds’; a train which is itself concrete, juxtaposed with the intangible hole that is the 
tunnel, and with the comparatively unstable (because, in theory, able to melt) snow country; 
a train which perhaps represents for Shimamura the active (the train is in motion), masculine 
Tokyo he leaves behind, whilst the tunnel (being static, and passively penetrated) might be 
equated with the destination, the inactive (rural, unchanging), feminine snow region. 
(Shimamura’s entry, therefore, into the snow country might be gynoscopically imaged, 
recounting his return to the maternal womh).
The narrative continues with a real visual image (“The earth lay white under the night sky” 
[3]); then with a tactile image (“The snowy cold poured in” [3]); then with an aural image 
(“the girl called to the station master as though he were a^reat distance away” [3]). Reality 
continues to be privileged until Shimamura forsakes his senses and engages his imagination.
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Employing his (creative) “mind” (6), Shimamura commences his contemplation of the girl 
who shares his carriage, mentally re-shaping her (by dividing her from the man who would 
logically appear to be her husband) according to his personal (desire-motivated) 
specifications. What he first asserts as fact, as substance of reality, he rapidly re-evaluates by 
rendering his rational perception myopic, a judgement “from a distance” (6). Memory, 
recollection, hallucination and reverie -  “emotions peculiarly his own” (6) -  come to 
dominate. The interior “symbolic world not of this world” (9) encroaches upon exterior 
reality. This is evidenced in “the working of his strange mirror” (9), a mirror he constructs 
via a reconceptualisation of the train window.
According to Kinya Tsuruta, this mirror functions to “blur the spatial dimensions of the 
real world” (Tsuruta, 1971: 253).27 Shimamura is “taken by the unreal, otherworldly power 
of his mirror in the [real] evening landscape” (SC: 11), which debilitates his logical ability 
(“Shimamura came to forget that it was a mirror he was looking at” [10]). Shimamura’s 
mirror enables his visualisation of unreality, transmuting reality into “a tableau in a dream” 
(9). It also has an important connective, time-binding function, operating to link the present 
woman (Yoko) with a woman who is both past and future (Komako) (14).
Shimamura’s journey is one of repetition, an act of remembrance: he is returning to 
Komako (7). Shimamura recalls her, associating her (intangible) memory with his (tangible) 
finger. Then, “[t]aken with the strangeness” (7) of this association, he brings his “hand to his 
face” and “dr[aws] a line across the misted-over window” (7). This action, again, implicates 
the physical that conflicts with the ‘unreal’ (in)activity of remembering, drawing the past 
into present experience, bringing clarity, illumination (even masculine rationality) to the 
opacity (the “clouded”, “steam[ed]” [7] window) of (emotional, thus feminine) memory. 
Shimamura’s “illusion” (10) is, however, only fully destabilised (and then impermanently) 
when his body is assaulted by the “cold air” of reality that “made him suddenly ashamed of 
his rudeness [his ‘interference’ with un/reality] on the train” (11).
Shimamura continues to perceive Komako, a woman he has known, a woman he has
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experienced sensorily (in reality, and not merely in reflection) “as somehow unreal, like the 
woman’s face in that evening mirror” (24). Komako is a (pellucid) mirror, emphasised by 
fact that Shimamura finds it impossible to call up a clear picture of her. She lacks solidity, so 
that Shimamura perceives that “the light must pass through [her], living in the silkworms’ 
room, as. it passed through the translucent silkworms” (54). Shimamura learns from 
Komako’s excessively “clean and fresh” (18) body that she is nature’s mirror, with, for 
example, “[tjhe dusky green of the cedars seem[ing] to reflect from her neck” (30), and her 
skin associated with “the mountain snow” (53).28
In spite of her tenuous relationship with reality, the memory of Komako is, of course, 
seemingly contained within Shimamura’s real, physical body (suggestive of a reverse, 
masculinised maternity). ‘This remembered you best of all” (15), he tells her, referring to his 
memory-inducing finger, the finger that enables him to “catch and hold” (7) her. But the 
phallically symbolic finger is limited in its masculine power, as it seems engulfed by 
Komako’s feminine secretion (“damp from her touch” [7]). Shimamura attempts to 
relocate the woman, shifting the traces of her image away from the physical sphere, and 
directing them instead into the male-territory of the mind. However, “[t]he more he tried to 
call up a clear picture of her, the more his memory failed him, the farther she faded away”
(7). All that he is able to re-create is a fluidly physical sensation, a scene suggestive of past 
engulfment, of past feminine feeding. His left finger (and emphatically not the right [15-16]) 
is perhaps contained by (rather than contains) the memory of Komako. The finger’s 
‘leftness’ suggests its association with femininity, founded upon the previously discussed 
Pythagorean bisection of the universe, and it is perhaps this gendering (this intimation of a 
bi-sexed condition) that further contributes to Shimamura’s feelings of “uncertainty” and 
“strangeness” (7).
By distinguishing between his left and his right, Shimamura might, alternatively, be 
commenting on general polarisation (of ‘this one’ which is not ‘that one’), as opposed to 
pertaining to specific spatial opposition. This parallels his involvement with two worlds, the 
real and the ideal, and with two women, Komako and Yoko. Shimamura has a single
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conceptualised object of desire, but two potential candidates for the role’s fulfilment. 
Komako is initially privileged due to a temporal advantage -  she is already known to him; he 
is returning to her.
Initially, Komako humbly renders herself to Shimamura, masochistically renouncing her 
subjectivity so that she might operate, in "cool purity” (Liman, 1971: 270), as a mirror; as a 
reflective medium for his idealised (and narcissistic) self-image or desire. Komako, who 
gives herself entirely, must accept a condition of blindness.64 "Shimamura, Shimamura,’ she 
called in a high voice. 4I can’t see. Shimamura!’ ” (34). Komako sees nothing in her own 
right: she lives to reflect.(Blindness is, of course, also suggestive of castration in 
psychoanalysis.29 Komako’s blindness serves to emphasise her phallus-loss. Her willingness 
to surrender the phallus evidences her acceptance of a secondary, othering femininity). 
Without masculine input she is a blank canvas, ""transparent and intangible” (9). Shimamura 
interprets her pledge of entire submission as, ""with no attempt at covering itself, the naked 
heart of a woman calling out to her man” (34). Komako, in her working capacity, is 
subjected to an enforced dependency, to be objectified under the insidious guise of idolatry 
(or hylolatry). Her language is degraded into passive expression (the geisha speaks only in 
response [to masculine desire], and when she does appear to initiate communication it is only 
with learned words, a script of flattery). The geisha, trained to court the masculine gaze, 
must surrender her body, with the semblance of willing submission. Her body is restorative, 
as in "House of the Sleeping Beauties’, where old men purchase young flesh as a temporary 
counter against their own bodily disintegration. One body (the young, the beautiful) is 
exchanged for another (the fading, decaying) and is worn for one night, a garment of artifice.
The geisha, or ""arts person” (Downer, 2000: 13), is not only a female who excels in the 
arts, but is herself an artefact, an artificial woman, raised from the "base’ status of receptacle 
for male carnal expression into a "serene’ (and silent) object-position. Komako, at work, is 
situated to postulate the permanent exposure of her loss (the vagina of the ‘prostitute’,30 her 
token of economic exchange, is literally open, thus metaphorically dilates her into phallic
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absence). Komako, as ‘prostitute’, is an impotent commodity (her coition never having 
the productive imperative of procreation). Shimamura ‘identifies’ physical evidence of her 
aversion to life, her destructiveness, her vampirism, imaging her mouth “a beautiful little 
circle of leeches” (SC: 32). (A blood-sucking, bestial and sexual image). Her overwhelming 
“cleanness” (32) soon begins to submit to alternative, less favourable (according to 
Shimamura’s perception) descriptions.
Part I of the text (Snow Country is bisected) occurs in winter (with connotations, in this 
case, of purification, although perhaps also suggesting death, as in ‘House of the Sleeping 
Beauties’, so that Komako’s ‘real’ and imperfect living body might be interpreted as having 
been ‘killed’ into idealisation). Part II, however, takes place in autumn, the season of 
disintegration, death and decay. Komako’s body, due to its affinity with the natural world, 
begins to change, to degrade in harmony with the season, Komako becomes “full 
flesh... [which] suggested a woolen [sic] cloth, and... the pelt of some animal” (130). Her 
coolness gives way to “warm[th] and sensuous[ness]” (21), particularly “under Shimamura’s 
[Pygmalion] hand” (35). Her pure unreality is exposed as deception, as being largely 
cosmetic. “Your cheeks are flaming. That’s how cold it is”. “It’s not from the cold. It’s 
because I’ve taken off my powder” (47-8). She closes her eyes, in an act of veiling the 
mirror, and her visual warmth becomes all the more apparent (21). This warm redness, at 
first admired, comes to be interpreted as the “scarlet [of] anger” (148), or a ruddiness 
induced through drink (“Bright red... Am I really so drunk?” [143]). Even her translucent 
whiteness becomes degraded into a “blanched” (148) state. Komako’s image begins to 
acquire solidity, moving away from “transparent emptiness” (71) and towards “voluptuous 
softness” (73); from (superior) spirituality to (inferior) materiality; from unreality to reality. 
Her physicality becomes overbearing for Shimamura, who privileges the (lost) unoppressive, 
uninvasive domain of the spiritual, unreal, ideal. She comes to violate his valued principle of 
moderation, so that Shimamura worries that “perhaps he was.. .too intimate, too familiar 
with her body” (112).31 He loses, furthermore, control of the (masculinity-affirming) gaze, as 
she enters his field of vision at will (“[coming] often enough without being called” [128]).
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Komako comes to be conceptualised in maternal terms, with Shimamura describing 
“[t]he fat on her abdomen” as becoming “heavier” (104). She draws attention to her 
tumescence herself: “ ‘My stomach aches.’ Komako thrust both hands tight inside her obi, 
and her head fell to Shimamura’s knee. ‘My stomach aches’ ” (96). Komako’s is a 
dysfunctional parturition. Shimamura connects the vision to an image of death: “Insects 
smaller than moths gathered on the thick white powder at her neck. Some of them died there 
as [he] watched” (96). Komako, if pregnant, is visibly tainted, her body sexualised, 
camalised, so that the transcendence-permitting mirror cracks.
Komako no longer embodies a healing whiteness for Shimamura. She cannot continue to 
remove the suffocating grime of T^ okyo, the grime of life, the grime of stifling warmth for 
him, which has always been his true motivation for entering the snow country: “to make him 
feel that the dirt of the summer had been washed away, even that he himself had been 
bleached clean” (152). Shimamura conceptually links himself with an image of Chijimi 
grass-linen, which depends upon snow for its creation. This fabric, particular to the region, 
was comprised of “thread...spun in the snow.. .cloth woven in the snow, washed in the 
snow, and bleached in the snow... ‘There is Chijimi linen because there is snow,’ someone 
wrote long ago. ‘Snow is the mother of Chijimi’ ” (150). Komako can no longer be the snow* 
the beautifying mirror that would fulfil his purification desires. “Shimamura must locate a 
new pole of unreality” (Tsuruta, 1971: 257).32
He rejects the failed mirror and turns to Yoko (the original woman in the train; the woman 
whose own tangibility and subjectivity were secondary to her status as a conduit for the 
unreality of memory). Yoko is perceived as a potential doorway to the otherworld; to the 
clean dreamscape of unreality. This is due to the fact that she remains detached from life 
because of her apparent morbid madness: Yoko can never mean excess, unlike Komako, 
whose drinking renders her (unfemininely -  in the sense of a social stereotype) 
confrontational and invasive.
Yoko, throughout the text, retains her “transparent coldness” (11). Aware of her presence,
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Shimamura becomes "strangely reluctant to call Komako” (127). She (the latter), in her 
"straining to live” (128), acquires a concrete, palpable, physical “existence” (128), whilst 
Yoko is identified ethereally as an (dis)embodiment “light” (128). Even when she falls from 
the burning warehouse in the final scene, Shimamura conducts a cool, detached, “aesthetic 
evaluation of... [the] event” (Liman, 1971:269). He worries only that her “perfect 
horizontal[ity]” shall be corrupted into erratic formlessness: “If Shimamura felt even a 
flicker of uneasiness, it was lest the head drop, or a knee or a hip bend to disturb that 
perfectly horizontal line” (173). Shimamura is reluctant to conceptualise her as anything but 
“part of some distant world” (57), and in order to be sustained thus, she must not transgress 
the boundaries he has (imaginatively) authored. (She must be a doll and not a woman, a 
clean, clearly defined artefact and not a fluid, amorphous female).
Yoko is intimately connected with death, a perpetual mourner perhaps lamenting (with 
prescient knowledge) her own inevitable death (she must, of course, be imaged as dead, like 
MacDonald’s Lona, in order to be sustained in ‘unreal’ purity). She recalls the Mater 
Lachrymarum of Lilith: Mara, the woman weeping for her children.33 Additionally, she 
recalls the Virgin (artistically/idealistically portrayed in the pieta as the Mother bearing a 
dead child) when she compulsively visits the cemetery. Here, accompanied by the statue of 
Jizo, the “guardian of [dead] children” (119),34 Yoko is associated with the maternal. She is 
not, however, the corporeally-evident mother, but retains purity and bodilessness. In addition 
to her Jizo-attended appearance in the cemetery, Shimamura identifies that during the initial 
train journey (whilst she was the unwitting object of his clandestine gaze) “[s]he was exactly 
like a mother” (52), at which he “was very much impressed” (52). Again, whilst she is 
bathing a child, Yoko is described as singing with “the voice of & young mother” (139). This 
encounter with her maternity is another act of voyeurism for Shimamura, who listens in 
invisibility through a neighbouring wall.
The fact that Shimamura evades direct observation of Yoko suggests, nevertheless, the 
potential danger posed by the ‘transcendent’ feminine for the masculine subject. Yoko (not
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only to be connected with maternity but also with mortality) might indeed be imaged as a 
medusa figure, with her “beautiful eyes that so pierced their object” (174). In this sense, 
Yoko’s (phallic, penetrative, emasculating) gaze must be avoided in order for the male to . 
escape the certain death of his masculinity. This serves to explain Shimamura’s focus upon 
her reflected eye in the train window: Yoko is mediated through a “mirror which filters... [as 
well as] purifies” (Tsuruta, 1971: 254).35
Although a child in Komoko’s arms (“A childlike feeling of security came to him from the 
warmth of her body” [146]), Shimamura, to summarise, desires another mother, another 
embrace: a woman who can enfold him in the coolness of death. Komako speaks warmth 
and vitality even in her drunken “nonsense” (141). Shimamura hears ‘woman’ in her voice, 
“[a] good woman” (147): “the awareness of a woman’s being alive came to [him] in her 
warmth” (147). Nevertheless, it is Yoko’s speech he desires: “the voice that had called to 
the station master at the snowy signal stop, a voice so beautiful it was almost lonely, calling 
out as if to someone who could not hear, on a ship far away” (119). Yoko’s is the voice that 
does not belong to life, to the ‘fire pillow scene’, where “warmth sank into [Shimamura’s] 
head, bringing an immediate sense of life”; where “[r]eality came [violently and 
oppressively] through” (123). When she falls, unconscious, from the balcony of the burning 
warehouse, Shimamura does “not see death in the still form” (174). Death cannot die. Life, 
on the other hand, threatens always to disintegrate, so that, in spite of Komako’s continued 
presence, and the triumph of redness over white (the fire “melt[s]” [171] the snow, the 
flames “[flicker] over [Yoko’s] white face” [174]), Shimamura “feel[s] that a separation [is] 
forcing itself upon them*’ (172). In the world of reality, the world of primal sensory 
perception, Komako can be loved. Shimamura can look upon her face and have instilled a 
“feeling of intense physical nearness” (73), its “healthy, vital flush” (73) rendering him 
“relaxed and warm” (73). Despite her original (idealised) whiteness (a complexion 
“suggesting the newness of a freshly peeled onion or perhaps a lily bulb” [73]; the “fine 
geishalike skin [which] took on the luster of a sea shell” [101]), the “ruddiness of her north- 
country girlhood” (101) cannot help but intrude. “[T]he polish of the city geisha”,
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Shimamura asserts, “had over it a layer of mountain color” (73), a corporeal reality that 
cannot be suppressed.
In the world of unreality, Komako’s “too-black hair” (80) and “brilliant red” (63) skin are 
excessive. They possess a vitality that will not be silenced. Shimamura endeavours to modify 
and manipulate his perception to permit her satisfaction of his necrophilic desire. He 
describes how “he had never touched such cold hair.. .less the cold of the snow-country 
winter than something in the hair itself’ (39), in an attempt to diminish her tangibility, her 
reality. In reality, he does feel for her an “affection” that “welled up violently” (136), an 
affection that is felt corporeally, sensually. However, she does not possess the “uncanny sort 
of beauty” (136, emphasis added) he detects in Yoko.36 He receives from both women, but it 
is Yoko’s transmission that is of spiritual, incomprehensible, indefinable allure. Komako 
gives him a warmth that comforts but does not fulfil: “Like a warm light, Komako poured in 
on the empty wretchedness that had assailed Shimamura” (62). Conversely, interaction with 
Yoko makes him “[feel] a chill come over him” (138). The latter’s face is “like a mask”37 
and “seemed...extraordinarily pure” (82). Her fall serves to further contribute to her “doll- 
like passiveness” (173); her “puppetlike deadness” (172). However, this has an undesired 
effect, as her unconsciousness (even perhaps death) renders her body knowable. Her eyes, 
once “so bright that he felt impaled on them” (134), are now closed. She is rendered inert, 
impotent, passive flesh. Yoko’s apparent death makes her “soft and pliant” (173), and she 
might no longer fulfil the ideal Shimamura has defined.38 He has already acknowledged his 
own coldness, at first identified by Komako. “Tokyo people are complicated”, she states, 
“[t]hey live in such noise and confusion that their feelings are broken to little bits” (118). 
Shimamura recognises his own need for pure, cool transcendence:
He stood gazing at his own coldness.. .All of Komako came to him, 
but it seemed that nothing went out from him to her. He heard in his chest, 
like snow piling up, the sound of Komako, an echo beating against empty 
walls. And he knew that he could not go on pampering himself forever. (155)
Shimamura is aware that his destiny involves an eventual and permanent evacuation of the
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snow country, and his surrender of the warm, vibrant, symbolically red Komako. He himself 
is “coldness”, “empt[iness]” (155), demanding sustenance (a vampiric stipulation) from a 
similarly ‘white5 source. Komako willingly and passionately gives to him, but her warmth is 
the fire which debases his spirit, which turns the snow to “slush” (171). Yoko, however, is 
sustained in cool unreality -  even, as I have suggested, during her fall. Whilst in the air, she 
retains serene mastery, momentarily “seemfing] to hold both life and death in abeyance55 
(173); transiently embodying “a phantasm from an unreal world55 (173). On collision with 
the ground, Yoko interferes with this aesthetic visualisation, her body impeding 
Shimamura5 s evaluation of her as conferring “the freedom of the lifeless55 (173, emphasis 
added): “At the spasm in Yoko5s leg, a chill passed down his spine to his very feet. His heart 
was pounding in an indefinable anguish55 (173). As he endeavours to see spiritual 
“metamorphosis55 as opposed to physical “death in...[her] form55 (174), her (ugly, spasmodic) 
change is perceived as negative, with her whiteness corrupted to an undesirable red.
Shimamura can only be saved from redness by the Milky Way,39 which (symbolising the 
Great Mother) “came down.. .to wrap the night earth in its naked embrace... [in its] terrible 
voluptuousness55 (165). Shimamura observes how the Milky Way causes “[e]ach individual 
star [to stand] apart from the rest, and even the particles of silver dust in the luminous clouds 
[to] be picked out, so clear was the night. The limitless depth of the Milky Way pulled his 
gaze up into it55 (165). The Milky Way has a cleansing effect, so that even Komako is 
“bathe[d]...in its light55 (167). It takes her oppressive warmth and colour away (“the color 
was gone from her small lips55 [167]), neutralising, to a certain extent, her face into a (Yoko- 
like) “mask55 (168). More important is its effect upon Shimamura, as it “flowed through his 
body55 (168), separating him (physically and spiritually), in its penetration, from the two 
women.40 The text concludes with his total engulfment: “[H]is head fell back, and the Milky 
Way flowed down inside him with a roar55 (175). He need never return to the snow country 
for artificial resuscitation into whiteness. Neither Komako nor Yoko are further required for 
their reflective potential. Shimamura learns to heal himself (via association with a truly
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disembodied ‘mother’, the Great Mother/Mother Earth), so that the red wounds o f‘base’, 
bodily living might be self-assuaged, no longer demanding human female assistance.
4 The Sound o f the Mountain
In contrast with Shimamura, Shingo, male protagonist of The Sound o f the Mountain, 
exists in a place in which beauty is sparse, a rare commodity, a forbidden ‘pleasure’. In 
Shimamura’s world(s), beauty was too evident, too tangible, so as to be denigrated as excess 
(with cool emptiness privileged). Shingo, however, inhabits one world, lacking the necessary 
outlet for physical escape. (Shimamura, of course, was capable of movement, entering and 
leaving the snow country at will; approaching and retreating from his wife/Komako at will).
Shingo is dissatisfied with his wife Yasuko’s incapacity for beauty. She never had youth 
but had always “looked older than he” (SM: 8), so that despite his having now overtaken her 
in physical aesthetic deterioration, she has permanently inhabited a (masculine) solid, 
definite space of temporality. Time, simply, has always manifested itself in her face. She 
cannot be the sister desired by Shingo who died (femininely) into immortality. Shingo finds 
Yasuko a particular threat to beauty when she is asleep. At that moment, the visually 
repellent “sight of [her] aged flesh” (9), her aurally repellent “snoring” (9), and her tactilely 
repellent “sweaty” skin (9) contribute to an overwhelming climate of unbeauty. Yasuko, 
asleep, is too ‘bodied’, too bestial. She is unlike the translucent ‘marble’ bodies of Eguchi’s 
‘sleeping beauties’ (or of Vane’s, Anodos’ and Severin’s desire-objects in their respective 
supine states). Shingo acts upon her unconscious body, but his (Pygmalion) gestures are not 
to draw youth and life from it. He wants to aggressively confer upon her an eternal silence; 
to forcefully confer upon their Union an eternal silence; to dramatically confer upon desire an 
eternal silence. Shingo, then, responds to her animalistic snoring (which suppresses her 
should-be feminine ‘silence’) by “twist[ing] her nose” and “takfing] her by the throat and 
shak[ing] her” (9). He wants to awaken her so that she will cease to be the object of his 
gaze. He renounces the voyeuristic advantage, turning away from her, literally “repelled by
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the sight” (9).
The woman has given him two children, a son who is disavowed for his inability to 
appreciate beauty (as demonstrated by his cruel treatment of his wife Kikuko, who has 
become Shingo’s contemporary desire-object),41 and a daughter who is disavowed for her 
inability to personify beauty (failing to emulate the potential hereditary beauty of her dead 
aunt). Shingo explicitly reveals that “[h]is blood kin were not as he would wish them to be”, 
to the extent of being “leaden and oppressive” (32). This “blood kin” is a grouping which 
implicates himself, which pertains to his own being, his own body, his own blood: his own 
‘bad’ blood. His offspring, in this way, rather than affirming his virility, his masculinity, 
contribute to his sense of emasculation: suggesting his affiliation with the ‘tainted’ blood of 
femininity.42 (This is reinforced by the fact that his married son and separated daughter 
inhabit the patemal-govemed home, implicating [especially in the case of the daughter, who 
returns to the family] emasculating vampiric activity).
Loving Kikuko, the daughter-in-law, the ‘not blood relative’, “br[ings] relief’ (32) from 
Shingo’s personal condition, his status as receiver of the word of the mountain, the sound 
transmitted to him that promises death.43 “Kindness towards her was a.. .way of pampering 
himself’ (32), an act of narcissistic self-reassurance. Kikuko does not speak the language of 
the mountain. As Shingo explicates, “Kikuko did not indulge in dark conjectures on the 
psychology of the aged, nor did she seem afraid of him” (32) She is accepting, described in 
terms of illumination and unflinching clarity (“a window looking out of a gloomy house”, “a 
beam lighting isolation” [32]). She will be a beautifying mirror for Shingo (recalling Lilith’s 
attempts of self-unification, and Shimamura’s endeavour to be cleansed through Yoko). His 
own self is permitted a positive, affirmative reflection in Kikuko, who might be interpreted 
as his idealised creation. He originally loved his wife’s (dead) sister, images Kikuko as this 
lost love, and returns himself to a status (and stasis) of eternal youth by re-living the (long 
passed) moment of the occurrence of this loss. Kikuko, therefore, serves as a vehicle to 
enable an evasion of darkness, of ageing, of death. Whilst she continues to light Shingo’s 
world, he is immortal.
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I have extensively considered light as a masculine substance, with darkness being 
associated with the feminine. Kikuko’s identification as a light source, therefore, suggests 
her masculinity, in the sense that the male Shingo comes to be subordinated to her, needing 
her input in order to restore his own masculinity-affirming light. Shingo is rendered the 
symbolic moon (an ‘inferior’, feminine luminosity) that sources its light from the 
(masculine) sun.44
The (‘bad’) blood-line does not end its oppressive flow with Shuichi and Fusako, but 
continues with the offspring of these, Shingo’s son and daughter, respectively. Fusako’s 
children fail to re-member Shingo’s dead and desired sister-in-law. Satoko, the eldest 
daughter, is destructive and covetous. She has “sombre, shadowy eyes” (31), in direct 
contrast with the luminous Kikuko. (Satako’s darkness is a derogatory, infeminative 
expression of her femininity. Kikuko’s whiteness can also be interpreted as a feminine 
condition [in addition to my previous masculine association], as connoting a placid passivity 
and a dysgenic virginity).
Satako likes to play with locusts, but stipulates that their wings be clipped (a gesture that 
perhaps aligns them with her own should-be condition as a female ‘imprisoned’ in 
femininity). Then, “when the adult in question had surrendered and cut the wings.. .she 
would [sadistically] throw the insect.. .out into the garden” (31) to be devoured by “a swarm 
of red ants” (31). Satoko submits the feminised locust to a funeral pyre, represented by the 
redness of the ants. If the locust is to be deemed ‘feminine’, then it might be understood as 
receiving an automatic (symbolic) whiteness. Accordingly, its engulfinent by the red ants 
serves to recall the triumph exerted in Snow Country of fire (reality) over the snow 
(unreality).
Redness and whiteness, as I have determined, have several potential symbolic 
significances, which I shall now briefly re-delineate. Redness in the texts can represent life, a 
positive, virile masculine blood; or it can indicate death, the negative, impotent, menstrual 
feminine emission. Whiteness can represent a positive death into a body-transcending,
(masculine-associated) spirituality, or a creative, masculine semen; alternatively, it can 
suggest a negative death into a feminine inertia, the death of difference, or the positive 
(because transformative) death of feminine corporality/sexuality.
In this present case, the white feminine (locust) is sacrificed by the dark female (Satoko) to 
the red masculine (ants). This serves perhaps as an act of defiance on Satoko’s part: she is 
not the ‘good’, purified, redeemed (whitened) feminine, and will not be.
Just as Satoko derives pleasure from death, Shingo, too, is preoccupied with morbidity. 
They diverge, however, in their approaches to this common obsession. Whilst Shingo utilises 
beauty (located in his dead sister-in-law and his living daughter-in-law) in order to defeat 
death, Satoko employs death against beauty. An example of the latter is evident where 
Satoko enviously watches “little dancing girls...[in] long-sleeved festive kimonos” (122). 
Her plea to be similarly costumed goes unheeded and she grasps at another child’s sleeve, 
with almost devastating consequences. “The child was being run over.. .The automobile 
screeched to a stop.. .The girl jumped up... ‘If [the car] had been a broken-down wreck you 
wouldn’t be alive’ ” (123). Satoko, in an attempt to compensate for her own loss (she is 
considered a plain child), responds to beauty by inducing (near-)death. Because Shingo loves 
beauty, he is reluctant to face his granddaughter’s denial of it, and turns away 
(“Shingo... brought his hands to his face” [123]). (This, of course, parallels his earlier 
repudiation of voyeurism regarding his [‘too ugly’] wife).
Shingo blames his daughter’s ineffective mothering for Satoko’s aversion to beauty. 
Fusako, as well as being a failed wife (blamed by Shingo for her husband’s desertion), is a 
failed mother who was unable to create a beautiful child. She possesses, however, visual 
evidence of a functional maternity: “rich breasts” (99). Shingo perceives that “[h]er features 
were bad, but her breasts were white and remarkably full” (108). Their visible repletion 
suggests a compliance to the maternal nurturing imperative, whilst their whiteness images 
the sister-in-law who is located in memories described as “fresh and clean” (120), and 
sensorily connected with “white breath” (121) and “snow” (120). (This whiteness, of course,
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also recalls descriptions of‘unreal’ femininity in Snow Country). Fusako’s materiality, 
nevertheless, ruptures any true association of her with the idealised sister-in-law. Fusako, as 
a mother, is necessarily bodily, so that she can only signify a debased (sexualised) version of 
Shingo’s feminine ideal.
Shingo invests hope in his son’s (indirect) restoration of absent beauty. Shuichi promises 
the birth of two further Ogata children, by Kikuko (his wife) and by Kinuko (his mistress). 
These are children who will potentially re-member the sister-in-law. But both are denied 
Shingo, with the mistress refusing to permit Shuichi paternal involvement and with Kikuko 
desiring abortion. Shuichi’s mistress operates as a masculine (deep-voiced and tight-lipped) 
substitution for his feminine wife Kikuko (her name even aurally echoing his wife’s).
Shuichi forces Kinuko to vocalise, demanding that she sing when she desires to 
communicate only silence. “He told her to sing for him” (96), a friend of Kinuko’s tells 
Shingo, regarding his son’s aggressive ventriloquistic desires:
She doesn’t like to sing, and there was nothing for me to do but sing 
in her place.. .1 felt so insulted myself that I could hardly go on... |l]t 
seemed to me that I was the woman he was having. I cried and I sang 
some songs that weren’t very proper... [W]hen Shuichi made me sing,
Kinu would be crying with me. (96-7)
Imposing language upon a woman in this way is a disempowering experience. He does not 
permit her own speech, but violently enforces a masculine vocality. Her singing is 
experienced as a rape, an ironically silencing act (as it is not the woman’s desire that is 
spoken). Kinuko’s response to Shuichi’s attempted ventriloquism of her is to refuse to abort, 
yet to deny him knowledge of his child. Her pregnancy is illegitimate, making visible the 
‘shameful’ conception-scene which should have been unseen. Kinuko refuses, nevertheless, 
to admit Shuichi’s paternity (to validate his virility, his masculine creative potential). Her 
defiance of Shuichi’s imperative of abortion (“He told me I was not to have the child, and 
beat me and stamped on me and kicked me and dragged me downstairs to try to get me to a 
doctor” [185]) permits Kinuko to take back, literally, her body, and, metaphorically, 
gynovocality -  the voice that articulates whatever, however and whenever she wants.
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Kikuko, on the other hand, activates her gynovocality (her ‘feminine speech’, a concept 
that is to be discussed at length in Chapter Four) by undertaking the opposite choice of 
abortion. She herself was the outcome of a traumatic scene of birth (“Forceps had been 
applied to Kikuko’s head”, leaving her “scar[red]” [16]), and her own mother, associating 
her maternity (or mortemity) with shame, “had considered abortion” (16). Shingo appears 
aroused at the visual apprehension of Kikuko’s “difficult birth” (16): the “faint scar on her 
forehead” (16). She is physically branded with a symbol of near-death, a sign that 
conceptually links her with the (fully dead) sister-in-law. Kikuko is described in terms of 
“cleanness” (85); as pure and “innocent” (93); as “pale, delicate, childlike” (85). Like 
Yasuko’s sister, she does not only suggest an image of whiteness but is also conceptualised 
as red (in Shingo’s memory, his sister-in-law is identified with a “red glowpng]...maple” 
[40], and is described as being “dressed in a red kimono... going down of a morning when 
snow was piled on the shelves to brush it away from the branches” [120]). Kikuko is 
associated with the “dazzling red” (213) of “crow-gourds” (213) which emphasise her visual 
appearance of (white) “maidenly freshness” (213). Watching her arrange the plants, Shingo 
is, however, compelled to consider her disappearing whiteness (slowly becoming engulfed 
perhaps by redness). Her “long, slender throat...was beginning to swell a little...and that 
maidenliness would soon disappear” (213). Maternity causes a tumescence that corrupts the 
virgin’s (eternally pure) body. (Indeed, Kikuko’s flower-arranging continues through to the 
close of the text. The final line of dialogue is emitted by Shingo on the matter. “ ‘Your 
gourds are sagging,’ he called to Kikuko. ‘They seem to be too heavy’ ” [218]. Kikuko’s 
body is slowly degrading and distorting into amorphousness, shapelessness. Her idealised 
form is gaming weight, substance, redness, recalling Komako’s similar deterioration in Snow 
Country). Kikuko also suffers a nosebleed (which causes her birth-scar to be revealed), 
constituting a visually apparent infringement of redness upon the territory of a “face, white 
as if she had fainted” (93). Life (in this case, the red, the sexual, the ‘woman’) co-exists with 
death (the white, the virginal, the ‘girl’). This nosebleed operates as perhaps an early
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indication of Kikuko’s abortion intention. She will make a decision that will re-dress the red- 
white tension in favour of liberating the former. Shedding her own blood (that admittedly 
makes her paleness only the more evident), she will kill the dream and infiltrate the sphere of 
reality.
Yasuko’s sister firmly belongs to ethereality, to whiteness, to the dream (and the fact that 
she is unnamed in the text supplements the sustenance of her idealised image, as language is 
thought or spirit transposed and substantiated into matter). As Shingo indicates, she and her 
husband “had been like inhabitants of a dream world” (16). Kikuko’s presence, however, is 
described as actively (penetratively -  perhaps like Snow Country's Yoko) “pierc[ingj” 
Shingo’s memories with “moments of brightness, like flashes of lightning” (17). She 
vitalises used time, granting bland pallor and indefmiteness with precise luminosity.
Kikuko chooses to abort her child in order to express a gynovocality that addresses both 
her husband and his father. The communication to the father is of greatest pertinence as it 
functions as a final refusal of submission. In Beauty and Sadness, the young Otoko ties the 
necktie of her older lover (“a man twice her age” [i?Y: 10]), whom she addresses as “Sonny- 
boy” (BS: 10). This is suggestive of both a girl’s appropriation of a maternal, nurturing role 
(infantilising grown men into little boys) and a girl’s manifestation of a sexually aggressive 
stance (whereby she actively takes charge of the tie/penis). Kikuko shares a similar 
experience with Shingo. Unlike Otoko, she fails to knot the tie. In this act of recalcitrance 
(subtly and subversively concealed as demure ‘feminine’ incompetence: “ ‘I can’t do it.’ 
Kikuko flushed” [SM: 204]), she refuses to submit to his maternal and sexual instruction.
After Kikuko aborts, Shingo (obsessing over his daughter-in-law’s ‘necessary’ maternal 
redemption) must continue to (mis)conceptualise her as pregnant. He confronts her, in the 
belief that she has re-conceived, but she denies his hopeful accusations. Nevertheless, Shingo 
persists:
I hope you’ll treat it better next time. I argued with Shuichi over the last 
one. I asked if he could guarantee that you would have another, and he said 
he could.. .The baby would be yours and Shuichi’s, of course, but it would 
be our grandchild too. A child you would have would be too good to lose. (198)
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Kikuko refuses Shingo, for the second time, his demand for a baby; his desire for the 
reincarnation of his wife’s sister (but tangibly belonging to him -  “[my] grandchild too”). 
The act is empowering. Kikuko triumphantly (in an “unusually bright and lively” mood 
[199]) dresses in “a white sweater” and reddens “her cheeks with rouge” (199), as if to 
comment on the existence (as in ‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’) of ‘woman in the girl’.
Kikuko desires perhaps to embody both life and death. She shows Shingo her black lilies, 
flowers which confer both states. These black lilies are perhaps suggestive of the vagina, its 
chaotically cavernous monstrosity exacerbated with its death-imaging, blackly-feminine 
discoloration; a sexualised vagina, its original virginal whiteness degraded into feminine 
bodily blackness. Kikuko indicates, indeed, that the black lilies have emerged from 
whiteness: “It must have snowed eleven or thirteen times this spring... [so that] black lilies 
seemed even more unusual” (126). From death, sexuality is reached -  a fact intimated by 
Kikuko when she explains that the true colour of the flowers is “a transparent purple touched 
with red” (127). The lilies become more evidently vaginal, evoking first a visual and then an 
olfactory sensation of “[t]he smell of a dirty woman” (127). Kikuko must force an 
association of herself with sexuality and mortality if she is to break free from Shingo’s 
enslaving project which renders her the echo of an already-lived life.
Shingo, emasculated in his inactivity, is unable to successfully mould Kikuko in his reality. 
He begins, therefore, to experience various incarnations of her in his unreality. Shingo’s 
sleeping dreams repeatedly return him to the arms of young girls. He recounts having “slept 
with a girl” (27), a union that “could not have happened in real life” (28). Later, he has a 
similar dream in which he “embrace[s]” a woman who “was very young, a mere girl” (65). 
Her appearance, like that of the first, is a mystery to him (“He did not know, after he woke, 
who the woman had been. He could remember neither face nor figure” [66]). Shingo refuses, 
at this stage, to admit his quasi-incestuous desire (for his son’s lover and for his wife’s sister) 
and reveal ‘her’ identity. He is unable (or unwilling) to identify the object of yet another 
dream, a young “girl who had an abortion at fourteen or fifteen and was at the same time a
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holy child” (105); a girl-woman who is tainted and chaste, and clearly represents his 
daughter-in-law. In yet another dream, Shingo palpates the unresponsive breasts of a 
paradoxically bodiless woman (who has “no face and no body” but is “a dim figure” [164]). 
The prominence of her breasts suggest this woman’s association with a maternity that co­
exists with virginity. In spite of her apparent incorporeality, she is, however, sexualised, so 
that Shingo is “startled to find traces of her purity on his finger” (165). This latter woman, 
whose “purity” is eroded by Shingo’s interference, is, at last, explicitly interpreted as “an 
incarnation of Kikuko, a substitute for her” (165). Shingo directly addresses the possibility 
that he desires her (lost) virginity: “And might it not be that, if his desires were given free 
rein, if he could remake his life as he wished, he would want to love the virgin Kikuko, 
before she was married to Shuichi?” (165)
Shingo’s conversion of ‘woman’ into a sexualised object constitutes her transformation 
into a fetish,45 into an object onto which sexual anxiety might be displaced. In the instance of 
this dream, Shingo fetishises the breast, a (Kleinian) part-object46 of woman (“just two 
breasts floating in space” [164]), whose separation from her totality (as whole object) 
confers a fragmentation. The breast is selected as an obvious object of past infantile 
Tookhig’. Such fetishism determines an umbilicafity between male/son and female/mother: 
he is connected via the breast-as-displaced umbilicus.
Kikuko’s is the omnipresent but obscured face that inhabits Shingo’s dreams, a face he 
must repress. He dreams of purifying her (of restoring her chastity even after abortion), but 
also of defiling her (shedding her blood without guilt [165]). He desires to both cleanse and 
soil her; to absolve her ‘sin’ with ablution whilst implementing the (red) flow that 
symbolises her sexuality; to fluidise her twice.
Shingo’s focus on fluidity serves to re-image the scene of Kikuko’s abortion. Fluidity and 
abortion are explicitly connected themes in the Japanese concept of mizuko. The literal 
meaning of mizuko is ‘water-child’, a term pertaining to an aborted foetus (whether induced 
or spontaneous), to stillborn infants, and to children who have died soon after birth.
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According to Buddhist metaphysics, asserts William LaFleur, the dead foetus is conceptually 
twinned with water, with the life-force perceived as originating from (and returning to) a 
fluid existeilce. The aborted mizuko resumes its liquid state to await another opportunity for 
reincarnation. The death of the infant, in this way, is never an act of finality, but a temporary 
delay in its (solid) realisation.47
Shingo appears to support this notion of fluid flexibility, which permits life and death to 
seamlessly merge. It provides him with interminable access to the dead desire-object that he 
is determined to re-instate into Kikuko’s (already-occupied) body. Through her abortion, 
Kikuko might have seemingly denied Shingo the “grandchild [in whom]...Yasuko’s sister 
[would be] reborn” (SM: 143), but this loss is impermanent. Imaged as mizuko, the aborted 
baby/Shingo’s sister-in-law is promised the chance of a future return.
Fluidity, in this case, is posed as a potential enemy (rather than ally) of the feminine. (The 
male Shingo might continue to enforce his revivification imperative upon the female body 
via a conceptualisation of the foetus as the fluid mizuko). Kikuko’s refusal, nevertheless, to 
comply with Shingo’s demands (as expressed by her abortion) means that the mountain 
continues to sound; to signal the impossibility of eternal life (that Shingo desires for 
Yasuko’s dead sister). The sound of the mountain indicates impending death; a sound which 
initially accompanied the death of Shingo’s original desire-object; a sound which is 
manifested physiologically to Shingo (10, 204). Whilst Kikuko refuses to be a substitute or 
surrogate mother for a dead and desired woman, the mountain, death and femininity will 
continue to haunt Shingo.
5 The Lake
Whilst Shingo is stalked by death, Gipipei, male protagonist of The Lake, stalks death. He 
is compelled, by his own ugliness, to pursue beauty, which culminates in his being 
apprehended by death: by his own self-image. Gimpei is physically described in bestial 
terms, which suggests his alignment with the teratologised feminine. He has a simian
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appearance, a “monkey-face” (TL: 150) and, most significantly, feet “just like a monkey’s” 
(15).48 Gimpei reveals that his feet, inherited from an ugly father (“his father’s ugliness had 
left a stronger mark on him than his mother’s lovely face” [150J, a physical mark of 
“deformity” [150]), are the source of his lies. (He indeed embodies a life, being a man who 
seems bestial rather than human). “Gimpei told half-truths. How many times in his youth had 
he told different lies because of his ugly feet?” (15) At first, he uses his monkey-feet to draw 
his desire-objects to him. He asks his pupil, the “high-school student” Hisako (22), for a 
“medicine for athlete’s foot” (23), in order to legitimise his following her, but soon discovers 
that his foot-lies are slavery: “A lie, once told, never vanishes, but chases after us”, so that, 
“[j]ust as Gimpei followed women, so his lies trailed behind him” ( 35). Gimpei degrades his 
voyeuristic act to disease: “The first time Gimpei followed a woinan led to the second, and 
so on...The need to follow women is as persistent as athlete’s foot” (35).
Gimpei finds himself objectified, the victim, the prey, (emasculatingly) “pursued by his 
own hideous feet” (23). They cause the ghost-baby of his imagination to torment him, 
threatening to reinforce his sense of “masochistic self-disgust” (150) by revealing similarly 
inherited bestial feet, the “strongest proof’ (150) of paternity. Gimpei is haunted by this 
claim of paternity after a “prostitute.. .had left a child outside the door of his lodgings” (148). 
Gimpei refuses to acknowledge the baby, and is permanently followed underfoot by its 
“dead” and “ghostly” presence (149). He interprets that “[i]t was his feet, as ugly as a 
beast’s, that had made the baby follow him, crawling underneath the bank” (150). The child 
“at the bottom of a grave against the wall of earth that weighed down on it” (13) projects a 
similar living imprisonment upon its potential father (“From all directions the dark walls of a 
prison closed in on Gimpei” [13]). He cannot escape the physical reality of his feet, nor can 
he destroy the controlling gaze of the baby, who appropriates a merciless, voyeuristic 
subject-position.
Although unsure about the baby’s sex, Gimpei images it as female. Thus, when the young 
masseuse pummels his body, she evokes his recollection of the child: “The attendant’s palms 
were still a girl’s, but the slaps on his back were continuous and surprisingly strong,
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and... [h]e remembered his own child slapping him on the forehead with all the force in its 
round palm” (12). Whenever he ‘feeds’, subjecting a girl to a hungry gaze, his own 
(apparent) daughter deflects the action, to optically frame him m a similarly parasitic event 
of looking.
Gimpei fantasises that his baby is “buried” (128) under the mound of snow at his and 
Hisako’s secret meeting-place (128). Incidentally, this secret place perhaps resembles 
Hisako’s idealised, ‘purified’ genitals. Cleansed into whiteness (through the snow 
association),49 Hisako’s body provides Gimpei with a perfect gynoscopic retreat for the 
orphaned bodies of both himself and his rejected baby. When Gimpei observes that the 
“mountain” (128) of snow “stand[s] in the way of [Gimpei’s and Hisako’s] love” (128), it is 
perhaps sexual love to which he refers -  sexual love that is replaced by (and is incompatible 
with, due to the incest taboo) filial-maternal love.
The baby, seemingly buried at the meeting-place, defiantly returns, mirroring Gimpei’s 
own movement by “crawl[ing] in the earth beneath him, matching its palms against his as if 
across a mirror” (143). Gimpei indicates that “[tjhey were the cold hands of the dead” (143), 
but does not specify to which (the baby’s or his own) he refers. The vision must be silenced, 
denied femininity and subjectivity. Gimpei translates the actual living daughter -  there is no 
indication that her literal death is anything more than his own infanticidal fantasy -  into the 
image of a “noseless, mouthless dummy” (149). Even though Gimpei asserts a belief that her 
sex is female, “the sex of the apparition” (148) is rendered “uncertain” (149). Furthermore, 
the baby is connected, in her ghost-status, with Gimpei’s (male) deceased father, who is 
perceived as such by the local community of his mother’s village:
[H]is father’s ghost now haunted the shores of the lake. The villagers 
claimed that the sound of footsteps followed those who went near the 
spot where he had perished, but whenever they looked round, there was 
nobody behind them. When they ran away, the footsteps would recede, for 
the ghost was unable to run after them. (94)
Gimpei’s voyeuristic pursuits repeat the (supposed) actions of his father, who follows the
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living (Gimpei himself is socially dead) in invisibility. The ghost cannot run, presumably due 
to the (patrilineal) deformity of his feet, just as Gimpei can only invent a past of rock- 
climbing (“clinging to the rocks with [hisj long toes" [15]) to the bath attendant.
“Gimpei’s father had died in the lake when Gimpei was ten, and as he had had head 
injuries people said that he had been murdered and his body thrown into the lake. But he had 
had water in his lungs, so it was possible that he had drowned” (93). Gimpei, since his 
childhood, had been convinced of his father’s murder. Thus, “he used to hide in a thicket 
near the spot where his father’s corpse had been recovered and watch the passers-by. He 
reasoned that the murderer would be unable to pass there without showing some sign of 
guilt” (93). Looking, then, comes to be conceptually associated with concealment, with 
fluidity, with death, and with guilt. Gimpei translates these findings into later experience.
He watches, out of sight, with guilt assuaged by denial, a defence-mechanism that permits 
his actual lived experience to be comfortingly transmuted into “hallucination” (17). He 
watches with fluid eyes, so that one ‘victim’ recalls seeing “floating in the darkness, only the 
blurred distortion of his face as he struggled with his tears” (66); “a face which had seemed 
to weep the moment he decided to follow her” (66). His watched objects, now specifically 
female, are also fluid. The eyes of his latest prey, Machie, are explicitly described as “liquid” 
(87), becoming a “black lake” (87) in which Gimpei desires to “bathe naked” (87). His desire 
is, through them, to be consumed, to sink into death (the lake, being symbolic of death, as 
the site of his father’s, and in its connotion of gynoscopic maternal amniotic fluidity).
Gimpei’s paternal loss activates a morbid fascination, so that he comes to be intrigued by 
death. This culminates in his (fluid-infused) murder fantasies. In Hisako’s bedroom he feels 
“bathed in a wild glow of happiness” (120), then acknowledges that “[i]f he had had a pistol 
with him he would have shot Hisako from behind” (120). Gimpei mentally lives the scene: 
“the bullet passed through her breast.. .Hisako turned, arching her body in a graceful curve, 
and clutched at Gimpei’s legs as she fell. Blood gushed from her wound” (120). The fluidity 
is used by Gimpei, in this fantasy, to purify (to whiten, despite its redness) and beautify his 
ugly feet:
[Her] [b]lood... soaked the inside of his feet. In an instant, the coarse, 
blackish skin had become as soft and pure as rose petals, his wrinkled 
arches as smooth as mother-of-pearl. And bathed in Hisako’s warm blood, 
even his crooked, gnarled and shriveled toes, which were as long as a 
monkey’s, became as graceful as a mannequin’s. (120)
Gimpei consumes, his looking (whereby beauty is reflected, thus attained, mastered, 
possessed by the surfaces of his eyes) serving as self-beautification. Gimpei’s assertion that 
“ugliness” chases (and ensnares) “beauty” (36) is, in his fantasy-world, realised.
Another fluid-fantasy involves Gimpei’s drowning of his cousin Yayoi:
The lake lay in a shroud of mist, and all beond the ice near the shore 
looked infinitely remote. Gimpei had tricked his cousin Yayoi into trying 
to walk on the ice, for as a boy he had borne a grudge against Yayoi and 
cursed her. His sinister hope was that the ice under her feet would give way 
and that she would sink into the water. (26-7)
Gimpei visualises Yayoi’s drowning as an act of vengeance, because she (along with the rest 
of his mother’s family) rejects him after his father’s scandalous death. Yayoi renders Gimpei 
an outcast, an ‘other’, asserting that his deformity (and, by association, Gimpei himself) 
certainly does not “come from our [Yayoi’s and Gimpei’s mother’s] side of the family”
(150, emphasis added). As the lake has become his father’s territoiy, sacrificing her to it 
images a paternal victory.
The various murder-fantasies of Gimpei serve to suggest his anal-sadism, his necrophilic 
fascination with faecal expulsion, whereby he desires to transform the organic to the 
inorganic, and then to sustain the inorganic through reingestive processes. He desires, for 
example, to kill Hisako, then grant himself new life through the cannibalistic nourishment of 
his dead body -  specifically his feet -  with her blood. Such an endeavour, the imposition of 
cyclical mechanisms upon a normally irreversible linearity, serves to raise questions of 
Gimpei’s equally aggressive ora/-sadistic tendencies. This is demonstrated in his demanding 
a constant nutritive sustenance for his voyeurism-habit. His “addiction]” (22) is a gluttonous 
scopophilia, a feeding, sucking, biting, parasitic hunger requiring visual-ingestion. He has no
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choice in the matter (he often describes his compulsion as a product of bewitchment), thus he 
is the ‘eaten’ as well as the ‘eater’, consumed by his very desire to consume. His self­
perception indicates that he is the voyeur enslaved to looking. His addiction is vivified into 
“a living being with a mind of its own” (20); an animated, personified force that 
“intimidate[s] him, refusing to go away” (20). Gimpei’s conviction that he is subjected to 
this oppressive ‘being’ (so that his voyeuristic condition is reactive; so that he operates 
passively in response to external stimuli, to the desires of the watched women) causes him to 
doubt the “existence]” of “entirely one-sided pleasure[s]” (21). Voyeurism, he suggests, is 
instigated by female exhibitionism. One apparent victim is, therefore, accused of being “an 
evil woman” (66) who courts the gaze: “Imagine being followed by so many men.. .Aren’t 
you frightened ofyourself! There must be some devil hidden in you” (66, emphasis added). 
(This statement of a ‘Gothic’ trope that suggests demonic possession, is, of course, repeated 
throughout Kawabata’s writings).
Gimpei’s claim to being “drunk or sleepwalking, lured on by [women’s] charms” (33), a 
“passenger” (100) subordinated into passivity and denied free-will, results in his recognition 
of two potential choices of action. (He must, of course, learn to act in order to liberate 
himself from his enslaving addiction to reaction). He must, he believes, either kill the object 
of his scopophilic gaze or kill himself (81).
The drive of Gimpei’s scopophilic addiction posits ‘looking’ as usurper of the genitals’ 
position as the conventional locus of sexual desire.50 Without the genital apparatus, he can 
only revert to the pre-genital stages of psychosexual development, regressing into the 
(Freudian) id51 world of infantile fantasies, violence and perversion. When Gimpei follows 
Machie he claims it is because “[h]e wanted only to walk beside her.. .and talk to her” (81), 
to share her space, her “warm pink” (100) world of activity and freedom (from addiction).
His own world is the “cold blue” (100) of passivity, of slavery, (a distinction he derives from 
a taxi journey, where the passenger’s view is perceived as differing from that of the driver’s). 
When Gimpei contemplates Machie, “[t]he pink sky seem[s] to suffuse his brain” (98), 
affecting primarily his mental, as opposed to sexual, function. What he desires is a regular
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opportunity to watch her, unseen: “Do you take [your dog] for a walk at the same time every 
day?” he asks. “Always along this road” (85). He is momentarily compelled to touch her:
But before he could do anything rash, the sudden realization that, every 
evening, she would walk here with her dog beneath the shade of the gingko 
trees and that he could watch her from a hiding place on top of the bank came 
to him like a ray of hope. It was like lying naked in the new grass, so cool and 
fresh was his sense of relief. Yes, he would watch her from the top of the bank, 
and she would come up the slope toward him forever.. .His happiness knew no 
bounds. (86)
Although his visualisation of her warm pinkness might be interpreted as indicating a trope of 
the female genitals (pink because she has not fully matured from girl-status to the redness of 
a woman’s sexuality), it suggests maternity in addition to sexuality.
Gimpei describes himself as motherless: “I don’t like talking about the place where I was 
bom... I haven’t got a home any more” (15). His mother was a beautiful woman whose 
presence was omitted from his own physical self (so that his appearance is determined 
paternally, by the ugliness of his possibly-murdered father). Whilst Gimpei is being 
massaged by the bath girl, he detects a return of the lost maternal. Her voice, he perceives, is 
“the voice of the eternal woman, or the compassionate mother” (8);52 the (fluidly creative) 
voice which is “like the flow of time or life” (13); the voice which (again) speaks directly 
to his mind (“It feels as though something gentle and delicate were sinking through my inner 
ear into the core of my brain” [7]). The masseuse’s voice “lingers on even after [she has] 
stopped speaking” (7), paralleling Gimpei’s personal lingering memories of maternity (“He 
remembered his beautiful mother, not the father who had died so strangely” [150]). Denied 
physical commemoration of her (he has inherited his father’s ugliness), Gimpei endeavours 
to locate the maternal in the girls he selects as visual prey. The warm, pink space becomes 
the wombscape, a haven and a constriction. Gimpei enjoys the sense of envelopment his 
looking brings, but is also suppressed by the fact that it is an act of compulsion rather than of 
choice. Intent on looking, he finds himself in situations which threaten his masculinity, such 
as his being secured by the masseuse in the steam bath which activates an oppressive
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(decapitation/castration) “guillotine” (9) image:
The girl opened the front panel of the square wooden box and gently 
pushed him in. A board on top of the box had a place for his head to fit in, 
and once it was settled in snugly, she brought down a lid which shut off the 
remaining space.. .Trapped in the hole, he turned his head to left and right.
But the girl didn’t nptice his fear.. .Gimpei was thinking that if he were left 
alone in the bathroom he would find it unbearable; he would panic, afraid that 
the rim of the slot would tighten its hold and strangle him. (9-10)
The masseuse is imaged genitally as the vagina which should be (according to patriarchal 
logic) in passive receipt of the penis. This vagina, however, is an oppressive (perhaps 
toothed) “slot” that threatens a role-reversal: to feed upon the feeder. The masseuse also 
might be perceived as embodying maternal ambiguity* She violently enforces Gimpei’s 
gynoscopic re-entry (“pushling] him in”, “shutjting]” out the outside world, “trapp[ing]” him 
in her abyssal, “fear[-invoking]” “hole”). However, Gimpei also expresses a need for the 
‘mother’; a reluctance to be separated from her, to be released into autonomous being; to be 
“left alone”. Gimpei, in this sense, is afraid to be a man.
The matter of maternity might be related back, of course, to my earlier assertion of 
Gimpei’s oral-fixation. Gimpei is not alone in the text in his compulsion. Nor is feeding 
gendered as solely a male’s operation. Another male character, Arita (the wealthy and aged 
businessman whose mistress is Miyako, one of Gimpei’s women), exhibits a similar hunger. 
Arita’s vampirism renders him a “greedy, blood-sucking old man” (56) in the eyes of his 
mistress. Miyako finds herself permitting the sustenance of this “half-dead... old man” with 
her “own blood” (49), “her youth [to be] lost in old Arita’s shadow” (50). Arita seeks the 
maternal in both Miyako and his young housekeeper Umeko: “When his head was pillowed 
in the arms of these two women, his neck supported by them and their breasts in his mouth, 
old Arita, who was almost seventy, imagined the two young women were his mother. For 
only with a mother could the old man find peace of mind” (53). Arita makes explicit this 
requirement (“His own mother had been divorced when he was two years old, and a 
stepmother had appeared. The old man had told this story repeatedly to Miyako” [54]). Now, 
in her “company” he would “indulge himself childishly” (54), meekly accepting her
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supercilious denigration of him as “a horrible boy” (54), responding with an expression of 
pathetic gratitude. Although granted a dominant position (she as mother, he as child), 
Miyako, nevertheless, understands that she “was losing her youth and energy, spending her 
life in aimless anticipation of an old man’s visits” (55). Like Eguchi and the old men of the 
‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’, Arita buys her time, making himself the owner of her 
youth.
Not only the male Arita but also the female Miyako is susceptible to a vampiric feeding (a 
fact which aligns her with MacDonald’s Lilith). Miyako is encouraged by her maid Tatsu to 
siphon extra money from Arita; “to have the [hotel] bills made out for more than the real 
amount and then to arrange for the surplus to be returned to her” (55). In terms of voyeuristic 
cannibalism, Miyako also feeds upon Gimpei’s prey, Machie. She reveals that “[i]f she ever 
passed Machie in the street, she knew she would turn and stare at her retreating figure” (76), 
her experience of feeding designed to counter the effects of Arita’s consumption of her own 
body. What Arita takes from Miyako (namely, her youth), she will take from Machie. In this, 
which constitutes her repetition of the actions of Arita, Miyako is masculinised. (Although, 
in her role as ‘mirror’ to his actions, she is still a representation of negative femininity: 
inhabiting the suppressed, secondary position in the masculine/'first sex’-feminine/‘second 
sex’ dichotomy). She might also be identified with Gimpei (who already perceives their 
similarity, identifying them as “inhabitants of the same infernal world” [21]). Miyako’s 
voyeurism/vampirism invokes in her emotions that resemble Gimpei’s: “Though they were 
both women, Miyako almost gave a little cry of joy when she touched Machie’s hand, so 
pleasant was the sensation. She... was deeply moved by the young girl’s beauty”, yet, “while 
she was looking at the girl, a great sadness welled up in her that made her wish she were 
alone and far away” (76).
Gimpei, too, explicates how, when he is witness to great beauty belonging to a stranger, his 
initial feeling is one of immense pleasure, closely followed by the notion that he “could die 
of sadness” (37). Experiencing beauty in others, additionally, has vampiric repercussions,
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causing Gimpei to “feel somehow drained and empty” (37). Witnessing this ‘beauty that is 
not his own’ instils in him feelings of maternal loss (reinforced by the fact that this beauty is 
located in women),53 recalling not only the death of his mother (and his rejection by her 
family) but serving as a painful reminder of his own ugliness (the matrilineal legacy of 
beauty was, of course, denied him).
Gimpei identifies another kindred spirit in a woman who seems compelled to follow him, a 
woman who challenges his voyeuristic enterprise. This woman is imaged as sharing physical 
Characteristics with Gimpei, not only possessing “ugly feet” (154), which recall his primary 
mark of identification, but also being “dressed rather like a man” (153). This woman, 
furthermore, has a gaze that is emitted from a masculine source, from “slit eyes [which] were 
watchful, dry [as opposed to femininely fluid], like a man’s, and glinted with cunning” 
(155).54 Gimpei cannot identify her biological sex with certainty without a tactile exploration 
of her body -  his eyes fail him in determining this -  and her apparent rejection of femininity 
remains indicative of her assumed subject status. Her gaze is the master (as she is visually 
undesirable)55 and “Gimpei, whose experience in chasing women had made him unusually 
acute in the matter, [finds] himself unable to discover why she was following him” (153).
The woman chides him. “What do you want with me?” (154), she asks, with affected 
innocence (the question, of course, should be his, due to the fact that he is the pursued). The 
woman confronts Gimpei with his own flawed hypothesis which states that the victim is 
responsible for ‘her’ (the feminised object of the gaze) own victimisation. Her determined 
pursuit is an ironic act of revenge, in which ugliness chases not beauty but more ugliness.
Gimpei compares (and contrasts) two distinct acts of looking which have occurred that 
night: the dream-like perception of beautiful Machie and the reality vision of this ugly 
stranger. Through this he learns to re-dress the power balance, to re-inscribe his position of 
phallic mastery, as controller of the gaze. “[T]his ‘reality’ seemed.. .a way to reach the girl in 
the dream. The uglier the woman, the better the vision. Her ugliness brought Machie’s face 
into view” (157). Gimpei derives from ugly reality (the teratologised woman) a facilitated 
appreciation of idealised beauty.
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Women who hunger, in The Lake, are denigrated as either masculine (such as this woman) 
or hyper-feminine, excessively corporeal and sexual “slut[s]” (153). Confronted by the ugly 
reality-woman, Gimpei is provoked to remember a prostitute “who had pestered him.. .after 
[his] running away from.. .Hisako’s house” (153). This woman had also challenged his right 
to territorialise the act of following, of looking:
‘You’ve been following me, haven’t you?’ Gimpei said to the woman.
‘I don’t think I was following you exactly.’
‘I don’t suppose I was following you, was I?’
‘Sure.’
The woman’s answer was ambiguous...
‘If I wasn’t doing the chasing, then it must have been you’. (24-5)
She plays with him, enacting a reversal of Gimpei’s prodding of the breast of the masculine 
woman by “pinch[ing] him sharply on the chest” (26). Gimpei can derive no pleasure from 
direct observation of the sexually-aggressive female (neither this prostitute nor the 
phallicised woman). She is only of worth as a medium, bridging the gulf between his ugly 
(reality) self and his idealised self-image (the beautified version which, as a source in itself 
of beauty, need no longer chase it in an externalised form). Gimpei, momentarily relieved at 
the idea of utilising his ugly, masculine counterpart as a lens through which to better 
perceive the concept of superlative beauty, is, however, returned to a state of desperation. 
“Gimpei felt overwhelmed with sadness, as though the world were at an end” (158), a 
feeling merely exacerbated by his contemplation of lost beauty (“Perhaps it was because he 
had seen Machie that same evening” [158]). Looking at the woman, he sees himself reflected 
but not perfected, his body “entangled” (159) in hers, so that differentiation becomes 
redundant. He desires to see her feet, as proof of her identity (a method he proposes in order 
to determine the paternity of ‘his’ ghost-child), visualising them as “misshapen, with thick, 
brownish skin” (159). (He insists that they will not be monkey-feet as this would serve as 
irrevocable confirmation of her ‘Gimpei status’). At the moment of revelation (as they reach 
“a cheap hotel where one could spend the night with a girl” [160]), Gimpei, the avid watcher, 
turns away.
6 WAStory
Shimamura is, of course, not myself. He is nothing but a foil to the 
geisha, Komako... [I]n many ways I am Komako rather than Shimamura.
I consciously tried to keep Shimamura at a distance from me as I wrote...
The feelings of Komako in particular are the embodiment of my own sadness. 
(Kawabata, cited in Mathy, 1969: 212)56
In his postscript to the original completed version of Snow Country, Kawabata explicitly 
identifies himself with the feminine, thereby suggesting the authorial voice would 
accommodate gynovocality. By gynovocality I mean to indicate the potential for a counter 
discourse within the negative rhetoric of infemination, whereby femininity is (positively) 
inscribed rather than ‘destroyed’. (I shall discuss this in further detail in the following 
chapter).
Nevertheless, ‘History’ has focused on representations of ‘bad’ femininity, privileging 
masculine ‘language’ over feminine ‘silence’: the stories of Eguchi, Shimamura, Shingo and 
Gimpei over those of the texts’ female characters. However, these males are demonstrated as 
being themselves, at times and to varying degrees, subjected to the autonomy-destructive and 
silencing processes to which they treat their female objects. Despite the masculine 
domination of narration in ‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’, Snow Country, The Sound o f 
the Mountain and The Lake, and the subsequent mediation of femininity, male ‘speech’ does 
not entirely omit gynovocality. ‘Woman’ is, admittedly, represented through ‘man’ (first and 
foremost through Kawabata). But, as Eguchi, Shimamura, Shingo and Gimpei discover, 
counter representations of empowered femininity serve also to challenge their primacy. As 
metaphoric mirrors (an image frequently employed in Kawabata’s writings) to the past, 
female characters implement for the males a remembrance that it is truly re-membrance: re­
assembling the fragmented or fragmenting body to compose a ‘text’ beyond loss.
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CHAPTER FOUR: HERstory
1 Trilingualisms
As I intimated in my ‘Historical’ interrogation, man might be interpreted as speaking 
language, and woman silence. In the current (‘HERstorical’) investigation, I endeavour to 
explore the ramifications of this statement in depth. What then, I shall enquire, of the man 
who ‘writes woman’ infeminatively in ‘HIS’(torical) language, but also exhibits a sensitivity 
towards ‘writing woman’ in ‘HER’(storical) silence.1
Toril Moi, in ‘Feminist, Female, Feminine’, suggests that ‘woman-writing’ must take into 
consideration a tripartite organisation which encompasses the (biologically) female, the 
(politically) feminist and the feminine. This third possibility identified by Moi involves 
“writing [that] which seems to be marginalised (repressed, silenced) by the ruling 
social/linguistic order” (Moi, 1989:132). Feminine writing is bound to neither biology nor 
politics - it is potentially accessible to anyone who writes.
In this chapter, I shall argue that negative representations of femininity do not monopolise 
the Kawabatan text, but that counter-representations which valorise the feminine might be 
detected.2 Through a close reading of his Beauty and Sadness, I shall indicate not only an 
increased presence of female characters (suggesting that the man/present-woman/absent 
dichotomy is challenged), but also consider the femininity of his language.
To briefly recapitulate, then, ‘HlStoiy’ focused upon a selection of Kawabata’s texts in 
which feminine heteronymy was read. By this, I mean that the representations of the feminine 
were interpreted as being mediated (and othered) by the male Kawabata, the male character, 
the male narrator. Kawabata’s ‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’, Snow Country, The Sound 
o f the Mountain and The Lake were interrogated for evidence of this ‘ventriloquising’ 
heteronymous project.
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‘HERstory’, on the other hand, shall communicate the presence (that is, the made present 
by my reading) of a counter discourse of femininity, which I term feminine autonymy. This 
metaphoric notion of ‘self-authorship’, of ‘autobiography’ shall be taken to indicate the 
feminine’s challenge to (and possibly escape from) its status as a suppressed, subordinated 
concept. Autonymy, although originally a linguistic expression,3 shall be taken, in the context 
o f ‘HERstory’, in its literal sense o f‘self-nomination’, of telling one’s own story, with one’s 
own language. In this chapter I intend to examine (predominantly) Beauty and Sadness, a 
text in which the Kawabata reader is granted access to the perspective of a female character 
that is not transmitted (and translated) solely through the eyes, words, thoughts, experiences 
of infeminators. I shall consider the experience of (the female) Otoko as ‘self- 
communicated’ (without, however, forgetting the authorial infeminator’s continued 
presence); as more than a figment of a male protagonist’s imagination. ‘HERstory’ shall 
centre, therefore, upon conceptual processes of feminine self-naming.
Beauty and Sadness, I shall aim to demonstrate, permits the reader, in its presentation of 
feminine airtonymy, an experience of two (gendered) voices. The masculine, which is doubly 
evident as the voice of the male protagonist (Oki) and of the author himself, shall be termed 
androvocality and exogenous-androvocality, respectively: meaning simply, the ‘man-voice’ 
and the ‘man-voice-originating-from-the-outside’. The feminine, which I shall refer to as 
gynovocality, the ‘woman-voice’, occupies the space of the female protagonist (Otoko’s) 
stoiy. Her (silent) voice shall be explored through a consideration of concepts of language 
and silence, and related themes such as feminine fluidity, mobility and chaos, evident in 
thematic concerns such as lesbianism, painting, maternity, suicide and the body.
I shall begin my discussion of the ‘trilingual’ Beauty and Sadness with an interrogation of 
the masculine languages, which shall lead into a more extensive and expansive analysis 
o f‘HERstoricaT feminine vocalisation.
196
2 Masculine Vocalities
The infeminative text is the product of a male-sexed exogenous-androvocality, the 
authorial language (of Kawabata, MacDonald, Sacher-Masoch, Stoker) originating from a 
‘signed’ male. The exogenous-androvocal writer might be interpreted as the God of 
Language (permitted by his primacy in relation to the creation of the text, and by his 
maleness). His ‘divinity’, however, is not impervious. Language can fail to offer a flawlessly 
transparent medium for thought, instead impeding direct transmission with distracting and 
distorting superfluities, or infecting the visions it purports with its own invasive orders. 
Alternatively, its univocality can be perceived as indicative of its imperfection. Language 
that is minimal, economical, precise, resistant to ‘artificial’ embellishment might be 
understood as constituting an impoverished documentation of mechanical exchange; as being 
bound by restrictive formulae, governed by dormant and sterile imperatives, sustaining the 
‘morbid’ footholds of logic, space and time. (Beauty and Sadness, indeed, commences with a 
consideration of these latter ‘strictures’. However, what the initial sequence appears to take 
as its focus is the mobile rather than finite, the static -  Oki moves literally through both time 
and space, being situated in a vehicle that takes him towards the beginning of a new year. 
Nevertheless, the reader soon learns that Oki’s journey is not truly progressive: he is 
travelling to the past).
Kawabata, the exogenous-androvocal writer of Beauty and Sadness, affirms (according to 
my reading) the paradox of language, enabling both speaking and not speaking, constructing 
inviolable and irrefutable images and refusing to sustain the concept of a supremacy of 
words. He communicates univocality, but also conceptualises plurality. His God of 
Language is not the sole textual monarch, but might be understood as being accompanied by 
one of Silence. Kawabata’s exogenous-androvocality, in short, incorporates both andro- and 
gynovocalities. Kawabata’s ‘HERstorical’ infeminations transmit both pictures and words, 
absence along with presence, silence along with language.
In order for language to be fruitfully expanded, its capacities ameliorated, and for it to
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access the senses it normally neglects and by which it is neglected, it is not necessary that it 
be physically augmented. Kawabata would appear to promote this perspective. In Beauty and 
Sadness, Otoko “open[s] the dictionaiy to the character for ‘think’ ” (BS: 117). In that one 
word dwells “yearn for”, “be unable to forget”, and “be sad” (118) -  her whole experience 
communicated in one randomly selected word. The same might be said for the economy of 
expression presetted in the haiku poem,4 which transmits a plethora of possibilities, 
awakening usually disengaged senses. Haiku are about non-representation, about the refusal 
to perpetuate a myth of presence, conferring the something-which-cannot-be-directly- 
represented, the image which imparts a sense, an absent presence. Within this ascetic art, two 
disparate elements are joined in a perfect union: “poetry and sensation, spirit and matter, the 
Creator and the Created” (Blyth, 1963: 7), so that “meaning is sensation” (Blytli, 1963: 8). 
Haiku are spiritual and physical -  physical in that they regress to sensation; spiritual in that 
they progress to a state post-beauty, post-morality, post-thought (Blyth, 1963: 24). Haiku, in 
this way, intimate the paradox of Kawabatan exogenous-androvocality, the male language 
that speaks both andro- and gynovocally. Haiku dramatise very simply the concurrent 
existence of masculinity and femininity, of language and silence. Significantly, they would 
seem to privilege gynovocality. Physicality (in this case, the male ‘body’ that is language) is 
undermined: “In haiku the words are less important than the sensation.. .that gave birth to 
them”, asserts Blyth (1963: 25). “Silence”, he continues, “is deeper than speaking; from 
silence springs speaking, and returns to it” (Blyth, 1949: 244). Nevertheless, words are 
required if only for vehicular purposes: enabling the thought, the vision, the sensation to 
concretely be, in the form of the poem. Kawabata’s exogenous-androvocality, with its haiku- 
like extolment of the feminine ‘voice’, would serve to counter (to an extent) the destructive 
infeminative representations (the morternalisation, the teratologisation, the dysgenication) of 
his textual ‘secondary infeminators’.
What Kawabata’s exogenous-androvocal language allows, to summarise, is the potential 
for bi-vocality. Although, in itself, measured and manipulated, the authorial (exogenous-
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androvocal) voice deems two possibilities for ‘speech’ within Beauty and Sadness. One (and 
the first the reader encounters) is androvocality, the language of the male protagonist. This, 
in its privileged position as the initial voice, is concerned with the masculine word, with 
(phal)logos. The second is gynovocality: the sub-text of silence. When gynovocality is 
enabled, the suppressed thought and concealed text might be retrieved from the depths and 
made surface, palpable, validated and assimilated into interpretation. The secret knowledge 
outside knowledge, silenced by language, might be at last realised. The two languages 
transmuted through (the masculine) exogenous-androvocality are as divergent as the distinct 
approaches of the male and female protagonists to a shared act of copulation, whereby Oki’s 
meticulous calculated preparation co-exists with Otoko’s spontaneity (BS: 89). These 
languages are as contrary to one another as Otoko’s flowing stream of time is to Oki’s 
experience of stagnation (120). Mediated via the same space, the outcomes may greatly 
differ.
Gynovocality and androvocality correspond to the two ‘moments’ of haiku, with the 
feminine former finding identification with the abstract idea, and the masculine latter 
suggesting an affiliation with the concrete image for transmission. In this way, androvocality 
might be interpreted as text, in contrast with the pictorial nature of gynovocality, and both 
are communicated via the exogenous-androvocal ‘poet’. A brief example of a haiku-like 
operation might be illustrated thus: “[T]he warm crimson of the [train] rails had reminded 
[Oki] again of the past he had shared with Otoko” (20). First, exogenous-androvocal activity 
is evident: Kawabata vocalises Oki’s and Otoko’s lives. Second, and most significantly, a 
present, concrete, tangible, masculine image (the rails) transmits, in this example, an absent, 
insubstantial, abstract feminine (the memorial image of Otoko).5 That andro- and 
gynovocality are concurrent and co-dependent is further emphasised by Otoko’s intimation 
that “[i]f [Oki] had not written about it, perhaps that vision of herself would not have 
remained alive for so many years” (89). Without the masculine words, the feminine picture 
would have been denied existence. Likewise, without Otoko’s feminine silence (which Oki’s
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novel could be interpreted as being about) there would be no masculine writing. Whilst Oki’s 
language causes “[Otoko’s] past love [to] come back to life” (89), conversely, “[t]hanks to 
[the ‘silent’ Otoko]... [Oki] had experienced all the ways of making love” (89).
The masculine authorial (exogenous-androvocal) voice, like the writer of haiku, expresses 
a need to transcend language, so that a new ‘word’ (encompassing both andro- and 
gynovocalities) might be established.6 Kawabata’s sensitivity towards the language of haiku7 
(the poetry in which the void is foregrounded; in which sense is not subordinated to the 
sign)8 is evident in his own space-conscious voice. His writing would appear thus to 
negotiate between masculinity and femininity; to encompass both a loyalty towards the 
former (a position of order) and an impulse towards the latter (a position of chaos).9 
Kawabata’s language is pluralised, his perception of the feminine a ‘(Di) Vision’. His 
apparently measured, metronomic prose threatens to descend (or ascend) at any moment into 
discomposition and syncopation; into silence. What his ‘HERstorical’ activity intimates is 
the paradox of writing to escape the word, in accordance with Susan Sontag’s notion of  ^
silence as “the artist’s ultimate other-worldly gesture: by [which] he frees himself from 
servile bondage to the world, which appears as patron, client, consumer, antagonist, arbiter, 
and distorter of his work” (Sontag, 1969: 6). Sontag explicates that “silence” which comes 
with the end of language “is a metaphor for a cleansed, non-interfering vision” (Sontag,
1969: 16), which would serve also as a succinct description of haiku. In conclusion, the 
implication of writing the haiku/valorising the ‘silence’ is that ‘masculine language’ (of 
androvocalities) shall not be viewed in isolation. Despite the presentation of female 
characters always in ‘translation’, that is, their being communicated to the reader via a 
primary male mouth-piece (via Kawabatan exogenous-androvocality), they are permitted a 
degree of comparative presence. The female Otoko, therefore, continues to live even after 
her relationship with the male Oki, having authored for herself an existence where, for 
example, painting supplants writing, where lesbianism supplants heterosexuality. The male 
Taichiro, on the other hand, does not continue to live after his relationship with the female
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Keiko, who determines a script that demands his death and her survival. Exogenous- 
androvocality, thus, permits the text’s female characters to occupy a space reserved for 
autonymisation; a space in which an element of conceptual independence from male 
authority might be attained.
Even before the reader enters into the domain of feminine language (that is, Otoko’s 
story), gynovocality and androvocality are destined to meet. One point of reference for this 
collation is on the matter of time. The concept of time is particularly pertinent to a discussion 
of fluidity (which is concerned with matters of mobility and stasis, and which I shortly 
intend to illustrate as a gendered concern).10 Oki remains permanently and morbidly aware of 
time’s limitations, of its irrefutable adherence to the chronological imperative which imposes 
a static regularity upon duration. Time can be dangerous. It sustains duality and mortality. It 
means either life or death. Symmetrically and diametrically opposed archetypes such as these 
may struggle to maintain their occupation of positions of intrinsic difference, but one is 
easily transmuted into the other. Life becomes death (and even vice versa, where the ‘dead’ 
are revived in acts of commemoration or repetition) in time.
The opening sequence of Beauty and Sadness is itself concerned with this theme. Oki 
observes how “[t]he low armchairs on his side of the car did not swivel” (BS: 5), whilst a 
seat opposite is in motion. Watching the (distanced, removed, impossible) movement of this 
other chair causes him to “feel lonely” (5), and prompts his thoughts to return to the past. He 
recalls the vital motion of Otoko, now lost to him. He considers the passage of time, which 
has transmogrified a fulfilling ‘present’ into a past lost to him. He recollects the motion of 
spatial separation, whereby Otoko was physically removed from his life. The reader first 
encounters Kawabata’s male protagonist on a journey towards New Year’s Eve, at which 
point his feelings of loss become most acute. New Year’s Eve means not only the sadness of 
losing “the departing year” (6), of moving forward in time, but also of re-visiting the past 
(meeting with Otoko again), dragging lost time into the present.
Oki begins in the “observation car of the Kyoto express” (5, emphasis added), seated
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alone, watching. This continued actual observation of the revolving chair becomes a covert 
observation of Otoko. “He could not take his eyes from it” (5), as he could not turn his gaze 
away from the past. (This recalls Shimamura’s integration of past and future, as he considers 
the Komako of his memory whilst anticipating their next meeting. Shimamyra also travels 
through not only time but space, his train journey taking him between two realms [S'C]). Oki 
perhaps fears that, like the chair, which is the only one to be “revolving with the movement 
of the train” (BS: 5), he might by now occupy a different rhythm from Otoko. She has never 
tried to communicate with him since moving away (introducing, from the outset, the theme 
of silence) and although he has watched her life from afar (introducing another key 
Kawabatan ‘revision’: the theme of voyeurism) to know her occupation and marital status, 
he does not know whether she has moved with time (the chair with the train) or has been, 
like him, paralysed, immobile.
Oki, the writer of autobiography, the writer of his own life -  but perhaps not the owner of 
it -  is concerned with linear verbal experience, to the extent that he is effectively enslaved 
(like so many other Kawabatan infeminators) to the past. He admits to never having “written 
an ‘abstract’ novel” (23), and his language, his medium of literary creation, driven by an 
“attitude” described as “straightforward” (24), is accordingly bound up in the militant 
workings of time. Oki is trapped. Chronological logic would appear to have autocracy over 
his language, binding him to a lost body. He is no longer the young(er) man who loved the 
‘girl of sixteen’ because time has passed. There is no ‘girl of sixteen’. There is no love affair. 
They are, as he admits, separated by “a gulf of many years” (8). And time is apparently (at 
least, in a tangible, physical sense) irredeemable. He seeks endings, but they have already 
happened. His language, the language that captured his young body and the body of the 
young Otoko, needed to be singular, .finite, static. It had to deny the authority of time. He 
could not permit multiplicity, processual movement, or alternative possibility. Verbal 
controls were, it appeared, empowering. They granted him absolute authority.
Thus, the story ends: Oki and Otoko become separated, and Oki immediately writes his 
novel, the words of his lover (“you ought to be more yourself’ [25]), thereby contributing to
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the compulsion. Time, though having propelled the stoiy from beginning to end, has had no 
apparent further bearings on Oki’s world. That is, until he finds the story written. After his 
novel has been completed, the passing of each year becomes “a moving experience” (6) -  
“moving” both literally, separating him from the past, and emotionally. “Some years that 
emotion was violent or painful. Sometimes he was racked by sorrow and regret” (6). Oki 
becomes fearful of time and seeks to render it unwritten and unwritable. Time, as such, could 
be anachronised, so that the analepsis and the prolepsis are undifferentiated; so that 
flashbacks and flashforwards collide, conflate, melt, merge, metamorphose; so that 
tomorrow and yesterday can and will never happen. Past, the dimension of memory and 
origin, and Future, the sphere of potentiality, could be denied. Time, in this sense, is no 
longer fixed, but is granted a delinearity, a circularity. Time (as in ‘House of the Sleeping 
Beauties’) becomes a non-linear structure with Past and Future incestuously involved in a 
complex Present. Oki’s ‘time’ causes him to experience today the sensation that “[e]vents of 
over twenty years ago were more alive to him than those of yesterday” (15); to identify in the 
Kyoto of his present a false past significance (“he had never lived here”, yet is “nostalgic” 
[15]) and an irrefutable future potential (his plans to re-member the Kyotoite, Otoko).
Time is also a concern for Otoko who appears to express a pathological perspective of it, 
interpreting the image of the child as a symbol of senility, decrepitude and decay. Otoko’s 
child died at birth; was delivered into life and death simultaneously. She contemplates how 
to revive the baby as (timeless) art. “And how was she to paint the wizened body of a 
premature baby?” (122, emphases added). Creation and degeneration come to be 
conceptualised as concurrent, as the bi-polarity of life and death is contested. Death, like life, 
is a falling, its embodiment, the cadaver, self-evident of its own origination from the Latin 
cadere, ‘to fall’.
In Beauty and Sadness, Kawabata distinguishes between two ‘times’, a personal inner time 
and an external collective time.11 Both, he asserts, can be understood as fluid, but the flow
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can be in different directions. Whilst our common experience of time moves linearily 
forward, individual temporality is omni-directional:
Time passed. But time flows in many streams. Like a river, an inner 
stream of time will flow rapidly at some places and sluggishly at others, 
or perhaps even stand hopelessly stagnant. Cosmic time is the same for 
everyone, but human time differs with each person. Time flows in the same 
way for all human beings; every human being flows through time in a 
different way. (120)12
Time, as a personal construct, progresses, regresses, or even stagnates. Although both ‘times’ 
are fluid, acting, moving, they are also rigid, inflexible, impossible to manipulate in a chosen 
direction. Therefore, synchronism between two people’s time-experience is impossible: 
“Even if two people were lovers, their streams of time would never be the same” (120). 
“Cosmic time” totalling some twenty years has passed for Otoko, but Oki remains with her. 
She wonders whether her inner time has arrested or whether it has indeed flown, carrying her 
memories along with it. For Oki, too, cosmic time (“a gulf of many years” [8]) has separated 
him from Otoko, yet his inner time has borne her with him. Both Oki and Otoko endeavour 
to escape the negative conditions imposed by time. He, through his writing, condemns her to 
a permanent girlhood -  she is the subject of his best-selling novel, A Girl o f Sixteen. She, 
through her painting, condemns him (indirectly) to the same time and space -  she is 
compelled to paint her (and Oki’s) dead baby: a “picture [which] was to symbolize” not only 
“herself surviving all these years” but also “the beauty and sadness of her loVe for Oki”
(121). Time is silent (the words, the paint), but it also silences. Gravestones, therefore, “worn 
out of shape by time” become “mute” (138).
Taichiro, the son of Oki, studies tombs; the past. The past has sustained his present, the 
“old memory” (133) supporting the Oki family, paying for his education, his sister’s 
wedding, his mother’s pampering. Taichiro is also sustained as past by Otoko. She forbids 
Keiko (her female lover) to meet with him, endeavouring to keep her separate from the past. 
Keiko is the present. Her paintings speak youth, her current and permanent state -  “a tea 
field swelling with youth” (56); a “plum blossom [which] throbbed with the youthful
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emotions of the painter” (34). Keiko refuses Otoko’s request: ‘H e has no connection with 
you. It’s just that he’s Mr Oki’s son -  he isn’t your child” (127). Taichiro is sustained, 
furthermore, as past by his father. “He had originally wanted to study ‘modem literature’ -  
Japanese literature since Meiji -  but because his father objected he was specializing in the 
Kamakura and Muromachi periods” (37). His father’s past (the affair that produced a 
successful, [semi-]autobiographical novel) pays for Taichiro’s own transportation to the past. 
But this is a safe past, a past of silent memorials, of tombs which cease to re-member (“there 
comes a time when a tombstone loses its meaning” [138]), a past where death has reclaimed 
order.
Keiko (a vengeful ‘child’ who competes with Taichiro for the ‘mother’, Otoko) leads him 
away from this security. She accompanies him to a monument he is studying. “Right in front 
of your precious tombstone”, she entices, “Why don’t you give me some fond memories of 
it?” (138, emphasis in original). He holds her. She wins. “I’ll always remember being in your 
arms in front of an old tomb on a morning like this” (139). Taichiro concedes: “[Tjhey’re 
built for memories, aren’t they?” (140). Keiko succeeds in creating something new, and 
thereby frees herself, in a sense, from heteronymising binds.
Keiko, herself young, is obsessed with Otoko’s history, with a past to which she can never 
belong. Otoko helps sustain this by agreeing to paint her portrait and using as inspiration “a 
number of sketches of her dead baby” (46). Despite Keiko’s youthful exuberance and 
vitality, “[n]ow that [she] had asked to be painted, Otoko thought of her old sketches for The 
Ascension o f an InfanF (47). Otoko decides to use death in order to portray life. Her art itself 
is an effective means of capturing the vital and transmuting it to inanimacy (unlike the young 
Keiko, suspended in an eternal presence, whose painting sustains the motions of life, giving 
“no impression of being a static decorative design” [34]). Also connecting life with death, 
Otoko paints her deceased mother but bestows on her a restored youth (“Her mother looked 
young and beautiful in it, even younger than herself’ [47]). This painting, unlike her others, 
is described in animate terms: “The picture breathed with her” (48). Otoko realises that she
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has, in fact, composed a self-portrait: “It was out of longing that Otoko had painted her 
mother as young and beautiful, but perhaps there was an element of self-love there as 
well.. .Perhaps she was actually portraying herself’ (122-3). Otoko, bound to the past, to the 
death that is loss (loss of mother, loss of child, loss of lover), attempts to revivify herself. 
She takes a youthful lover from whom to perhaps vampirically feed (she was denied the 
opportunity to be the mother who nourishes her child, thus becomes the mother who 
nourishes herself from her child). “Even if she had been led into her infatuation with her 
pupil Keiko, so much younger and of her own sex”, she ponders, “was that not another form 
of infatuation with herself?” (123) Otoko relies upon Keiko as food-source, embodying a 
living death (or undead?) status as a childless, impotent mother. Keiko is not a virgin, yet 
Otoko fantasises her as one (rendering her perhaps akin to Eguchi’s “virgin prostitute[s]” 
[‘HSB’: 43]), desiring to portray her “as a Buddhist Holy Virgin” (BS: 123). In this, she 
renders Keiko her dead baby girl, a non-sexual (and never-sexual) being, who entered death 
before life could taint her, “a kind of spirit child, a child who had never entered the world of 
human beings” (123).13 (Keiko’s own birth coincided approximately with that of Otoko’s 
[lost] baby’s, which assists the seamlessness of her substitution). Furthermore, she 
acknowledges that this portrayal bears another testament to her own narcissism: “Had Otoko 
not wanted to create a pure, lovely image of herself?” (123)14 Otoko, acutely aware of her 
own mortality, paints herself into a child. She is both immortalised and mortalised, but her 
immortality is what is ironically responsible for her delivery into mortality. She realises that 
“the girl of sixteen who loved Oki would always exist within her, never to grow up” (123), 
yet this immortalising fact also condemns her to loss. She is sentenced to carry with her an 
eternal burden: “Otoko still loved Oki, her baby, and her mother.. .and these three still lived 
within her” (123). She cannot herself live, but relies upon Keiko as a medium between life 
and death. Keiko becomes her living baby, her baby restored to life: the ascending infant. 
Self-portraits, which fix one in time, are transformed into portraits of ‘others’ -  her mother’s 
face, too young (and too alive) to be Otoko’s own image, becomes Keiko’s. Her dead love,
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the man who left her, Oki, is replaced by the living love, Keiko. Otoko writes Keiko as 
Otoko-without-death. Their relationship parallels that which she enjoyed with Oki. At 
fifteen, she had promised her older lover that she would die for him. Keiko, becoming the 
young girl infatuated, now speaks the same language: “As long as I have you I’m not afraid. 
How do you suppose I’d paint if I lost you? Maybe I’d give up my painting -  and my life” 
(44). Otoko sends her to see Oki on her behalf. “Why did you have me go to meet Mr 
Oki...?” Otoko replies, “[bjecause you’re young and pretty” (44, emphasis added). She 
confesses that she “was afraid he’d be disillusioned” (45) as time has eroded her beauty and 
youth. Keiko becomes the illusion Otoko requires if she is to sustain any grip pn life. Living 
matter, it appears, is bom but synchronously dies, diminished from potency into impotency 
at the very instant of conception.
Oki’s written words are death. He himself laments “the decay of language” (99). Words, 
he identifies, “have only a short life, and even if they survive they’re dated -  like the novels 
we write” (99). When Oki writes his novel, committing the transgression of ‘telling’ in his 
communication of the private experience of love, he condemns Otoko to this ‘death’ to 
which he refers. In his novel he literally speaks for her, instead of her, so that she need not 
and cannot. This constitutes a metaphoric sealing of her orifices -  a feminine infibulation.
But this is not to be a permanent condition because he seeks out his sealed object years later 
-  an act which allows the reader to finally encounter and experience the female perspective. 
Oki, therefore, metaphorically sews Otoko’s mouth, only to break the seal. This act is one of 
violence as he penetrates her life, a life in which he is not certain of having a place, a life in 
which his position (as lover) has indeed been replaced. He decides to go to Kyoto. There, he 
considers “te!ephon[ing] her the next day, if not that night, or drop[ping] in at her house” (9). 
The means and time of communication are controlled entirely by Oki and there is an inherent 
threat in his contemplation. He knows where she lives. When he is ready for an encounter he 
shall instigate one. Otoko is oblivious to the fact that she has been observed by him over the 
years. “Oki had come across a photograph of her in an art magazine” (8); he had vicariously 
entered her home, her private space; he has followed her career, her life, remaining himself
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unseen. Oki finally decides “to send her a special-delivery letter” (9) in order to implement 
his desired meeting. He shall send her his words, a testament to his (continued) authority.15 
The sub-text of this letter must be the information that he is still the writer; the declaration 
that as once he wrote her story, so shall he still; that as language once was his possession, so 
it remains as such. Oki, however, finds this particular letter impossible to write, finding 
himself “staring perplexedly at a blank sheet of [paper]” (9). Otoko’s story is now of her 
own telling and shall no longer be simply mediated through a masculine voice. Oki does not 
know this. He seeks reassurance of his possession of language and of Otoko’s possession of 
silence. He telephones her, and finds the distinctions to be satisfactorily reaffirmed:
‘I came to hear the New Year’s Eve bells in Kyoto.. .Won’t you listen 
to them with me?’
She made no reply, even when he repeated his question. Probably she 
was too surprised to know what to say.
‘Did you come alone?’ she asked, after a long pause.
‘Yes. Yes, I’m alone.’
Again Otoko was silent.
‘I’m going back New Year’s morning - 1 just wanted to hear the bells toll 
out the old year with you.. .How many years is it since the last time we 
met?... ’
There was no answer. (14-15, emphases added)
Oki telephones Otoko with the knowledge that she will be stunned into silence (“too 
surprised to know what to say”). To have sent a letter would have granted her the 
opportunity to arm herself with empowering language. To have sent a letter would have 
equipped her with time. Telephoning enables Oki to utilise time to his advantage: to enforce 
a more immediate response from Otoko; to close more effectively the space that divides 
them.
Otoko responds favourably to his request, agreeing to meet, but sets the terms herself, 
asserting control over all the arrangements and conditions involved. “ ‘May I call for you 
tomorrow?’ ‘No don’t,’ Otoko said a little hastily. ‘I’ll come for you... [L]et’s say around 
nine, at your hotel. I’ll make a reservation somewhere’ ” (15, emphasis in original). Oki fails 
to read this as perhaps indicative of her having grown into language, into autonomy and,
208
more significantly, into autonymy. He “had hoped for a leisurely dinner with her, but nine 
o’clock would be after dinner” (15), yet Oki does not argue. Otoko’s domination of the 
meeting arrangements serves, ironically, to only remind him of the girl he once loved, the 
child-Otoko, the Otoko who once posited herself at his mercy, claiming she would die for 
him (“I’d gladly give my life for yours, anytime” [118]). The adult Otoko hesitates, no 
longer the impulsive child who would “throw [her]self forward to shield [Oki], without even 
thinking” (118, emphasis added). Nevertheless, for Oki, “[t]he Otoko of his old memories 
had come to life again” (15). When they finally meet, Otoko stands no longer alone, no 
more the subservient, submissive, impressionable (that is, waiting to be shaped, sculpted, 
forged by the masculine hand) young girl. She surrounds herself with a circle of women that 
renders the male ‘intruder’ the outsider, the ‘other’. Furthermore, she admits that she has 
selected them on the basis of age (“I thought it might be pleasanter with young people” [17]), 
which serves to clarify her position as adult. She is an older woman within a circle of “very 
young” (17) women. Her companions represent her past, the Otoko that was, the Otoko that 
Oki knew, the Otoko that is no more. Her selection of young females operates as a visual 
statement, communicating her perspective on the passage of time. Otoko, as I have asserted, 
considers that “time flows in many streams... [and] differs with each person” (120), so that 
“[e]ven if two people were lovers, their Streams of time would never be the same” (120). 
Thus, Oki’s re-experience of her as the ‘girl of sixteen’ is not necessarily an accurate reading 
of her current and post-relationship self. Indeed, the inability to acknowledge change, 
movement, and even loss is what Otoko considers to be a condition of “stagnation]” (120).
Oki, nevertheless, continues his project of feminine heteronymisation even beyond the 
closing pages of his Otoko novel. He judges that his actions have “spoiled her life”; have 
“robbed her of every chance for happiness” (15); have sustained a continued forceful and 
painful impact upon her current existence. The “vividness” of his recollection of “[t]he 
Otoko of his memories [to be] the most passionate woman he had ever known” (15) serves to 
grant him ‘evidence’ of their continued bond. Thus, even though he enables Otoko’s physical 
entry into the text, as opposed to permitting her solely to occupy his novel, his memories, his
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mind, and allowing her ‘being’ only through his voice, Oki still maintains authority. Even 
her life ‘in-between’, her life without Oki’s concrete presence, must be written by him. “[I]t 
was a shock to learn that Otoko had become a painter.. .but her accomplishment gave him 
keen pleasure. When he came across one of her paintings in a gallery his heart leaped” (32). 
Her achievements are translated into his own as he expresses a vicarious sense of pride and 
victory at “overcom[ing]” (32) hypothetical experiences not his own. Oki’s instant response 
to discovering her painting is to take possession of it -  “He bought it immediately” (32) -  an 
act of territorialisation, of reclamation.
Both prior to and immediately following their meeting, Otoko seems to Oki to be always 
already-written. She begins in a position of silence (before the telephone call), he forces her 
into vocality (during the telephone call; during the meeting at Kyoto), and she is returned to 
silence (when Oki goes home to Kamakura). This silencing might be interpreted, as I have 
already implied, as a metaphoric repetition of the Sadean sewing torture of female 
inflbulation/penetration. In Justine, ou les Malhevrs de la Vertu,16 the vagina is stitched in 
order to reinstate the (already violated) victim as a virgin, so that the degrading defloration 
might never end. The infibulated female is ripped, sewn, ripped, sewn, ripped, according to 
her male torturer’s authorisation, thus is maintained within the masculine sphere of desire 
which founds itself on woman-as-object imperatives.
In his essay, ‘Sade: or Text as Fantasy’, Michael Riffaterre examines Barthes’ 
interpretation of the Sadean sewing torture, as postulated in the latter’s Sade, Fourier, 
Loyola. Barthes questions the link between sewing, which seals up lack, and castration, 
which removes in order to create lack. “How could there be an equivalence”, he asks, 
“between sewing (which always means sewing up again, making, mending) and mutilating, 
amputating cutting off, making an empty spot?” (Barthes, cited in Riffaterre, 1989: 168, 
emphasis in original). The connection, he purports, is that this particular mode of torture 
conducts an inversion of castration, serving to negate the negative: a solecismic enterprise 
which elucidates a response of shock. Riffaterre, on the other hand, casts doubt on the
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validity of this analysis, asserting instead that:
The whole effectiveness of the text rests upon a purely verbal Scandal, 
and the partial destruction of the semantic components of the word sewing.
One of the oppositions that define its meaning is inanimate vs animate. In 
relation to sewing, only an inanimate fabric is grammatical. You don’t sew 
a living body. With one proviso: you do sew up a body if you are restoring the 
grammaticality of the animate fabric... Conversely, natural apertures are 
grammatical in the world of words and closing them up is not. This torture 
gives the reader a jolt because its verbal representation is doubly 
non-grammatical. (Riffaterre, 1989: 169, emphases in original)
It is not secondary castration that outrages the reader, Riffaterre argues, but linguistic 
impropriety. Castration is a desire that Barthes merely projects onto the text; a fantasy that 
he grafts on top of true meaning, and that is disputed by the factual evidence. The stitches, 
for example, are not a permanent imposition, but are sewn in order to be broken: to reveal 
again the vaginal ‘wound’ for male penetration.
In Beauty and Sadness, overt shock-tactics are avoided. This is not, however, simply 
because there is no actual representation of physical violence involving the sewing/tearing of 
female flesh. Rather, it is due to the fact that, at this moment in the text, only one 
perspective, that of the heteronymising male narrator, is permitted. Riffaterre discusses the 
horror connected not to gender but to the abuse of ‘sewing’, with regard to animacy and to 
absence: the living body should not be holed, and the hole should not be wholed. The 
metaphoric infibulation-penetration-infibulation in Beauty and Sadness derives its potency 
from the gendering of language and silence. When Oki controls the initial narrative, Otoko is 
femininely silenced (contained in his past, a memory). When he chooses to do so, Oki 
penetrates this silence with his masculine language (summoning her to the present). Again, 
when he chooses, Oki re-confers her to silence (re-asserting control over the narration of her 
story, returning her to memory). Although an obviously less apparent method of torture than 
in Sade, the ‘sealing of orifices’ in Beauty and Sadness is a similarly reversible process. It 
consists of an infibulation (a fusion in which contraries are cauterised, conjoined, seemingly 
healed), followed by a defibulation (whereby seals and silences are broken), and concluding
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with another infibulation.
Oki communicates, in a certain sense, a desire for permanence, compelled by “a defiant 
wish” (BS: 6) to meet with Otoko and cdnflrm that they had never really separated; to 
confirm that time has not really passed and, indeed, does not pass. His yearning for 
permanence enables him to read, within the “first glance” they share in twenty-four years, 
the ‘fact’ that he is “still living within her” (17);17 to sustain a belief in the “continuing life of 
the novel” (32). But the implementation of this desire, this re-affirmation of impenetrable, 
inextricable union through physical reunion, threatens the stability that the condition of 
permanence demands. Oki’s longing to restore must interfere with his desire to sustain ‘his’ 
story as told, as complete. The very fact that he calls a meeting with Otoko serves to 
substantiate the claim that the past requires a re-visitation: the past is therefore riot ever­
present, not contained in an all-encompassing ‘now’. If Otoko is truly with him and he with 
her then such movement is unnecessary. The language of re-visitation, repetition becomes 
obsolete. But Oki simply does not know. He has questions without answers. “When Otoko 
moved to Kyoto with her mother, Oki was sure they had parted. Yet had they, really?”; “But 
what had she thought of him as she spent all those lonely years?” (15). Oki realises that he 
might not contain the answers to these questions within himself; that, in actuality, “he [does] 
not know how she might have changed” (8). This knowledge, however, is not enough to 
prevent him from continuing in his efforts to tell her story.
When they part, following their reuriion, he eats rice balls she has prepared for him, and 
tastes within them “a woman’s emotions” (21). He perceives a perhaps absent, even 
impossible sub-text to his supper. Otoko has, after all, made every effort to avoid a direct 
confrontation with Oki, shielding herself from “being alone with him” (19) with constant 
accompaniment. Nevertheless, in her cooking he detects a coded confinriation. “Chewing the 
little bite-sized rice balls, he could feel her forgiveness in his very tongue and teeth. No, it 
was not forgiveness, it was love. Surely it was a love that still lived deep within her” (21). 
Accordingly, the rice tastes “[djelicious.. .seasoned exactly right, neither too salty nor too 
bland” (22) -  the rice tells the correct story, delivering the precise hungered-for resolution;
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satisfying his own personal taste requirement. Tasting Otoko in the food, Oki’s satisfaction 
also comes perhaps from the notion that he is performing a cleansing ritual, an ablution and 
absolution of past transgressions. “No doubt”, he muses, “Otoko herself had made them [the 
rice-balls] for the man who had long ago destroyed her girlhood” (21). Having once 
devastated her chastity, Oki now ‘destroys’ (through eating) her soiled body, getting rid of 
the evidence of his ‘crime’ once and for all.
The meal, which appears to Oki to continue (positively) with the narration of Otoko’s 
story, does not even come directly from Otoko’s hand. Rather, it is mediated through her 
pupil’s. For Oki, Keiko becomes the intercessor between Otoko and himself, communicating 
clandestine reassurances of a reciprocated love, in accordance with the invisible ‘stream’ that 
apparently continues to connect them. The body of Keiko is suppressed from becoming the 
source of love in itself as Oki cannot allow the recognition of a ‘replacement’ (which would 
prove fatal for his desired state of ‘permanence’). First in the rice balls (which permit a 
metaphoric ingestion, a cannibalistic consumption of her body) and later in the art Keiko 
gives to him, Oki sees evidence of Otoko’s love (a testament to Otoko’s constancy; to her 
affirmation of permanence; to her defiance of time). Oki, requiring a state of permanence, 
the substantiation of his hope that there still exists a reciprocated desire, a “current of 
feeling... flow[ing] back and forth between them” (19), must risk permanence. Failing to be 
convinced beyond doubt that ‘History’ (that is, his version of their shared history) is a 
factual account (he admits to having embellished their shared experience with “imaginative 
and fictional touches of his own, and a certain idealization” [24]), he concedes that Otoko is 
perhaps more than solely the product of his projection. Oki admits that there are two Otokos 
who may or may npt be the same person. “[W]ho could say which was the real Otoko”, he 
deliberates, “the one he had described, or the one she might have created in telling her own 
story?” (24) Instigating a meeting threatens to reveal the existence of one, and to deny and 
obliterate the presence of the other. Both Otokos, according to Oki’s definition, are fictions, 
however, the former, the Otoko of ‘HIStory’, is the product of a safe feminine heteronymy,
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whilst the latter threatens to be a counter-representation of feminine autonymy. He stands to 
lose everything (his control of language and of time) if the Otoko of ‘HERstory’ prevails. 
However, as he departs from Kyoto, eating the rice cakes which support the unchanging, 
eternal, atemporal love he has asserted in language, he is satisfied that the outcome was in 
his favour. Language and time are still masculinely vocalised.
Masculine language might be understood as holding as its ideal the goal of definition. This 
search for definition expresses a desire for endings, for closure: de/zmtion, conclusion, 
resolution, satisfaction, satiation. The establishment of the definite is what the regime of 
patriarchy perceives as conducive to order. When Kawabata, however, writes the masculine 
and the feminine, as he does in his exogenous-androvocalisation of Beauty and Sadness, 
definition comes to signify more than endings. Not only constituting the key to eternal 
suture, to final infibulation, to the denouement implicated in the last word of language, to the 
fin  of negation, nothingness and non-being, ‘definition’ is permitted to signify the very 
opposite. ‘Definition’, with its ‘de-’ prefix, connotes also its undoing: intimating, instead of 
closure, unfinished business, wherein infinite replaces finite, multiplicity replaces 
homogeneity. To write with a mind to define (in one way or another) will, therefore, 
automatically mean to valorise conflict, to affirm chaotic antagonism.
Kawabata’s description, in Beauty and Sadness, of a “stone landscape” (64) intimates a 
textual example of such contradictory compounding of cavity and completion, his conflicting 
conjugation of the palpable and the imperceptible, an errant union that operates to constitute 
a presence of absence.18 The stone garden is a “human composition” (67), art which mimics 
life, seeming as though “the stones.. .had always been there” (67), yet simultaneously 
communicating an unnatural randomness. Both Keiko and Otoko endeavour to paint it, but 
“couldn’t even attempt it realistically” (65) as “[a]ll stone compositions are abstract” (65). 
The stone garden, although aping nature, also defies it: “Trees grow and die, storms ravage 
it, and the like. Though probably the stone arrangements haven’t changed much” (69). The 
garden changes, the stones do not, so that presence and absence occupy the same space.
Even mountains can be transformed into hollows, perforations, geographical gashes in the
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landscape -  coveted by tourists* then rejected when granted them:
Two middle-aged American couples came back from the dining-car 
and, as soon as they could see Mt Fuji, past Numazu, stood at the 
windows eagerly taking photographs. By the time Fuji was completely 
visible.. .they seemed tired of photographing and had turned their backs 
to it. (7)
Kawabata’s natural world is characterised with a fickle impermanence, a desire for being 
that is supplanted, in the same breath, with its very opposite. Furthermore, ‘nothing’ attracts 
more ‘nothing’ -  ‘nothingness’ is magnetically lured towards its own kind, so that the 
emptiness is effectively repleted by more emptiness, chasmic nullity is satiated by the 
injection of another vacancy. Drawn to the empty spaces are Kawabata’s (male) ‘heroes’, 
seeking fulfilment in spaces of lack. In ‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’, for example, 
Eguchi is likened to the dead Fukura (who had himself once sought to locate satisfaction 
from the “nothing[nessj” [‘HSB’: 44] of sleeping girls). “Fukura was like this, you know”, 
his friend Kiga warns. “You’d better be careful yourself’ (‘HSB’: 84). Eguchi, however, still 
determines to repeat the actions of the absent man, even expressing a desire to communicate 
with his ghost. “The ghost should be coming out one of these nights”, he is informed by the 
proprietess. “I’d like to have a good talk with it...I have a ghost here inside me” (‘HSB’: 85), 
he responds. In Snow Country, Shimamura, due to his aversion to reality, is also drawn to 
emptiness, as exemplified by his attraction to mountaineering. “[H]e looked upon mountain 
climbing as almost a model of wasted effort. For that very reason it pulled at him with the 
attraction of the unreal” (SC: 112). In The Sound o f the Mountain, Shingo, in his continuing 
“boyhood yearning for [Yasuko’s] sister”, sustains within himself the nothingness of “an old 
wound” (SM: 41, emphasis added). Gimpei, in The Lake, is keen to inhabit the literal hollow 
of ditches. As well as spending his youth in hiding, waiting to “aveng[e] his [supposedly 
murdered] father” (TL: 95), he later occupies “the ditch between the tree-lined sidewalk and 
the aristocrat’s mansion” (TL: 113), immersing himself in death (“last year’s decaying 
leaves” [TL: 113]), whilst awaiting (the unattainable) Machie. He recalls, furthermore, a box
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of kittens he once found “at the bottom of [a] ditch” {TL: 115). Gimpei did not remove them 
from their grave (despite acknowledging that “they would die of hunger” [TL: 115]). Rather, 
he conceptualised himself as embedded in the hole: “He tried to identify with the kittens and 
stayed on to listen to their wailing” {TL: 115).
In Beauty and Sadness, Oki endeavours to record “vanishing beauty” {BS: 103), which he 
believes “could be recaptured by a writer and made into a moving work of art” (103). The 
concept of recapturing testifies to loss. Oki, in a language that is “a concrete, realistic mode 
of expression” (23-24), in a language of (patriarchal) ‘stone’, endeavours to re-cultivate the 
transient, irredeemable ‘garden’. His “straightforward” (24) prose (a phallic presence) seeks 
to re-member a feminine absence, “to bring to life his impression of [Otoko’s] face” (24). 
Yet Oki, in his reconstruction of a “long past tragic love” (31) through equal parts memory 
and idealisation, succeeds only in recounting “not Otoko’s own story, [but]...something he 
had written” (24). Oki anticipates snaring the irretrievable, to patriarchally (even paternally) 
impose a condition of static (words-on-a-page) presence to a fluid, evasive (spent emotion, 
past memory) absence, purely because it refutes him. It is the frustration of desire, and not 
the satisfaction of it, which he seems inevitably to seek.
Oki observes, for example, (albeit from within the safe permanence of his study) the 
changing face of nature. His garden contains a small, unidentified, flowering, wild plant, “so 
close to his window that he often thought he would like to take one [flower] in his hand and 
study it” (38). However, “[h]e had never yet gone to pick one, [which].. .only seemed to 
increase his love for [them]” (38). Oki detects the “barely notice[able]” (38) flowers which 
seem to have no special function (“they could hardly be familiar harbingers of spring [38]), 
but refrains from detaching one from the totality of its surroundings. The picked flower, like 
the written word, threatens to descend into nothingness. The language kept silent and the 
flower kept an unsatiated desire have the potential for a greater -  because transcendent -  
potency.
To summarise masculine vocality, it might be sufficient to state that Kawabata’s male
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protagonist in Beauty and Sadness is simply (andro-)vocal. He utilises a language with a 
strict logical design -  a language which shares similarities with exogenous-androvocality 
(although not its interest perhaps in m&mtaining feminine along with masculine ‘speech’). 
Oki, in Beauty and Sadness, is granted the written word, which he refuses to allow to 
diminish into self-scorned “sentimentality]” (103), instead favouring “realisjm]” (23). 
Kawabata’s male characters are generally denied interactive communication. They might be 
allowed to speak, but the conversational direction is one way. Kawabata’s females, however, 
are most often silent/silenced (not only Otoko but, for example, Eguchi’s ‘sleeping 
beauties’). In Beauty and Sadness, Otoko aspires, in many ways, to a concatenation with this 
male unidirectional voice. She spends two decades alone, ‘speaking’ to an unresponsive 
canvas. Her paintings are static, unlike the life-infused creations of her student. Keiko, 
however, as her teacher’s connection to life (a fact I have already established), enforces 
interlocution. She paints (learning from the language of Otoko) and gives these works/words 
to Oki.19 Even though they are not emitted from Otoko’s own hand/mouth, Oki recognises 
this ‘exchange’ as communication. Keiko paints, for example, a plum tree that existed in the 
memories of both Otoko and Oki.20 “As he looked at the painting Oki thought of the old 
plum tree in his garden.. .No doubt [Keiko] had heard about the tree from Otoko... She had 
remembered -  and told her pupil. Had she also confessed her old love?” (34-5) From this 
painting, composed by another hand, Oki believes that he is in receipt of Otoko’s continued 
devotion (36).
This non-communicative aspect of masculine vocality would appear to render it 
comparable with silent feminine vocality. Oki is unable to make a conscious, visible, 
evident, vocal commitment to Otoko. After the loss of her baby, a suicide attempt and a 
period of hospitalisation in a psychiatric ward, her mother approaches Oki with a request. 
“Won’t you please many her?” (22). Oki responds: “I’ve been thinking about that” (22) -  
then says no more. He has already committed himself to her, silently, with his body. Oki 
does not resist communication with the female when it is unidirectional, when the female is 
unresponsive, absent from her ‘dangerous’ body. When she is unconscious from her
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overdose he stays at her side, “wip[ing\ away the ugly discharge oozing between [her 
thighs]” (18, emphasis added), endeavouring to erase the guilt of having violated her body. 
Alone with her inanimate 'corpse’, “he swore to himself that he would save her, that he 
would never part from her, come what might” (18, emphasis added).
The androvocal Oki’s silence is one not of creation but of regulation, manufactured in 
order to assert his masculine primacy. Due to his non-communicative, unidirectional • 
expression, his silence goes unread. Feminine silence, on the other hand, might be 
interpreted as instigating the action of the text: Oki travels to Kyoto, after all, for the purpose 
of reading the body of a silent woman; he requests Keiko’s paintings to locate in them the 
body of a silent woman.
3 Feminine Vocalities
Silence, as I have suggested, can lead to gynovocal inclusion within masculine-dominated 
discourse (the trinity of gyno-, andro- and exogenous-andro- vocalities being clearly 
weighted in favour of masculinity). Gynovocality, in Beauty and Sadness, can be explored 
through several distinct yet intimately connected themes. These concerns (of fluidity, chaos, 
the body, painting, maternity, homosexuality, suicide) might all be considered as 
representing a feminine language of autonymisation.
Commencing with a brief analysis of a Kawabatan short story, ‘Her Husband Didn’t’,21 
which might be understood as functioning as a distillation, to a certain extent, of many of the 
thematic concerns expressed at length in Beauty and Sadness (silence, fluidity, chaos, the 
female/feminine body, art, lesbianism, death), I shall proceed by privileging a definition of 
‘fluidity’. Through my consideration of this ‘fluidity’ (which permits an appreciation of a 
cohesive strand between all of the above themes), I shall examine the ways in which 
Kawabata enables the feminine in Beauty and Sadness to be ‘positively’ represented. (By 
this, I mean that Kawabata enables a counter-representation of the feminine, constituting a
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‘positive’/active element in contrast to the ‘negative’/passive representation in infemination). 
This ‘fluidity’, which implicates, in particular, the metaphor of a chaoticised feminine body, 
shall then be related more concretely to the text via an interrogation of the theme of painting. 
Following this, I shall examine the related (in Beauty and Sadness), but differentiated, for 
purposes of clarification, themes of homosexuality and of suicide, which are both central 
textual concerns, and shall conclude my gynovocal analysis with a summarising exposition 
of chaos and/as femininity in language.
3:i ‘Her Husband Didn’t’
Kawabata’s ‘Her Husband Didn’t’ recounts the brief relationship of a young, sexually- 
inexperienced student with an older, married woman. The young man, although at first 
appreciated by the woman (for “doing things [to her body] that her husband didn’t” [‘HHD’: 
186]), is soon rejected and emasculated by his lover’s dominant actions into a final negative 
silence. Central to Junji’s and Kiriko’s relationship is the (male) former’s morselisation22 of 
the (female) latter’s body. “First her ear, then her eyebrow, then.. .One by one the various 
parts of Kiriko’s already^marriCd body drifted up before Junji, filling his head” (174). This 
activity, as I have suggested in my chapter on MacDonald’s ‘GynoScapes’, contributes to the 
concept of the female body as a chaotic landscape. This fragmentation has its dangers, 
provoking Junji “to fear that [in his detailed dissection] he might discover some flaw in her 
body” (175). (Significantly, his ‘gynoscopic’ exploration invokes similar anxieties to those 
experienced during Vane’s and Anodos’ -  culminating, now, in the oppressive sensation of 
her “hair engulf[ing] him” [‘HHD’: 175]). This “flaw” refers, of course, to the female 
genitals. Junji, recoiling (as both Vane and Anodos were wont to do) from this hostile space, 
comes to focus upon a displaced “mysterious jewel” (176): Kiriko’s earlobes. He identifies 
that touching this (fetishised) region, this locus of “abnormal excitement” (176), induces in 
him a necessary “sense of guilt” (176), as it recalls an earlier experience “when he had 
fingered the earlobe of a prostitute” (176). (The prostitute is, of course, the woman already
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divided into parts, or, rather, part: the bought vagina). Junji, describing the prostitute, 
expresses a desire to restore patriarchally-valorised chastity to the chaotic feminine body: to 
the woman who is sexualised but not matemalised. “Her purity had remained intact there, 
inside it” (176), he postulates, permitting her corruptible body one refuge of integrity, of 
convexity. He images the earlobe as a receptacle for feminine (boundary-transgressing) 
fluidity, asserting that it “held dew-like droplets of the essence of female beauty” (176). This 
action suggests his distrust of the female body, his belief in the necessity of sealing the fluid- 
permitting crevices. Imaging the solid, contained earlobe in place of the open, gaping vagina 
communicates his desire for female ihfibulation. The earlobe/sealed vagina is a silenced 
mouth -  a mouth no longer able to express fluidity, chaos or difference.
Junji and Kiriko are both artists, having met at “a class on Westem-style painting... [where] 
[tjhey had learned to sketch female nudes” (180).23 Unlike Oki and Otoko (the former 
creating via the medium of words, the latter creating with paint), both Junji and Kiriko 
access the femininely-fluid sphere of art24 However, in the course of the text, only the 
female Kiriko is permitted to create in this way. Kiriko draws Junji -  without permission -  
feminising further the already-feminised (as ‘painter’) male, rendering him the reluctant 
object of her dominant gaze. (This dialectic is reinforced also with the frequent textual 
emphasis placed on his being a boy, compared with her woman-status). Junji interprets 
Kiriko’s act of drawing as not only creative, but self-creative: “It seemed to Junji that her 
fape became more and more beautiful as she alternately glanced up at him and looked down 
at the paper.. .Kiriko was sketching his face” (180). This, nevertheless, also serves to 
articulate his desire for involvement in the creative activity: so that he beautifies, that is, 
modifies, her face, creating it anew in mind if not matter. Junji, furthermore, recognises the 
necessity of literal male intervention in Kiriko’s female act of masculine heteronymisation, 
endeavouring (through a forced intrusion upon the feminine creative-space) to reclaim his 
‘right’ to both masculine autonymisation and feminine heteronymisation:
He took the sketchbook from her without saying a word [her
appropriation of heteronymisation renders him speechless -  or
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femininely-silenced]. He looked at it for a moment or two [his gaze 
is disempowered, as he is not only subject but object of it, also], then 
took out his own pencil [an obvious reference to the phallus, the erect 
male organ which symbolises sovereign power -  expressing Junji’s 
attempt at self-emasculation] and began adding to the sketch she had 
started, drawing over it [he successfully re-establishes paternal order].
(180, emphases added)
Junji articulates the necessity of self-nomination. “It’s my face -  if I don’t finish it 
myself...” (181), he argues, communicating his anxiety at the potential loss of self in his loss 
of language (the decline into ellipses): his feminine silence. Junji’s act of anticipated 
reclamation is clearly flawed, so that the integrity of his identity is further contested. “The 
outline of his face grew blurry in certain places, places where the lines Kiriko had drawn and 
the lines Junji had drawn overlapped excessively” (181). Junji’s intercession causes his 
(masculine) boundaries to be fluidised -  his lines mutated (and muted) into an image of 
femininity. Not only does his Kiriko-authored face become less ‘Junji-like’, it also becomes 
more feminine (perhaps, albeit obliquely, even ‘Kiriko-Iike’, operating as a narcissistic self- 
portrait). With regard to narcissism, Kiriko, in this way, might be understood as drawing 
Junji out of (not only a masculine desire but of) a lesbian desire.25 She does, however, imply 
that her masculine heteronymisation actually arises perhaps out of a disappointment with 
female homosexuality. “Her [the model at their art class] body wasn’t very pretty - 1 really 
didn’t even want to draw her. But it was fun drawing you” (182). Kiriko defames the female 
body, rejecting the (female) model out of a dissatisfaction with her aesthetically-imperfect 
form. Her implication is that Junji, the cnon-bioIogicaIIy-femaIe’, has a more beautiful body 
and, therefore, is a ‘better female’. Kiriko, the only sexually-mature adult who is represented 
as physically occupying the text (Junji, although having previously encountered a prostitute, 
is emphasised as being, like Sacher-Masoch’s Severin, “a beginner in the affairs of love”
[177]) is, in a certain sense, masculinised: permitted the dominant masculine gaze which 
fixes the female/feminine body, exalting or disparaging it at will. A woman looking at 
another woman in this way might be interpreted as self-destructive, thus Kiriko’s ultimate 
selection of a male gaze-object constitutes a subversion, serving to re-direct this negation
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towards masculinity.
Kiriko draws Junji not only to reinforce her apparent masculinised subject-position but in 
order to locate through him her dead daughter (182). (This activity of seeking to revive the 
dead in the living is evident, of course, not only in Otoko’s search for her lost baby but in 
Vane’s and Anodos’ common search for the lost mother). Kiriko’s daughter was not merely 
sexually-inexperienced (like Junji) but died a virgin, so that her pre-sexualised status would 
be forever sustained. “[M]y late daughter.. .had never known love”, Kiriko relates of the 
girl’s eternal pre-defloration suspension, “she died when the bud of her flower was starting 
to open” (182). Kiriko adds, furthermore, that “that must have been best for her.. .Maybe 
that’s what happiness is?” (182). Purity, as my MacDonald chapters intimate, is traditionally 
male-authored as a feminine perfection (culminating in the conceptualisation of the idealised 
non-sexualised maternal: the Virgin Mary). Kiriko’s collaboration with this female- 
oppressive notion serves to reinforce her seeming masculine standing, as does the fact that 
she is mortemalised, having both lost her only child and being (one might infer) menopausal 
(due to the emphasis placed upon her “middle-aged” status [177]).
Kiriko permits Junji, at first, to believe in the success of his masculine reclamation 
(following the apparent failure he had experienced when she drew his portrait). Junji was 
“completely overwhelmed by the surprise he felt on discovering that he could satisfy... [her] 
so completely. He came to understand his own masculine charm for the first time through the 
pleasure Kiriko took in hijn” (177-8). Kiriko is imaged as a vampire, parasitically draining 
his body in her predatory hunt for pleasure, yet Junji locates power in his position as ‘food- 
source’, understanding the potency his body possesses as a desire-object, perceiving himself 
as authoring both her hunger and the satiation of it.
His control of her “ecstatic joy” (178) soon comes to be undermined as her pleasure is 
described as waning. Furthermore, he is disembodied (or, rather, his body is made less 
concrete, less tangible, less masculine) through her conceptualisation of him as a dream. “It 
sounded to Junji as though (Kiriko’s] daydream had been realized through him” (178) -  a 
recognition that he interprets as a metaphoric murder, as being “pushed [by her] off a cliff”
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(178). This constitutes an additional blow to his ego-integrity, which culminates in her actual 
rejection of him. “They arranged to meet. . .but Kiriko didn’t show up at the appointed 
time.. .Junji could feel that her body was more tightly closed to him than it had been at first” 
(184). This closure of Kiriko’s body suggests her further migration towards masculine being, 
her feminine fractures becoming self-healed into an impenetrable solidarity. Junji comes to 
realise that Kiriko is self-contained and will not surrender herself to him, conceding: “I don’t 
know the first thing about you -  about your mind or about how you live.. .1 don’t have the 
slightest bit of influence over you” (185). Her rejection of him is devastatingly emasculating, 
“fill[ing] Junji with a frantic emptiness” (186) that images the ‘absent’ female genitals; 
causing “tears [to] suddenly [spill] from his eyes [which] would not stop” (186) that image 
feminine fluidity; forcing him “to be[come] suspicious of himself’ (186), to question his 
(masculine) identity. Junji’s masculine pride along with his metaphoric body is, therefore, 
wounded. He retaliates by attempting to appropriate the maternal function -  if he is to be a 
woman, then he shall be her apotheosis; he attempts to create Kiriko, just as she once 
(through art) created him. “Junji kept imagining her, drawing her inside his head” (186). 
However, his gravitation towards the insubstantial, his location of comfort in the imaginary 
rather than the real world, constitutes his final and most devastating emasculation. “[H]e kept 
thinking through the sequence of kisses he would give her, imagining the methods he would 
use”, until discovering “that he seemed to have more fun doing this than he did when he was 
actually with her” (186, emphases added). This masculine silencing is a negative condition: 
it is not a silence that ‘speaks’ subversion. Whilst Kiriko ends the text with speech (with 
“cruel words” [186]), Junji descends into the stasis-inducing silence that renders him “unable 
to move” (186).
‘Her Husband Didn’t’ might be understood as exemplifying aspects of ‘HERstorical’ 
writing. Junji’s voice, admittedly, opens the narrative, and we read his (silent but violent) 
dissection of the female body into parts. He thereby claims not only Kiriko for himself, 
despite acknowledging that she is already another man’s ‘property’ (with her “already-
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married body”), but claims also narrative primacy. In this opening passage, however, we 
learn that he is merely contemplating activity: he is “thinking’ about “giving’ her kisses.
This is a statement of his passivity; he “imagine[s]” rather than does. And his fantasies are 
disempowering, bringing him disappointment, guilt, confusion, rather than satisfying his 
desire. The tables are turned most dramatically -  as I have illustrated -  at his third or fourth 
meeting with Kiriko. The woman does not just speak, but vocalises “something unexpected”. 
As with the cruel trick played upon Lewis Carroll’s ‘dream-child’ Alice, Junji is confronted 
with the question: ‘Which Dreamed It?’26 Kiriko reveals that, all along, he has been a part of 
her fantasy. She has awakened in him his “masculinity]”; she has ‘mothered’ him, created 
him, instructed him on how to be. She draws him (and, even when he tries to take over, 
continues to make her mark on the project she had instigated). In doing so, she creates, 
constructing of him a ‘husband’ for her late daughter. The portrait becomes blurry and 
shadowed; ghost-like. Junji is made into a ghost, denied masculine solidity and definition in 
order to become the male counterpart to a dead girl. In a certain sense, she ‘kills’ him, 
instigating a Barthesian authorial death. She becomes the re-writing reader, undermining 
Junji’s status as mere writer. In this way, authority is hers[torical].
3:ii Gynovocalising Fluidities
As with Junji and Kiriko, Oki and Otoko compete, in Beauty and Sadness, for the telling of 
stories. Oki, like Junji, would tell both ‘HIS-’ and ‘HERstory’, motivated by the belief that to 
relinquish telling (language, vocalisation) would mean to suffer emasculation (into an inert 
silence). Otoko, like Kiriko (although commencing from a position -  as Oki’s ‘girl of 
sixteen’ -  that more closely represented Junji’s), does not simply surrender the mouth-piece, 
but might be interpreted as ‘speaking’, even when she cannot, with metaphorical silence.
This alternative language (the language of silence) might be employed even when the male 
would suppress the female’s ‘vocalisation’. It is intimately connected to notions of the 
feminine body, and takes the form, most generally, of fluidity.
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The instability and erratic incongruency of ‘feminine’ writing is bound up, therefore, in 
conventional conceptions of the female body as fluid. Luce Irigaray, in This sex which is not 
one, attributes solidity and fixity to patriarchal/phallocratic law, identifying it as constructing 
an oppressive “zone of silence” (Irigaray, 1985a: 112) that is conducive to death. It is the 
fluidity of woman, Irigaray proposes, which enables a mobilisation of the self into traversing 
this masculine implementation of inertia. Woman and ‘her’ writing (that is, the language 
identified with the feminine) locate both profit and loss in their being associated with 
fluidity; in their being imaged as beginning and end. The female body and feminine writing 
exhibit a common self-contained and self-fulfilled circularity; indicating shared cyclical 
mechanisms which testify to repletion and completion, a unity that masculinity lacks or has 
lost. Writing fluidity, nevertheless, can be interpreted as a process not only of creation but 
also of destruction. To write the fluid can mean to authorise a cleansing which allows for 
new creation), or that implements an engulfment and devastation. Mikhail Bakhtin identifies 
the ‘dangers’ of feminine fluidity when, in Rabelais and his World, he bisects literature 
according to the traditional code of sexual difference. The fluidly feminine, he renders as 
belonging to the “grotesque.. .body” (Bakhtin, 1984b: 315); operating as a counter to the 
self-controlled and contained masculine “elassic[al]” body (315), which he deigned “a 
strictly completed, finished product... isolated, alone, fenced off from all other bodies” (29). 
Masculine linguistic style is taut, solid, muscular, whilst feminine is slack, soft, glutinous, 
glandular. Feminine writing is undermined as it attests to the fluidity of the (female) body, 
connoting, as described by Elizabeth Grosz,
the permeability of the body, its necessary dependence on an outside, 
its liability to collapse into this outside (this is what death implies), 
to the perilous divisions between the body’s inside and its outside... 
a certain irreducible ‘dirt’ or disgust, a horror of the unknown...
(Grosz, 1994b: 193-4)
Otoko, in accordance with this, fears her feminine fluidity. Her (chaos-enforcing) lesbianism 
is embraced solely because it permits her to retain her heterosexual experience of love with
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Oki in a unique way. “She feared that had her new lover been a man the vision she secretly 
guarded within her -  the sacred vision of her love with Oki -  would have vanished at his 
touch” (BS: 92). Accordingly, in making love with Keiko she refuses to create anew, 
“repeating Oki’s old caresses” (86), sustaining a lie of heterosexual activity. Otoko, although 
asserting possession over Keiko (as her teacher, her ‘mother’, the artist of her portrait), 
experiences ambivalent feelings towards her. She invites orality (the “nibbling at [Keiko’s] 
sensitive ears” [86]) into the relationship simply because it is an already-lived experience. 
However, the allowance of such acts of orality prove threatening as control can be reversed. 
Thus, from a dominant position of oral-aggression, she is reduced to infantile status (to suck 
upon Keiko’s finger [85]). And Keiko becomes the Jungian Terrible mother (a figure 
discussed at length in relation to MacDonald’s writings) who feeds upon her dependent 
child, “bit[ing] down hard on Otoko’s little finger” (78). (The fact that Keiko bites the 
phallic-imaging finger also suggests a castration desire. Keiko perhaps believes that this 
body part represents for Otoko the lost male Oki. The act of biting the Oki-commemorative 
finger, therefore, communicates Keiko’s wish to sever Otoko from her [heterosexual, 
phallus-affirming] past).
Otoko is repulsed by Keiko’s act of hair removal, the depilation by which she civilises the 
alleged unruly, chaotic feminine body, as it forces her to confront both her homosexuality 
and her own ‘errant’ femininity. “Her queasiness at seeing Keiko remove hair had within it a 
feeling of contact between woman and woman, a direct pressure on her own skin” (91). The 
nausea at this contemplation is only assuaged, Otoko indicates, by her thought of 
heterosexuality, as “when she thought of Oki the queasiness miraculously subsided” (91).
The outcome of Otoko’s consideration of female hair-removal is one of ambivalence. Not 
only does she acknowledge that “beneath her repugnance a flame flickered” (91), but also 
the desire to enact a murder fantasy (similar to the strangulation with which she had once 
been threatened by Oki).“The thought had come to Otoko that if she thrust her razor into this 
lovely throat, Keiko would die” (93).
Otoko reads Keiko as ‘mad’. When she introduces her “disturbingly beautiful” (16) pupil
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to Oki, she explicitly identifies her abstract artwork as the product of a “crazy” (17) mind; as 
“so passionate they often seem a little mad” (17). Although the victim of madness is 
consigned to the broken status of ‘other7, is rendered chaotic, erratic and transgressive to 
order, Otoko “env[ies] her” (17). She herself has been officially certified ‘not mad’ (22), yet 
she supports this subversive persuasion in her pupil. Encouraging Keiko’s ‘mad’ art (“You 
can see her tremble as she paints” [17]),27 Otoko valorises the chaos. She is, in one sense, 
empowered by her cultivation of her pupil -  she gains a new body in her, a substitute to send 
on her behalf to meet Oki because “[she is] middle-aged, beginning to thicken around the 
waist [but not with a potent maternity].. .[and] was afraid he’d be disillusioned” (45). 
However, her sentiments are also of disempowerment, disembodiment. Her breasts, for 
example, which are diminished and slackened with age, change at Keiko’s touch. She 
interprets this Keiko-manipulated “swelling of her breasts” as “morbid and evil” (87), a cruel 
act of “victory” (87) on her lover’s part: a conquest and assertion of mastery.
Fluidity is, therefore, intimately connected to perceptions of the feminine body.
Withiri the text, the abstract concept of fluidity is made perhaps most concrete via 
Kawabata’s treatment of painting. This motif of painting serves to enable the construction of 
a fluidly feminine language, and is of particular focus in Otoko’s narrative. Firstly, she has 
made her name through her prize-winning portrayal of two geisha “based on a trick 
photograph... [that] showed a double image” of a single woman (78).28 Otoko selects this 
subject matter because “[s]he wanted to give an uneasy feeling that the one girl was two, the 
two one, or perhaps neither one nor two” (79). This painting (which significantly is the ‘bait’ 
that lures Keiko to her) is perhaps her first artistic communication of self-plurality. Otoko is 
the single woman who is always already doubled29 (she is a ‘copy’ of her mother, and also a 
‘repetition’ of the young girl with whom her own father had an extra-marital affair). The 
geisha painting is also prophetic in that it precedes her narcissistic, self-reflexive relationship 
with Keiko. “Isn’t your body the same as mine?” Keiko asks, rhetorically. “It really is, you 
know” (86). Keiko becomes Otoko’s pupil. Otoko has given her her voice, the language of
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art. Symbolically, Otoko might now be perceived as lacking language (because she has 
given it to her pupil). What results is a crisis of identity. She experiences ambivalence and 
uncertainty in relation to her past and present painting -  in comprehending how to 
paint/re-create her mother/herself, and how to paint Keiko/her child. When Otoko paints her 
mother, she assumes her mother’s role (both as artistic creator and in supplanting the 
maternal likeness with her own), thus effectively excises her mother. Her painting of Keiko, 
on the other hand, operates as an affirmation of her maternity. And her painting of the 
generic child renders her the generic mother.
What she gives perhaps is not strictly speech, which is amorphous, but the tool for speech, 
the tongue. It is not speech because what Keiko enunciates is free, personal, original. It is 
tongue because it is the principles of art, the knowledge which enables art, which Keiko 
receives. The tongue, unlike speech, is static. Giving her tongue (she has but one, rooted in 
one mouth), the Mother Tongue, Otoko inhibits her own capacity for vocalisation. Keiko, 
enabled, speaks what Otoko cannot. Otoko’s tongue in Keiko’s mouth becomes potent 
(Keiko uses her art to reach first Oki, then his son, then Oki through his son). Otoko gives 
her tongue (her voice and phallus-substitute) away because silence can mean chastity. 
Accepting silence is a means by which she endeavours to restore to herself her lost purity. 
Keiko becomes the medium for Otoko’s lost speech. She attempts to appropriate and 
ventriloquise (which I have previously determined as a masculine or masculinising 
activity) Otoko’s body. She makes her presence evident even in Otoko’s art (as perceived by 
Oki and his wife).
Also to be equated with the relinquished tongue is Otoko’s dead baby. This child might be 
visualised as representing the phallus, a fantasy of the symbolic completion of the mother’s 
body, and also (in its separation into autonomous being) a loss. Otoko attempts to fill the 
absence, the wound at the loss of her baby/phallus, by consuming a “powerful drug” (120), 
but this too is “purged from her body” (120). It is painting which eventually compensates for 
the loss, allowing her to establish an apparent dependent (unmarried, lesbian, childless,
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patriarchy-refuting) identity. Her painting might lead her only to another loss -  but this a loss 
over which she has control. She actively surrenders her tongue to Keiko, choosing to do so in 
an act of self-sacrificial self-mutilation.
Otoko is not, however, fully empowered -  even by her painting. She can, rather, be 
perceived as attempting to mimic the masculine language in her painting, particularly in the 
portrait of her mother. She creates, admittedly, but these images she fashions might be 
interpreted in linguistic terms as ‘metaphors’, in a negative sense, constituting a (defense- 
mechanistic) detour from the truth. Otoko’s ‘metaphor’ associates two identifiable objects 
that are never truly unified in order to create a (synthetic) third. She takes her mother (from 
life), an idealistic sensibility (from art) and creates something new -  something which is 
suspended between reality and unreality. The ‘metaphor’, one might argue, is emptiness in 
itself, artificial and contingent, functioning only to reflect the idea, but denied the accuracy 
and efficiency of mimetic reiteration, of effective copying. Metaphor can be interpreted as 
clouding the original thought, masking meaning with a distraction. Otoko endorses artifice, 
understanding that, without it, an economy of loss is negotiated. The mother must be 
resuscitated, even if it is artificially, because she is a mirror in which Otoko sustains herself. 
Otoko’s fluid interpretation of the mother constitutes the destruction implicated in the 
recollection of the lost beloved. Her mother will be substantiated in paint, in matter, in 
tangible, palpable form -  no longer preserved in memory as the painting is granted authority. 
Otoko’s painting of her mother will stand in the place of the mother, speak for the mother, or 
be the mother reborn. Otoko’s commemoration will be a re-creation. Painting proves to be a 
means by which the child might reverse the birth-process, enabling Otoko, in this way, to 
give birth to her mother. (This conceptualisation is, of course, both matemalistic and 
mortemalistic. Otoko affirms her own maternity, whilst undermining that of her mother’s). 
Otoko’s commemoration of her mother, her restoration of the maternal image, provides her 
with a substitute but this ‘copy’ only undermines the ‘original’.
When the feminine language of painting threatens to become a masculine language, Otoko
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is at risk of losing control over ‘HERstory’. Otoko learns to experience herself as mere 
image: as artifice. As John Berger argues, “a woman must continually watch herself. She is 
almost continually accompanied by her own image of herself... And so she comes to consider 
the surveyor and the surveyed within her as the two constituent, yet always distinct elements 
of her identity as a woman” (Berger, 1977: 46, emphases in original). Otoko’s painting is 
about a narcissistic self-watching. Her art involves the erotic appropriation of the body (her 
body) in paint. Her portraits are expressions of not only the displayed female body, but also 
of the painted person. Two forms of sensuality are required and united in the act: the 
manifestation of the female body as visual spectacle, and its taetile interpretation in facture 
(that is, in the literal manipulation of the paint). The physicality of the body, the physicality 
of artistic performance, the physicality of paint -  all are mediated through Otoko’s fluidity. 
Otoko’s self-portrait operates, through idealism, to transform the sinful ‘mother’ (herself) 
into the virgin, allowing the redemption of the unwed mother who can now be associated 
with the Divine Maternal. The Madonna icon fiilfils humankind’s eternal need to see the 
mother as selflessly nurturing and protecting the naked infant, and the painting will be an 
archetype that communicates this ideal of maternity. Otoko, self-mariologised, has her errant 
sexuality (irreconcilable, in Mariology, with motherhood) negated. Furthermore, because the 
icon is a frozen image, this perfected portrait is sustained in a condition of permanence.
Although her art can be used to regulate, to impose order, intransigence, stability, Otoko 
must first confront erratic, untamed surfaces. Her raw materials (that is, her subject matter, 
the object of her gaze) begin in ambiguity, to be tamed, via art, into safely recognisable 
generic images. The body of Keiko, for example, commences as an uncertainty, lacking 
concrete (univocal) definition. She is a “young girl” (124), a “young woman” (77), a “young 
sorceress” (77), a “Holy Virgin” (47, emphasis in original), a “boy saint” (48), “predatory” 
(123), “not quite human” (124). For Otoko, she is an abstraction: “A Girl Abstractionist (47, 
emphasis in original). She is neither physical nor sensual, but a body ‘at a loss’, painted 
without sexuality as an androgynous holy being. Otoko desires to express Keiko as a body 
with a reduced physical presence: to tame her into an icon.
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Significantly, Keiko asks to be painted, positioning herself as consumer of herself. She 
wants to be painted as an object of her lover’s desire; to be created by a childless woman 
who mothers her. Her love for Otoko means that she is willing to submit to self-sacrifice, 
offering her own body to fill the wound left by loss -  of the baby and of Oki.30 Otoko agrees 
to become the reluctant voyeur; to surrender herself to taking a morbid pleasure in 
possessing the illicit (erotic, violent) gaze. Keiko the masochist is equally Keiko the sadist, 
demanding (as Severin does of Wanda) her "punishment’, her "violation’, "subordination’ 
and ‘commodification’. Keiko insists on being transubstantiated, via Otoko’s art, from base 
matter (her bestial hairiness emphasised by the shaving episode [92-3]) into art(ifice). 
Requesting her portrait, she stipulates a condition of nudity. The female ‘nude’ (as opposed 
to the ‘female naked’ (a dichotomy I have previously investigated) is the product of a 
conventionalised and institutionalised mode of representation. She is beautiful, passive, 
clean, her ‘corrupt’ flesh transmuted (according to the imperative of a masculine aesthetic 
ideal) into safe sanitation. But this anticipated cleansing project, with its aim of restoring 
integrity and propriety to the supposedly transgressive female body via art, is problematic. 
Any commitment to accommodating the patriarchal objective of restoration (unnecessary, 
unless one is to concede that the female body is intrinsically ‘incorrect’) conflicts with the 
utilisation of paint as feminine language. Otbko is impeded from completing the works of 
herself, Keiko and the dead infant whilst her goal is one of univocality -  as it would mean to 
regulate the fluid in a medium that is in itself inherently fluid. She attempts to tell 
‘HERstory’ in the language of painting -  and this (feminine) language, this gynovocality is 
fluid.
3:iii Gynovocalising Lesbianism
Another feminine language evident in Beauty and Sadness is that of Otoko’s and Keiko’s 
shared experience of lesbianism. It is Oki who first addresses the ‘issue’ in order to reassure 
his wife that Otoko no longer poses a threat to their marriage. Fumiko insists that Keiko’s
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paintings, given as a gift to Oki, are an insidious vehicle for “her feelings about Otoko” (36). 
If Keiko’s paintings are about Otoko, “[t]hen maybe she and Otoko are lovers” (36), Oki 
proposes, though feels “ashamed of having brought up lesbianism to talk himself out of a 
difficulty” (37). His hasty response is, of course, accurate. But imaging the still desirable 
Otoko as homosexual operates to conveniently deflect his wife’s “lightning flash of feminine 
jealousy” (36), permitting him to enjoy, unfettered, “Otoko’s still glowing love” (36). 
Fumiko is particularly implicated in Oki’s affair because she was given the responsibility of 
transmuting his heteronymising story of Otoko into concrete language. Whilst Oki writes 
(physically, from the body, and, in this way, perhaps even femininely), Fumiko translates his 
manuscript into (masculine) print. Fumiko becomes for Oki a “machine” (28) in order to 
sustain some degree of control over the story. Fumiko (although merely repeating Oki’s
i
words, as opposed to speaking her own) is at first empowered, masculinised, her ‘translation’ 
privileged over Oki’s original creation. Oki himself acknowledges the “difference in effect 
between a pen-written manuscript and the tiny characters in print” (26): “Even passages that 
seemed...loose in manuscript would turn out to be tightly written [when typed]” (26, 
emphasis added). Flexibly feminine intimation would be transgendered into rigid masculine 
expression. Oki, conscious of the fact, recognises the superiority of Fumiko’s ‘language’.
“He had learned how to write for print” (26); he had learned how to be a man. Oki’s 
ascension to/recovery of masculinity restores the conjugal hierarchy. “[T]he typescripts of 
Oki’s novels... seeiped colder and flatter than.. .the pen manuscripts... Yet for that reason he 
could recognize their defects, and found it easier to make corrections and revisions. And so it 
had become customary for Fumiko to type up all his manuscripts” (27). Oki understands the 
weakness of the ‘machine’ (its ‘cold’ and ‘flat’ dimensions) and exploits it, sustaining 
Fumiko in the position of inanimate utility, which renders her ‘easy to read’. Significantly, 
Oki’s apprehension about his wife’s linguistic capabilities derives from a self-consciousness 
regarding his origins. “Oki Came from the western part of Japan, and had never really 
mastered Tokyo polite speech; Fumiko, however, had been brought up in Tokyo, so he often
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asked her help with it” (98). Oki must overcome his position of neediness by denigrating her 
language as “only a vulgar dialect with a shallow tradition” (98).
Relegated to the silence of a linguistically-incompetent automaton, forced by the pressures 
of Oki’s affair to suffer a miscarriage, and made “sallow and hollow-cheeked” (29) by her 
typing workload, Fumiko continues to maintain that the experience has been profitable. 
Despite the fact that she is silenced in the novel (“I wish you’d written more about me!” 
[29]), Fumiko can derive a degree of satisfaction from the knowledge that she has . 
participated in the greater silencing of her rival. It is Otoko who, in her presence within 
Oki’s story, is ‘absenced’. Now, Oki continues this silencing his wife desires and demands, 
so that his current narration of Otoko ‘writes’ her a lesbian.
Lesbianism might be defined as a space of similitude, where identity boundaries between 
lovers are demolished in favour of absolute reciprocity. For Otoko, homosexuality can be 
understood as testifying to her narcissism, as her mother is represented as a mirror-image of 
herself (with each seeing “her own reflection in the other’s mirror” [117]). Otoko’s difficult 
experience of motherhood (her loss of Oki’s child, her replacement of this child with Keiko, 
her position as a repetition of her own mother) is implicated in her experience of lesbianism. 
Otoko battles to conceptualise an image of self that exists in autonomy from the maternal 
image (as expressed in her portrait painting, which gives mother and daughter a common, 
undifferentiated face). Keiko, another lesbian, posits herself as a child (both as a pupil and as 
a younger woman) to her ‘maternal’ lover, and desires, furthermore, to conflate her own 
image with that of the already-mother-conflated (in art) Otoko.
A connection between lesbianism and maternity is also evident in the fact that no lesbians 
in Beauty and Sadness are permitted to become literal, biological mothers. Otoko is denied 
motherhood, thus the patriarchal law which stipulates that a lesbian should not be a mother 
(as she violates her ‘contract’ to provide the system with its men) is enforced. Patriarchal 
logic will maintain that the woman who chooses to love another woman shall be removed 
from the sphere of reproduction. As defined by (heterosexist)31 nineteenth-century
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patriarchal science and medicine and its representatives (such as Freud), the lesbian separates 
female sexual pleasure from her procreative imperative. She creates a space outside the 
heterosexual, patriarchal sphere. Otoko transgresses, according to this definition, as the non- 
procreative ‘mother’ -  a mother figure to her pupil Keiko, though not one who gives birth. It 
would appear, then, that Otoko is subjected to a mortemalistic punishment for her choice of a 
same-sex partner. Her initial experience of failed maternity (where she loses her Oki-sired 
baby) is not, however, governed by this rule: that lesbianism causes the transformation of 
maternity into mortemity. Otoko’s loss, in this case, occurs before she becomes a lesbian 
(that is, whilst she is a heterosexual woman). Furthermore, she cannot be punished even for a 
latent homosexuality as she is never a ‘real’ lesbian, but chooses to engage in a same-sex 
relationship with Keiko in order to continue to give expression to her heterosexual desire for 
Oki. Nevertheless, a subsequent maternity is denied her (and Keiko), whilst Oki’s unfailing 
heterosexuality brings him two additional children. Otoko’s punishment would seem to be 
for her ‘decline’ into lesbianism, which, causes her to be teratologised: conceptualised as 
errant, inverted or incomplete.
Female homosexuality, in Beauty and Sadness, also concerns itself with ideas o f‘looking’, 
with subjectivity and objectivity, with the gaze (a concept discussed at length in the previous 
chapter). The represented pleasure of lesbian lovers is appropriated by the masculine gaze 
(then intimated through the masculine voice) as phallic. The sequence of perspectives in 
Beauty and Sadness, whereby Oki’s voice initially occupies a privileged authoritative status, 
demonstrates the ways in which femininity and lesbian intimacy is filtered through male 
eyes. It is only after extensive exposure to Oki’s perspective that the reader ‘enters’ Otoko’s 
consciousness. Female-exclusive pleasure becomes masculine-exclusive pleasure in the 
phallocentric infeminator’s fantasy of the lesbian ‘act’ (an appropriate term for an event 
which is translated into performance). It becomes not a true, unknown, different, ‘other’ 
expression, but an inversion of a conventional expression. It is therefore ‘known’, rendered 
an artificial heterosexuality. The infeminator refuses to communicate a love between two
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women that might exist outside of this framework. Rather, he conceptualises one that must 
inhabit the same spaces (subordinated to the same gazes and desires: the masculine). The 
language permitted is the phallocentric language, the language of linearity, authority, self- 
possession. The phallus as primary and transcendental signifier, with its physical expression, 
the penis, excludes woman from the symbolic, from language.32 However, it also must be 
noted that lesbianism, in its involving women looking at women, creates the potential for a 
female gaze. Otoko’s art enables a reclamation of the body, permitting an act of sexual self- 
expression. This could be understood as acting to subvert the masculine gaze, allowing her to 
finally become a speaking subject. Subversion is allowed, as Otoko’s art (that is, her 
personal works, sustained in the private sphere, wherein she constructs various ‘self’- 
portraits) is presented only to a spectator who will read it as she commands. She is the 
consumer of her own art. Objectification is disabled due to her refusal to take a masculine 
subject position in relation to it. What Otoko is forbidden to speak, however, is her 
relationship with Keiko. This love is supplanted in Oki’s reading by a conventional, male- 
centred expression. Oki’s reading removes Keiko from Otoko’s canvas and replaces her with 
himself. When Otoko paints in order to possess Keiko, Oki ejects the chosen desire-object 
with his selective and subjective gaze. Keiko is therefore forbidden expression that is not 
authored according to Oki’s (heteronymising) desires.
Keiko, unlike Otoko, is a willing lesbian. And she is willing to ‘perform’ heterosexuality 
also. When she seduces Oki (and later his son), she reveals a distinction between her two 
breasts -  recalling Shimamura’s (‘Historical’) self-division in Snow Country33 -  allowing 
him to touch the one, and forbidding his fondling of the other. When Oki tries to touch the 
“wrong” breast, Keiko warns him: “The left one is no good” (105). Oki supposes that her 
“right breast [is] a somewhat spoiled virgin, and the left [is] still virginal” (106), but Keiko 
refuses to confirm or deny. She keeps her silence on the matter, refusing to share with him 
her story. Although she tells Oki that her left breast is defective, she tells his son that it is the 
right which must not be touched (“The right one makes me feel sad” [142]). Father and son
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are, therefore, given one each -  but Otoko is presumably given both. In Classical Greek art, 
“[t]he bared right breast most often has erotic significance, [whilst] the bared left suggests 
motherhood or care of the young” (E.B. Harrison, cited in Cohen, 1997: 79).34 After this 
model, Keiko’s union with Oki comes to mean sexuality, whilst, with Taichiro, it appears to 
be based upon feelings of motherly love.
Keiko emasculates Taichiro by requesting also that he ‘mother’ her\ persuading him to 
submit the fluid (tea as blood) that she, the vampire, would usually need to actively source. 
Keiko demands that she be fed from his mouth. “ ‘Let me have some tea,’ she whispered... 
‘From your mouth’. He took some tea in his mouth and let it seep little by little between her 
lips.. .Except for her lips and throat, [Keiko] was inert” (145). Keiko’s passivity is, in this 
case, empowering because it is self-authored. Indeed, even when Keiko demands for her 
body to be written by others, by both Oki and Otoko, her reasons are distinctly separate: 
being for the destruction of the former and (as well as through) the affirmation of the latter.
In conclusion, the body of the female object might be (phallocentrically) perceived as 
being marred by the stigmata of loss, but allowing this (fictional) ‘loss’ to be countered by 
another absence (and refusing a supposed satiation by the phallus), the lesbian subverts the 
hierarchic dualism of presence/absence. Female homosexuality can in this way be interpreted 
as validating phallic absence, and authorising a language of silence.
3:iv Gynovocalising Suicide
The concept of silence is particularly pertinent to an interrogation of the thematic concern 
of suicide, which, in Beauty and Sadness, is portrayed as another potential form of feminine 
language, associated with both Otoko and Keiko. Suicide is to be understood as a 
paradoxical concern, involving not only the “disintegration of identity” but also the 
“reaffirmation of autonomy” (Bronfen, 1992: 153). It signifies an entry into non-being, but 
also, being self-administered, it can mean the silent pause which permits speech to begin.
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The act of taking one’s own life, in this sense, is not an act of completion, but an act of 
beginning. It constitutes the writing of another, a self-authored script, the story of one’s own 
death, and, for Kawabata’s ‘woman’ (excluded from language), the transposition of a silent 
life into language. Suicide allows ‘her’ to have the final word (a silent word).
The concept of ‘Japanese suicide’ can be understood as encompassing two distinct yet, in 
some senses, related categories. (Despite my intentions to avoid authorial contextu&lisatiOn -  
in this case, the ‘Nipponication’ of Kawabata -  in order to assert the ahistorical and acultural 
potential of the infemination-reading, the ‘bilingual’ nature of Japanese suicide renders it a 
useful comparative device).35 The Japanese suicide twice, both ‘occasions’ anachronistic in 
the sense that they respond, according to Daniel Brown’s ‘Seppuku and Jisatsu m Modem 
Japanese Literature’, to feelings of alienation from, and ambivalence towards, the modem 
world.36 Seppuku, involving an act of self-disembowelment followed by decapitation, is the 
traditional and perceived noble Japanese ritual form of suicide (despite the emasculating 
connotations of decapitation which, in -  Western -  psychoanalytic discourse, signifies 
castration). The other, jisatsu, is motivated not by the compulsion to redeem one’s acts of 
failure, to restore honour, to vocalise a respect for an imperial past, or to prove one’s loyalty 
to a lord, but as an intellectual response to societal degradation caused by modernising 
processes. Jisatsu, lacking the complex ritual involved in seppuku, relates similarly to loss. 
When the ‘victim’ loses his system, his world, the old to the new, he commits seppuku.
When he loses himself to the modern, he commits jisatsu?1
For the young Otoko, suicide is selected to counter the effects of an assaulted body. Denied 
the child bom of her and the ability to unite with Oki from whom she received the child, 
Otoko is left with only a defiled body. Suicide appears to be a means by which this violated 
flesh (which is never to be loved by another man, nor to bear another child) can be atoned. 
(That is, the body that has been fragmented through penetration can be ‘at-oned’). Her 
attempt at suicide (the poisoning, which mimics an ingestion of the infant she loses; an 
endeavour to repair a tragic detumescence; to restore an empty vessel to potent repletion)
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fails. Otoko’s is no death-wish but an expression of an impossible desire: the desire to live, 
non-diseased, repaired, restored. In order to achieve this, to “[cleanse] the wound she had 
received from Oki” (92), she contemplates a noble (and, in this sense, a seppuku) death; a 
death in childbirth, which would have spared the losses she encounters post-partum. What 
she selects is, unlike that prescribed by the laws of seppuku, a passive death, a death without 
intervention by her own already-condemned hand: a death which would counter the 
fragmentation, the fissure, the fracture imposed by life upon her self. “Better still, she felt, to 
have died in childbirth -  before she tried to kill herself, and before her own baby died” (92). 
But parturition would not save her. She strives to ape passivity, taking “an overdose of 
sleeping medicine” (18) -  the next best thing to a non-interventionist suicide. She falls asleep 
and Oki stays at her side, kneading her inanimate flesh (“massagpng] her thighs, swollen and 
hard from massive injections” [18]) and, similarly, manipulating, fashioning, moulding the 
story from which she (in her unconsciousness) is effectively absent. What Otoko now feels is 
the separation inherent in jisatsu. It is Oki who is responsible for this separation. He has 
separated her from the world -  their love affair causes her to be first “hospitalized in a 
psychiatric ward, behind barred windows” (22), then exiled to Kyoto, to spend a life 
unmarried and childless. Furthermore, he has separated her from herself, condemning her 
story, her life, to being “forever enshrined in... [his] work of art” (92).
Otoko’s additional endeavour to purify herself through art is similarly doomed to failure. 
Convinced that she is tainted by her youthful encounter with Oki and the resulting scandal of 
their union (otherwise she would not express a need for ablution), she focuses on sanctifying 
her illegitimate (and dead) baby by translating her into a holy martyr. Entitling her sketches 
‘Ascension of an Infant’, Otoko aims to communicate a re-written stoiy. The baby, 
untouched by earthly sin, enters heaven -  a symbolic gesture indicating Otoko’s own bodily 
submission to the supremacy of chastity. Otoko, now in the body of her child, is absolved. 
Troubled by the efficacy of this redemption ‘solution’, Otoko never completes the painting. 
Her portrait of Keiko is a similar ‘story’. She conceptualises this interpretation of her lover
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as representing divinity. Yet Keiko is a sexual predator. Their relationship is marred by 
feelings of guilt and jealousy. Otoko places an unbridgeable gap between the subjects of her 
art and the desired referents they can never fully signify. Her second-naming (her baby, the 
product of a teenage love-affair, as “a haloed spirit” [121], and Keiko, her lesbian lover, as 
“a Buddhist Holy Virgin” [123]) comes to assert a presence of otherness -  an otherness 
which overshadows the originals and which the originals can never be. Her second-naming 
becomes problematic as it reveals itself to be a self-naming. “Perhaps in both cases”, Otoko 
considers, “she had a hidden desire for a self-portrait. Might not these sacred visions be 
nothing other than a vision of a saintly Otoko?” (122). She strives to validate her palimpsest, 
but traces of loss make their presence felt. Neither painting is completed.
Significantly, what Oki recalls most vividly about Otoko’s attempted suicide is the image 
of her thighs, which he describes in monstrous detail (18). Inoculated and mutilated, her legs 
are the channel through which her body is re-membered. With clinical morbidity, Oki forces 
the life back into them, and through them, into her entire being. It is not the spiritual, the 
“embrace” (18), which accompanies him through time. Rather, it is her moment as meat, as 
blood, as matter, the moment at which she is reduced to the crude and primitive materiality 
of the body, that remains the most potent memory.
Keiko also contemplates suicide, considering it a “sacrifice” (59) made worthy when 
transposed into art. “I’d be happy if you strangled me”, she tells Oki, “after you used me as a 
model, that is” (59). When aesthetic transformation is complete, when her body is repeated 
in Oki’s words, when a new Keiko, a fictionalised Keiko, emerges, then the old, the 
‘original’ body must fade. Keiko’s desire for translation into an Okian ‘heroine’ is based 
upon her concerns with ‘becoming’ Otoko. Just as she requested Otoko to capture her form 
in paint (as a repetition of Otoko’s self-creation in paint), Keiko desires repetition in Oki’s 
language. This operates as part of her revenge scheme, by which she intends to seduce Oki 
and retrieve from him the baby {or mizukof8 Otoko has lost, and which requires her to ‘be’ 
that ‘girl of sixteen’. Sara Harris, in her study of geisha, identifies how female suicide can 
operate as a means by which the woman posits herself “in the same sublime category as
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history’s [male] heroes, the forty-seven samurai.. .who, left without a lawful lord in the year 
1703, committed mass suicide” (Harris, 1962: 127-8, emphasis in original). This ennobling 
practice, however, is equally one of masculinisation, demanding an end to truly feminine 
autonymisation. This is perhaps why the culmination of Keiko’s revenge plan involves a 
drowning suicide: a return to the femininely fluid element of water, to the amniotic contents 
of the uterus, into which she will also draw the ‘new’ Oki, the second generation Oki, his son 
Taichiro. Keiko survives this ‘suicide’, but Taichiro, excluded from the feminine sphere of 
fluidity, drowns. Even though her true intentions may not have been to die with Taichiro (to 
whom she has confessed her plan, her deceit, and has professed, though with possible 
insincerity, her love), Keiko’s selection of drowning as a suicide method can be interpreted 
as an empowering alternative to the male-dominated seppuku. Whilst water might be 
construed as a feminine element, a female’s suicide through self-penetration, as demanded in 
seppuku, inscribes masculinity. Thus, Keiko finds success when she rejects ‘masculine’ 
forms of suicide, locating an alternative feminine expression.39 Whilst the male who commits 
seppuku is ennobled, his virility conceptually reinforced, the female who undertakes the 
same act condemns her femininity to (a negative) silence.
By way of a gynovocal conclusion (and in order that ‘suicide’, ‘lesbianism’ and ‘fluidities’ 
might briefly be conflated), I would propose that the transgressive body (which surfaced in 
my individual considerations of each) ‘speaks’ the feminine language of chaos. Whilst 
androvocality might be conceptualised as static, central, holistic, gynovocality can be 
construed as mobile, marginal, fragmented, manifold. Permitting feminine expression, in 
this way, incoherences certainty and validates incoherence, so that the fragment ‘speaks’, the 
blank ‘speaks’, the unsaid ‘speaks’, the silence ‘speaks’. The language of femininity, being 
the language which, paradoxically, is unspoken, elucidates chaos.
When the autonymous project of ‘HERstory’ is permitted, when gynovocality is 
evidenced, chaos can no longer be dismissed as disorder but must be understood as another
240
form of order (without needing to renounce its proclivity to formlessness). The language of 
femininity is ‘chaordered’ in that it exemplifies the workings of chaos as a system which 
derives a sense of order actually from its non-linearity.40 Masculine discourse, one might 
argue, holds the ideal of an instrumental and communicative expression, rendering 
ambiguity, anomaly and polysemy -  the vocabulary of chaos -  as excessive and obstructive 
to an effective clarity of comprehension. Although Kawabata’s exogenous-andfovocaiity 
acknowledges a degree of sympathy with this (mechanistic, conventional, rational) style of 
writing, it also perhaps permits the communication of a contrasting gynovocality. This is 
represented, in Beauty and Sadness, by the female characters Otoko and Keiko, who oscillate 
between being infeminatively constructed and vehicles for a counter-representation of the 
feminine. Otoko, for example, subverts her ‘destiny’ as the infeminated, heteronymised 
female by adopting a language of her own, a language not given to her by a male character: 
the language of painting. However, negative infeminative representation perhaps triumphs 
when she is only able to communicate desire for the male Oki in her lesbianism with Keiko. 
Again, Keiko autonymises in the fact that she is desired by all men, but refuses to belong to 
any. Keiko’s ‘story’, as 1 have indicated, also closes the narrative, denying Oki the right to 
finish what he had begun. She is, however, also condemned to re-live according to an 
already-authored script: to be the replacement baby for Otoko, the replacement Otoko for 
Oki, the second Otoko-authored portrait, the second Oki-authored heroine, the mediatrix 
between the present and the past for both Oki and Otoko. Her destiny means that she is 
forced to love without true reciprocation, and to experience heterosexual relationships even 
though she “hate[s] men” (127).
Kawabata’s Beauty and Sadness presents the infemination-reader with an insight into both 
‘History’ (the ‘language of language’) and ‘HERstory’ (the ‘language of silence’), 
testifying, therefore, to the potential for polyphony within the text.
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4 T(H)erminations
To write the multivocal or bi-vocal (in terms of masculine and feminine gendered 
languages) text, and to communicate this through a third (authorial) voice, demands the 
acceptance of competing logics.
Keiko, in Beauty and Sadness, wears a self-painted obi portraying a sombre rainbow. 
“What do you think it is?” she asks Taichiro. (It is unidentifiable to all but the artist). “It’s a 
rainbow! A colourless rainbow.. .just curved lines in light and dark ink” (109), she reveals. 
Keiko is “wrapped in a summer rainbow” (109) that is without summer. In contrast to this 
design, however, the back of her obi portrays lush “green mountain ranges” and a “rose- 
coloured... sky” (109). As Keiko explicates, “the two sides don’t match” (109). (The same is, 
of course, true of her breasts). Nevertheless, they are eternally bound: opposites attracted and 
compounded against their will. This operates as a metaphor for Kawabata’s contrary-yet- 
complementary writings contained within the text.
In Beauty and Sadness, the problem of the subservience of space and time to the logic of 
linearity is compounded by that which it lacks. His prose in the text very rarely relies on the 
physical evidence of disruption. He does not (generally) write the ellipsis: that which speaks 
unspeakability, intimating an unrepresentable image which is only presented through the 
mark of its lack. In the ellipsis, sense is fractured, the caesura (from the Latin for ‘cut’) 
interjecting to stem and let at will the fluidity of linear prose. Nevertheless, the text does 
intimate a jarring, jagged (de)composition, conferring a (silent) serrated typography. At the 
end of each chapter in Beauty and Sadness Kawabata does appear to conduct an invisible 
ellipsis of syntactical and logical binds in order to implement a momentaiy pause from the 
vocality of language, a pause which allows silence, which constitutes a lack, a separation, 
fragmentation or loss between word and image. Such an interruption constitutes the 
engendering breath -  the breath one must take in order to allow speech, the omission that 
always precedes emission, the uterine emptiness in which positive creation must originate. 
Such an interruption actively constitutes an encroachment of femininity upon masculinity.
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Thus, the first chapter, ‘Temple Bells’, concludes with rationality, conveying 
dispassionately and impersonally a cultural (and historical) fact: “According to long custom, 
that fire [at the New Year ceremony] would light the stove for cooking holiday dishes” (19). 
However, the following sentence (which begins the next chapter, entitled ‘Early Spring’) 
conveys emotion, recounting a private moment in which Oki, standing alone, contemplates a 
“purple sunset” (20) that re-ignites memories of Otoko. Similarly, the chapter ‘A Stone 
Garden’ concludes with a tense, restrained, though erotically-charged moment shared by 
Otoko and Keiko. Having successfully seduced Oki, Keiko has allowed her lover Otoko to 
neither see nor touch her body. In the concluding sentence, however, a (restricted) physical 
relationship is restored: “Keiko reached behind Otoko’s obi and gently straightened the back 
seam of her kimono” (75). This sentence is followed by another rigid, masculine, factual one 
-  one which begins the following chapter, ‘The Lotus in the Flames’: “There is a celebrated 
passage in the Illustrated Sights o f the Capital.. (76).
Chapters also seem to begin with vocality and end in silence, rotating to begin in silence 
and end audibly. Thus, ‘The Lotus in the Flames’ concludes with the line: “As Otoko sat 
there vacantly, she could hear the murmur of the flowing stream” (95). And ‘Strands of 
Black Hair’ must, in following, restore reality, conducting a movement away from the 
spirituality of silent contemplation and back to the materiality of the body -  in which 
language is implicated. “We have a visitor, dear!” (96) Oki’s wife informs him loudly, 
disrupting the self-contained musings of Otoko just one line earlier.
Kawabata, then, communicates both language and silence, permitting the ‘expression’ of 
femininity within the confines of male-authored discourse. Kawabata surpasses masculine 
univocality with Beauty and Sadness, to gynovocalise. Beauty and Sadness is, therefore, 
paradigmatic of the pluralised text; a text which, although Originating from a masculine 
place, demonstrates the fluidity of gender categories by relating (at least in part) a feminine 
story: ‘HERstory'.
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CONCLUSION: At-One-Ments
1 INTRAductions1
‘HERstory’, the seeming antithesis of ‘History’, and ‘GynoScapes’, the apparent counter 
to ‘GynEscapes’, here, in ‘At-One-Ments’, are respectively conjoined. ‘GynoScapes’, which 
comprised Chapter One, and which communicated a MacDonaldian vision2 of a feminised 
textual landscape; ‘GynEscapes’, my second chapter, which narrated an account of the 
MacDonaldian male (mortemalistic) escape from or disavowal of the bodyscape; ‘HIStory’, 
Chapter Three, which indicated the privileging of the masculine perspective in Kawabata’s 
writings; and ‘HERstory’, my fourth chapter, which suggested the possibility of a 
reclamation of the feminine ‘voice’3 within the Kawabatan androcentric schema: these four 
stories, although retaining their own agendas, converge at the moment of ‘At-One-Ments’.4 
In this, my concluding chapter, separation becomes unity, as the texts are considered 
explicitly with regard to their similarities: their common representations of the feminine as 
constructed via an infemination reading.
‘At-One-Ments’ shall, like its preceding chapters, be structurally segregated (for purposes 
of clarification). I shall commence by considering the specific texts of my current study; the 
texts of MacDonald and Kawabata, via a recapitulation (and an indication of the application) 
of the neologisms (mortemalisation, teratologisation, dysgenication) coined in order to 
represent the textual effects of infemination. Following this, I shall conduct an overview of 
the reading strategy of infemination, recalling its critical origins (as explored at length in my 
Introduction), and indicate its potential applicability to texts other than those treated in 
‘Infeminations’. I shall, therefore, not only rewrite but write anew: considering matters 
already considered, and indicating possible movements beyond the current text of my 
‘Infeminations’.
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2 Recallings
The infeminative concept of mortemalisation is perhaps most demonstrable in its 
application to MacDonald’s gyno/gynescopic writings. The mother figure is, as I have 
asserted, integral to the notion of these configurations,5 with her womb (gyne) being visually 
inscribed in their very names. The mother, in MacDonald’s writings, might be understood as 
having a dualised resonance:6 conceptualised as a life-giver, a source of fecundity, a nurturer 
and healer; but also as the opponent of life, growth and development. (Hence Vane and 
Anodos are nourished and cherished by Lona and the wise woman, respectively, but 
‘betrayed’ by Lilith and the white/inarble lady). This latter (Jungian) Terrible mother, who is 
intent upon retaining possession and dominance of her male offspring, is a symbol of the 
mortemalised feminine. As I conceptualise it, mortemalisation is a representation of the 
demonised mother figure; the literal or figurative maternal body within the text that is 
denigrated, assaulted or rejected in some way.
I shall reflect on the concept with textual examples -  firstly, one taken from/constructed 
out of Lilith. Vane considers the two worlds of his experience: the first (‘real’) being 
characterised by dependency (on the mother); the second (‘otherworld’) characterised by 
autonomy (from the mother).7 Vane learns to fear his former existence, which would sustain 
him as an eternal infant bound to the maternal body:
I said to myself that if in this forest I should catch the faint gleam of the mirror,81 
would turn far aside lest it should entrap me unawares, and give me back to my old 
existence: herQ I might learn to be something by doing something! I could not 
endure the thought of going back, with so many beginnings and not an end achieved. 
(L: 82)
This privileging, in this episode, of the world of “here” over the world (regressively) of 
“back [there]” constitutes Vane’s displacement of the mother as the locus of his existence; 
constitutes Vane’s mortemalisation.
Another example of MacDonaldian mortemalisation might be located in Anodos’ 
description of his encounter with a Fairy Land boat:
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At length, in a nook of the river,... still and deep as a soul in which the torrent eddies 
of pain have hollowed a great gulf, and then, subsiding in violence, have left it full 
of a motionless, fathomless sorrow - 1 saw a little boat lying... [A]s I was in Fairy 
Land where one does very much as he pleases, I forced my way to the brink, [and] 
stepped into the boat. (P: 122)
Anodos describes the boat-as-matemal-symbol in aggressive terms, suggesting the trauma 
that is maternity. Conceptualising maternity in this way (in the language of “pain”, 
“violence” and “sorrow”) might be understood as mortemalistic. Additionally, he suggests 
that it is maternity that makes of the feminine absence, as opposed to masculine presence. 
Maternity, according to his description, creates in woman the “great gulf’ (at the 
loss/expulsion of the child) that can never be satiated. Childbirth, in this way, is a tripartite 
experience, commencing with a repletion, followed by a depletion, followed by an 
oxymoronic repletion-with-a-depletion. Childbirth brings the mother a concrete, tangible, 
physical pain, followed by the abstract pain-of-loss that instigates an eternal mourning. The 
representation of mortemalisation is compounded, furthermore, by Anodos’ claim that he 
resorts to an enforced penetration of the ‘mother’. Anodos, with the understanding that 
maternity creates in woman an absence, endeavours to territorialise (by force) this space.
Although I have privileged examples of mortemalisation from MacDonald’s writings -  due 
to the foregrounding of the mother figure in the Gyno/Gynescape divide - 1 shall also briefly 
indicate the term’s application to Kawabata’s writings. The notion o f‘bad’ 
feminine/maternal fluidity is of particular thematic significance in Kawabata, evident in, for 
example, The Sound of the Mountain, where Kikuko’s “nosebleed” (SM: 93) precedes the 
blood-shed of her abortion; in The Lake, where it is associated with death (the titular -  
perhaps uterine -  lake in which Gimpei’s father drowns; and the female Hisako’s bleeding 
wound in Gimpei’s murder fantasy [TL: 120]). hi ‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’, fluidity 
is related literally to the death of Eguchi’s mother (‘HSB’: 95), and in Beauty and Sadness, 
Oki visualises the “premature baby” he and Otoko lose as suspended in water (BS: 13). This 
depiction of boundary-traversing fluidity, a fluidity that transgresses phallic solidity and is 
associated with the figure of the mother, is a depiction of mortemalisation.
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Connecting the concept of mortemalisation with teratologisation -  and being foundational 
to dysgenicating activity -  is the notion of denigrated feminine difference. The teratologised 
feminine is the embodiment of such difference -  conceptualised as a degeneration -  from a 
privileged masculine norm. The teratologised feminine is represented in the infemination 
text as the monster, the animal, the vampire, the hysteric, the ‘invert’.9 Teratologisation 
means (feminine) dehumanisation. Thus, Kawabata’s female characters, when represented in 
this way, come to be degraded into “something diabolical” (‘HSB’: 82) (the proprietess in 
‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’), or refuse heterosexuality to be written instead as 
madwomen (Otoko and Keiko in Beauty and Sadness);10 MacDonald’s females are vampiric, 
feline, serpentine (Lilith), or are physically concealed to suggest hidden horrors (Mara in 
Lilith)}1
I shall recapitulate on the concept of teratologisation via a specific example from 
Phantastes, recounting an episode of feminine degradation, voyeuristically observed by 
MacDonald’s male protagonist. Anodos watches (himself unseen) the “[female] fairy of the 
rose-tree” (P: 38), who “complained bitterly that [the other fairies] were stealing her clothes” 
(P: 38). The fairy, at first, “defendfs] her property bravely” (P: 38), refusing to submit (her 
metaphoric virginity) to the aggressive sexual advances of her ‘suitors’. However, she does 
eventually relinquish control -  of both virginity and sanity.12 Her actions become those of a 
madwoman as she conforms to the (late nineteenth-century) stereotype of ill, infectious, 
insane femininity;13 her actions become those of the teratologised woman.
Teratologisation might be evinced in the representation of dehumanised female characters, 
who are portrayed variously as beasts and monsters. MacDonald conceptualises a monstrous 
feminine, describing, for example, in Phantastes, the toothed ogress, whose appearance is 
bestial and vampiric. Likewise, in Kawabata’s writings bestialisation is associated with 
female characters -  such as in Beauty and Sadness, where Oki images the female Keiko as a 
dolphin; in Snow Country, where Shimamura describes the female Komako’s leech-mouth 
and animal-pelt skin; and in The Lake, where Gimpei visualises Machie’s eyes as “the shape
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of a tiny, beautiful fish” (TL: 132).14
Teratologisation is, of course, not alone in its status as a concept within the rhetoric of 
infemination founded on principles of difference. Equally, (hierarchic) distinctions between 
the male and the female, between masculinity and femininity form the basis for 
mortemalising discrimination. Furthermore, dysgenication also necessarily indicates 
difference, and the implications of difference (othering and secondisation) in its concerns 
with sameness. In MacDonald’s writings, female characters are ultimately reduced to a 
generic representation of femininity. Thus, Lilith, initially polarised in terms of morality with 
the ‘good’ Eve, Lona and Mara, is proven to share their destiny: a common outcome of 
goodness.15 Likewise, Kawabata’s writings are replete with images of young, virginal female 
bodies; with pale, idealised fantasy-women.
I shall recapitulate on the concept of dysgenication using examples firstly from 
MacDonald’s writings. In Lilith, the bodies of Eve and Mara are rendered physically 
interchangeable in their whiteness. Additionally, focus is placed upon the eyes of both 
women, which are described as incongruously vital elements of corpse-like bodies. “The life 
of [Eve’s] face and her whole person was gathered and concentrated in her eyes, where it 
became light... [TJhe still face might be a primeval perfection; the live eyes were a 
continuous creation” (L: 28). Mara, too, (who “reminded [Vane] rtot a little of [Eve]” [Z:
80]), has ‘active’ eyes, described as “we[eping] constantly” (Z: 80). Lilith is also classified 
according to dysgenication principles, sharing the whiteness of Mara and Eve. Lilith has 
vibrant eyes, which recall the colour, immortality and illuminating potency of Eve’s: a 
shared “darkness” (Z: 28) or “blackness” (Z: 127), an ability to “[flash] as never human eyes 
flashed” (Z: 131), and “seemfing] to fill the heavens, and give light to the world” (Z: 109).
In Kawabata’s writings, likewise, female characters are homogenised into a generic status. 
In ‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’, the girls are intratextually interchangeable (a living one 
might be substituted for a dead one). Additionally, female characters are transtextually 
similar: Keiko, in Beauty and Sadness, has a “pallor” (BS: 72) and is described as “milk- 
white” (BS: 91); Gimpei’s greatest voyeuristic triumph, Machie (in The Lake) has a “fair”
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(TL: 114) complexion; Komako, in Snow Country, has an albeit artificial whiteness courtesy 
of her “white geisha’s powder” (SC: 15); and the repeatedly bleeding Kikuko, in The Sound 
o f the Mountain, has a “pale face” (SM: 107), a “wan face” (SM: 162).
Dysgenication might also be recalled via examples from Kawabata’s Snow Country and 
The Lake. Shimamura, the male protagonist of Snow Country, occupies two worlds -  one the 
real, the known, the other the world of “the exotic and the unknown” (SC: 25). Shimamura 
valorises the latter world, as exemplified by his dilettantish obsession with “the occidental 
ballet” (SC: 24), an obsession which demands the alienation of its object from Shimamura’s 
world of experience.16 Shimamura recognises that his love is for the artificial, relating his 
treatment of his ballet hobby to his feelings for his ‘woman hobby’: Kom&ko (SC: 25). 
Likewise, in The Lake, Gimpei’s idealisation of Machie as a ballerina recalls Shimamura’s 
inhabitation of two worlds: “ ‘In my next life.. .we’ll dance together in a ballet of white.’ The 
girl’s dress was the white tutu of classical ballet, and the skirt swirled and fluttered” (TL: 
132-3). In contrast with the beautiful, fair-skinned, idealised Machie, a woman, approaching 
forty, with a “dark” (TL: 154), “sunburned” (TL: 155) complexion, is visualised by Gimpei 
to be “ugly” (TL: 154) beneath her clothes. He differentiates between Machie as “a beautiful 
dream” (TL: 157) and this woman as a “reality” (TL: 157). When this latter woman gets 
drunk, as does Snow Country's Komako, she visually reddens into reality.17 The 
representation of feminine sameness -  the originally idealised Komako (and later her 
replacement, Yoko) and Machie; the ‘real’-ised ‘female Gimpei’ (and eventually Komako) -  
exemplifies dysgenication.
Mortemalisation, teratologisation and dysgenication comprise the critical apparatus of the 
infemination reading strategy. Having redefined and recapitulated on these constructs -  
stating their individual agendas and acknowledging their shared status as principles of 
difference - 1 shall continue by demonstrating their critical-contextual underpinnings. In the 
following section I shall focus on summarising the theoretical basis of infemination, 
indicating the various debates in gender criticism that have informed its conceptualisation.
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3 FINfeminations
Difference not only informs all of the texts examined (courtesy of a reading of 
representations of mortemalisation, teratologisation and dysgenication), but is to be 
additionally evinced externally, as directly influencing my selection of material for defining 
and reading ‘infemination’. To compare the writings of MacDonald and Kawabata is to 
undertake an exercise in bridging difference. This difference, claims ‘At-One-Ments’, proves 
surmountable, with my readings of each writer presenting new possibilities for the critical 
evaluation of the other. I reconceptualise difference, therefore, as an opportunity rather than 
an obstacle.
I have deliberately studied texts without confinement to cultural or temporal boundaries, 
and this comparatist stance is further reinforced in the fact that I have also focused on the 
interrelationship of literature and other disciplines -  namely, critical theories. I have 
interrogated, therefore, not only the (fictional) interaction between MacDonald’s and 
Kawabata’s writings, but the relationship between literary text ahd literary criticism. My 
rewriting via the infemination reading ‘at-ones’ MacDonald with Kawabata, and also (to 
varying degrees) MacDonald/Kawabata with Cixous, Kristeva, Derrida et al.18
My conceptualisation of the infemination reading, as outlined in my Introduction, is 
informed by a range of theoretical perspectives. Of greatest significance have been aspects of 
deconstructive and French feminist critical approaches. Deconstruction, as I suggested in 
Tnformulations’, attacks Western metaphysical thought by showing how it privileges certain 
ideas and concepts. Derrida argues that a hierarchic relationship governs all binary 
oppositions: one term is privileged at the expense of the (suppressed) other, yet the 
privileged element relies on the existence of the subordinate for its own meaning. In defining 
the infemination reading I expressed a concern for the binarisms of gender, a stance indebted 
to the French feminist Cixous’ ‘Sorties’.19 Cixous’ project was to locate a discourse that is 
separate from the ‘ruling order’ of patriarchal discourse; to construct/reveal a feminine
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language that is freed from oppressive and phallocentric binary structures. Additionally, she 
sought to establish new traditions of women’s writing; to encourage women to “write from 
the body -  the female body and reject a phallic position within language.” (Cranny-Francis 
and Waring, 2003: 211). The infemination reading, however, considers male 
conceptualisations of femininity, focusing upon male representations of the feminine, rather 
than female self-representation.20
To summarise, I have contextualised my enterprise, situating it within the critical domains 
of feminist/deconstructive/gender theory by outlining some of the major debates that have 
informed such positions: I have considered the value of Anglo-American and French 
feminisms for my purpose, their essentialist and anti-essentialist implications, their relations 
to social reality, experience, expression and textuality, ecriture, representation; I have 
considered the applicability of deconstructive thought to feminism, via an interrogation of 
contemporary critical perspectives on gender representation such as Butler’s. I have selected 
elements from such debates that have enabled the conceptualisation (and contextualisation) 
of infemination; elements that have appealed to my specific requirements for the treatment of 
texts I term the ‘infemination reading’. The critical and methodological framework, then, of 
the infemination reading is founded on tenets sourced from a range of critical perspectives, 
encompassing not only feminisms but also the diverse theoretical strands that inform such 
feminisms (deconstruction, poststructuralism, postmodernism, psychoanalysis).
By way of an ‘embedded conclusion’, I would assert that my aim has been to propose a 
general mode of reading, the infemination reading, applicable to texts in addition to those 
that have occupied the ‘Infeminations’ text;21 a reading of representations of 
gender/femininity in male-authored fictions. It has also, of course, been my intention to 
conduct a detailed reading of the narrative and verbal textures of MacDonald’s and 
Kawabata’s writings. These specific writers were selected on the basis of sameness: because 
of their common maleness, and because of their shared textual fantasy of femininity. This 
choice was also made on the basis of difference: because of their separation in terms of
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nationality (implicating linguistic and cultural difference) and temporality (their occupation 
of historically different contexts).
In Spite of writing from markedly different experiences, the texts of both MacDonald and 
Kawabata lead, via the infemination reading, to similar conclusions. Not only united in their 
representations of gender, these writings might be positioned in the Gothic tradition. 
Recognisably ‘gothic’ features22 are evident (even prominent) in MacDonald’s writings -  his 
representations of grotesquely exaggerated monstrous women, who shape-shift and gorge on 
blood; his labyrinthine libraries and gloomy towers, animated skeletons and stalking 
shadows -  yet Kawabata’s writings also have an affinity with the tradition. Kawabata writes 
hauntings, but his texts traverse the psychic terrain of his male protagonists: isolated23 and 
insular men ‘possessed’ by dreams, memories and desires that betray their mental delusions, 
their regressive fantasies, their sexually and socially transgressive impulses.24 As David 
Punter asserts, texts need not provide stock features such as “archaic settings, a prominent 
use of the supernatural, [and] the presence of highly stereotyped characters” (Punter, 1996a:
1) in order to be deemed ‘Gothic’. Rather, they might focus on “landscapes of the mind, 
settings which are distorted by the pressure of the principal characters’ psychological 
obsessions”, so that the reader is “immersed in the psyche of the protagonist” (Punter, 1996a:
2). Punter’s broad conceptualisation of the Gothic text extends to writings by (among others) 
Thomas Pynchon, J.G. Ballard and William S. Burroughs. On Burroughs’ writing, he argues 
that “Gothic interlocks with the heritage of Kafka to produce a mode of fiction about 
bureaucratisation, institutionalisation, the alienation of the individual from power and control 
over his or her own life” (Punter, 1996b: 120). Burroughs “is concerned with the limits of 
the human, with the points at which man ceases to be man and becomes either beast or 
machine. He is concerned with vampirism, with the ways in which people feed off each 
other... [H]e is concerned with distortions of perception...” (Punter, 1996b: 131-2).
Following on from Punter’s classification of Burroughs in this way, I shall conduct a 
concise infemination reading of aspects of his 1959 work Naked Lunch in order to 
demonstrate how the strategy might be applied to other Gothic texts. Although an in-depth
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analysis that introduces entirely new material would be inappropriate at this (concluding, 
reflecting, summarising, terminating) stage, the brief interjection of pointers beyond the 
current analyses (of MacDonald’s and Kawabata’s writings) might indicate how the 
infemination reading might be applied to enrich our readings of other texts.
Mortemalisation is evident in Naked Lunch, a text in which the mother figure is 
conceptualised as a “sainted gash” (NL: 48); a glorified vagina. Mortemalisation might be 
evinced where Doctor Benway’s “cutrate abortions in subway toilets” and “hustling [of] 
pregnant women in the streets” (NL: 40) is (gleefully) discussed. Mortemalisation might also 
be located in descriptions of “[w]hore[s] staggerfing] out through dust and shit and litter of 
dead kittens, canying bales of aborted fetuses, broken condoms, bloody Kotex...” (NL: 80). 
Again, mortemalisation might be demonstrated in the notion of “mak[ing] sex in no 
gravity...[so that] female guests are subject to immaculate or at least indirect conception” 
(NL: 114) -  in this way, women are impregnated against their will and knowledge; raped 
without a threat being posed to the vagina dentata-fezring male,25 or the male who fears 
contact with the ‘polluting’ feminine; removed from participation in the sphere of 
reproduction, yet continuing (potentially) to supply patriarchy with its men. Maternity is 
associated in Naked Lunch with ‘bad’ fluidity, premised on the notion that “women have 
poison juices” (NL: 141). Aracknid the chauffeur, for example, “ran down a pregnant 
woman.. .and she miscarried a bloody, dead baby in the street.. .and [the police] finally 
arrested the woman for a violation of the Sanitary Code” (NL: 177). Likewise, the hospital 
delivery ward is littered with “[b]edpans full of blood and Kotex and nameless female 
substances, enough to pollute a continent” (NL: 68).26
Teratologisation is also evident in Naked Lunch, which features the bestialised Violet, 
Doctor Benway’s “baboon assistant” (NL: 39), and the female junkie with her “hunger of 
insects” (NL: 20); the “women with bestial faces” (NL: 83), and those described as “she- 
foxes” (NL: 87) or “bitch dogs in heat with rabies” (NL: 87). Additionally, there is the 
grotesque manly “Lesbian... [who wears] a leopard-skin jockstrap with enormous falsie
253
basket... [and] stands there smiling stupidly and flexing her huge muscles” (NL: 70); and 
another lesbian, who “slip[s] to the pub floor on a bloody kotex” and is “trample[d] to death” 
(NL: 129) by a male who sings of his phallic power: “He has loosed the fatal lightening o f 
his terrible swift sword” (NL: 129, emphasis in original).27 The text’s depiction of the 
monstrous Pantopon Rose is also teratological: a woman who “gouge[s] a great hole in her 
leg which seem[s] to hang open like an obscene festering mouth waiting for Unspeakable 
congress with the dropper which she.. .plunge[s] out of sight into the gaping wound” (NL: 
20); and its descriptions of female cannibals -  such as Mary, who “bites away Johnny’s lips 
and nose and sucks out his eyes with a pop.. .tears off great hunks of cheek... [and] lunches 
on his prick” (NL: 101) -  also permit its association with teratologisation.
Dysgenication, also, is a feature of (the infeminatively read) Naked Lunch, evident 
particularly in Burroughs’ persistent conceptualisation of female characters as meat. 
Pantopon Rose, for example, views her own body “with the cold blank eyes of a meat trader” 
(NL: 20); A.J. butchers (as well as symbolically castrates) female bodies with his 
decapitating “cutlass” (NL: 87); an anecdotal episode recalls a male’s visit to a prostitute, 
which culminates in his “switch[ing] [his] blade and cut[ting] a big hunk off her ass” (NL: 
122); vaginas are ingested by male characters (in a comparatively ‘civilised’ counter-piece to 
the earlier female cannibal description -  “Dinner is Lucy Bradshinkel’s cunt saignant cooked 
in Kotex papillon” (NL: 132).
As with those of both MacDonald and Kawabata, Burroughs’ writings might be read as 
originating out of personal feminine loss. Although not orphaned prematurely, Burroughs 
notoriously shot dead his wife (accidentally and fatally wounding her during an impromptu 
performance of his ‘William Tell party-trick’)28 -  an incident that he claimed was 
instrumental in compelling him to write:
I am forced to the appalling conclusion that I would never have become a writer but 
for Joan’s death, and to a realization of the extent to which this event has motivated 
and formulated my writing. I live with the constant threat of possession, a constant 
need to escape from possession, from Control. So the death of Joan brought me in 
contact with the invader, the Ugly Spirit, and maneuvered me into a lifelong
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struggle, in which I have had no choice except to write my way out. (Burroughs, 
1985: 18)
Burroughs’ (Gothic) ‘possession’ is codified feminine:29 Burroughs claims to be haunted by 
his dead wife, a haunting which comes perhaps to be translated into writing as the negative 
representation of the feminine. In this sense, Burroughs is ‘at-oned’ with the equally 
‘possessed’ MacDonald and Kawabata (and the niale characters who infeminate within their 
texts), their common hauntings originating out of feminine loss; their common feminine loss 
potentially influencing their infeminative representations.
I shall conclude with a consideration of the value of associating the Gothic literary mode 
with infemination. In Gothic representation, boundaries between polarised phenomena such 
as the real and imagined, order and chaos, life and death, self and other are blurred; notions 
of fixed identity and fixed meaning are violated. My (principal) infemination reading of the 
texts of MacDonald and Kawabata -  a reading strategy which draws on deconstructionist 
methodologies30 -  serves not only, then, to unite them in their represeiltations of gender, but 
also to reconceptualise them as examples of Gothic fiction. Connecting MacDonald and 
Kawabata as Gothic writers31 via the infemination reading, I deconstruct the binarism that 
polarises ‘low’ and ‘high’ art, so that the conspicuously Gothic text (MacDonald’s fantasy 
writings) and the inconspicuously Gothic text (Kawabata’s canonical, symbolist writings) are 
brought together.
Both my choice of textual and critical material has, therefore, been based on a hypothesis 
regarding boundaries. My selection of diverse approaches/traditions/conventions has enabled 
me to present a view of specific texts (notably MacDonald’s and Kawabata’s) that would be 
unavailable from any single perspective, and through this eclecticism I have endeavoured to 
demonstrate the permeability o f boundaries ', that several critical positions have valuable 
insights for a single reading mode, and that strikingly separated texts need not be 
(hierarchically) polarised.
ENDNOTES
Introduction: Informulations
II do not follow the Japanese name order in my study, whereby surnames precede. This is simply 
because I am considering Kawabata’s works (as well as critical texts) solely in English translation. 
2Infemination, as I conceptualise it, is a reading of negative femininities textually constructed by 
males. In simple terms, it is a reading of representations of male-authored misogyny.
3Phantastes was originally published in 1858; Lilith in 1895; ‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’ in 
1961, as Nemureru Bijo\ Beauty and Sadness in 1963, as Utsukushisa To Kanashimi To.
4My insertion of ‘apparent’ similarity is in order to stress their representative pairing as opposed to 
their exemplarity (in the sense of their being privileged as consummate infemination writings.)
SScott, 1994: 366.
6Cixous makes a similar assertion in ‘Sorties’, where she suggests that binary oppositions -  such as 
man/woman, activity/passivity, sun/moon -  can only be uridermined when they are acknowledged as 
being not dialectic but hierarchic structures (Cixous, 1986).
71 employ the binary terms ‘French’ and ‘Anglo-American’ in my discussion of feminisms, although 
‘French feminism’ is often also termed ‘postmodern’ feminism (see, for example, Tong, 1998). It is 
not my intention to comment, via these terms, on ethnicity -  indeed none of the ‘French’ feminists 
Cixous, Irigaray and Kristeva are French by birth.
80n ‘Gynocritics’ see Showalter’s ‘Towards a Feminist Poetics’ (Showalter, 1985).
90n Cixous’ notion of woman’s “writ[ing] in white ink”, which she associates with the “good 
mother’s milk”, see ‘The Laugh of the Medusa’ (Cixous, 1981:251). 
lOMoi, 1985: 110-3. See also Cixous’ La Jeune Nee (Cixous, 1975: 147) and ‘Castration or 
Decapitation?’ (Cixous, 1976: 171, 175).
11 Along similar lines, Elizabeth Grosz argues in Volatile Bodies that “[t]he body must be regarded as 
a site of social, political, cultural, and geographical inscriptions, production, or constitution. The body 
is not opposed to culture, a resistant throwback to a natural past; it is itself a cultural, the cultural 
producf’ (Grosz, 1994b: 23, emphasis in original).
12That Cixous conceptualises ecriture feminine as a writing that is not tethered to femaleness is 
evident where her exemplars of its proponents are drawn from the male literary avant-garde. She 
writes, for example, that “the continent [of feminine sexuality] is not impenetrably dark. I’ve been 
there often. I was oveijoyed one day to run into Jean Genet.. .There are some men (all too few) who 
aren’t afraid of femininity” (Cixous, 1981:255-6). In ‘Sorties’, Genet is explicitly connected with “a 
proliferating, maternal femininity” (Cixous, 1986: 86).
Likewise, Kristeva points to male writers who locate, via avant-garde techniques, the ‘feminine’.
Their language, Kristeva argues, permits femininity (the abject, the maternal semiotic) to, at moments, 
‘breakthrough’ (Kristeva, 1982:20).
Irigaray’s writings, furthermore, conceptualise a ludic mimicry that women, oppressed within the 
masculinist symbolic realm of discourse, might adopt in order to “convert a form of subordination into 
an affirmation, and thus...begin to thwart it” (Irigaray, 1985a: 76 [See also 1985b]). In mimicry, the 
female parodies the feminine style she is assigned, which is suggestive of the antf-essentialist position 
of Judith Butler. Butler, briefly, denies that sex (male/female) creates a definite gender 
(masculinity/femininity) which creates a definite desire, and conceptualises gender instead as 
unbound, fluid, and performed (Butler, 1990: 141): “[G]ender is a kind of persistent impersonation 
that passes as the real” (Butler, 1990: viii). As exemplary of gender subversion Butler suggests drag. 
(See also Joan Riviere’s 1929 ‘Womanliness as Masquerade’.)
13Deconstruction is markedly anti-essentialist in that it challenges the notion in Western metaphysics 
“that there is an essential unity of self through time and space tamed self-identity and that there is an 
essential relationship between language and reality termed truth” (Tong, 1998:195, emphases in 
original.)
14Cixous’ essentialism in this ‘additional desire’ might be considered a necessary expression, rather 
than a shortcoming. Vicki Kirby, for example, defends essentialism against Moi, arguing that “Moi’s 
fervid desire to remain unsullied by essentialism forgets that essentialism is the condition of 
possibility for any political axiology: the minimal consensual stuff that political action fastens onto is 
already essentialism’s effect” (Kirby, 1991:93).
15In ‘The Retrait of Metaphor’ (1978a), Derrida attacks the concept of the metaphor (of which male- 
female, masculinity-femininity are but examples). Metaphors, according to Derrida, are definitively 
unequal, in that one term is self-sufficient, real (the literal), whilst the other is figurative, dependent
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(the image/figure). Binary oppositions in Western thought are unbalanced, upholding the notion of a 
privileged ‘original’ arid a subordinated ‘derivative’. (“[I]n classical philosophical oppositions we are 
not dealing with the peaceful coexistence of a vis-a-vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy” [Derrida, 
1981b: 41). Derrida’s interest is not in reversing (and thereby upholding) binaries, but in 
demonstrating the dependency of even the privileged concept. Derrida does not strive to 
reconceptualise, for example, femininity as a superior term to masculinity, but merely to indicate the 
necessary presence of this typically suppressed concept for the ‘being’ of its supposed origin. 
Deconstruction focuses especially upon the hierarchical opposition of speech/writing. On such 
phonocentrism, Jonathan Culler writes, “[s]peech is seen as in direct contact with meaning: words 
issue from the speaker as the spontaneous and nearly transparent signs of his present thought, which 
the attendant listener hopes to grasp. Writing, on the other hand, consists of physical marks that are 
divorced from the thought that may have produced them. It characteristically functions in the absence 
of a speaker, gives uncertain access to a thought, and can even appear as wholly anonymous, cut off 
from any speaker or author” (Culler, 1983: 100). This tendency to privilege speech and presence 
derives from the Western tradition of logocentrism (whereby God created through speech -  a 
phallocentric verbalisation in that woman was created only after the light, the world and man). The 
association made by deconstruction of phallocentrism with logocentrism has been the focus of 
interest, as I have suggested, for French feminists.
16This term combines ‘difference’ with ‘to defer’, and is employed by Derrida to suggest a space (of 
deferral) between words and the things they mean, and to identify that meanings of words are rooted 
in difference. The change of the second ‘e’ to an ‘a’ can be seen (in writing) but not heard (in spoken 
French), with the effect that this term dramatises the limitations of speech. See Derrida, 1978c and 
1982.
17This concept also arises in ‘Sorties’. See Cixous, 1986: 84-5.
18“To this self-effacing, merger-type bisexuality,...I oppose the other bisexuality on which every 
subject not enclosed in the false theater of phallocentric representationalism has founded his/her erotic 
universe. Bisexuality: that is, each one’s location in self.. .of the presence -  variously manifest and 
insistent according to each person, male or female -  of both sexes, non-exclusion either of the 
difference or of one sex, and, from this, ‘self-permission’, multiplication of the effects of the 
inscription of desire, over all parts of my body and the other body” (Cixous, 1981: 254, emphasis in 
original).
19See note 12 above.
20See, for example, Martha Nussbaum’s ‘The Professor of Parody’ (Nussbaum, 1999), and Lynne 
Segal’s ‘Sexualities’, which considers Butler’s “endorsement of] a view of politics as a type of 
‘semiotic guerrilla warfare’ ” (Segal, 1997: 216).
21Schor, 1994: viii. On this debate see Moi’s Sexual/Textual Politics, to which the rise of anti- 
essentialist sentiment might be indebted (Moi, 1985); and see also Elizabeth Grosz’s critique of 
egalitarian feminism and defence of difference feminism (Grosz, 1994a).
22Not only Butler -  who, indebted to Foucault’s historicisation of sexuality (Foucault, 1976), argues 
that sex is gender -  challenges the conventional distinction between biological and cultural 
differences, between maleness/femaleness and masculmity/femminity. (See, for example, Ann 
Oakley’s polarisation of “the visible difference in genitalia, the related difference in procreative 
function” and the “social classification into ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ ” [Oakley, 1972:16]). This 
division is also contested by, among others, Thomas Laqueur (1990), who argues that sex as well as 
gender is a social construct. (Laqueur indicates that male and female bodies were considered, in the 
seventeenth-century, in terms of sameness, with testicles and ovaries bearing even a single name). 
Likewise, Christine Delphy (1996) argues that gender precedes sex, as does Catharine MacKinnon, 
who states that “[w]omen and men are divided by gender, made into the sexes as we know them” 
(MacKinnon, 1982: 533). Monique Wittig, furthermore, denies even the existence of sex, proclaiming 
“There is no sex. There is but a sex that is oppressed and a sex that oppresses. It is oppression that 
creates sex and not the contrary” (Wittig, 1996: 25).
This slippage/contestation of the difference between sex and gender, then, occurs in the writings of 
feminists of diverse political positions, blurring the distinction between poststructuralist and radical 
feminisms.
23It also follows Teresa de Lauretis’ argument in the late 1980s that gender is a representation 
constructed by culture: “The construction ofgender is the product and the process of both 
representation and self-representation” (Lauretis, 1987: 9, emphasis in original). This modification of 
Foucault’s 1976 historicisation of sexuality -  extended to include notions of self-representation (to 
suggest that we are not only represented but also represent ourselves as sexed bodies) -  is developed 
in the conceptualisation of performance.
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24Further challenges to essentialist notions of gender include Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s 
‘Epistesmology of the Closet’ (1990) and Donna Haraway’s ‘A Cyborg Manifesto’ (1991). Also, Susan 
Kessler articulates ways in which gender works to construct sex in her ‘The Medical Construction of 
Gender’, demonstrating that doctors create a ‘natural’ sex of intersexed bodies on the basis of cultural 
gender stereotypes (Kessler, 1994).
25Elizabeth Grosz, for example, criticises egalitarian feminists for their apparent belief that sameness 
should fell in favour of men: that women should become like men, rather than vice versa (Grosz, 
1994a: 89).
261 have already considered French feminist essentialism. However, it might be argued that the 
conceptualisation of “women as a coherent, biological mass with common concerns” (LeBihan, 2001: 
135) by Anglo-American feminists is essentialist, as opposed to French feminists who “[refocus] 
attention on the aspects of femininity in writing itself (regardless of the gender of the author)” 
(LeBihan, 2001: 135).
As Vicki Kirby argues, “[e]ssentialism is not an entity that can be identified and dissolved by saying 
yes or no to it” (Kirby, 1991: 93). Rather, “[t]he ‘place’ from which both essentialism and anti- 
essentialism make their claims is ‘something’ of a ‘share accommodation’, a strange abode in which 
their contradictions co-habit And this abode recalls a body that demonstrates its anti-essentialism by 
pinching its essentialism, a body that denies the violence of identity on the one hand by violently 
grasping its identity with the other” (Kirby, 1991: 94).
27By ‘both’ I mean not only Anglo-American and French feminism but the closely interconnected (in 
spite of their apparent polarity) positions of essentialism and anti-essentialism, feminism and 
deconstruction.
28My retention of the author is not only shared with Anglo-American feminists, but might 
additionally be interpreted as French-feminist-via-Bakhtin. In Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 
Mikhail Bakhtin critiques the monologic form of the traditional novel, where the authorial position is 
privileged (authorised) over the voices of the characters. He argues that Dostoevsky’s Writings express 
an aesthetic interaction between the consciousness of the characters and the author, creating an 
intermingling of voices, a polyphony. This gives shape to a new novelistic form: the dialogic novel. In 
Bakhtin’s conceptualisation of dialogism, the presence of authorial intention is retained. However, 
additional voices are not subordinated to -  but, rather, compete with -  this exogenous-androvocal 
presence (Bakhtin, 1984a).
See Kristeva’s reading of Bakhtin (Kristeva, 1986: 35-61).
29‘Herstory’ is a term that has been employed by feminists to mean ‘women’s history’ -  functioning 
as a convenient shorthand notation and as a comment on the (fictional) sexism inherent in ‘history’ 
(that is, ‘his-story). This is not my intention for the term in my naming of Chapter Four. Rather, I 
polarise ‘HIStory’ and ‘HERstory’ in order to suggest my concepts of andro- and gynovocality as 
invoked in my reading of Kawabata.
301 later define the infeminator’s textual homogenising of women as ‘dysgenication’.
31See note 12 above.
32See, for example, Kristeva, 1980: 92-3.
33EIizabeth Grosz speculates that this is because “in not occupying a phallic position in the symbolic, 
women can only imitate men, act in ways that are modelled on men’s behaviour” (Grosz, 1989:69) 
but associates it with male writers -  such as Artaud, Mallarmd and Joyce.
34In writing on abjection (a concept she associates with the maternal [Kristeva, 1982:208], Kristeva 
also invokes male writers such as Celine, Baudelaire, Lautreamont, Kafka and Bataille (Kristeva, 
1982:207).
35See also Alan Williamson’s study of male writers such as D.H. Lawrence and Cesare Pavese, who 
express, he argues, an affinity with femininity, or are in some way alienated from the ‘norms’ of 
(male) masculinity. Williamson critiques both the argument that males cannot identify with female 
experience and the alternative: that they can and do, but should not, as it poses a threat to their 
psychical integrity (Williamson, 2001).
36See also Derrida’s Spurs (1978b: 62-5).
37My assertion of‘plundering’ might be interpreted as a reference to Cixous’ ‘Sorties’, where she 
considers the dual meanings of the French word voler: ‘to steal’ and ‘to fly’. Cixous writes that “[t]o 
fly/steal is a woman’s gesture, to steal into language to make it fly” (Cixous, 1986: 96).
Flying/stealing, a metaphor for ‘feminine writing’, “scrambl[es] spatial order, disorient[s] it, mov[es] 
furniture, things, and values around, break[s] in, emptfies] structures, tum[s] the selfsame, the proper 
upside down” (Cixous, 1986: 96).
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381 am aware of the negative implications of this. French feminists, for example, in ‘sacrificing’ the 
social in favour of the textual, are often accused of shirking their practical political responsibility to 
the feminist cause.
39See Diane Elam, who notes that “deconstruction argues that we will not become conscious of the 
true essence of women through an endless recourse to descriptions of experiences of or by women.” 
(Elam, 1994: 30). See also Elizabeth Weed’s warnings against feminisms that unproblematically 
ground themselves upon ‘women’s experience’ (Weed, 1989). ^
40This latter sentiment has echoes of the Anglo-American feminist Showalter’s aversion to male 
theorists. Kappeler’s “literary critic” seems codified as the male enemy to the ‘true’ feminist Both 
Kappeler and Showalter uphold an apparent ‘either/or’ logic -  one must be literary critic/theorist or 
feminist; the ‘fiction’ that is representation must be shed by the ‘true’ feminist in favour of ‘truth’. \ 
Deconstructive feminism, as I have detailed at length, contests this notion.
41‘Dissemination’ refers to Derrida’s attack on Socratic Patriarchy, constituting his recommended 
scattering of the ‘seed’ in writing. Dissemination, according to Derrida, is the notion that meaning is 
not contained in language but is coextensive with the play of language itself. Meanings of texts are 
disseminated, spread across its entire surface. Dissemination involves scattering, dispersion, 
propagation, the spreading of seed. It suggests a textual ‘free play’, which is joyous but unstable and 
excessive. Derrida employs the term, then, in reference to language, referring to the diffusion of 
meaning, the surplus of meaning, which is inherent in the use of all language. Derrida puns on the 
words semen (seed) and sema (sign) to evoke the idea that signification is a scattering of seed/signs 
rather than a determinate endeavour (Derrida, 198 la: 304).
My emphasis is on an inversion of this Derridean notion, indicating a gesture of phallic power and 
imposition rather than the scattering or loss of it.
42My stance on representation is also indebted to Loma Sage’s essay ‘Simone de Beauvoir’. Here, 
Sage postulates an anti-Barthesian notion of reviving the author through autobiography. De 
Beauvoir’s writings, Sage argues, “destabilised the relations between past and present, work and 
world, on which realism depends” (Sage, 2001: 151), demonstrating that “the boundary between 
books and the world was permeable” (Sage, 2001: 154). In de Beauvoir’s writings, the 
representational and the material are not posited as binary opposites, rather, “the life of the write' 
[becomes] a representable life” (Sage, 2001: 179). I share this perspective of permeability in my 
conceptualisation of the infemination reading. The author, although denied automatic (monologic) 
privilege, is made manifest via my conceptualisation of the trinity of‘voices’: androvocality, 
gynovocality and exogenous-androvocality. Autobiography surfaces in the latter construct which 
considers a ‘presence’ external to the text.
43‘Deconstruction’, as I have suggested, describes “procedures for the active interrogation of 
logocentric texts” (Grosz, 1989: xv), as postulated by Derrida in Of Grammatology (Derrida, 1976). 
See also Kamufj 1991; Norris, 1991; Culler, 1983.
44See note 41 above.
45Derrida, 1999:286.
46Interpretatian, according to Tzvetan Todorov, is constituted by textual “substitution”, by extracting 
from “the apparent textual fabric, a second more authentic text” (Todorov, 1977: 238). Interpretation 
concerns itself not, then, with the text, but with texts.
47Kawabata’s are termed ‘Revisions’ because they re-visit many of the themes (pertaining to negative 
constructions of the feminine) explored in MacDonald’s ‘Perversions’.
48The duality that is central to the concept might also be interpreted as a means of re-locating and 
inscribing the suppressed concept of femininity.
49MacDonald re-writes most evidently in Lilith. However, even his Phantastes might be understood 
as repetition, as I explore in Chapter One. This is due to its generic connections -  with German 
Romanticism, with fairy tales etc. (Also, its titular claim to being a ‘Romance’ aligns it with the 
Mediaeval literary tradition of the romance or romaunt, which is a chivalric tale often centred upon a 
quest).
50Deconstructionists argue that translation constitutes a valid re-writing, allowing originals to be 
continuously reconstructed in the present. Translation, in this way, ‘creates’ the source text.
On deconstruction and translation see, for example, Derrida’s Positions (Derrida, 1981b: 20) and The 
Ear of the Other (Derrida, 1985b), and Barbara Johnson’s ‘Taking Fidelity Philosophically’ (Johnson, 
1985).
51In his short story ‘Papa’s Story’ (first published in 1865), MacDonald too presents a translation of 
sorts: a Scottish tale ‘translated’ into English (MacDonald, 1973a: 311).
52Chow, 1999: 502.
530n the matter of translation see Peter Metevelis (1994) and Gwenn Boardman (1971), who consider 
both literal and interpretive Japanese-to-English translation, and indicate the losses incurred in 
transliteration. See also Edward Fowler (1992), who discusses the implications of translating Japanese 
fiction for an English-speaking market.
54Scott Watson criticises a specific Seidensticker translation (of a Kawabatan text, Izu [The Izu 
Dancer]), and indicates the pitfalls of translation in general. “Seidensticker pleaded that all he saw in 
Kawabata at the time of the Izu translation was the bittersweet and die exotic, that his understanding 
was that of a mere tourist” (Watson, 1991: 316). Translation, according to Watson, is subjective and 
narcissistic, and is especially problematic when it concerns occidental and oriental conversion. “They 
[translators] will reveal what is West about East or what is East about West” (Watson, 1991: 317)
Such a notion is clearly indebted to Edward Said’s conceptualisation of‘Orientalism’. According to 
Said, the Orient is an imagined place, produced out of the encounter between Europe and its others. 
These others -  bom out of processes of “designating in one’s mind a familiar space which is ‘ours’ 
and an unfamiliar space beyond ‘ours’ which is ‘theirs’ ” (Said, 1978: 54) -  are constructed within a 
discourse, both materially and imaginatively; a discourse called ‘Orientalism’. Said states that 
Orientalism might be defined (among several other definitions) “as a Western style for dominating 
restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (Said, 1978: 3). Said’s formula, which 
conceptualises a privileged ‘here’ space in contrast with a feared/despised/romanticised ‘there’ space, 
has, of course, a significance to studies of gender -  such as mine -  which draw on deconstructive 
theory.
55See also Walter Benjamin’s ‘The Task of the Translator’ (Benjamin, 1992).
56See Margaret Atwood’s Negotiating with the Dead, where she argues that the author of a work 
ceases to exist with its completion. The post-publication author is not, according to Atwood, the same 
person as during the writing process (Atwood, 2002).
57Barthes’ concept of authorial death is premised on the understanding that the signifier is mobile, 
moving between producer and recipient, and owned exclusively by neither. Barthes argues that it is 
the text itself that should form the focus of reading, and eschews its interpretation via external 
structures. The text’s innumerable readings are accessible in varying degrees -  some readers locate 
some meanings, others locate others, and yet more readings remain unexplored/unknown (Barthes, 
[1968] 1988). (The notion of authorial death was not, however, pioneered by Barthes. See, for 
example, Coleridge’s 1817 consideration of an equality between author/producer and reader/observer 
[Coleridge, 1906]).
58Likewise, for French feminists, authorial biography is excluded, sex negated. They disregard the 
sex of the author as being disruptive of a theory which postulates authorial death (Barthes, 1988), 
suggesting, as discussed above, that both males and females might textually inscribe masculinity and 
femininity (Cixous suggests non-gender-specificity when she associates certain male authors with 
ecriture feminine, and indeed pronounces explicitly that “you can sometimes find femininity in 
writings signed by men: it does happen” [Cixous, 1981: 52]; Kristeva, likewise, locates the feminine 
semiotic which subverts the Law of the Father in the writings of males (Kristeva, 1980: 92-3; 1982: 
207).
59The Kawabata texts I intend to consider have a number of translators. All of these, apart from one 
(Reiko Tsukimura, who translated The Lake), are male. The ‘presence’ of a female ‘shadow author’ 
possibly presents another layer for the reader concerned with gender to excoriate (and the fact that 
Tsukimura is Japanese also raises questions about ethnicity -  as to whether a Japanese woman is 
more ‘qualified’ to re-write Kawabata than an American man, such as Edward Seidensticker). It would 
be an interesting study to consider translations of the same texts by male and female translators, and 
compare and contrast them with the ‘original’, as well as with each other. However, for the purposes 
of the current study, the translator, along with his or her gender, is invisible. (Nevertheless, to consider 
Kawabata’s translators as secondary, as a suppressed faction, perhaps also suggests their common 
feminisation -  in spite of their sexual differences, and validates their relevance to an infemination 
reading.
60Julia Kristeva coined the term in Kristeva, 1986: 37. (For a comprehensive introduction to the 
theory and practice of intertextuality see also Worton and Still, 1993).
61 That is not to say, however, that a text already known through other readings is denied the prospect 
of an infemination interpretation. I shall not, therefore, silence all data pertaining to the ‘real life’ 
experiences of MacDonald and Kawabata -  who surface, in any case, in my conception of exogenous- 
androvocality. Rather, when art appears to mirror life, I shall acknowledge the fact (usually in 
[end]notes).
621 create a critical text using signifiers from diverse sources (including my own) to illuminate 
primary texts with which they seem to resonate. (Hence my utilisation of aspects of Freudian,
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Lacanian, Jungian and Kleinian psychoanalysis, in addition to my borrowings from gender studies and 
poststructuralism). I would argue that different textual moments perhaps demand subtly or 
dramatically different attentions.
630n the notion of “In-between[ness]” see Cixous’ conceptualisation of bisexuality (Cixous, 1981: 
254). See also her "Sorties’ (Cixous, 1986: 86). Elisabeth Daumer, furthermore, argues that 
‘bisexuality’ should be understood as a configuration of queering: “Because bisexuality occupies an 
ambiguous position between identities, it is able to shed light on the gaps arid contradictions of all 
identity, on what we might call the difference within identity” (Daumer, 1992: 98, emphases in 
original).
64Mortemalisation is a comment on the death inherent in being bom: perceiving the mother’s 
expulsion of the baby into fife as an automatic death-sentence.
Mortemalisation might be located where arguments of orificial interconvertibility persist. Freud, for 
example, considers the anus as a displaced vagina (Freud, 1908:219).
Kristeva’s Powers o f Horror also identifies two categories of pollutant which support the view of an 
affinity between birth and death. These pollutants, both of which signify the body’s constant and 
synchronous living and dying, she labels “excrement[al]” and “menstrual” (Kristeva, 1982: 71). Both 
embody a physical, concrete manifestation of that which once lived but is now dead. The vagina, 
although fulfilling a similar function to the anus, is not, however, to be considered its equal. Whilst 
the menstrual orifice intimates a threat to order, the excremental does not. What makes menstrual 
blood fearful whilst excrement is not is die fact that, as well as demonstrating the life-to-death descent 
(the cyclical but nonetheless irreversible process encapsulated in defecation), the breakdown of the 
womb (lining) into death also symbolises the body’s capacity for renewal.
On the ‘danger’ of orifices see also the anthropologist Mary Douglas’ Purity and Danger (Douglas, 
1966:122).
65The term ‘teratology’ is used in contemporary medical discourse to connote the study of the effects 
-  developmental alterations -  that external exposures have on foetuses. As defined by Monstrous.com 
(1998-2003), “[t]eratology is the study of perceived abnormalities in the natural world, both real and 
imagined”. I adopt (a modified version of) the term in order to describe the infeminator’s 
representation of monstrous femininity.
66Indeed, according to Havelock Ellis, the lesbian and the animal are united, with lesbianism being 
equated with bestiality (see Dijkstra, 1986:297).
67As Rosi Braidotti writes, “[w]oman as a sign of difference is monstrous. If we define the monster as 
a bodily entity that is anomalous and deviant vis- -^vis the norm, then we can argue that the female 
body shares with the monster the privilege of bringing out a unique blend of fascination and horror” 
(Braidotti, 1994: 81, emphase/in original).
The ‘monstrous feminine’ is a term which permits the correspondence between ‘teratologisation’ and 
‘mortemalisation’, in that it has been employed to suggest a horror-inspiring mother-figure. See, for 
example, Bakhtin’s image of the ‘pregnant hag’ in his discussion of camivalesque transgression 
(Bakhtin, 1984b); Kristeva’s writings on the abjection of the maternal body (Kristeva, 1982); Barbard 
Creed’s study of the image in film (Creed, 1993).
68According to Jonathan Culler, word-play “show[s] speakers intently or playfully working to reveal 
the structures of language, motivating linguistic signs, allowing signifiers to affect meaning by 
generating new connections” (Culler, 1988: 3). Derek Attridge also writes that the play on words 
“hinder[s] what is taken to be the function of language: the clean transmission of a pre-existing, self- 
sufficient, unequivocal meaning. It is a characteristic mode of the dream, the witticism, the slip of the 
tongue: those irruptions of the disorderly world of childhood pleasures and unconscious desires into 
the clear and linear processes of practical and rational thought...” (Attridge, 1988:140).
69The visual segregation of ‘At-One-Ments’ is achieved through hyphenation.
70This notion of the text’s multiple voices, or multiple opportunities for expression, is not meant to 
convey a correlation with expressivist aesthetics. I consider, rather, Kristeva’s appropriation of 
Bakhtin’s ‘polyphony’ when discussing ‘voice’ (Kristeva, 1986: 35-61). In Problems of Dostoevsky's 
Poetics (1984a), as I have indicated, Bakhtin identifies subversive voices in dialogic novels which 
disrupt patriarchal structures. This notion appealed to Kristeva in her conceptualisation of the 
semiotic, the ‘unconscious’ aspect of language, characterised by slippage, random associations, 
disorder (1986: 90-136).
71Biographical similarities include, most pertinently, their common premature experiences of 
motherlessness. Greville MacDonald (1924) and David Holbrook (1991; 2000) discuss MacDonald’s 
maternal loss, and J. Martin Holman considers Kawabata’s orphanhood (Holman, 1998: vii-viii), as 
does Kawabata himself in the autobiographical ‘Oil’ (Kawabata, 1998: 68-76).
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From this feet of their shared experience of motherlessness it might be possible to suggest that 
infemination appeals to the male writer who suffered mother loss in childhood. Infemination would 
opefate, then, as a compensatory function, or even as a kind of‘revenge’ on the mother, signalling an 
‘orphan complex’.
MacDonald’s mother weaned him suddenly and prematurely, and died when he was still young. A 
letter preserved by MacDonald for the rest of his life regarding his sudden weaning was written by his 
mother to his maternal grandmother. MacDonald’s mother was instructed to wean her son prematurely 
by her husband, who had himself received written instruction from his mother-in-law. According to 
Judith Gero John, “[t]his situation created a unique set of circumstances for a male writer. MacDonald 
craved a mother strong enough to remain with her child -  over the objections of the father. In his 
fantasy the strong grandmother who raised him combined with the beautiful mother who died young 
to create beautiful, powerful women who did not often let the masculine order interfere with their 
ability to love and guide their children” (John, 1991:28). MacDonald’s experiences of maternal 
rejection (first by her weaning, second by her dying) influenced, according to John and Holbrook, the 
ways in which he textually constructed femininity,
Kawabata, likewise, wrote frequently of his orphan psychology/nature/sorrow; his experience of 
being, from early childhood, a “stranger in a strange land” (Kawabata, cited in Starrs, 1998: 27). His 
male characters, likewise, seem autobiographical with their alienated, marginalised existences, and 
their narcissistic desire for motherliness in women (see Roy Starrs, 1998: 130).
Again, although his writings are invoked for solely thematic support (in my Chapter Two), Sacher- 
Masoch’s biography also reveals details of maternal ‘loss’. Like MacDonald, Sachef-Masoch was 
removed from the breast of his mother, whose milk could not nourish him, and given to another 
woman. This sense of deprivation might have been interpreted as cruelty on the part of the mother, 
and expressed as such in his textual portrayals of sadistic women. (See James Cleugh’s biographies 
[Cleugh, 1951; 1967] and Wanda von Sacher-Masoch’s memoirs [Saeher-Masoch, 1990]).
72Selected biographical information shall, as I have both stated and demonstrated, be ‘present’ in the 
form of notes. It is removed from the body of my text because of its interference with an infemination 
reading. However, it is retained (albeit conspicuously) because, although irrelevant to such a reading 
(which seeks a common thread of negative feminine representation), it may have a bearing on the 
respective writers’ texts in their own right.
See, for example, note 71 above, where I consider the common orphanhood of MacDonald and 
Kawabata. Many of these writers’ works also feature orphans (whether motherless, fatherless, or 
both). As well as Lilith and Phantastes, see MacDonald’s ‘The Gifts of the Child Christ’ (MacDonald, 
1973a: 31-60), ‘The History of Photogen andNycteris’ (MacDonald, 1973a: 63-101, and 1999: 304- 
341), ‘The Golden Key’ (MacDonald, 1973a: 153-177, and 1999:120-144), ‘Cross Purposes’ 
(MacDonald, 1973a: 181-197, and 1999: 103-119), ‘The Castle: A Parable’ (MacDonald, 1973a: 283- 
294), ‘The Carasoyn’ (MacDonald, 1973b: 75-111, and 1999: 189-224), ‘The Cruel Painter’ 
(MacDonald, 1973b: 123-152, ‘The Broken Swords’ (MacDonald, 1973b: 155-174), ‘The Wow 
O’Riwen’ (MacDonald, 1973b: 177-189), At The Back of the North Wind (MacDonald, 1966). 
Likewise, see Kawabata’s first-person narratives (or “I-eye” [Buckley, 1988: 444] texts -  where the 
narrator is “source of both the narrative and the gaze” [Buckley, 1988:444]), which communicate a 
strong sense of maternal loss. See, for example, the short stories ‘Oil’ and ‘The Master ofFunerals’, in 
the collection The Dancing Girl o f Izu and Other Stories {Izu No Odoriko) (Kawabata, 1998: 68-76 
and 77-87, respectively).
73MacDonald’s ‘The Light Princess’ (1864), ‘The Grey Wolf (1871), ‘The History of Photogen and 
Nycteris’ (1879); Kawabata’s Snow Country (Yukiguni, 1947), ‘Her Husband Didn’t’ (in Fuji No 
Hatsuyuki, 1952), The Sound o f the Mountain {YamaNo Oto, 1954), The Lake {Mizuumi, 1954); Bram 
Stoker’s Dracula (1897); Leopold von Sacher-Masoch’s Venus in Furs {Venus im Pelz, 1866).
(I state here the original publication dates of these texts in parentheses).
74MacDonald also wrote third-person narratives elsewhere. Kawabata also wrote first-person 
narratives elsewhere. My comments here refer to the author-narrator-character set-up in the main 
MacDonald and Kawabata texts of my current study.
75See Kristeva’s reading of Bakhtin in ‘Word, Dialogue and Novel’ (Kristeva, 1986: 35-61).
76This study acknowledges David Holbrook’s observation that “all [MacDonald’s] work...is 
compelled by the quest for the dead mother” (Holbrook, 1991: 28). Holbrook interprets MacDonald’s 
personal quest in terms of Kleinian ‘good/bad’ breasts (Holbrook, 1991: 64). I focus, however, not on 
MacDonald’s autobiographical relationship to his male protagonists, but on their textual experiences 
of the maternal and the mortemal.
77See Eiji Sekine who argues that Eguchi “identififes] with life through his female partner’s 
sacrificial death” (Sekine, 1993: 56).
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78The proprietess, whose key might be interpreted psychoanalytically, is perhaps identifiable as a 
‘Phallic woman’. In ‘On the Sexual Theories of Children’, Freud describes the ‘Phallic woman’ as the 
boy’s fantasy of a “woman with a penis” (Freud, 1908: 216). He later explicitly terms her “the phallic 
mother, of whom we are afraid... dread[ing].. .mother-incest and [the] horror of the female genitals” 
(Freud, 1932:24, emphasis in original). Laplanche and Pontalis also define the ‘Phallic 
woman/mother’ as a “[w]oman endowed, in phantasy, with a phallus...represented either as having an 
external phallus or phallic attribute, or else as having preserved the male’s phallus inside herself’ 
(Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988: 311).
79Indeed, David Holbrook states that Lilith was originally intended as a counter-piece to Phantastes. 
However, the original manuscript portrayed a son’s search for his father, in contrast with Phantastes’ 
dramatisation of a mother quest. In the original Lilith manuscript, MacDonald writes “My mind was 
filled with my determination to devote my life to the finding of my father.. .1 felt that all my life 
hitherto had been but a preparation for setting out to search for him” (MacDonald, cited in Holbrook, 
2000: 242).
Changes to the manuscript, whereby the text was reworked as a search for the mother, were 
implemented following the death of MacDonald’s daughter Lilia, who had adopted a ‘maternal’ role 
within the MacDonald household after her own mother’s death. The text’s title (Lilith) is, of course, 
evocative of the name Lilia; additionally, the character of the child-mother Lona became more 
prominent in the text when Lilia died (Holbrook, 2000: 31).
80French feminists have associated femininity with fluidity. Irigaray, for example, argues that the 
fluid “represents feminine joidssance quite well” and is “completely foreign to what an economy of 
erection...represents” (Irigaray, cited in Grosz, 1989:170). See also This sex which is notone, in 
particular Chapter Six, entitled ‘The “Mechanics” of Fluids’ (Irigaray, 1985a: 106-118). Kristeva’s 
Powers of Horror also makes the connection in her conceptualisation of the abject: that which 
“disturbs identity, system, order” (Kristeva, 1982:4), and which must be expelled in order to gain 
subjectivity. Kristeva associates the abject with the maternal body, and with the ‘obscene’ fluids 
(according to a phallocentric perspective) identified with this body.
See also Elizabeth Grosz’s reading of Kristeva in Volatile Bodies. Grosz asserts that bodily fluids 
(codified culturally as feminine) “have enabled men to associate women with infection, with disease, 
with the idea of festering putrefaction, no longer contained simply in female genitals but at any or all 
points of the female body” (Grosz, 1994b: 206).
81‘At-One-Ment’ is a title inspired by Lilith's climax of personal and universal 
consolidation/redemption. As Vane describes: “The world and my being, its life and mine, were one. 
The microcosm and macrocosm were at length atoned [‘at-oned’], at length in harmony!” (L: 243)
Chapter One: GynoScapes
. IThis term connotes Lacan’s “corps morcele” (Lacan, 1966: 97), a concept employed in order to 
describe the transition, during the mirror stage, “from a fragmented body-image to a form of its 
totality” (Lacan, 1977: 4). Morselisation describes not a progression to wholeness, but a regression 
into parts.
This feature of the representation of women also occurs in Renaissance poetry, where the convention 
of the ‘blazon’, the literary inventory of female bodily attributes, is frequently discussed. See, for 
example, Mazzio and Hillman (1997); Sawday, 1997.
2 the state of‘uterine insecurity’ is related, of course, to Freud’s repression hypothesis. According to 
Freud, when the external world cannot satisfy the id’s pleasure drives, or if such satisfaction would 
transgress the moral sanctions imposed by the superego, defence mechanisms such as repression 
operate to reconcile reality with the demands of both (id and superego). Repression forces unresolved 
conflicts/past traumas/‘inappropriate’ desires into the realm of the unconscious. From there, however, 
this repressed material continues to exert an influence upon the conscious mind, revealing itself (albeit 
in a disguised form) in neuroses, parapraxes, dreams and art (Freud, 1915). MacDonald’s orphans, 
denied the reality of a maternal-filial relationship, are compelled to seek ‘safe’ wombs and to evade 
‘uncanny’ ones. (On the uncanny see Freud, 1919).
3As MacDonald asserts, “[h]e who will be a man, and will not be a child, must.. .become a little man, 
that is, a dwarf’ (MacDonald, 1999: 10). See also Don King’s discussion of the MacDonaldian 
concept of the childlike (King, 1986).
4See Jung, 1959.
See also Edmund Cusick’s Jungjan interpretations of MacDonald’s writings (Cusick, 1990).
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5Grimal, 1996:167.
6ibid.
7Klein, 1946: 99-110.
8 Jung, 1959: 81. These associations are also suggested by Dijkstra’s description of depictions of 
women in late nineteenth-century iconography and literature: “As earth, earth mother, vulval round, 
moon, and mirror of nature woman was a simple reflection of the world around her. She was the 
arable soil of the material world... [and] water, the natural mirror, was the source of her impersonal, 
self-contained self-identity” (Dijkstra, 1986: 132).
9Jung, 1959: 82. 
lONeumann, 1963:21.
UNeumann, 1963: 26.
12Neumann, 1963: 148.
13According to Robert Graves, the ash is traditionally perceived (in British folklore) as a cruel tree, its 
shade being harmful to crop-growth, and its oppressive “roots strangl[ing] those of other forest trees” 
(Graves, 1999:164). The alder, Graves adds, is granted a maternal association, deemed the 
“guardi[an] of milk’7 (Graves, 1999:165). MacDonald’s alder-woman is a dysfunctional mother who 
withholds this milk, and conspires to enforce Anodos’ ‘delivery’ into receipt of a (paternal) castration. 
The Ash is exemplary of what David Holbrook describes as “an even more terrible figure” than the 
potentially malignant dead mother: “the father” (Holbrook, 1991:64). Holbrook explains the paternal 
danger via a consideration of Klein’s (1932) concept of the ‘Combined Parents’ fantasy (Holbrook, 
1991: 65). “The in font fears that the parents, in the oral intensity of their sexual hunger, may turn on 
him, and destroy him” (Holbrook, 1991: 239). This fear is realised in Phantastes.
(Incidentally, the theosophist H.P. Blavatsky recounts a Scandinavian legend of the creation of the 
human race. Three gods find a pair of sticks floating in the sea, animate them, and name the man Askr 
[meaning ‘ash’] and the woman Embla [meaning ‘alder’ [Blavatsky, 1988: 151]. This suggests the 
primordial, archetypal nature of the ash-alder parental configuration).
14Patai, 1964:295.
15ibid.
16See also Patai, 1978; Unterman, 1991: 120; Bach, 1999.
17Patai, 1964:295.
18Patai, 1964:296-7.
19MacDonald’s male characters often assert their ‘right’ to create women. In ‘The Butcher’s Bills’, 
for example, MacDonald’s first-person narrator asserts: “[M]ost women affect me only as valuable 
crude material out of which precious things are making... [S]o many rough-hewn marble blocks” 
(MacDonald, 1973b: 225). MacDonald’s ‘The Gifts of the Child Christ’ also features a male who 
“h arbour [s] the presumptious hope of so choosing and so fashioning the heart and mind of a woman 
that they should be as concave mirrors to his own” (MacDonald, 1973a: 34).
This theme recurs in MacDonald’s writing, and is also evident in Kawabata’s -  as I shall lata1 
illustrate.
20LiIith exemplifies Freud’s “dark continent” (Freud, 1926:212) of adult female sexuality. (This 
description is particularly appropriate for my gynoscopic study ofbodyscapes as it connotes terrain). 
Like Bunyan’s Christian, Vane must “[turn] ‘the shadow of death into the morning’ ” (Bunyan, 1964: 
66). (See also Johnson, 2002).
21 The dichotomy of (feminine) darkness and (masculine) light is evidenced throughout MacDonald’s 
writings (Pennington, 1999). This division of‘good’ light and ‘bad’ darkness is associated with 
Pythagoras (c. 570-495 BC), as Geoffrey Lloyd indicates (Lloyd, 1962:169). The (apocryphal)
‘Gospel of Bartholomew’ associates the “bright” sun with Adam, and the “stained” moon with Eve 
(which is marred by darkness due to her “transgression” [cited in James, 1986:173]). H.P. Blavatsky 
describes the perpetual battle between the “night of Heathenism” and the “divine light of Christianity” 
(Blavatsky, 1988: ix). And, according to Jung, “[d]ay and light are synonyms for consciousness, night 
and dark for the unconscious” (Jung, 1959: 167).
22“Women have no definite indi vidual limits”, writes Otto Weininger in Sex and Character 
(Weininger, 1906: 198). And, for the infeminator, “shapelessness adds to...horror” (MacDonald, 
1973b: 196).
23MacDonald’s text does not overtly use the metaphor of the medusa. Nevertheless, Northrop Frye 
identifies Lilith with the medusa: “The Great Whore of the Bible is the Medusa who turns mm to 
stone, the femme fatale of the romantic poets whose kiss is death, whose love is annihilation” (Frye, 
1967: 140).
For further discussions of the medusa see also Wilk, 2000; Garber, 2003; Freud, 1940.
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24See Elaine Showalter’s The Female Malady, where she explores the Victorian connection between 
loose hair, loose morals and loose wits (Showalter, 1987).
25Freud, 1940.
26FoucauIt bases his notion of panopticism on Bentham’s architectural figure, the Panopticon. 
“Bentham laid down the principle”, states Foucault, “that power should be visible and unverifiable. 
Visible: the inmate will constantly have before his eyes the tall Outline of the central tower from 
which he is spied upon. Unverifiable: the inmate must never know whether he is being looked at at 
any one moment, but he must be sure that he may always be so” (Foucault, 1979: 201). “[T]he major 
effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that 
assures the automatic functioning of power” (201).
For a discussion of panopticism see both Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1979:195-228), 
and Bentham’s The Panopticon Writings (Bentham, 1995:29-95).
27John Pennington argues that Vane’s difficulty in ‘reading’ Lilith originates in her assertion of 
multiple, fractured, fragmented, dividual selves (Pennington, 2002).
28See also Doris Bargen on the various implications of un/masking, un/veiling: “Symbolically, 
masking can hide or disguise the self, it can also be a form of self-disclosure or revelation. Sometimes 
masking is associated with twinning in that the doubled face has the effect of blurring or confusing 
identities. Masking also has the potential for making a face both more elusive and more expressive...It 
can also dreate the impression of immutability, thereby claiming universality. Finally, in philosophical 
or religious terms, the process of masking and unmasking corresponds to the process of Buddhist 
enlightenment.. .Thus the layering and piling up of experience contributes to the refinement and, 
ultimately, the enlightenment of the human heart. Within a ritual context, masks become instrumental 
in the dramatization of liminal crises and foreshadow the eventual transcendence of conflict. Masks 
epitomize character and signify ‘categorical change’ ” (Bargen, 1991: 149).
29Castle, here, is historicising Judith Butler’s position. Butler, as described in my Introduction, argues 
that identity is fluid and performed (Butler, 1990).
30MacDonald’s description of Mara recalls that of the “wise woman” (MacDonald, 1973a: 205) in his 
‘The Wise Woman, or the Lost Princess’ (first serialised in 1874): “[A] tall woman, muffled from 
head to foot” (MacDonald, 1973a: 205), who, unveiled, reveals “a garment...’[a]ll lilly whites, 
withoutten spot or pride...’ ” (MacDonald, 1973a: 205).
It also suggests H. Rider Haggard’s description of the white sorceress Ayesha in She (first published 
in 1886). “The curtain agitated itself a little, then suddenly between its folds there appeared a most 
beautiful white hand (white as snow)” (Rider Haggard, 2001:145). A “figure” appears, with both 
“body” and “face.. .wrapped up in soft white, gauzy material” (146). When Ayesha unveils herself she 
also resembles Lilith (with her bodily whiteness and black hair): “[TJhis beauty, with all its awfiil 
loveliness and purity, was eviF (Rider Haggard, 2001:158, emphasis in original).
31Rider Haggard’s Ayesha threatens a similar punishment for the transgression of seeing her 
unveiled:
“ ‘Rash man!’ she said; ‘like Actaeon, thou hast had thy will; be careftd lest, like Actaeon, thou too 
dost perish miserably, tom to pieces by the ban-hounds of thine own passions... (Rider Haggard, 
2001:159)
32This punishment also recalls that incurred by Orpheus in Greek mythology. Orpheus visits the 
Underworld to convince Hades to release his deceased wife, the naiad nymph Euridike. Hades agrees, 
but stipulates a single condition for her return: Orpheus must not look at his wife until they reach their 
home. Orpheus, fearing that his wife is not following (and desiring to re-frame her with his gaze), is 
compelled to look. Euridike immediately disappears, to be permanently lost to her husband (Soto, 
2000).
33The Scottish National Dictionary defines mar as the sea (Grant, 1938:205), and MacDonald’s 
Mara might be associated, via her tears, with water. Elsewhere, MacDonald writes: “The waters of 
Mara had risen and filled the house” (MacDonald, 1973a: 53). The Scottish National Dictionary also 
associates mar with maw, a Scottish version of the English ma (mother) (Grant, 1938:226). (Of 
course, in terms of maternity and fluidity, mar might also be associated with the French: mer [‘sea’] 
and mere [‘mother’]). The Scottish National Dictionary, again, defines mar-as-maw as “the call of a 
cat” (Grant, 1938:227). Notions of water, mothers and cats are all relevant to MacDonald’s Mara. 
34Mara is comparable with Thomas De Quincey’s Mater Lachrymarum, Our Lady of Tears, the 
“Madonna” (De Quincey, 1888: 110). Additionally, she is, as Magdalene, the prostitute who once 
“beguiled” (De Quincey, 1888: 50) men; “led [them] astray” (De Quincey, 1888: 50); “from 
heaven...stole away...[their] heartfsf’ (De Quincey, 1888: 50); caused them to be “idolatrous”, to 
“[worship] the worm”, to “[pray] to the wormy grave” (De Quincey, 1888: 50). MacDonald’s Mara 
finds her redemption in bringing sleepers ‘home’ to mother Eve. De Quincey’s Lachrymarum has a
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similar calling, implicated as “a ghostly intruder [in] the chambers of sleepless men, sleepless women, 
sleepless children” (De Quincey, 1888: 110).
35See note 21.
360n a biographical note, Vane’s encounter with the vampiric Lilith-leech recalls MacDonald’s own 
experience of disease. His wife writes in 1869: “The Doctors ordered leeches twice. Fancy his losing a 
lot of blood!...His eyes [became] sunken, his cheeks hollow, and he [became]... weak” (cited in 
Greville MacDonald, 1924: 395, emphasis in original). MacDonald’s wife ridicules the notion of her 
husband’s sanguinisation, his blood loss that suggests an incongruous male menstruation. 
37MacDonald also describe’s a vampire’s “greedy leech-like lips” in ‘The Cruel Painter’
(MacDonald, 1973b: 136).
38See also Marjorie Garber’s ‘Fluid Exchanges: The Bisexual Vampire’ (Garber, 1995).
39This notion of a polarised mastery and slavery shall be explored in greater depth with regard to 
Sacher-Masoch’s Venus in Furs.
40The vagina inspires terror as both displaced anus and as potential castrator. On the symbol of the 
vagina dentata see Wolfgang Lederer’s The Fear of Women (1968).
41Freud first discusses his concept of the ‘castration complex’ in ‘On the Sexual Theories of 
Children’ (Freud, 1908:217). See also ‘Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood’ (Freud, 
1910:460).
42Lacan’s “nom du pere” (Lacan, 1966: 278, emphasis in original) originates in his ‘Fonction et 
champ de la parole et du langage en psychanalyse’. “It is in the name ofthe father that we must 
recognize the support of the symbolic function which, from the dawn of history, has identified his 
person with the figure of the law” (Lacan, 1977: 67, emphasis in original). His tom becomes Nom-du- 
PerelName-of-the-Father in his seminar on the psychoses, punning (in the French) on the paternal 
nom that grants the subject identity, and the paternal non that denies Oedipal (maternal) incest (Lacan, 
1993).
43Lacan 1966: 93-100, 1977: 1-7.
Lacan based this 1949 paper ‘Le stade dumiroir comme formateur de la fonction du Je’/ ‘The Mirror 
Stage as Formative of the Function of the I’ on an earlier version entitled ‘Le stade du miroir’, first 
delivered in 1936, and translated into English in 1937.
44Similarly, Kawabata’s 1926 palm-of-the-hand story, ‘Goldfish on the Roof (Kawabata, 1990: 76- 
8), describes a woman whose “mirror” acts as “a silver curtain of illusion” (Kawabata, 1990: 76, 
emphasis added).
45See Chamisso’s Peter Schlemihls wundersame Geschichte (1962) and Hoffmann’s DieAbenteuer 
der Silvestemacht (1919).
460n the ‘monstrous feminine’ see Barbara Creed, 1993.
47See also Rider Haggard’s description of Ayesha, whose white “wrappings” recall “grave-clothes” 
and lend ha* a “ghost-like” appearance (Rider Haggard, 2001: 146).
Lilith’s emphasised (‘bad’) whiteness also causes her to resemble the White Witch of C.S. Lewis’ The 
Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe. David Holbrook suggests both are “phantom [s] of the dead 
mother” (Holbrook, 1991:103). Similarly, whilst the Lilith of mythology is associated with male 
nocturnal emissions (from which she conceives [Patai, 1964]), Lewis’ White Witch, according to 
Holbrook, “tempts [her author] to masturbation” (Holbrook, 1991: 103), to releasing his white seminal 
essence,
48MacDonald’s writings, according to David Robb, identify “home” or “hame” (Robb, 1990: 19) as 
“the scene, time and time again, of the hero’s return tp origins and to love” (Robb, 1990: 19). Robb 
argues that MacDonald’s (‘Scottish’) works polarise ‘Scotland’ and ‘England’, so that the former is 
considered with nostalgia and affection and the latter is perceived as alien, as other, as not-home 
(Robb, 1990:20). (See also Walter Houghton’s discussion regarding Victorian perspectives on ‘home’ 
[Houghton, 1957]).
49Holbrook, 1991: 27.
50In a Kawabatan context this symbolism suggests mastery, the power to hold rather than to be held. 
Kawabata’s ‘palm-of-the-hand’ story is a self-sufficient literary world crafted to fit into the palm of '■ 
the author’s hand; a would-be fleeting narrative (in its brevity) that can nevertheless be controlled; 
held.
51See Gaarden, 1999.
52Again, the association between feminine darkness and masculine light is suggested.
The notion of light as the ‘saviour’ of darkness is expressed also in the Bible, where Jesus identifies:
“I am the light of the world: he that followeth me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of 
life” (John 8:12).
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53See also Rider Haggard’s She, where Leo Vincey (on his twenty-fifth birthday) receives his 
paternal inheritance: a silver chest (and the phallic keys that open it), containing his father’s story (of 
his encounters with the beautiful white [and Lilithesque] sorceress, Ayesha) (Rider Haggard, 2001: 
33-9).
54Jung, 1953:49.
55 See Freud, 1919:76-86.
56If palms are ‘homes’, according to MacDonald’s conceptualisation, Lilith’s hand might be 
understood as representing the womb. However, her clenched fist will not permit Vane’s return. 
57MacDonald discusses the nature of the vampire in ‘The Cruel Painter’ (first published in 1864), 
which features a woman named Lilith (although she is not one herself). This story involves a love-sick 
and feminised (MacDonald, 1973b: 123) young man, his tutor, the titular artist, and the painter’s 
beautiful daughter (who is also the young man’s desire-object). Lilith, the daughter, is initially 
associated with death (she first appears in a “churchyard”, “seated on a grave” [MacDonald, 1973b:
124], and is described as “always pale, and now pale as death” [MacDonald, 1973b: 125]). At first, 
she is perceived as unreal: as “Adam’s first wife” (MacDonald, 1973b: 123), “a vision” and 
“apparition” (MacDonald, 1973b: 124). HpweVer, she is a real woman, beautiful but cold 
(MacDonald, 1973b: 131), and loved by Lottchen, who surrenders his dignity (like Sacher-Masoch’s 
Severin and, indeed, MacDonald’s Vane and Anodos) in order to satisfy his scopophilic desire 
(MacDonald, 1973b: 128, emphasis in original).
MacDonald defines the vampire as “[a] spectrum of the deceased” (MacDonald, 1973b: 133, emphasis 
in original); the re-animated corpse of a “suicide” victim (MacDonald, 1973b: 133); “a body retaining 
a kind of animal life after the soul ha[s] departed” (MacDonald, 1973b: 135); as having “a blind 
hunger for the sole food which could keep its awful life persistent -  living human blood”
(MacDonald, 1973b 135). MacDonald describes how the vampire, motivated by a (sexual) blood- 
thirst, “[creeps] from its tomb, and...roam[s] about till it [finds] some one asleep, towards whom it 
ha[s] an attraction” (MacDonald, 1973b: 136). The (sexually and nutritionally) satiated vampire is 
invigorated: becoming “perfectly fresh and plump, sometimes indeed of rather florid complexion” 
(MacDonald, 1973b: 136) -  recalling, for example, the experiences of Stoker’s Lucy and of 
MacDonald’s (1895) Lilith.
(For a definition of the vampire in Stoker’s Dracula see 1974: 241-5).
58See Frank Riga’s discussion of the dualised nature (destructive/protective) of MacDonald’s nature 
goddess, North Wind (Riga, 1991: 92). North Wind inflicts ship-sinking storms and nurtures the boy 
Diamond (her voice “was more like his [Diamond’s] mother’s voice than anything else in the world” 
[MacDonald, 1966:54]).
59Seenote 13.
60An example of a Kawabatan association of women with statues is evident in his 1924 palm-of-the- 
hand story, ‘The Weaker Vessel’ (Kawabata, 1990:5-6). Also, a male’s physical manipulation 
of a female’s body is discussed in Kawabata’s 1925 palm-of-the-hand story, ‘The Incident of the Dead 
Face’, hi this story, the male is confronted with the female’s perceived ugly dead face. He is 
compelled to knead the ‘offending’ flesh into an expression of beauty (Kawabata, 1990:28-9).
61 The beech tree, in British folklore, is connected with writing, with the English word book finding 
etymological origination with the word beech. For Celtic Druids, Robert Graves indicates, “ ‘[b]eech’ 
is a common synonym for ‘literature’ ” (Graves, 1999: 34). Anodos’ beech-woman, although unable 
to write herself (into her desired woman-status), imparts on him the ability to communicate with the 
feminine (that is, with the natural world around him). Anodos comes to be more fully integrated with 
nature, understanding the language of birds, squirrels, mice and monkeys (P: 63).
62Nostcdgia is etymologically derived from the Greek nostos (return home) and algos (pain) (Onions, 
1966:615).
63Incidentally, a reversal of this Western tradition of equating light with the masculine and darkness 
with the feminine is apparent in Shinto, the indigenous religion of Japan. According to Shinto 
mythology, daylight is governed by a goddess, whilst the night is the domain of her brother (Storm, 
2002:14). In MacDonald’s writing, also, female characters are sometimes described in terms of 
whiteness, whilst blackness (such as embodied by the Shadow) is deemed masculine.
64MacDonald was raised as a Calvinist, but later rejected this in favour of a “romantic theology” 
(Hindmarsh, 1990:55), influenced by Blake, Swedenborg and F.D. Maurice. MacDonald’s heterodox 
Christian beliefs encompassed the notion that all of creation, including the Devil, would eventually be 
redeemed -  as opposed to the Calvinistic doctrine of pre-destination. Therefore, although good and 
evil are polarised in Lilith, the titular anti-heroine is finally ‘claimed’ for good.
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65Stoker suggested Dracula to be a morality play, writing that “[t]he book is necessarily full of 
horrors and terrors but.. .these are calculated to ‘cleanse the mind of pity and terror’ ” (Stoker, cited in 
Hughes, 2000: 15).
His first published work of fiction, Under the Sunset (1882), was a collection of Christian allegories 
for children, concerned with good and evil, sin and Divine Order. In both MacDonald’s and Stoker’s 
(Christianity-influenced) writings, evil is finally expelled and moral order is restored, so that God’s 
omnipotent and omnibenevolent status is reaffirmed.
See Victor Sage’s Horror Fiction in the Protestant Tradition (Sage, 1988).
66Lilith might be associated with Thomas De Quincey’s Mater Tenebrarum, Our Lady of Darkness,
“the defier of God”, “the mother of lunacies”, “the suggestress of suicides” (De Quincey, 1888: 112). 
Tenebrarum is also described as ‘‘moving with incalculable motions, bounding, and with a tiger’s 
leaps” (De Quincey, 1888:112, emphasis is added), whilst Lilith is, of course, a leopardess.
67“Daemon est Deus inversus, the Devil is the shadow of God” (Blavatsky, 1988:560, emphasis in 
original).
68‘The figure of the black woman”, states Sander Gilman, writing on racial stereotypes, “becomes an 
allegory for the soul that has fallen from grace but still contains the potential for salvation” (Gilman,
1985:145).
69Gn a biographical note, MacDonald’s skin was ‘blemished’ by eczema, which his son describes as 
a “torture” (Greville MacDonald, 1924: 558); “the evil thing” (Greville MacDonald, 1924: 560, 
emphasis added). George MacDonald also writes, in an 1861 letter to his wife, “I have had a most 
strange, delightful feeling lately -  when disgusted with my own selfishness -  of just giving away the 
self to God -  throwing it off me up to heaven -  to be forgotten and grow clean, without my smearing 
it all over with trying to wash out the spot” (cited in Greville MacDonald, 1924: 327, emphasis in 
original).
The notion of ‘evil’ skin pigmentation is also considered in Kawabata’s Thousand Cranes (first 
published in 1958 as Sembazuru). A birth-mark on a woman’s breast, that corrupts her should-be n/
whiteness, prevents her (‘good’) maternity. “[T]he trouble would be having the child look at the 
birthmark while it was nursing...From the day it was born it would drink there; and from the day it 
began to see, it would see that ugly mark on its mother’s breast. Its first impression of the world, its 
first impression of its mother, would be that ugly birthmark, and there the impression would be, 
through the child’s whole life” (Kawabata, 1996b: 6-7).
70According to Jung, “[t]he shadow [archetype] corresponds to a negative ego personality and 
includes all those qualities we find painful or regrettable” (Jung, 1953: 169).
71 The figure of the nurturing “Grandmother” Nature (MacDonald, 1973a: 158) is central to 
MacDonald’s short story ‘The Golden Key5 (first published in 1867), and he also conceptualises 
“Nature [as] the eternal mother” in his 1882 ‘The Gifts of the Child Christ’ (MacDonald, 1973a: 46). 
72Roderick McGillis argues that a text’s refusal to aid constitutes a subversion of binary dynamics. 
“Narrative in its inevitable opening and closing”, he writes, “rests on binary opposition: 
beginning/ending”. MacDonald, however, “break[s] the codes of closure” (McGillis, 1990: 32), 
conducting a literary “liberation from binary thinking and from linear narrative” (McGillis, 1990:34).
The refusal to assart a definite ending suggests the narratives’ (feminine) circularity.
73Barthes, 1988.
74The (gyroscopic) image of circularity is focal in Phantastes, where even Anodos’ name can be 
interpreted as meaning ‘a way back [to the mother]’. Repetitions and re-visitations, as Roderick 
McGillis’ essay ‘The Community of the Centre’ demonstrates, form much of the action. Anodos’ 
experiences in the wise old woman’s four-doored cottage exemplify this. The first door of tears leads 
him back to childhood. The second door of sighs returns him the primal scene where he witnesses 
parental copulation (of the white lady and the knight Percivale). The third door of dismay leads him to 
reconciliation with his past. The fourth door of the timeless leads to Eden, permitting a flashforward 
rather than a flashback; q fleeting glimpse of the future -  but, of course, when Anodos finally reaches 
Eden it shall be a re-visitation. (See McGillis, 1992: 63, n.l).
Circularity is, of course, important to my readings of both Lilith and Phantastes with my focus being 
on representations of the mother (the ‘mother’ is itself an image of circularity in her configuration as 
womb and tomb.) According to Bruce Hindmarsh, circularity is central to MacDonald’s theology: the 
belief “that we do not proceed from nothing to something. Our path is mysteriously round; we journey 
from God to God. We leave home with our destination being no less than to return home once again” 
(Hindmarsh, 1990: 65). In my readings of MacDonald’s Lilith and Phantastes, God is feminised as the 
mother to whom Vane and Anodos must return.
75‘The Grey Wolf was originally published in 1871, ‘The Light Princess in 1864, ‘The History of 
Photogen and Nycteris’ in 1879.
268
76This Pythagorean division is also presented by Aristotle (1968-9).
Again, Vincent Foster Hopper, writing on mediaeval number symbolism, asserts that even numbers 
(such as ‘two’, the second, the other) are feminine because of their emptiness. When (masculine) odd 
numbers, however, are divided a “middle” (Hopper, 1969:40), a presence always remains. 
Additionally, when odd and even numbers are combined (that is, added) their ‘offspring’ is always 
odd (Hopper, 1969: 40). Masculine numbers therefore dominate their feminine equivalents.
77My use of this concept is informed by Kristeva’s reading of Bakhtin, as discussed in my 
Introduction (Kristeva, 1986: 35-61).
78The structuralist Vladimir Propp, for example, detects 31 generic fairy tale plot elements 
(functions) in his study of 100 Russian folk tales, and consequently argues that all can be reduced to a 
formula (whereby the protagonist experiences a lack/loss, sets off on a quest for recovery, encounters 
various assistants/opponents and trials, and is finally rewarded) (Propp, 1968). (On the fairy tale genre 
see also Zipes, 1979; 1983).
79David Robb’s discussion of MacDonald’s ‘Scottish’ novels concludes that ‘Scotland’ and 
‘England’ are polarised as self and other (Robb, 1990:20). In ‘The Grey Wolf the Scotland-England 
tension is sustained, but because the protagonist is English, Scotland comes to embody his sense of 
the other.
David Holbrook argues that this story is another example of the MacDonaldian ‘home’ quest. He 
interprets the text as a search for the lost mother, where “the reader encounters...the voracious 
impulse in his own unconscious: the hungry need for the mother that was once so powerful in infancy 
that it seemed to threaten to eat up the whole world” (Holbrook, 1991: 83).
80Duriez, 2002: v.
F. Hal Broome asserts that Anodos’ name “referfs] to an inward and upward journey, specifically of 
the soul” (Broome, 1990: 96).
Fernando Soto (2000) asserts that the word anodos indicates the cyclical rejuvenation of the Earth 
goddess(es) in Greek mythology. Soto associates Anodos with the seasonal ‘rising up’ of various 
Greek Earth/Mother goddesses: Cybele (Anodos’ fairy grandmother), Persephone (the flower-bearing 
maiden), Demeter (the cottage-dwelling old woman), Euridike (the marble lady) (Soto, 2000).
81 See Showalter, 1987.
82Dieter Petzold discusses Darwin’s theory of Evolution (which blurred the distinction between 
humans and animals), and suggested the influence of this on MacDonald’s writings (Petzold, 1995). 
83See Havelock Ellis’ association of menstruation and the moon (Ellis, 1894:282).
840n Kawabatan male sacrifice see Takao Hagiwara, who describes the closing sequence in The 
Sound ofthe Mountain as a “[Ejucharistic last supper scene. ..Shingo, in comparing himself to a 
falling trout, can be said to offer his body to be eaten symbolically by the rest of the 
family”(Hagiwara, 1992:261).
85This irrecoverability of the witch’s corpse suggests her rejection as a necrophilic desire-object. On 
such objectification/fetishisation/preservation see Bronfen, 1992.
86MacDonald’s ‘Little Daylight’ (first published in 1886) shares thematic similarities with his ‘The 
Light Princess’. It commences with an announcement of a royal birth of a girl who, like the Light 
Princess, is destined to be cursed (again after the ‘Sleeping Beauty’ mode) by a malicious fairy. The 
witch causes the child (named ‘Little Daylight’) to sleep during the day and be controlled at night by 
the moon; to wax and wane in vitality according to the lunar (menstrual?) phase. Little Daylight is, 
however, eventually rescued by the kiss of a prince. This occurs when she is in the form of a wrinkled 
old woman, an act of sacrifice on the prince’s part as it lacks the motivation of sexual desire. Daylight, 
not only the woman but the personification of light, is released from darkness -  which might be 
interpreted as a masculine victory on two counts, privileging both masculinely-gendered light and 
male-authored activity.
87This story is also known as ‘The Day Boy and the Night Girl’ (originally published in 1888).
See Frank Riga’s reading of it as a dramatisation of Plato’s Allegory of the Cave. His discussion of 
the story’s light and dark imagery might also be brought to bear on readings of Lilith and Phantastes 
(Riga, 1992).
88Dijkstra, 1986: 122-7.
89See Bonnie Gaarden’s reading of the structure of Phantastes, which she perceives as a four-coiled 
spiral-imaging narrative which diarts the protagonist’s journey from youth, through young adulthood 
and maturity, and concluding in late maturity. Each phase, Gaarden asserts, is instigated by an image 
of feminine fluidity, and is accompanied by a goddess figure. The Beech tree worhan is identified as 
“God in Nature”; the Fairy Queen is “God in Art”; the wise woman is “God in Christ”; and the 
singing maiden, although not strictly a goddess herselfj delivers Anodos to God-being (via the fluidity 
of her singing), awakening in him his “Christ-self or God within” (Gaarden, 1999: 7).
269
Chapter Two: GynEscapes
II conceptualise desire in the Platonic/Hegelian/Lacanian sense “as a fundamental lack in being, an 
incompletion or absence within the subject which the subject experiences as a disquieting loss, and 
which prompts it into the activity of seeking an appropriate object to fill the lack and thus to satisfy 
itself’ (Grosz, 1989: xv-xvi).
2Klein, 1928:167-180.
3See Don King’s study of the MacDonaldian ‘childlike’ (King, 1986).
4Notions of sin and redemption, of the satanic and the saved are central concerns for Christian writer 
MacDonald. As Bruce Hindmarsh indicates, MacDonald’s theology (a belief system that perhaps most 
evidently informs his Lilith) included the conviction that “the whole universe” -  including the 
‘beastlike’ -  must come eventually to be “transformed into a thing of holy beauty” (Hindmarsh, 1990: 
56).
50n the matter of the human’s menagerie of selves, Dieter Petzold suggests MacDonald’s affiliation 
with Jung. He asserts, however, that MacDonald diverges from Jung’s theory of individuation (which 
states that all selves, both good and bad, must be integrated) in his insistence that serpent-selves be 
rejected (Petzold, 1995).
6The Raven, of course, is bestial in his appearance. Jung identifies, however, that, in the unconscious, 
“[t]he animal form shows that the contents and functions in question are still in die extrahuman 
sphere, ie, on a plane beyond human consciousness” (Jung, 1959:230). Thus the Raven’s bestiality 
serves to signify that Vane inhabits the otherworld, and does not necessarily denote his debasement. 
The Raven is, as I have earlier indicated, an incarnation of Adam. In this form he might be associated 
with the Egyptian goddess of truth and divine order, Maat. According to Jon Davies, Maat provided 
the feather against which the heart of the deceased would be weighed before being permitted entry 
into the afterlife (Davies, 1999: 34). This is MacDonald’s Raven’s role: to evaluate candidates for 
reunion with God.
7See also C.S. Lewis’ novel The Horse and His Boy (Lewis, 1954).
On a biographical note, Vane as horse-lover recalls MacDonald’s own equine passion, as described by 
his son (Greville MacDonald, 1924: 54,235, 345).
8In MacDonald’s Wilfrid Cumbermede, a horse is indeed named ‘Lilith’ because her beauty recalls 
that of the demon woman (MacDonald, 1872: 101).
9 Vane perhaps Strives to locate in the horse a compliant version of Lilith: a Lilith who will not, like 
the demoness of mythology, refuse to be ‘ridden’ in sex.
lOMacDonald discusses “the divine nature of the child” (MacDonald, 1868:7) in his Unspoken 
Sermons. Takao Hagiwara (1992) describes children as “non- (or rather sub-) adults”, which causes 
them to be literarily “‘marked off as beings not yet fully human... [CJhildren.. .with their 
manipulative intellect...are potentially close to innocence” (Hagiwara, 1992:243) -  a perspective 
shared in MacDonald’s writings.
For an account of the Victorian child-adult dialectic in literature see Knoepflmacher, 1983. 
llln The Case o f Peter Pan (1984), Jacqueline Rose connects the writing of children’s literature with 
paedophilia: the child is an outsider (the child does not create the books it reads), and must be 
“seduce[d]” by the (adult) writer into accepting his/her words (McGillis, 1992: 6). Roderick McGillis 
considers MacDonald’s “appeal to the child”, in his ‘Introduction’ to For the Childlike: George 
MacDonald’s Fantasies for Children (McGillis, 1992: 6). MacDonald enlists “familiar techniques that 
connect history to the oral tradition; questions to the reader, personal asides, sound effects, colloquial 
turns of phrase” (McGillis, 199^ : 6) -  therefore, his use in Lilith of‘baby language’ and the like is a 
(quasi-paedophilic) seduction technique.
V2Bag, according to The Concise Scots Dictionary, indicates the stomach/paunch, or to 
stuff cram/cause to swell (Robinson, 1985:26).
13See note 12.
14The Scottish National Dictionary also defines bag as “[a]n epithet applied to a child, playfully or as 
a term of reproach” (Grant: 17), so that not only Lilith’s Little Ones but its ‘big ones’ are associated 
with infants.
15See, for example, Bronfen, 1998; Bland and Doan, 1998; Masson, 1986; Nead, 1988.
16Lone, according to The Concise Scots Dictionary, can indicate “a pasture, a milking place” 
(Robinson, 1985: 380).
17Klein, 1945:11-33.
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18In another of MacDonald’s fictions, ‘The Gifts of the Child Christ’, a little girl is explicitly 
identified with the Virgin Mary. Phosy is imaged as “at once the mother and the slave of the Lord 
Jesus” (MacDonald, 1973a: 55), and becomes “a speechless mother of sorrow [recalling also Lilith’s 
Mara], bending in the dim light of the tomb over the body of her holy infant” (MacDonald, 1973a: 
56). It is only this transformation that enables Phosy’s (adult male) father to loVe her, to regard her 
with “reverence for the divine idea enclosed in her ignorance” (MacDonald, 1973a: 59).
For further discussion on Virgin maternity see Marina Warner’s study (Warner, 1976).
19MacDona!d writes elsewhere (in his 1882 ‘The Butcher’s Bills’) that: “Death is the love-messenger 
at the stroke of whose dart the stream of love first begins to flow in the selfish bosom” (MacDonald, 
1973b: 226).
20Death before sexuality is similarly portrayed in MacDonald’s ‘The Broken Swords’ (first published 
in 1854): “[TJhe girl was safe; for her body lay a broken, empty, but undesecrated temple” 
(MacDonald, 1973b: 174).
211 conceptualise autonymy as an act of ‘self-naming’, although it is originally a linguistic term 
coined by Rudolf Carnap. (“When a symbol is used... as a name for itself.. .we call it an autonymous 
symbol” [Carnap, 1937: 17, emphasis in original]).
Autonymous (versus heteronymous, ‘being named by another’) activity shall be considered at length 
in Chapter Four.
22Lona’s non-threatening beauty/sexuality has a parallel in Kawabata’s ‘The Dancing Girl of Izu’, 
where the male narrator desires a young travelling dancer. Sandra Buckley argues that this adult 
male’s knowledge of the female as a sexually immature object poses him no threat (of castration). 
“The female body.. .can both look and be looked at without risk” (Buckley, 1988:446). This means 
that the male need not dismember/fragment/morselise her body (which is the device by which “the 
female is traditionally neutralized” [Buckley, 1988: 446]).
23Lona’s beauty perhaps epitomises Edmund Burke’s (1757) definition of the beautiful, which 
connotes the ordered, the proportioned and harmonious. Lilith’s ‘beauty3, conversely, suggests 
Burke’s sublime, which suggests imbalance, disorder, obscurity and irregularity. The sublime, Burke 
argues, can elicit a pleasurable sensation of horror, enabling the observer to confront his own 
mortality from the safe, non-threatening position of spectatorship. The observer, in this way, can live 
his fear fill fantasies vicariously through the sublime -  his body can remain solid, organised, 
uncompromised, whilst the very opposite can be realised in ‘unreality’, in art (Burke, 1798). Vane, 
however, is not removed from his art -  he is writing his gothic fiction from the inside. His integrity is 
therefore at risk unless he can reject (and indeed find a means of silencing) the sublime excess 
characterised by Lilith. (Her “dazzling beauty” blinds -  and, of course, blinding, as Freud states in 
‘Totem and Taboo’ is a symbolic “substitute” [Freud, 1913b: 130] for castration).
24See Marina Warner’s Alone of all her Sex (Warner, 1976).
25The word lone in Scots dialect means, among other things, “solitary” (Robinson, 1985: 356).
Lona’s dysgenication undermines her status of singularity: she comes to be undifferentiated from the 
other beautiful white females of the text.
2GIntratextuality suggests internal textual parallels, recurrences, repetition (for example, when Vane 
re-lives the experiences of his father, or when Anodos reads himself in the story of Cosmo). 
Intratextuality is evident where there is evidence of embedded narratives, stories-within-stories (the 
Raven’s manuscript in Lilith; the books within Phantasies’ fairy library).
Intertextuality, on the other hand, refers to outside influences or connections. Examples might include 
Lilith’s structural/thematic resemblance to Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress (Vane’s journey through the 
“bad burrow” desertland to reach the paradisal ‘New Bulikah’ parallels Christian’s traversal of the 
barren Valley of the Shadow of the Death that leads to the Celestial City of Beulah); or Phantastes ’ 
plundering of its Arthurian knights from other sources; or the re-enactment of MacDonald’s favourite 
Biblical parable, ‘The Prodigal Son’ (the theme of the son who goes away only to return is central to 
both Lilith and Phantastes).
The concept of intertextuality could be divided even further into a voluntary and involuntary category. 
Involuntary intertextuality, as I conceptualise it, recognises similarities between texts where concrete 
evidence to suggest authorial ‘collusion’ is nonexistent. This is most evident within my study between 
the writings of MacDonald and Kawabata (hence ‘Revisions’ which follows ‘Perversions’). Voluntary 
intertextuality, on the other hand, refers to parallels between not only sources acknowledged by the 
writer, but to those between his own texts. In Lilith, MacDonald quotes from the Kabbalah, suggesting 
explicitly his familiarity with this source. His character Lilith, accordingly, resembles the anti-heroine 
described in the Zohar, the principal work of the Kabbalah. An example of voluntary intertextuality 
between MacDonald’s own texts could be demonstrated in the characters of Mara in Lilith and the 
goddess in The Princess and Curdie, who are both blighted by ignorant false-namings.
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With regards to Kawabata’s writings, examples of involuntary intertextuality could include the motif 
of the branded forehead which occurs in both his Sound ofthe Mountain and Stoker’s Dracula; whilst 
voluntary intertextuality might be evinced between ‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’ and Zeami’s 
1424 Noh play, Eguchi (the play inspired Kawabata’s naming of his protagonist and Is alluded to m 
the text (Starrs, 1998:202).
27The term masochism was coined by Krafft-Ebing in his 1896 study of sexual deviance, and is 
derived from the name of Sacher-Masoch (Krafft-Ebing, 1965: 86).
28Ihcidentally, such boundaries are also blurred between the text and Sacher-Masoch’s life. Sacher- 
Masoch implemented a similar arrangement for himself and a woman pseudonymously titled 
‘Baroness BogdanofiP. They signed a six month contract stipulating their positions as mistress and 
slave, and agreed that she would wear furs for the duration of their relationship. Their story is 
recounted in the memoirs of Sacher-Masoch’s wife (Wanda von Sacher-Masoch, 1990 [1907]).
See also James Cleugh’s biography of Sacher-Masoch (Cleugh, 1967).
29Sacher-Masoch’s real ‘Venus’ appointed him as her valet, and renamed him Gregor. 
30Sacher-Masoch’s real ‘Venus’ took a lover -  an actor named Salvini. However, their triangular 
relationship had no such violent ending.
31Severin might be associated intertextually with Stoker’s Harker. His relationship with Wanda is a 
reverse-gender fantasy along the lines of Harker’s desire to be penetrated by the female vampires, and 
his interaction with Alexis-as-Wanda might be contextualised as a disguised homoerotic fantasy. As 
in Dracula, homoerotic desire is both articulated, albeit in a veiled form, and disciplined, ultimately to 
be ejected/abjected from the text.
32In life, Sacher-Masoch renounced his masochistic impulse. Following his experience with Fanny 
Pistor (‘Barbness BogdanofP, his real ‘Venus’), he married a woman named Aurora von Rum elm. 
Sacher-Masoch demanded that they share a sado-masochistic relationship, enforced with threats 
towards herself and her children. (Wanda von Sacher-Masoch, 1990 [1907]).
33See also H. Rider Haggard: “It is thy beauty that makes me fear, oh Queen,” (Rider Haggard, 2001: 
146, emphases added).
34Femando Soto also interprets Anodos’ resurrection of the marble lady as a re-enactment of the 
Greek myth of Orpheus and Euridike (Soto, 2000).
35Lona’s willingness to be fashioned by the hand of Vane is a testament to her masochism. She 
resembles a female child of another of MacDonald’s texts, Phosy, in ‘The Gifts of the Child Christ’. 
Phosy is the embodiment of masochistic femininity: “Whom the Lord loveth, he chasteneth”, she 
learns in church. “ ‘I wish he would chasten me,’ she [thinks] for the hundredth time” (MacDonald, 
1973a: 32).
36Freud’s ‘Oedipus complex’ is defined in ‘The Material and Sources of Dreams’: “Being in love 
with the one parent and hating the other are among the essential consituents of the stock of psychical 
impulses which is., .of such importance in determining the symptoms of the lata- neurosis” (Freud, 
1900:260-1).
See also Freud, 1925b and 1931.
37See Freud’s ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, where he replaces his original polarity of drives (the 
libidinal and egoistic) with a life instinct (Eros) and death instinct (Thanatos) pairing (Freud, 1920). 
Anodos chases death: a woman he describes as deathlike in appearance; a woman who might mean 
death for him also. The marble lady is a rpother (sought by the orphan Anodos), but if he returns to 
her (dead) womb, to a state of total dependency, he too shall inevitably die.
38The return to the favoured womb, the womb from which the human male does not desire to 
gyn escape, involves, for Anodos, his femininely fluid immersion in an “ocean of circumfluent tones” 
(P: 319).
39Vane’s initial mis-recognition is perhaps related to the fact that he is introduced to death by the 
ambiguous, metamorphic Raven. Although the Raven lafer proves to be Adam, his appearance at this 
time aligns him with perceived oppressive darkness. Erich Neumann describes the figure of the raven 
as the “dark bird of the dead, which is called waelceasig (corpse-choosing)”, and associates it with 
the Valkyrie (Germanic death-inducing female demons) (Neumann, 1963: 164). The morbid, black, 
‘bad feminine’ raven is perhaps all that Vane can see, at first, in his guide.
Chapter Three: HIStory
1 Salamanca’s Lilith was originally published in 1961.
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2Kawabata’s Snow Country was originally serialised between 1935 and 1937 and completed in 1947 
as Yukiguni); The Sound o f the Mountain as Yama No Oto between 1949-52; And The Lake was first 
published as Mizuumi in 1954.
3 The masculine nature of the proprietess is emphasised hi Eloy Lozano’s 2001 film version of‘House 
of the Sleeping Beauties’. Lozano sets his film in a Chilean brothel, which is visited by a Westernised 
‘Eguchi’, an English professor and writer, re-named Lawrence. The proprietess (unnamed in 
Kawabata’s text) becomes Salome, ha- emasculating, castrating potential rendered explicit.
Salomd is, of course, the Biblical head-hunter who dances for Herod in exchange for the decapitation 
of John the Baptist. (See also Oscar Wilde’s play, Salome [Wilde, 1891]).
4This suggests a comparison with MacDonald’s writing. MacDonald, according to David Holbrook, is 
a “bereaved child” (Holbrook, 1991:258) who seeks his own dead mother in his writing (a notion I 
have focused upon textually rather than biographically).
Based on his knowledge of KawaWa’s orphanhood, Kenji Noguchi concludes that Kawabata’s 
writings (Noguchi uses Snow Country as his example) also communicate a personal desire to retrieve, 
via female characters, his lost childhood (Noguchi, 1966).
David Hwang, in his 1983 one-act play, re-writes ‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’ as a Kawabata 
biography. ‘Eguchi’ becomes ‘Kawabata’, who visits the ‘house’ in order to conduct research for a 
writing project, but becomes bewitched by its girls. Grieving the deaths of both his wife and his friend 
(his prodigy, the writer Yukio Mishima, who did actually commit suicide), the fictionalised Kawabata 
both reflects upon his past and contemplates his future (Hwang, 1983).
5In the Japanese language version, age is clearly a defining feature for the protagonist, who is 
frequently referred to as Eguchi rojin, meaning ‘old man Eguchi’ (Starrs, 1998:194). As Roy Stairs 
indicates, whilst his family name (Eguchi) means literally ‘river mouth’ -  suggesting that he is 
approaching the end of life’s river -  his personal name (Yoshio) can be understood as meaning ‘like a 
man’, or ‘as if a man’ (Starrs, 1998: 194), which indicates his emasculation.
6See Freud, 1905: 251, and Laura Mulvey, 1989.
7This is emphasised in Hiroto Yokoyama’s 1997 film version of‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’, 
where Eguchi is equipped with a magnifying glass with which to even further scrutinise the naked 
female bodies, and fulfil his voyeuristic desires.
8The violence of voyeurism is made explicit in a film entitled The Bedroom (Sato Hisayasu, 1992), 
with which ‘House pf the Sleeping Beauties’ might be compared. The titular ‘Bedroom’ is a club 
where men buy the drugged bodies of naked, sleeping girls -  not as conduits of memories but as 
objects on which to perform their various perversions. The girls become murder and mutilation 
victims of a club member, during which they are observed by the proprietor via a video-link.
This film, an example of Japanese Pink Cinema (see Jack Hunter, 1999), also stars real-life cannibal 
Issei Sagawa, who fulfilled his desire to cannibalise the corpse of a beautiful white-skinned woman 
(see Sagawa [1983]; Martingale [1993]).
9See Freud, 1905: 249-50.
lOFor a discussion of panopticism see Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1979: 195-228), 
and Bentham’s The Panopticon Writings (Bentham, 1995:29-95).
llFor a Kawabatan example of a representation of literal female fragmentation see Ms ‘One Arm’ 
(Kawabata, 1980: 103-24). The male narrator (in this first-person narrative) borrows a virgin’s arm, 
which he temporarily attaches to his own body. The literally severed arm functions like the 
figuratively morselised bodies of the girls in ‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’, recalling images of 
women from the aged narrator’s past. However, the male’s own arm (which was substituted for the 
female’s) must rapidly be restored when the female’s begins to die.
See also Sandra Buckley’s discussion of Kawabata’s textual objectifying morselisaticn of the female 
body. Buckley argues that tMs fragmentation is a means of objectifying the female body, whilst male 
subjectivity is preserved (Buckley, 1988).
12Barthes distinguishes, in S/Z, between lisible or ‘readable/readeriy’ and scriptible or 
‘writable/writerly’ narrative (Barthes, 1990).
13Barthes, 1993.
14See Lacan’s concept of the “corps morcefe” (Lacan, 1966: 97)
15This textual endlessness suggests the shape of MacDonald’s gyroscopic narratives, Lilith and 
Phantastes. ‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’ does, however, eventually reach a point of closure.
16See note 10.
17According to Manfred Lurker’s study of symbolism, the emergence of a butterfly from its cocoon is 
an analogy for the soul’s release in death (Lurker, 1988: 632). This metamorphic action is evident in 
MacDonald’s Lilith (L: 20,29). In a reversal of tMs transformation from (earthly) worm to (aerial) 
butterfly, Vane also witnesses the devastating devolution from the spiritual to the corporeal. Vane
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observes a “radian[tp\ “splend[idj”, “blazpng]” and “luminous” butterfly in flight. “[I] put out my 
hand, and had it”, Vane relates. “But the instant I took it, its light went out” (L: 47). Re-ensnaring the 
soul in the body (in the palm of Vane’s hand) returns it to mortality. This episode also conveys a 
metaphor for the death inherent in the materiality that is writing: the butterfly diminishes from 
(spiritual, bodiless) thought to “a dead book” (L: 47).
18For a discussion of colour symbolism in ‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’ see Kinya Tsuruta’s 
article, which focuses predominantly upon the significance of this dichotomy: of white death and red 
life (Tsnruta, 1978).
19That excess, in Kawabata, is a negative condition, is exemplified by the opening lines of his 
‘Frightening Love’: “He had loved his wife intensely. In other words, he had loved this one woman 
too much. He considered his wife’s early death to be a punishment from heaven for his love” 
(Kawabata, 1998: 119).
20That virgins can, in spite of their supposed purity, be also beast-like or demonic, is illustrated in 
Kawabata’s 1926 palm-of-the-hand story, ‘The Maidens’ Prayers’ (Kawabata, 1990:55-7). 
21Eguchi’s desire is to ‘save’ his favourite daughter: to save her from sexuality and to save her for 
himself The girls of the ‘house’ perhaps re-member his ‘lost’ (both sexualised and married, that is, 
‘belonging’ to another man) daughter, because they are all available and are all virgins.
The latter claim (to virginity) is emphasised in Kozaburo Yoshimura’s 1968 film version of the text: 
for its Canadian release, ‘Beauties’ is replaced by ‘Virgins’ in the title.
(Mutual) incestuous desire, incidentally, is implicated in the plot of Hiroto Yokoyama’s 1997 film 
version of the text. Kawabata’s ‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’ is merged with aspects of his The 
Sound o f the Mountain. Eguchi is identified with Shingo, and is implicated in a relationship with his 
young daughter-in-law (named Kikuko in both text and film). Kikuko is removed, in the film, from 
her textual passive desire-object status -  she becomes predatory, seeking to bear her father-in-law’s 
child. In order to achieve this aim, Kikuko decides to apparoitly ‘surrender’ ho- body and become a 
‘sleeping beauty5 at the ‘house’ visited by Eguchi.
22Virginal female bodies should, according to this logic, be looked upon, whilst camalised female 
bodies should not.
23For another Kawabatan example of a male’s substitution of the original desire-object with other 
women see the 1926 palm-of-the-hand story, ‘Mother’ (Kawabata, 1990: 79-82).
24Darkness is, of course, also associated with shapelessness, with chaos in MacDonald’s writings. See 
also his short story ‘The Shadows’ (first published in 1864), where the titular embodiments of 
darkness are criticised by the male protagonist for their “insane lawlessness of form” (MacDonald, 
1999: 60).
In the Japanese language version of‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’, the polarisation of darkness and 
light, as embodied by the two final girls, is even more evident. The ‘dark girl’ is described as kuroi 
musume, meaning ‘black girl, whilst the ‘fair girl’ is shiroi musume, meaning ‘white girl’(See 
Kawabata’s Nemureru bijo, 1967).
250n feminine laughter (as an expression of the ‘semiotic’) see Kristeva, 1984:47.
26See Anthony Liman (1971), who discusses sense perception (kankaku) in Kawabata’s Snow 
Country, arguing that Shimamura experiences the world sensorily and “avoid[s]...discursive 
reasoning and intellectual processes” (Liman, 1971: 268).
See also Steve Odin’s study of intersensory experience (Odin, 1986).
270n Kawabata’s symbolic use of the ‘mirror’ see also Buckstead, 1981.
28This description recalls that of MacDonald’s Grandmother Nature in ‘The Golden Key’, with her 
“white arms and neck” and ‘hair... [which seems to have] a tinge of dark green” (MacDonald, 1999:
125).
See also Iraphne Childs’ argument that it is Shimamura’s alienation/separation from natitre that 
impels him to continuously visit the snow country/Komako (Childs, 1991). Additionally, Reiko 
Tsukimura considers nature in Kawabata (specifically in relation to The Sound of the Mountain) 
(Tsukimura, 1978).
29See Freud, 1913b: 130.
30The distinction between ‘geisha’ and ‘prostitute’ is not, at least according to a non-Japanese 
perspective, immediately apparent. The feet that the geisha might be an accomplished artist feils to 
effectively counter the additional feet that her body is bought by a paying male client. Nevertheless, a 
differentiation might (and must) be made. Lesley Downer recounts the instruction received by a 
reluctant geisha from her mother. “You are a Woman of Gion, your body counts for nothing. Your arts 
and your honour, those are the things to value” (Downer, 2000: 140). This assertion implicitly 
indicates the distinction between geisha and prostitute. For the prostitute, the body counts for 
everything. (She has no other [definitional] saleable commodity). For the geisha, however, the body is
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secondary to her art. Instructed to disown her body, the geisha perhaps enforces an equation of the 
male with corporeality, whilst elevating herself to a spiritual, body-transcendent ‘superiority’. 
Additionally, it must be noted that legislative changes in Japan (introduced after the time of 
Kawabata’s writing Snow Country) have altered the practices observed by ciqrent-day geisha. Due to 
the 1958 anti-prostitution law, customs such as mizuage (ritual deflowerment) are no longer observed. 
The modem day geisha is, therefore, at liberty to pursue an artistic rather than sex-oriented career 
(Downer, 2000).
Nevertheless, Komako’s status is as a hotspring geisha. This is “for the Japanese essentially a vulgar 
one-nighter, not to be confused with the skilled and respected professionals of Kyoto, Tokyo, and 
Osaka” (Boardman, 1971: 96).
On geisha see, for example, Cobb, 1997; Louis, 1992; Seigle, 1993; Dalby, 1983; Hiromi, 1999; 
Graham-Diaz, 2001-3.
31This echoes sentiments of Kenneth Clark’s ‘nude’ versus ‘naked’ dualism (Clark, 1957). 
Shimamura seeks in Komako a woman of art (as her ‘geisha’ title promises), a woman whose body is 
sealed into idealised nudity. In Shiro Toyoda’s 1957 film version of Snow Country, Shimamura is, 
significantly, a painter.
This also has biographical resonance -  Kawabata’s ambition had been to become a painter rather than 
a writer (Buckley, 1998:441). (See also Gessel, 1993; Lewell, 1993).
32In contradistinction with Kawabata’s portrayal of white unreality and red reality, MacDonald, 
according to F. Hal Broome, employs redness as “the most common colour...[to] preced[e] his 
characters into fairy land” (Broome, 1990: 95). In this way, red (rather than white) is associated with 
unreality.
33The feet that Yoko can be seen to have literary doubles is significant in the light of Shimamura’s 
perception feat she is “like a character out of an old, romantic tale” (SC: 11).
34 See LaFieur, 1994: 63.
See also Kawabata’s 1925 palm-of-the-hand story, ‘The O-Shin Jizo’ (Kawabata, 1990: 34-7). 
35Indeed, in Kawabata’s 1972 miniaturised, concentrated version of Snow Country, entitled 
‘Gleanings from Snow Country’, Shimamura only looks at fee reflected Yoko (other than in her 
appearance on fee train, she is omitted from fee narrative). (Kawabata, 1990: 228-238).
36This invocation of fee ‘uncanny’ recalls my discussion of MacDonald’s writings, where it is 
associated with the male protagonists’ repressed yearnings for their respective ‘forsaking’ mothers. 
Likewise, in Snow Country, Yoko is associated wife fee mother figure. As Roy Starrs argues, 
Shimamura is a narcissist, feus is compelled to seek ‘motherly’ women. He is arrested, according to a 
Freudian interpretation, in an infantile stage of psychological development, feus seeks only women 
who will love him like a mother: feat is, without fee demand for reciprocation (Starrs, 1998:130).
See also Freud, 1913a.
37Masking is a repeated motif in Kawabata’s writings. See, for example, his 1929 palm-of-the-hand 
story, ‘The Man Who Did Not Smile’ (Kawabata, 1990: 128-132), where a woman’s literally masked, 
artificialised fece is termed “beautiful”, in contrast wife her unmasked “ugly” reality (Kawabata,
1990: 131).
38This suggests feat Shimamura desires penetration (in spite of his initial reservations about looking 
directly at fee ‘medusa’). He does not, however, desire fee ‘base’ physical, sexual, emasculating 
penetration (hence his selection of a seemingly bodiless ‘penetratrix’). Rather, he desires to be entered 
spiritually, akin perhaps to fee Christian desire to “be filled with fee Spirit” (Ephesians 5:18, 
emphasis added), to “be filled wife all fee fulness of God” (Ephesians 3: 19, emphasis added).
Yoko’s materialisation prevents this -  she becomes a woman, bodied and potentially sexual, whereas 
she had been inhuman, disincamate and sexless.
39According to Gwenn Boardman, fee Japanese festival of Tanabata Matsuri celebrates fee one day 
each year when Heaven’s River (fee Milky Way) is bridged, and fee Herd-boy and Weaver-girl stars 
are reunited. Yoko, associated by Shimamura wife Chijimi linen (“When he heard fee song Yoko sang 
in fee bath, it had come to him feat, had she been born long ago, she might have sung feus as she 
worked over her spools and looms” [SC: 153-4]), is his weaver-girl (Boardman, 1971: 97). However, I 
would argue feat like fee fleeting reunion of fee star-lovers, Yoko and Shimamura’s is brief -  
consummated during her fell, ending upon impact.
40Takao Hagiwara describes this final scene in sexual terms: “Shimamura and fee Milky Way 
interpenetrate in a manner symbolic of sexual union” (Hagiwara, 1991:261). Their relationship, I 
would argue, is also symbolic of maternal-filial union (wife Shimamura being filled wife Mother’s 
milk), and of spiritual union (wife Shimamura being purified by a cleansing, whitening force feat fer 
exceeds both Yoko and Komako in its ability).
41See, for example, Masaki Mori on Shingo’s latent desire for Kikuko (Mori, 1994).
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42The infeminator in his representations of negative femininity might, as I have previously suggested, 
associate ‘bad’ female blood with the dead excretions of menstruation, and with the vampirism the 
woman requires in order to replenish it; or he might equate it with an expression of the bestial sexual 
desire (‘hot-bloodedness’) that ‘proves’ madness in the female.
The anthropologist Victor Turner’s 1950s study of the Ndembu people of Zambia demonstrates the 
association of women with ‘bad’ blood. Female (menstrual) blood in this society is termed mbayi, 
which is etymologically connected with the verb ku-baya: ‘to be guilty’ (Turner, 1967:42).
In Kawabata’s ‘One Arm’ (Kawabata, 1980: 103-24), blood is, however, separated into ‘good female’ 
and ‘bad male’: “The clean blood of the girl” versus “dirty male blood” (Kawabata, 1980:122). 
43According to Japanese mythology, mountain deities are femininely gendered. Ichiro Hori identifies 
a mountain goddess who makes way for the young by removing the old. The mountain goddess must 
“notify]” the elderly “that death [is] approaching” (Hori, 1968:10), communicating directly to their 
bodies with the voice (or sound) of the mountain.
44See, for example, Dijkstra, 1986:122.
45Freud, 1905:249-50.
460n part-objects see Klein, 1946:99-110.
47LaFleur, 1994.
LaFleur’s study examines the Japanese abortion paradox. Buddhism, he argues, holds life as sacred 
and the taking of life as immoral (so that abortion would validate karmic retribution). However, Japan, 
although largely influenced by the Buddhist faith, permits abortion or mabifd. The product of mabiki 
is the mizuko, the water child who is cohsigned to a purgatorial space called Sai-no-kawara (‘the 
Riverbank in the land of Sai’). This place is associated with actual (usually littoral) areas of Japan.
The desolate sea shore associated with the mizuko’s child limbo is suggested by MacDonald’s images 
of fluidity. In Phantastes, for example, Anodos experiences inizuko-\ike conditions when he is 
suspended amniotically in a grey and forsaken sea (prior to his encountering the wise old woman). 
48Gimpei shares certain characteristics with the Japanese mythological creature, the kappa. This 
creature resembles a monkey and inhabits ponds, rivers or lakes. Additionally, the kappa is vampiric, 
luring victims into its water-dwelling and sucking his/her blood (Whittaker, 1997: 112-4). Gimpei, 
too, as shall become apparent, is associated not only with monkeys but with water, and also feeds 
vampirically on the beauty of girls.
Kawabata writes explicitly of the kappa in his 1926 palm-of-the-hand story, ‘The Hat Incident’ 
(Kawabata, 1990:65-8).
49This recalls Eguchi’s description of a girl’s pure, white, snow-associated genitals (‘HSB’: 29).
50See Freud, 1905:251.
51See Freud, 1923.
52This voice is familiar from MacDonald’s writings: the voice, for example, of the wise old woman in 
Phantastes, and North Wind in At the Back o f the North Wind.
53Beauty also recalls loss for Shingo in The Sound of the Mountain. He witnesses it in one woman 
(Kikuko), which reminds him of the lost beauty of another (Yasuko’s dead sister).
54Gimpei might be compared with Erwin, the protagonist of Nabokov’s ‘A Nursery Tale’. This latter 
male’s “[morbid] shy[ness]” renders him a voyeur. Himself unseen, he “look[s] boldly and freely at 
passing girls”, mentally “captur[ing]” these “concubinefs]” (Nabokov, 1995: 161) for “his fabulous 
harem” (162). This continues until he meets his match with a masculine woman (who identifies 
herself as the “Devil” or “Frau Monde” [163]), who promises to convert his dreams into reality.
See also Susan Sweeney’s reading of ‘A Nursery Tale’ -  Which she compares with the ‘Sleeping 
Beauty’ fairy tale (Sweeney, 1999). The Nabokov text, in this way, is comparable also with 
Kawabata’s ‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’.
55The gendered gaze is challenged when gender itself is challenged, when “heteronormative 
representations of masculinity and femininity” (Cranny-Francis and Waring, 2003:177) are 
undermined (for example, via transvestism [Garber, 1992], or via the conceptualisation of gender as 
performance, as masquerade [Butler, 1990; Riviere, 1929]). Gimpei’s woman refuses to be a woman. 
As such, she refuses to be the object of his gaze.
56Incidentally, the 1957 Shiro Toyoda film version of Snow Country, according to Nobuko Ochner, 
converts the Shimamura-centric narrative of the text into a Komako-centric narrative (Ochner, 1993).
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Chapter Four: HERstory
IThe infeminator (that is, the writer representing the feminine in terms of mortemalisation, 
teratologisation and dysgenication) need not necessarily only infeminate. Infemination deals with a 
specific ‘voice’ -  the representation of negative femininity - r -  which might be accompanied in the text 
by countless other ‘voices.’ (As I have emphasised, I use the term ‘voice’ in the sense of Bakhtinian 
‘polyphony’). Infemijiation does not deny alternative possibilities for reading -  as I have intimated in 
my subtextual (eod)notes, where I indicate the potential pertinence, for example, of biographical data 
(such as MacDonald’s personal experience of being un/mothered), and cultural information (such as 
notions of Japanese abortion).
This chapter shall consider another prospective ‘voice’ expressed in Kawabata’s Beauty and Sadness. 
2Through various motifs -  of silence (Otoko), fluidity (painting -  Keiko/Kiriko), suicide (Otoko, 
unsuccessfully; Kelko, successfully, though die does not die) -  Kawabata enables a counter- 
representation of the feminine. This, as I shall demonstrate, is at times coupled with textual gesturing 
beyond representation. Examples might be the ellipses that end his chapters, and the female artist’s 
resistance and ultimate impenetrability (Otoko’s silences; Keiko’s breasts [the meaning of which 
remains unresolved]; Keiko’s obi [intelligible to herself the artist, alone]).
3Camap, 1937:17.
4Jackie Hardy (2002) delineates the history of haiku, indicating its origination in seventeenth-century 
Japan. Haiku, Hardy asserts, developed from renga (a fourteenth century poetic form). The opening 
verse of renga poetry, termed hokku, was eventually isolated from the longer (usually a hundred 
verse) sequence. This came to be recognised as a poetic form in its own right (Hardy, 2002: 7-8). 
According to Hardy, haiku was also influenced by Chinese poetry, Japanese waka or tanka (also 5-7-5 
syllable constructions), Buddhism, Zen, Taoism, Confucianism and Shinto (Hardy, 2002: 9-10). 
Kawabata’s ‘haiku-writing’ is particularly evident in his Palm-of-the-Hand Stories (TenohiraNo 
Shosetsu), written between the 1920s and 1970s. Lane Dunlop’s ‘Translator’s Note’ decribes “the 
microscopic concision, capable of being magnified with no loss of proportion, of Kawabata’s method” 
(Dunlop and Holman, 1990: xii). He also indicates its retention of “the traditional Japanese love of the 
delicate and the beautiful, the ability to endow a small space with spaciousness” (Dunlop and Holman, 
1990: xii). J. Martin Holman further suggests a connection between Kawabata’s writing style and 
haiku when he adds that “[t]he palm-of-the-hand story appears to have been Kawabata’s basic unit of 
composition from which his longer works were built, after the manner of linked-verse poetry”
(Dunlop and Holman, 1990: xiii).
5See Derrida’s writings on the inequality ofmetaphor, where he argues the dependency of the ‘unreal’ 
figure upon the ‘literal’ image (Derrida, 1978a).
6See Cixous’ notion of the feminine, bisexual writer, who “writfes].. .(in) the in-between” (Cixous, 
1981:254).
7Kawabata’s affinity with haiku is also apparent in Snow Country. This text, according to Roy Starrs, 
is comprised of haiku-like juxtapositions. The beginning scene where the girl’s reflected eye in the 
window is juxtaposed with a light demonstrates this. Again, there is haiku in the text’s structure.
Starrs delineates the action of three sequential scenes: Shimamura attempts to prove his ‘seriousness’ 
to Komako by boasting that he has come to see her out of the usual season for snow country tourism. 
This is followed by a discussion of Komako’s industrious diary-keeping habit. Finally, there is a 
discussion of Shimamura’s interest in the Occidental ballet. The function of the two latter topics,
Starrs argues, is to undermine Shimamura’s claim of ‘seriousness’. Komako’s diary-keeping, which 
she admits is a “waste of effort”, reminds Shimamura of his own dilettantish efforts as a Western 
ballet Critic. It follows that Shimamura’s initial boast is discredited -  the dilettante is serious about 
nothing -  including this ‘mere’ hotspring geisha. (Indeed, Shimamura only keeps returning to 
Komako because he is a narcissist and she is a mirror) (Starrs, 1998:120-1).
8See Roy Starrs discussion of the Japanese ‘aesthetics of emptiness’: the notion, in Zen Buddhism, 
that “form is emptiness, emptiness is form” {Heart Sutra, cited in Starrs, 1998: 177). Starrs argues 
that, according to this ‘logic’, any form the artist uses shall manifest emptiness (Starrs, 1998:177). 
Kawabata also speaks of the ‘emptiness’ in his writing in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech 
(Kawabata, 1969:41, 55, 56).
9That chaos might be associated with the feminine is suggested by its etymology. Chaos “derives 
from a Greek verb-stem, KHA, meaning ‘to yawn, to gape’ ” (Hayles, 1991: 2). Due to its linguistic 
origins, chaos might be understood as figuring the ‘nothingness’ of the female genitals. 
lOQn notions of gendered time see also Kristeva’s ‘Women’s Time’ (1986: 188-213). Here, she 
argues that the symbolic is the linear ‘masculine’ time of history, and the ‘feminine’ is cyclical and 
monumental time. ‘Masculinity’ celebrates logical connections and linearity (the symbolic), and this 
is challenged by the ‘feminine’ semiotic. (Kristeva replaces the Lacanian ‘imaginary’ [Lacan, 1966:
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93-100,1977:1-7] with the ‘semiotic’, which she grants a feminine (maternal) association [Kristeva, 
1980:133]).
HThis suggests Yoshio Iwamoto’s and Dick Wagenaar’s definition of geographically dualised time 
(Western time being considered public and objective, and Eastern tune private, subjective and 
introspective) (Iwamoto and Wagemaar, 1974).
12See T.S. Eliot’s notion of time in ‘Burnt Norton’: ‘Time present and time past/Are both perhaps 
present in time future” (Eliot, 1944: 7).
130n a biographical note, Kawabata himself fathered a daughter in 1927, who died even before she 
could be named. This daughter ‘haunts’ perhaps not only this text but his earlier novel The Lake. (That 
Kawabata associated himself with Gimpei is suggested by the feet that m his youth he perceived 
himself as “grotesquely ugly” [Keene, 2003:32]) Whilst in the former text the dead baby is perceived 
with horror, here Kawabata perhaps endeavours to ‘make peace’ with it, conceptualising it as (‘good’) 
spirit rather than a (‘bad’) ghost.
Incidentally, Kawabata had no other children, claiming that he feared transmitting his orphan complex 
onto the next generation (Gessel, 1993: 162). His fear to ‘give birth’, then, was in actuality a fear of 
his own death -  which suggests a parallel with MacDonald’s Lilith (in her belief that her daughter will 
be the death of her).
14See Freud’s ‘Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood’, where “homosexual[ity]” and 
“auto-erotism” are explicitly connected with the myth of Narcissus: The homosexual “finds the 
objects of his love along the path of narcissism” (Freud, 1910:463) -  of course, Freud here is 
describing a male example of homosexuality, however, his description might also be applicable to the 
female.
The notion of lesbianism as narcissism shall be addressed later in this chapter.
Additionally, Freud’s ‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’ identifies that maternity can be narcissism:
“In the child which they [narcissistic women] bear, a part of their own body confronts them like an 
extraneous object, to which...they can then give complete object-love” (Freud, 1913a 555).
Keiko, then, is not only employed by the narcissistic female Otoko on the basis of her femaleness but 
by the narcissistic mother Otoko, who endeavours to recoup the loss of her baby.
15It is a testament, perhaps, to Oki’s continued paternity, suggested by the “special-delivery> (BS: 9, 
emphasis added) status of the letter (delivery connotes childbirth and special modifies this to indicate 
some sort of unusual, unconventional [maybe because non-matemal] experience). Of course, this 
analysis depends entirely on the text’s English translation (a ‘special delivery5 letter in, for example, a 
French translation would -  as lettre reeommandee -  lose all connotations of childbirth).
16 Sade, 1981.
170ki, in this way, aligns himself with the dead baby -  imaging himself as inhabiting Otoko’s womb; 
visualising for himself a gynoscopic return to union with the mother.
Oki associates Otoko with absence -  the unpenetrated foils sexually lacking ‘hole’ of her (lesbianised) 
genitals; the maternally empty due to childloss (and subsequent lesbianism) ‘hole’ of her womb. He 
suggests himself as her ‘cure’, his masculine presence perceived as potentially able to heal her into 
wholeness.
18Kawabata discusses the stone landscape (or bonseki) in his Nobel speech: “[T]here is the form [in 
Japanese landscape gardening] called the dry landscape, composed entirely of rocks, in which the 
arrangement of the rocks gives expression to mountains and rivers that are not present” (Kawabata, 
1969:53, emphasis added).
19Keiko differs from many of the other Kawabatan female characters discussed in that ‘/ffiflstory’ 
concludes the narrative. The final chapter belongs to neither Otoko nor Oki, but communicates 
Keiko’s reclamation of language on behalf of her lover Otoko (who is permitted by Keiko the last 
word -  which is actually an affirmation of her own (Keiko’s] name). Keiko, in this way, ‘rescues’ 
Otoko from loss. She gives her the empowering final word, giving her the presence that Oki 
could/would not
20“From the male perspective”, Doris Bargen argues, “the complexities of child loss... are captured in 
Oki’s novel... [and he] folds the spirit of the lost child symbolically expressed in his ‘freak’ [red and 
white] plum tree” (Bargen, 1991:168).
21Kawabata’s ‘Her Husband Didn’t’ was first published in a collection of short stories entitled First 
Snow on Fuji (Fuji No Hatstiyufd) in 1958.
22This term, as I have suggested, is an anglicised derivative of Lacan’s description of the “corps 
morcele” (Lacan, 1966: 97).
23Junji and Kiriko are taught perhaps to see the female body as artifice -  the ‘nude’ being, according 
to Kenneth Clark, a transformed (and improved) version of‘nakedness’ (Clark, 1957).
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24Even though I identify painting with the feminine, being taught to paint the ‘nude’ might also be 
interpreted as an instruction in infeminative practice (as this involves the ‘sanitisation’ of a 
supposedly errantly fluid female body). Nevertheless, the medium might yet be associated with 
femininity.
25See note 14 on narcissism and homosexuality.
26See Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass, where Alice is confronted repeatedly (in Chapter IV, 
‘Tweedledum and Tweedledee’, and Chapter XII, ‘Which Dreamed It?’) with the possibility that she 
might be only the product of the Red King’s dream (Carroll, 1992: 138-148; 207-209).
27This might also suggest that, in painting, Keiko orgasms. Her desire, in this way, is truly lesbian (a 
desire for the ‘femininity’ of painting). Whilst Otoko ‘performs’ ha- lesbianism (which itselfmight be 
perceived as a liberation [see Butler, 1990,1993,1997; Harding, 1998; Rivi&re, 1929] -  as it permits 
her to remain an ambiguity, and her identity fluid), I read Keiko as ‘performing’ heterosexuality. 
Keiko is a ‘real’ lesbian, who manipulates the men with whom she has heterosexual relations in order 
to secure revenge for the perceived ‘wronged’ Otoko.
28Doris Bargen, furthermore, argues that this ‘two-in-one’ geisha painting expresses Otoko’s 
“longing.. .not only for the lost child [but]... for her wholeness as a pregnant mother” (Bargen, 1991: 
168).
29For another example of Kawabatan feminine doubling see his novel on female twins, The Old 
Capital (Kawabata, 1987).
30As Doris Bargen argues, “[t]he central trauma” in Beauty and Sadness “is the loss of a 
child... Otoko loses her child... [T]he unique experience of the liminal state of two-in-one in 
pregnancy is fatefully disrupted. The loss of the premature baby amounts to no less thap a partial loss 
of self. The traumatized [mother]... [is] driven to the utmost of [her] passionate capacities to recover 
this loss. In order to do so [she] seekfs] substitutes for [her] lost children...” (Bargen, 1991:168) 
31“Heterosexism describes social or personal structures which are defined and regulated by exclusive 
and compulsory heterosexuality” (Cranny-Francis and Waring, 2003:20).
See also Rich, 1993.
32Lacan, 1977:281-91.
33Shimamura remembers Komako with his left finger. Keiko’s left breast is associated, by Oki, with 
virginity -  the virginity that she refuses to surrender to him. The left, in both instances, suggests 
girlish purity, and indeed both Komako and Keiko are perceived, for a time at least, in this way. 
However, I think that there the connection probably ends. The leftness in the case of Shimamura 
should perhaps be subordinated to the feet that only a single finger remembers Komako, suggesting 
that “he is incapable of relating with women in a wholehearted way but only in a kind of fragmented 
way, as erotic or aesthetic objects” (Starrs, 1998:128, emphasis in original). In the case of Keiko, the 
left breast is perhaps offered to Taichiro because she has already submitted the right to his father, 
which has ‘spoiled’ it. Giving the right, which perhaps bears the invisible imprint of his father’s hand, 
would be an almost incestuous token.
341 have found no evidence of a specifically Japanese meaning for Keiko’s breast-division. However, 
in addition to the Classical Greek interpretation, I would suggest that certain associations assigned to 
‘right’ and ‘left’ in Chinese culture might be significant In China, according to Marcel Granet, “one 
gives to the left and one takes on the right. Hence a juridical custom: when two persons make a 
contract, they divide a slip, a cutting; the left half is kept by the me who has the advantage of the 
other, ie, by the creditor, and the right half is kept by the one in the inferior position, ie, by the debtor” 
(Granet, 1933: 46). Keiko, after this model, divides her body to give Oki her right breast and Taichiro 
ho* left: so that the son has the advantage. Oki becomes Granet’s “debtor”, ‘owing’ Keiko, who 
operates on behalf of Otoko. Taichiro, however, is made the “creditor” (even though he shall also 
incur a loss) -  Keiko is apparently willing to surrender her own life in punishing this man (“I could 
die now.. .I’m done for. Done for. And so are you” [BS: 145]). Keiko’s giving Taichiro the left breast 
also suggests the Chinese “ritual of salutation” (Granet, 1933:45), observed by females “[i]n time of 
mourning” (Granet, 1933:45): They bow whilst presenting the left hand and covering the right 
(Granet, 1933:45). Keiko mourns in advance the death of Taichiro, whose only ‘crime’ is his being 
the son of Oki; the baby which survived whilst Otoko’s died.
35Qn a biographical note, nevertheless, Kawabata himself commited suicide (see Iga, 1975; Keene, 
1996; Seinfelt, 1999; Yamamoto, 1975). He also aligned himself with gynovocality in both his 
persorial desire to become a painter (Buckley, 1998), and in his valorisation of silence (Yamagiwa, 
1953).
36Daniel Brown, 1997.
37ibid.
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38Doris Bargen conceptualises the lost child as a mizuko, recovered for Otoko “in the form of the 
surviving Keiko” when she “emerges from the waters of Lake Biwa” (Bargen, 1991:169). (On mizuko 
see also Bargen, 1992; Brooks, 1981; Smith, 1988).
39Kawabata, incidentally, “gassed himself to death” (Buckley, 1988:442), committing a passive 
(feminine) suicide, unlike his protdgd Mishima, who committed literal seppuku.
40See N. Katherine Hayles, 1991; Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, 1984.
Conclusion: At-One-Ments
IThe term ‘zn/raductions’ is designed to suggest a return to material already covered within my 
‘Infeminations’ text As this is my concluding chapter, I intend to draw attention -  via recapitulation 
and summary -  to points already made, as opposed to introducing new ones.
20f course, the vision is that of the infemination reader; the vision is mine. The (negative) 
feminisation ofMacDonald’s textual landscape is a conceptualisation/tabulation deriving from the 
infemination reading.
3My notion of ‘voice’, as explicated in my Introduction, is indebted to Kristeva’s use of Bakhtinian 
‘polyphony’ -  as opposed to deriving from an identification with an expressivlst feminist position 
such as Showalter’s.
4‘At-One-Ments’ refers simply to the act of (re)union, where disparate entities are freed from their 
initial positions as recipients of isolated analysis.
5A reading of the concepts of ‘gynoscape’ and ‘gynescape’ appeals to male-authored texts which 
feature a narcissistic male protagonist; a male who is permanently in search of the mother (seeking in 
adulthood only women who will provide him with an unconditional motherly love whilst demanding 
nothing in return). Gynoscaping and gynescaping are related to this search for the mother. 
‘Gynoscape’, a noun, describes a textual landscape in feminine terms. It indicates an environment in 
which the mother is central; a geographical space in which the dead mother of an orphaned 
protagonist is sought for reunion. I frequently describe in my MacDonald chapters the protagonists 
traversing the gynoscape. The gynoscape is both a passage and the rewards of passage.
‘Gynescape’, on the other hand, suggests a turning away from the mother whose body is perhaps 
misrecognised, or proves to be malignant. To gynescape, then, can connote a conscious rejection of 
the mother in favour of the father (the death of the mother can mean the birth of the father, as in Lilith, 
where God, although feminised in his association with Mother Nature, remains the Christian male). 
But to gynescape can also be accidental, unintentional (when, for example, Vane desires pre-pubertal 
girls over adult women he gynescapes, due to the feet that he chooses empty [barren] or hymen- 
obstructed [barred] wombs.
‘Gynoscape’ and ‘gynescape’ are intimately connected concepts because the mother-seeking male is 
in pursuit of one, but might end up being confronted with the other.
6The presence of duality, of the ‘other’, might be exposed as symbolically and linguistically contained 
in the ‘mother’. This relationship is made particularly evident in Lacanian psychoanalytic discourse, 
which explicates that the mother is desired by the infant but, being already claimed as ‘paternal 
property’, remains unattainable. The mother, as a result, might be symbolically represented within the 
unconscious mind as being both all and nothing: as being desire-object (‘mother’) and the denial of 
this desire (‘Other’). (See Lacan on the ‘mirror stage’, where the paternal ‘non’ causes the infant to re­
direct its desire away from the mother, to be transferred to a projection, an ‘Other’ of itself [Lacan, 
1977: 1-7; Lacan, 1966: 93-100]).
7“I had never yet done anything to justify my existence; my former world was nothing the better for 
my sojourn in it: here, however, I must earn, or in some way find, my bread!” (L: 23-4)
8Tb e ‘mirror’ is associated with maternity in the works of the psychoanalyst D.W. Winnicott, where 
he conceptualises the mother’s ‘mirror role’: the notion that subjectivity derives from a period of 
inter-subjectivity, whereby the in font sees itself first reflected in the mother’s eyes and fece 
(Winnicott, 1967).
9Freud uses the term invert to describe homosexuals: persons whose “sexual objects are.. .of their 
own sex” (Freud, 1905:241). This is derived from late-Victorian sexology, in particular from 
Havelock Ellis’ 1897 study Sexual Inversion (Ellis, 1975).
According to de Beauvoir, the female invert, that is, the lesbian, (as constructed in patriarchal 
discourse) “is unfulfilled as a woman, impotent as a man, and her disorder may lead to psychosis” (de 
Beauvoir, 1972:432). The lesbian, as a masculinist construction, is, she suggests, disordered, chaotic, 
errant -  ‘inverted’ -  from the (patriarchal) norm of heterosexuality and, therefore, sanity.
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10“I [Oki] wouldn’t be surprised if they [Otoko and Keiko] were lesbians.. .[as] both of them [are] 
insanely passionate” (BS: 37, emphasis added).
UMara is dehumanised because of her muffled face. However, her disguise also obstructs Vane’s 
(voyeuristic) gaze, to occult her (displaced) genitals and conceal her femininity.
On voyeurism and gender, see also Laura Mulvey’s ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’, which 
sexes the gaze in film as male. The male cameraman determines the voyeuristic gaze of the camera; 
the male actor’s gaze within the film positions the woman actor as his object; and the spectator of the 
film is assumed to be an additional male voyeur. This triangular male gaze, furthermore, is centred 
upon sexuality. It is aggressive, oppressive and fetishistic towards its female subject -  making of her 
an object and deriving sexual pleasure from this construction (Mulvey, 1989).
12“[T]wenty [suitors] had hurried off in different directions with [her leaves].. .and the little creature 
sat down and cried, and then, in a pet, sent a perfect pink snowstorm of petals from her tree, leaping 
from branch to branch, and stamping and shaking and pulling” (P: 38-9). Then, “after another good 
cry, she...ran away laughing” (P: 39).
13Late nineteenth-century quasi-medical (patriarchal) discourses such as sexology and psychoanalysis 
related madness to sexuality, associating it with the ‘errant’ female body. See, for example, Dijkstra, 
1986; Showalter, 1987;Ussher, 1991; Astbury, 1996.
140n Oki’s and Shimamura’s respective teratologisations see BS: 61; SC: 32; SC: 130.
15This is, of course, prefigured in the descriptions of the female characters’ physical appearances: 
they are already homogenised as physical echoes, as (white) shadows of each other.
16‘The pleasure he found in his new hobby came in feet from his inability to see with his own eyes 
occidentals in occidental ballets... A ballet he had never seen was an art in another world” (SC: 25). 
17In Snow Country, the “white porcelain” skin of Komako gives the illusion of beauty, However, 
Shimamura identifies that her ‘true’ appearance is one of “cleanness” rather than “beauty”(<5C: 32), 
redness rather than whiteness (SC: 39). When Komako becomes too real, she is discarded by 
Shimamura in favour of Yoko.
18My project of contextualising critically the infemination reading strategy has led me to 
acknowledge the interconnectedness of theoretical positions. French feminists draw, for example, on 
Lacanian psychoanalysis (see Kristeva’s conceptualisation of pre-linguistic being, whereby she 
replaces the Lacanian ‘imaginary’ [Lacan, 1966: 93-100,1977: 1-7] with the ‘semiotic’ [Kristeva, 
1980: 133]). Gender/queer theorists draw, for example, on deconstruction (see Butler’s liberation of 
‘sex’ from ‘gender’ [Butler, 1990]).
19See Cixous, 1986. French feminism, as I explored at length in my Introduction, emphasises the 
hierarchical order of language that privileges certain terms over others, and ultimately reduces these 
terms to a matter of the opposition between masculinity and femininity,
20Although I consider notions of feminine autonymisation in Chapter Four, the feminine continues to 
be mediated by males (that is, by the exogenous-androvocal author). Exogenous-androvocality, as I 
have defined it, describes a male subject which lies at least partly outside the process of 
representation. This subject is, of course, incompatible with premises of deconstruction (with which 
French feminism is implicated). My retention of this concept of the male author necessitates, 
therefore, a deviation from deconstruction. As I have argued in my Introduction, neither 
deconstruction nor French feminism completely satisfy in themselves my intentions for the 
infemination reading. Accordingly, I draw on additional sources such as earlier (Anglo-American) 
feminist traditions, in spite of their own limitations; traditions which retain a political thrust otherwise 
‘masked’ by deconstruction, and which feminist analysis, I believe, should not entirely overlook.
21 Within my current study I have already indicated its applicability to texts other than MacDonald’s 
and Kawabata’s, considering -  albeit briefly -  feminine representations in Venus in Furs and Dracula 
22The term ‘Gothic’ might be applied not only to a specific fictional configuration common at the end 
of the eighteenth century, but also to writings of any period characterised by motifs such as hauntings, 
doublings (the doppelganger, “a second self or alter ego which appears as a distinct and separate 
being apprehensible by the physical senses (or at least some of them), but exists in a dependent 
relation to the original” [Herdman, 1991:14]), “villain[s],.. .ghosts, vampires, monsters and 
werewolves” (Punter, 1996a: 1).
23The drama of the Gothic story takes place, according to Patricia Merivale, “in solitary 
circumstances, so that the evil may be concentrated in space and so that we and the characters may be 
sealed off together from the outside world, which might have provided help, or at least reaffirmed the 
norms of reality” (Merivale, 1978: 993).
24Kawabata’s Gothic status is perhaps most evident in his ‘House of the Sleeping Beauties’, which 
demonstrates, according to Roy Starrs, his “male as vampire” theme (Starrs, 1998: 6). Here, the 
drugged bodies of “eternal virgins.. .promise to ‘purify’ and rejuvenate old [and parasitic] men”
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(Starrs, 1998:195). Eiji Sekine interprets the protagonist’s need as vampiric: as a need for blood 
(Sekine, 1993: 56).
25See also Burroughs’ descriptions of “the vaginal grip... [that] could cave in a lead pipe” and which 
“tor[e}” a man “in two” (NL: 95); of the “women [who] stick severed genitals in then* cunts” (NL: 46); 
and of the ‘jungle bone-softener” that causes a “vaginal teeth [to] flow out” (NL: 103).
26An abhorrence for ‘dirty’ fluidity that is associated with the maternal is evident also in the 
statement, “De-active that pelvis, mom, you disgust me already” (NL: 86).
27This sword-wielding is reminiscent of Adam in MacDonald’s Lilith, who uses the weapon to 
metaphorically castrate the titular would-be phallic mother.
28See James W. Grauerholz’s essay, ‘The Death of Joan VoIIner Burroughs: What Really Happened?’ 
(Grauerholz, 2002).
29Burroughs also grants ‘possession’ a feminine association in Naked Lunch, where he writes^
“ ‘Possession’ they call it... Sometimes an entity jumps in the body... and hands move to disembowel 
the passing whore or strangle the nabor child” (NL: 219). Possession, it seems, takes over one’s body 
and causes it to conduct acts of violence against other -  feminine -  bodies.
30Burroughs also might be deemed a deconstructionist, arguing (in The Job) that “the Aristotelian 
‘either/or’.. .is one of the greatest errors of Western thinking. ..There are certain formulas, word-Iocks, 
which will lock up a whole civilization for a thousand years” (Burroughs, 1970:49); that 
“EITHER/OR is another virus formula. It is always you OR the virus. EITHER/OR. This is in point of 
feet the conflict formula which is seen to be an archetypal virus mechanism” (Burroughs, 1970:202). 
Burroughs’ challenges binary structures with his conceptualisation of in-betweenness: the ‘third 
mind’, which results from cut-up experiments and belongs to neither author nor reader (Burroughs,
1978). Robin Lydenberg indicates that this strategy has ‘mortemal’ implications: “[T]o take the place 
of the mother Burroughs must first displace her. To take on the maternal role is to confuse both sexual 
dualism and family structure, to confound the power structures which limit and rule conventional 
reproduction” (Lydenberg, 1987:168-9). Burroughs, in this way, mortemalises in order to subvert 
oppressive binarisms. (Jamie Russell points out, however, that Burroughs’ deconstructive attack on 
binary structures is limited, as his “understanding of both the sexual body and gender identity is 
always predicated on the assumption that there is a natural and authentic male-masculine body and 
identity” [Russell, 2001: 182-3]).
31 Incidentally, their connection to the Gothic is perhaps also ‘genetic’. Tuberculosis claimed die lives 
of Kawabata’s parents, grandmother and sister, and ravaged MacDonald’s family to the extent that 
they named the disease “the family attendant” (cited in Hindmarsh, 1990: 63). Although in Japan 
death from tuberculosis is associated with unrequited/unexpressed love (Boardman, 1971:95), it has 
an additional symbolic currency relation to the Gothic, where it might be associated with vainpirism. 
(See Joan Gordon and Veronica Hollinger, who describe the vampire as a “natural metaphor for the 
symptoms of tuberculosis” [Gordon and Hollinger, 1997: 6]).
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